

Political Memoirs 2 - Leader Azhari

Articles

In the context of the continuation of the war that broke out between the Sudanese army, led by Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces, led by Lieutenant General Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo, Due to the inability of either party to resolve the war in its known as (Hemedti), on 4/15/2023, and in view of favor so far, this war has become open to all possibilities, especially in light of the ambiguity surrounding the military situation on the ground, as it is not known precisely who controls what, especially in light of the conflict The severity of the statements and statements issued by both sides, and the difficulty of verifying their authenticity based on future sources.

In light of this, the aim of this study is to monitor and anticipate future scenarios for the war between the army and the Rapid Support Forces, especially in light of the failure of both parties' bets on achieving a quick and decisive victory, as it appears that the military data and facts on the ground have not changed B on 4/15/2023 until now. The study will be based on the outbreak of heat much in their approach to the issue on the basis of Conditional scenarios, where the conditions and requirements for the realization of each scenario are monitored and analysed, identifying the most likely scenario(s).

There are several general observations that must be taken into account as a general framework for thinking about the future prospects of the war between the army and the Rapid Support Forces:

First, the war is taking place this time between the two largest military forces in Sudan, which were the And the Rapid Support Forces. Together they constituted the two wings of the military component, as the Rapid Support Forces are legally subordinate to the armed forces, and are subject to the orders of the commander Given the military capabilities and capabilities possessed by each party, this enhances the...and the superior. The possibility of the war continuing for a longer period of time, making its repercussions catastrophic for the state and society.

Secondly, the war is taking place for the first time inside the capital, Khartoum, in its three cities, and some other cities, while the wars that Sudan witnessed in the past took place in the outskirts and rural areas, whether in the south, Darfur, or eastern Sudan. Given that the capital has three cities It is the center of power and governance, where the headquarters of official agencies and authorities are located, the main headquarters of companies and banks, most of the major factories, and the headquarters of diplomatic missions. The outbreak of war inside the populated capital leads to catastrophic results in terms of the numbers of dead and wounded, and the extent of destruction of structures, infrastructure, and property. Public and private, as well as injury

The state is in a state of paralysis, isolated from the outside world in a sense. With the outbreak of war between the army and the Rapid Support Forces, many countries quickly evacuated their diplomatic missions and sponsors from Sudan, and closed their embassies and consulates. In addition, urban wars are usually complex and difficult to resolve.

Third, the experiences of internal wars that Sudan witnessed in the post-independence phase, whether in the South, Darfur, Blue Nile, or South Kordofan, clearly confirm that these wars continued for many years thanks to internal and external factors. For example, and here lies the danger regarding the current war, the war in the south has continued for decades. The army and the Rapid Support Forces, as it can continue for a long period, especially if it expands to other states, and tribal and ethnic forces and armed movements become involved, as well as the intervention of Some external powers, whether regional or international.

Fourthly, regardless of the direct causes of the war between the army and the Rapid Support Forces, this war cannot be understood in isolation from a number of major challenges and problems that Sudan suffered - and is suffering from - in the post-independence phase, most notably: the faltering process of building the national state. In modern times, the post-independence elites failed to build a democratic national state based on the foundations and principles of citizenship, and capable of absorbing societal pluralism, ethnic, tribal, religious, and regional, and transforming it into a source of strength and enrichment, instead of being a source of Conflicts and wars. In this context, it is possible to understand the many internal wars that Sudan witnessed in the post-independence phase, one of which ended with the secession of the south in 2011. Among the Expanding the political role of the army. During the period since Sudan's independence in challenges are also From 1956 until 2023, the military ruled the country for a period exceeding 55 years, which Dedicated to the phenomenon of politicization of the army. In addition to this, there are many divisions among the elites political, and its chronic inability to build a minimum level of national consensus, let alone a depth elite is controlled by the elite Differences and contradictions between the center and the margins or peripheries. Historically, the Nile On the keys to power and wealth, which led to a deepening of the state of political, economic and social marginalization in many regions of Sudan, which contributed to the emergence of armed rebellion movements and fueled civil wars and protracted conflicts.

Fifthly, internal wars usually require external interventions, whether by states or non-state armed actors. Sudan experienced this phenomenon during the wars that broke out in the post-independence period, especially the war in the south. If the ongoing war in support of the Rapid Forces continues for a long time, it is likely that external interventions will occur in favor of this between the army and the forces Currently, one party or the other, according to the agendas and interests of the intervening parties, which fuels the continuation of the war.

Taking the previous observations into account, there are several scenarios for the future of the war between... And with

The army and the Rapid Support Forces. The first is to resolve the war in favor of one of the parties. Secondly, both parties accept a permanent ceasefire and engage in negotiations leading to a political solution. Third, the war continues intermittently over the short term. Fourth, the slide into a comprehensive civil war.

The study addresses each of these scenarios in some detail.

First scenario: The war is resolved in favor of one of the parties

This scenario seems unlikely, as no party has been able to achieve a decisive victory so far. It does not seem that either of them has the ability to achieve this in the foreseeable future. And the reason

The main reason behind this is the nature and specificity of the balance of power between the two sides of the war, which enables them to continue fighting for a longer period. If the army possesses superiority in terms of air force, artillery, and other heavy weapons, then the Rapid Support Forces possess the ability to maneuver and speed in the first place.

Movement based on light and medium weapons. The theater of operations is also represented in the capital, Khartoum, with its three cities, and the Darfur region, it makes the ability to end the war in favor of this or that party more difficult and complex.

Although it is difficult to imagine the ability of the Rapid Support Forces to defeat the army, the latter cannot easily resolve the confrontation in its favor, as fighting within cities restricts its ability to use its heavy weapons on a large scale. Therefore, some field observers emphasized that the equation of war in Sudan has become based on the army's control of the airspace and the Rapid Support Forces' control of the ground, as the army uses airpower to bomb the headquarters and gatherings of the Rapid Support Forces, while the latter spreads within populated neighborhoods and practices hit-and-run. Therefore, the confrontation between the two sides appears to be close to a mobile war within cities and residential neighborhoods [\[1\]](#).

Also, the occurrence of a major split within the Rapid Support Forces in a way that is in the interest of the army and enables it to resolve the confrontation in its favor is unlikely, given the tribal structure of these forces on the one hand, and the loyalty of its members to Hemedti on the other hand. But even assuming that the army is able, during a certain period of time, to impose some kind of control on the capital, Khartoum, this does not mean the end of the war, as the Rapid Support Forces can continue a guerrilla war inside the capital through small groups, as well as opening other fronts for confrontation with...

The army, especially in the Darfur region, where the tribes to which many members of the Rapid Support Forces belong are based. The region has already witnessed - and is witnessing - confrontations between the army and the Rapid Support Forces, resulting in hundreds of deaths and injuries, in addition to the displacement of thousands.

In addition to the above, the ethnic and tribal composition of the Darfur region, and the legacy of the bloody conflict it has witnessed for years, make it a suitable environment for the continuation of a state of war, which will not be limited to the army and the Rapid Support Forces only, but will involve tribal and ethnic forces, and this is what actually happened between the two tribes. The Masalit people of African origin and some Arab tribes in West Darfur. The confrontations in the region brought to mind the Darfur War that broke out in 2003, and its disastrous repercussions [2].

The second scenario: Both parties accept a permanent ceasefire and enter into negotiations leading to a political solution

This scenario is also considered unlikely, due to the lack of conditions for its realization on the ground Reality, foremost among which is the conviction of both parties of the difficulty of victory in this confrontation, and therefore there is no alternative but negotiation, and the presence of real international pressure forcing them to stop the fighting and accept serious negotiations to end the war. In addition, there are other factors that make this scenario unlikely, including: the two sides have gone into the confrontation, exchanging sharp accusations, and the war between them has become a zero-sum match. Each party is at least trying to achieve a tangible military achievement that will strengthen its negotiating position in the event that it is forced to negotiate to end the war.

What indicates the weakness of the possibility of this scenario is the failure of both parties to adhere to the numerous truce agreements they agreed to, as each party began to accuse the other of violating these truces, which confirms their unwillingness to enter into serious political negotiations that would put an end to the war, as the war has become, in their view, tantamount to A fateful struggle. The army's inability to resolve the war in its favor puts its role and status at stake. The defeat of the Rapid Support Forces also means its end.

Within the framework of Saudi-American mediation, which was accompanied by an American threat to impose sanctions on individuals responsible for threatening security and stability in Sudan, the army and the Rapid Support Forces accepted negotiations in the Saudi city of Jeddah. The results of these negotiations, which began on 5/6/2023, revealed the lack of seriousness between the two parties in reaching a political solution that would put an end to the war. On 5/11/2023, the negotiating delegations of the two parties signed the "Jeddah Declaration", which is merely a declaration of principles, which stipulated the following: "We, the undersigned, the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, confirm, through this declaration, our basic obligations under international law." "[3] . Under the Jeddah Declaration, both parties commit to ensuring the protection of civilians at all times, including allowing them safe passage to leave areas of active hostilities on a voluntary basis in the direction of their choice, and to refrain from any attack that is expected to occur.

It causes incidental civilian damage, and the obligation to evacuate, refrain from taking over, respect and protect all private and public facilities such as medical facilities, hospitals, water and electricity facilities, refrain from using them for military purposes, and allow the rapid passage of humanitarian aid without any obstacles. The declaration prohibits both parties from recruiting children, arbitrarily detaining civilians, and all forms of torture[4].

Despite the importance of the principles contained in the Jeddah Declaration, it did not include the two parties agreeing to a humanitarian truce or a temporary ceasefire in order to implement these principles. After a second round of negotiations between representatives of the army and the Rapid Support Forces, the two countries sponsoring the negotiations announced in a joint statement issued on 5/20/2022 the signing of a short-term ceasefire agreement between the army and the Rapid Support Forces, to enter into force 48 hours after the start of the negotiations. The signature lasts for seven days, and can be extended for another period with the approval of both parties.

Although both the army and the Rapid Support Forces announced their commitment to the short-term ceasefire agreement, it remained a partial commitment, resulting in a state of relative calm.

Because both parties continue to violate it. This was confirmed by the two countries sponsoring the Jeddah negotiations, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States of America, in a joint statement issued on 5/27/2023, where the statement indicated that "both parties to the conflict informed Riyadh and Washington of their commitment to facilitating that, humanitarian assistance and restoring basic services for the benefit of the Sudanese people." Bans hampered those efforts.

Realizing that the current ceasefire has not been fully observed, the Sudanese Armed Forces have considered acts committed by the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces. "Both parties agree to extend it, even if it is not fully adhered to, to provide more time for humanitarian actors to carry out this vital work" [5]. Against this background, the army and the Rapid Support Forces agreed to extend the short-term ceasefire, which ends on the evening of Monday, 5/29/2023, for another 5 days. However, ceasefire violations continued[6].

Before the end of the five-day period, several important developments occurred related to the course of the war. On May 31, 2023, the Sudanese army announced the suspension of its participation in the Jeddah talks, under the pretext of the Rapid Support Forces' lack of commitment to implementing the requirements of the "Jeddah Declaration." In this context, the official spokesman for the Sudanese Armed Forces, Brigadier General Nabil Abdullah, stressed that the armed forces are ready to implement their constitutional and national commitment to eliminate the rebellion and secure the homeland and the citizen, and this will happen in the coming days [7] .

Al-Burhan had anticipated this decision with striking statements he made in his second appearance since the beginning of the war, during his inspection of some army forces sites, in which he stressed that "the armed forces have not yet used their full lethal force so as not to destroy the country, but if the enemy (the support forces) does not comply... (or respond), we will be forced to use our maximum force... and the armed forces will remain

It is ready to fight until victory, and that it completely controls all military sites in Sudan, and that the rebels will not be able to take control of this country, and that victory is inevitably near" [8]. This statement reveals an aspect of the complexities of the war in Sudan, as the goal of A quick victory on the part of the army has become far-fetched. Many also wondered about the lethal force that the Sudanese army has not used yet, especially since it has already used air force and artillery. According to these statements, the expansion of the use of heavy weapons by the army means more destruction in the capital.

Following the army's suspension of its participation in the Jeddah talks, the two countries sponsoring the talks, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States of America, announced in a joint statement issued on 6/1/2023 the suspension of the Jeddah talks between the army and the Rapid Support Forces due to repeated serious violations of the ceasefire by both parties. . The statement considered that both sides of the conflict "claim to represent the interests of the Sudanese people, but their actions have increased the suffering of the Sudanese and endangered national unity and regional stability." In their joint statement, the two countries affirmed their readiness to resume talks as soon as both parties implement the necessary steps to build confidence. Thus, this statement condemns the two warring parties and holds them both responsible for the continuation of the war War[9].

These developments led to the United States of America imposing, on 6/1/2023, sanctions on both the army and the Rapid Support Forces, with the aim of holding accountable those responsible for undermining security, peace and stability in Sudan as a result of repeated violations of the ceasefire agreement. These sanctions included imposing restrictions on granting entry visas to specific people, including officials from the armed forces, the Rapid Support Forces, and leaders from the regime of former President Omar al-Bashir, as well as economic sanctions that included - according to the US Treasury Department's website - two companies affiliated with the Rapid Support Forces, and two affiliated companies. For the armed forces[10].

Whatever the case, the US sanctions on Sudan represent a type of pressure it is exerting

Washington approached both sides of the war with the aim of forcing them to enter into serious negotiations in order to reach To reach a solution a permanent ceasefire agreement with a commitment to implement its provisions in preparation for this.

Political conflict. Despite this, there are those who believe that these sanctions may not achieve the intended goal, in light of the long experience of Sudan and other countries with US sanctions. Although Washington imposed sanctions on the Bashir regime since the mid-1990s, these sanctions did not undermine the regime. Economic sanctions may also weaken the army and the Rapid Support Forces to varying degrees, but they may be able to circumvent them in various ways, as the Bashir regime did. Although the imposition of more sanctions on the two warring parties by the United States of America may push them to accept temporary truces to deliver humanitarian aid to those in need, this does not address the roots of the conflict, as it requires entering into serious negotiations, leading to a comprehensive ceasefire.

Fire paves the way for reaching a comprehensive political settlement that puts an end to the war, includes a road map to address its effects, and achieves a transition to democratic civilian rule [11]. Without this, it is likely that the current war will turn into a long and protracted conflict that may lead to the disintegration of the Sudanese state.

Despite the suspension of the Jeddah talks, and the escalation of battles between the army and the Rapid Support Forces, the negotiating delegations of both parties remained in Jeddah and engaged in indirect talks with the encouragement of the two countries sponsoring the negotiations. On 6/9/2023, the two countries announced that the negotiating delegations of the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces had reached a ceasefire agreement throughout the country for a period of 24 hours, starting at six (Khartoum time) in the morning of every Saturday, corresponding to 6/10/2023. According to the agreement, “the new truce will be under strict supervision. For both parties to adhere to this truce, the two facilitators will be forced to adhere to the intentions of the two parties... and in the event that they do not

Talks [12] due to the short period of time for this truce, it is not expected exam. Given the postponement of the Jeddah Talks [12] due to the short period of time for this truce, it is not expected exam. Given the postponement of the Jeddah Talks [12] due to the short period of time for this truce, it is not expected exam.

To have tangible effects on the course of the war, especially since the armed confrontations between the two parties were taking place on the eve of the armistice in the strategic military zone in the south of the capital, Khartoum, which includes the Armored Corps Command and the Yarmouk Defense Industries Complex, which is considered the most prominent military manufacturing facility in Sudan. Hence, control of facilities for the two warring parties. So once it ends It is an important goal for military industrialization In the truce, confrontations resumed between the two parties [13].

Thus, the Jeddah negotiations, and the results they have yielded so far, revealed the existence of a wide gap between the army and the Rapid Support Forces, and their unwillingness to make real concessions, especially since Al-Burhan had anticipated the negotiations by emphasizing that their goal was to stop the fighting only, and that there was no room to talk about any Political action during this stage. He considered that the withdrawal of the Rapid Support Forces from residential and service areas is the correct basis for a ceasefire, and without that, there is no point in any negotiation, as he put it [14]. However, it is inconceivable that the Rapid Support Forces will leave residential areas within the capital and its three cities, as this provides them with combat advantages against the army, especially since their members are trained in urban warfare.

The army's insistence on removing the Rapid Support Forces from the cities is also being viewed by the Rapid Support Command as a violation of the ceasefire. Heavy weapons. Added to this is a plan by the army to target it outside the cities using heavy weapons. In addition, the multiplicity and overlap of points and areas of armed confrontation between the two parties in the capital and its three cities makes it difficult to implement a mechanism that ensures effective monitoring of the ceasefire.

But even assuming that a longer-term ceasefire is reached at a later stage, the main goal will likely be to address humanitarian issues and situations. Therefore, fundamental issues will remain unresolved, such as the rapid evacuation of cities, especially after they fought a war against the army, and the location of cities.

Armed forces, and the future of the support forces, the framework agreement regarding any arrangements for a political solution after a ceasefire, as Hemedti emphasizes the

It is necessary to return to the framework agreement, while Al-Burhan sees the necessity of formulating a new agreement, as the old agreement consolidates the status of the Rapid Support Forces as one of the regular agencies, while Al-Burhan dissolved it after It is a rebellious force. The old agreement also does not include some political forces the outbreak of the war, considering And armed movements, which is something the army emphasizes the need to address in a new agreement [15].

Third scenario: The war continues intermittently during the short term

This scenario is considered the most likely in the short term, especially in light of the continued absence The factors that force the two parties to accept a permanent ceasefire and enter into serious negotiations to reach a comprehensive political solution, as well as the inability of either of them to achieve a decisive victory. Accordingly, it puts an end to the war. In this scenario, the war will remain largely confined to... The army and the Rapid Support Forces, and that they will remain primarily stationed in the capital with its three cities, and a number of other cities, especially in the Darfur region [16].

Violence is less intense, especially in the event of exhaustion. Under this scenario, it is likely that the forces of both parties will become exhausted, and the resources and capabilities necessary for war will diminish for each of them. It is also not unlikely that external parties will intervene to provide military support to this or that party, according to their priorities and interests, which will fuel the continuation of the war. But in a country like Sudan, with its complex composition and the presence of a number of armed movements on its territory, tribal, ethnic, and regional, it is unlikely that the war will remain confined between the army and the Rapid Support Forces, and centered in the capital with its three cities, as it could descend into the worst or worst-case scenario. Rather catastrophic, a scenario of all-out civil war.

Fourth scenario: sliding into a comprehensive civil war

If the armed confrontations between the army and the Rapid Support Forces continue for a relatively long period, then... It could turn into a comprehensive civil war, especially in light of the depth of the vertical divisions in Sudanese society on the one hand, and the legacy of the extended civil wars that the country witnessed in the post-independence phase, the repercussions of which are still continuing to this day, on the other hand. This scenario is based on several elements, including: the absence of a central civilian authority, as there has been no government in Sudan since the coup led by Al-Burhan against the civilian component of the transitional authority, represented by In the government of Abdullah Hamdok on 10/25/2021, the Transitional Sovereignty Council was preoccupied with the war with the Rapid Support Forces, in addition to the fracture of the state's apparatuses and institutions due to the state of war, and what It results in chaos and insecurity.

This scenario also involves transferring the confrontations between the army and the Rapid Support Forces to other states and cities, and the intervention of tribal and ethnic forces, armed militias, and political organizations to support this or that party. The state of security chaos may push tribal and ethnic forces to engage in armed confrontations, similar to what happened in the Darfur region. In addition, the rebellious movements

Armed forces, many of which were expected to be integrated into the Sudanese army, may become active again. Some of them may be able to impose their control on some areas of Sudan, especially since the two forces that were cooperating to confront these movements (the army and the Rapid Support Forces) have turned into arch enemies and engaged in a war of attrition, which is likely to be long.

In addition to the above, the expansion of the scope of the war will allow external powers to intervene by supporting this or that party according to their interests and agendas, which will fuel the continuation of the war.

The history of civil wars in Sudan, Somalia, Lebanon, Libya, Yemen, and Syria is the best witness to [this \[17\]](#). It is known that parties involved in civil wars usually search for military and economic support from external parties, in order to enhance their ability to confront opponents and continue the war. The Sudanese wars also follow a horrific pattern

This war will happen to him. It begins with confrontations. Day after familiar day, the fate that has come becomes clear

. As it turns out It is fierce, and each party pledges a quick and decisive victory. This never happens

Before, it is difficult to reach and maintain a ceasefire. Both parties do not want to be in a critical situation, or if

"His ally" [18]. Stop believing that victory will occur

As for Sudan, it will lead to a state of chaos that may lead to...

This scenario is disastrous

The state is fractured and torn apart, similar to what happened in Somalia, Libya, and Yemen, where there is no central authority, and parts of the state's territory become under the control of militias and armed movements. This scenario will also result in an aggravation of the humanitarian situation due to the extent of destruction and devastation

in the infrastructure, which will result in an escalation of mass displacement and forced displacement, and perhaps massacres on ethnic lines, as well as turning the country into an arena for regional polarization.

and international [19]. This situation will also have serious negative repercussions at the regional level, especially in Sudan's neighboring countries. These meanings were expressed by former Sudanese Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok by saying: "If Sudan were to reach the point of real civil war, Syria, Yemen, and Libya would be just small duels"[20].

Conclusion

The data and developments of the war that broke out between the army and the Rapid Support Forces on April 15, 2023 suggest the possibility of this war continuing for a long period of time, and it may turn into a war that includes other states, and tribal forces became involved in it. Comprehensive eligibility if geographically expanded Ethnic and armed movements, and external parties, regional and international, intervened in them according to their agendas and interests. Thus, it will bring to mind the legacy of internal wars in Sudan, which continued for years and perhaps decades. This scenario will have catastrophic repercussions, not only on the state and society in Sudan, but also at the regional level. The disintegration of the Sudanese state, the absence of central authority, the militarization of society, and the expansion of armed non-state actors, all of this

And others will have an impact on Sudan's neighboring countries, especially since most of them suffer from fragile internal conditions.

Can this catastrophic scenario be avoided? This is the real challenge.

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Articles

Sudan is facing a stifling crisis reinforced by the state of political impasse, which was exacerbated by the outbreak of armed clashes on April 15, 2023, in a number of Sudanese states and cities between the armed forces led by Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces led by Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), amid the failure of... In containing the conflict despite regional and international movements to find a way out of the crisis in the country.

Developments in the operational scene in the Sudanese arena reveal the insistence of both sides of the conflict and ignoring the calls of the international community to stop the raging fighting in the country. On his decision, Askar Hoping to begin negotiations on a final settlement of the conflict, which reinforces my fears Countries directly neighboring Sudan from the continuation of the conflict that threatens the stability of the region as a whole.

Features of the current Sudanese scene

The general context in Sudan is characterized by greater complexity, a feature that has accompanied the Sudanese to the outbreak of the current military conflict in scene since the overthrow of the Ingaz regime in April 2019 The country. The most prominent features of the current scene in Sudan can be noted as follows:

1- A battle for influence between two opposing projects : two projects led by Al-Burhan and Hemedti "Rasin" after the fall of Even Sudan is seen as having a transitional government system The rescue regime in 2019 and the start of the transitional phase, which led to the outbreak of a political conflict that quickly turned into a military clash between the two most influential parties inside Sudan during the last four years.

Each party aspires to overthrow the other party with the aim of imposing its vision on the Sudanese scene and shaping its future in preparation for seizing power in the country after the end of the current transitional phase.

In light of the difficulty of the two projects meeting in a common space for dialogue, at least in the foreseeable future, the military confrontation is likely to continue until one side of the conflict excludes the other from the conflict. The entire political scene.

2- Continuing armed clashes : Since their outbreak in the capital, Khartoum, the armed confrontations between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces have focused on a number of strategic sites, such as airports and some sovereign headquarters, in an attempt to control them in order to assert qualitative superiority at the expense of the other party. The confrontations quickly expanded to a number of Sudanese states and cities, in an expected escalation of the conflict.

[\[1\]](#)

This caused the death of about 387 people and the injury of 1,928 others, according to statements by the Sudanese Doctors Syndicate. Despite the attempts of the international community to reach humanitarian truces between the two sides of the conflict since its beginning, fighting continued between the warring forces in some Sudanese regions such as Khartoum, Omdurman and Darfur, amid mutual accusations by both parties of violating the truce.

3- Information War : It is a battle parallel to the military conflict taking place in the country, through which both parties to the conflict, especially the Rapid Support, attempt to hide the truth about developments in the operational theater with the aim of A of exercising more misleading Sudanese public opinion and neutralizing the international community out of fear. Pressure on both sides of the conflict, in addition to weakening the morale of Sudanese soldiers in preparation for their possible withdrawal and the final resolution of the conflict.

On the other hand, the Sudanese army paid attention to the Rapid Support Forces' efforts to distort its image at the local and international levels by spreading misleading information, and launched a counter-campaign by issuing several successive statements to deny the allegations made by the Rapid Support Forces regarding developments in the conflict on the ground and to reassure Sudanese public opinion out of fear. It undermines confidence and instills fear in people. Citizens.

4- The absence of political forces from the scene : Both sides of the Sudanese conflict continue to ignore repeated calls by most Sudanese political forces and parties to stop the fighting immediately and begin This led to the internationalization of the conflict [\[3\]](#) In a negotiation process to end and settle the conflict Internal attempts at containment, as the weight of these forces is diminishing at the present moment as they are encroaching in the midst of developments in the current military conflict. The future may be affected. The less powerful party The political and civil forces in the Sudanese political scene during the next stage and what the current conflict will lead to.

5- The continuation of evacuations of foreign nationals : This is an important indicator that reflects the scale of developments at the level of the field theater in the combat zones. It also portends an escalation of armed clashes between the two sides of the conflict in the near term. A number of countries have announced the evacuation of their nationals from Sudan during the past few days, such as the United States of America, China, France, Britain, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Turkey, Japan, Spain, Greece, Libya, Jordan, South Africa, Kenya, and others.

6- Deterioration of the health system : The conflict caused dozens of victims and hundreds of injuries, 71% of them are hospitals, which stopped about which put pressure on Sudanese unable to work in combat zones, according to statements by the Sudanese Doctors Syndicate, due to the lack of medicines and medical aid, which threatens the collapse of the health system in the country, and its repercussions on community security there.

Accounts of Al-Burhan and Hemedti in the conflict

The tactics and policies of both parties since the outbreak of armed clashes in the country reflect the transformation of the conflict into a zero-sum game ^[4] that may prolong its duration during the coming period. Each party has its own strategic calculations in this ongoing conflict in the country. On the one hand, the Sudanese army G him inside, realizes the necessity of monopolizing the military force, and not allowing the presence of a large army In favor of the Sudanese army, it gives it more legitimacy and influence The conflict was resolved by military means inside Sudan.

Therefore, the army is strengthening its efforts in the midst of this conflict to strip the political legitimacy on which the Rapid Support Forces rely to legitimize its presence in Sudanese reality, and to push towards its dismantling or at least forcing it to integrate into the Sudanese Armed Forces on the latter's terms, which may result in the exclusion of Hemedti from the scene. The entire political process during the next stage, in addition to eliminating the regional and international incubators supporting its forces, in addition to protecting Sudan from the dilemma of regional and international alignment and becoming an open arena for tensions between countries, while at the same time supporting the political ambition of the institution aspiring to play a regional role in the region. The Sudanese military has requested that it present a candidate whose chances of winning the upcoming presidential elections in the country will be enhanced.

On the other hand, Hemedti is strongly seeking to confirm the legitimacy of him and his forces as a difficult figure in the political and military equations inside Sudan, in the context of the growing political ambition of the Rapid Support Commander, perhaps to lead the country in the future after the end of the transitional phase, which is What prompted him to justify his involvement in this conflict with his claims about defending democracy, protecting the democratic transition in the country, and the transfer of power to civilians. Hemedti is also well aware that strengthening his military power and balancing it with the Sudanese army will serve his future ambitions in the Sudanese scene.

Therefore, Hemedti is trying to shake the confidence of a large segment of citizens in the armed forces, and to turn public opinion against its leaders in light of more accusations against them of belonging to the former regime and targeting civilians in aerial bombardment, taking advantage of the media mechanism possessed by the Rapid Support Forces. Since the beginning of the conflict, which indicates the possibility of using a network of experts in the media field to manage the battle through the media and social media at the local and international levels. Even if the conflict is not resolved, the international community may press for negotiation between two parties

The conflict, which may represent an opportunity for Hemedti to bargain for his stay in the political scene without making major concessions, and to obtain guarantees regarding the future of his forces and his future during the next stage.

Accounts of neighboring countries in the conflict

Sudan's neighboring countries have their strategic calculations regarding the escalation of the military conflict and the possibility of it extending beyond the Sudanese borders, threatening regional security and stability, especially since Sudan is of growing strategic importance thanks to its geographical location, which makes it a strategic point of contact between the East African region - including the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. - And the Sahel and Central Africa regions, where Sudan is in contact with five countries in sub-Saharan Africa: Eritrea, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Central Africa, and Chad. These countries' calculations towards the Sudanese conflict can be referred to as follows:

1- South Sudan : It is considered the most affected by the continuation of the conflict inside Sudan, especially as it threatens about 800,000 refugees from South Sudan who are stationed in Sudanese territory to return again to Juba, which represents increasing pressure on them in light of the weakness of the infrastructure and the increasing

Poverty rates and the fragility of the political and security conditions there. Juba fears the expansion of the conflict to reach the border between it and Khartoum, which may witness the infiltration of some armed elements into the southern territories to escape the fighting, which may further destabilize.

The continuation of the conflict also negatively affects the oil industry, as it hinders the process of transporting oil from... Oh - which exacerbates South to Port Sudan, eastern Sudan - 170 thousand barrels per day the economic and financial losses for both countries. While South Sudan's fears are increasing about the future of the fragile peace agreement concluded in 2018, especially since Sudan is one of the guarantors of this agreement, which pushes it towards bringing the views of the warring parties in Khartoum closer in hopes of a ceasefire and beginning to settle the conflict.

2- Ethiopia : Addis Ababa fears increasing activity of armed movements on the border with Sudan in the event of an expansion of the conflict in the country. It also fears the possibility of the presence of the Wagner militia in Sudan during the coming period, as it does not accept the presence of more international powers in its immediate neighborhood because of the threat they pose to its stability and Ethiopian influence in the region. Addis Ababa is also increasingly concerned about the return of Ethiopian refugees who were displaced to Sudan in the midst of the recent Ethiopian war to their country again, which represents pressure on the Ethiopian federal government and may exacerbate conflicts.

And ethnic conflicts in some Ethiopian regions.

The Sudanese conflict affects the vital roads leading to Ethiopia, especially as it relies heavily on the port of Port Sudan for trade with the outside world via the Red Sea.

Ethiopia may view the conflict in Sudan as a new starting point for regional influence in East Africa, through its efforts to play a role in mediation in the hope of stopping the fighting between the two sides.

The conflict, which Addis Ababa may use to disengage between Sudan and Egypt regarding the Ethiopian dam file during the coming period, in addition to easing the severity of the Sudanese position towards the disputed Fashqa region crisis between the two countries and reaching friendly understandings regarding it.

3- Eritrea : Eritrean concern is increasing about the possibility of the return of more than 234,000 Eritrean refugees from Sudan as a result of the worsening conflict there. Asmara fears the threats of armed movements - which may be active due to the Sudanese conflict - to the Eritrean interior. Some Eritrean elements may become involved in the conflict - if the situation worsens in the next stage - in fighting alongside one of the warring parties, especially the Rapid Support, in an attempt by Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki to enhance his influence in the settlement equation.

It is inside Sudan to become part of the conflict in
the future.

4- Chad : It is also more vulnerable to risks, especially since it shares more than 1,400 kilometers of borders with Sudan, which reinforces fears of more rebels infiltrating Chadian territory, and the possibility of some Chadian rebel movements joining the conflict in Sudan for the benefit of one of them. Its outskirts, which may form the nucleus of future rebel groups to threaten the Chadian state. N'Djamena fears the possibility of a decline in rapid support to the Darfur region, and the security repercussions it could impose that threaten the security and stability of the Chadian side, which also fears the dangers of the Russian Wagner security group getting involved in the conflict, making it on the outskirts of the Chadian border from three sides: Libya, Sudan, and Central Africa. In addition to growing concern about the possibility of establishing cooperative relations between Wagner and some Chadian armed movements active in the region.

The Sudanese conflict also hinders the Chadian state from benefiting from Sudanese ports, especially the port of Port Sudan, which may constitute an economic crisis for Chad as it is a country landlocked in the Sahel. Meanwhile, Chadian fears are increasing about the conflict spreading to its borders in areas receiving refugees, especially since Chad has so far received more than 20,000 Sudanese refugees, which may increase economic and security pressures on the N'Djamena government during the coming period.

5- Central Africa : Fears the exodus of large numbers of Sudanese refugees into the country, and the pressure it poses on the weak infrastructure and the national economy. In addition to the fear of the activity of many armed movements on the border between the two countries, and the possibility of some of them getting involved in the Sudanese conflict, which may exacerbate with the security situation there in addition to tense relations with Khartoum. On the other hand, Wagner's involvement in the conflict and its deployment in Sudan may represent a message of reassurance to the ruling regime in Bangui, which is using Wagner's forces to confront the rebel armed movements in the country and secure the ruling elite there.

6- The Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) : The Authority presented an initiative on April 27, 2023, in an attempt to find a way out of the Sudanese crisis, and within the framework of working on the principle of African solutions to African crises adopted by the African Union. The initiative included two basic proposals regarding extending the humanitarian truce for a period of an additional 72 hours in the country with the aim of continuing evacuations of foreign nationals in the country and continuing efforts for a ceasefire, in addition to sending representatives of the Sudanese army and rapid support to South Sudan for negotiations.

O Sudan (the ruling Transitional Sovereignty Council) and enjoy The Ejad Initiative - which you are currently chairing - aims to... In which Ethiopia has a strong influence - to strengthen its presence in the Sudanese arena in an attempt to bring the views of the two sides of the conflict closer together in preparation for reaching a ceasefire agreement soon, especially after What is happening is an internal Sudanese matter that can be resolved through organizations. The UN Security Council recognized that what is regional, which closes the scope for international intervention - at least at the current stage - and expands the scope for the African regional parties to contain the conflict and its parties in the hope of finding Therefore, one of the problems facing the initiative is a comprehensive settlement in the near term. Despite the ambiguity of its possible paths, will it be limited to consensus on extending the humanitarian truce or will it actually have a role in reaching a political settlement?

Potential risks

The continuation of the current military conflict in Sudan may undermine the gains of the transitional phase that followed the fall of the rescue regime in April 2019, which will return the Sudanese state to square one, and threaten its future with more tension and political and security unrest, in a way that exacerbates the regional fears of neighboring countries about the expansion of the conflict and the threat to their security and stability. short term.

In light of the expansion of the conflict and the insistence of both sides to continue fighting until the battle is resolved, Oh, it may be difficult for there to be room for any mediation by the international community in this regard Askar

The foreseeable future, unless the major powers threaten to apply deterrent sanctions - within a short time frame - on the two warring parties to force them to comply with regional and international calls to end the fighting immediately.

The current moment's data is like a regional time bomb, especially

Overall, Sudan is in good condition

Within a regional belt rigged with crises and conflicts, which may make...

It is located geographically

The continuation and aggravation of the conflict is a pivotal point in Sudan's transformation into a regional hotspot for attracting more armed movements and terrorist organizations active in geographically neighboring regions such as the Sahel region and Libya. Which in turn threatens the regional security of the immediate neighboring countries.

[1]. What to Watch for as Violence in Sudan Escalates, RANE, 21 April 2023, available at: <https://bit.ly/41Vm4zh>

[2]. Alind Chauhan, Why Sudan's latest conflict has led to concern among so many countries across the world, 24 April 2023, available at: <https://bit.ly/41vsCop>

[3]. Michelle Gavin, Sudan in Crisis, Council on Foreign Relations, 20 April 2023, available at: <https://on.cfr.org/3oHfsGi>

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Events in Sudan are accelerating towards the worst, the fierce fighting that broke out on the morning of Saturday the 15th

This April (2023), between the forces of what is known as the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese army forces, which are According to what is prevailing in Sudanese circles, Sudan and its people are put in place known as the military component according to

It targeted the gradual transformation towards a form of civil rule at a crossroads and the political process that followed dangerous. Fighting and open-ended military confrontations are in themselves an indicator of serious danger.

The dismantling of national armies using local or foreign tools, or a combination of both, has become known and witnessed in the past

The plans of international powers and their regional allies to deepen divisions in the targeted countries, for the purpose of sustainable control over them and their destinies, in the service of strategic plans with implications related to the conflict at the top of the international system.

Sudan, with its African and Arab location, represents an attractive focus for such grand conflict plans, which can only be repelled by a cohesive and solid society, united by all its civil and military components, accompanied by a political system that protects the rights of all those components, under the roof of the law and constitution accepted by all. A defect in any of these two complementary conditions, content and behaviour, could lead to...

To undesirable consequences, which is what Sudan faces at this sad moment, as it fights

The Sudanese with his Sudanese brother, in light of justifications and reasons that have nothing to do with the interest of the country and the people, and are dominated by personal ambitions, which hindered all the efforts made during the months.

Despite the past, Sudan is at the beginning of a political process that is supposed to herald some hope

Among some of the gaps that had to be addressed step by step, so that all Sudanese components could be integrated into making the future of their country.

The stated reasons for the Rapid Support Forces, led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, Vice President of the Sovereignty Council, beginning the process of controlling strategic military facilities, including military airports, government headquarters, radio and television, and civilian airports, and closing the roads leading to the capital, Khartoum, and major cities, do not seem convincing. The plan for the simultaneous movement of the support forces in more than one direction and more than one city, since the night of Wednesday, April 12, reveals prior planning and is not described as an army "assault" on some rapid support headquarters.

Just reacting to what

The justification that the support forces' propaganda tried to highlight, with the aim of showing the legitimacy of defending those headquarters and punishing the army forces and its leaders.

This apparent and propaganda justification does not hide that there are deep disagreements between the commander of the support forces and the leadership of the armed forces regarding the process of integrating the support forces into the general structure of the armed forces, as a necessary condition for the unity of the military component and its submission to the law, constitution, and customs applicable in any country where normal conditions prevail. It is known that this disagreement is based on the nature of its support forces

A special situation, both in terms of its origins dating back to 2003 as an armed group practicing guerrilla warfare known as the "Janjaweed," and the major services it provided to the regime of ousted President Al-Bashir in crushing the rebellion of the non-Arab people of Darfur in protest against their marginalization by

Al-Bashir and his regime, which prompted Al-Bashir to reward the leader of the Janjaweed and his forces by giving them special legal legitimacy, which facilitated their presence in the political and security scene without limits, as they ~~place~~ abide by the controls in It regulates the work of the armed forces, has freedom of movement, and has large headquarters spread throughout Sudan without any oversight. It is an independence that exempts it from being subject to the laws, unlike the regular forces. Many questions are raised about the sources of its armament and financing, which are shrouded in mystery and hearsay, especially regarding Dagalo and his family's control over the mines. Gold in Darfur.

It is likely that the process of integration into the regular forces, which is an important and main component of any political process that moves Sudan to constitutional civil rule, caused great sensitivity among the members of those forces, Takes off especially among their senior leaders, who view regular integration as a method.

They enjoy, especially the direct, hidden and apparent influence on them, all the privileges that the general political system We are used to it, too in Sudan as a whole, and places on them restrictions and responsibilities that they do not have. Their overwhelming presence in the Sudanese economy, especially gold mines, which represents a major factor in In the great wealth of the Rapid Support Command, despite the complex conditions of the Sudanese economy as a whole.

It is true here that the apparent disagreement lies in Dagalo's refusal to lead Lieutenant General Al-Burhan to lead the armed forces in the transitional phase that was agreed upon in the framework agreement that was supposed to be signed on April 6, as Dagalo demanded that the leadership of the armed forces be grafted into the Rapid Support Forces, which will gradually be minister, which I rejected integrated. , for a civilian person as prime With Criticism of the Sudanese Army for Rapid Support as elements Along with an members of the armed forces, side by side undisciplined military force, and its integration will raise many problems of discipline and loyalty within the general structure of the Sudanese army, especially since the support forces include non-Sudanese elements and from neighboring countries, which will place major burdens on the army in the next stage.

Reasons closely related to personal ambitions, economic wealth, and escaping from the aforementioned rules explain the outbreak of Legal discipline among rapid support leaders, and objectivity

The extent of the evasion with which the Rapid Support Forces tried to justify their move to fight, as the illegal military action revealed, as it aims to liberate Sudan from the alleged "Egyptian occupation." Perhaps this gives legitimacy and popular support to its move to control Sudan and its people, and subjugate...

The Sudanese Armed Forces for their objectives. This reflects the psychological and intellectual makeup of those who played unprecedented role in inciting hatred among the general public The forces are closely linked to the Bashir regime, which the Sudanese people towards Egypt and the Egyptians, to which official and popular Egypt responds by embracing thousands of Sudanese who came to it to escape the deteriorating conditions in their country, and prefer Residence and living in Egypt, where they are treated comfortably as Egyptians are treated in everything.

It is known that Egypt is keen to cooperate with all Arab armies, and to conduct joint exercises according to announced programs, aiming to enhance military and security cooperation based on the vision of

A solid Arabism that aims to protect Arab national security, establish stability in the regional environment as a whole, and confront smuggling gangs, organized crime, and armed religious extremist groups. The presence of limited Egyptian forces at Sudan's Meroe Airport is part of the announced joint training plans with the Sudanese Armed Forces, and any falsification of these facts is a rebuke to its publisher, and exposes its malicious goals and goals in serving the forces aspiring to harm the common Sudanese and Egyptian interests. There is no doubt in the minds of any Egyptian and Sudanese patriot for common security.

My objective is that the Egyptian forces and their sister Sudanese forces remain a shield

This tragic fighting, which Dagalo announced, would continue for days until victory over the forces Armed forces for his country, and that he brings goodness to the people and will lead to democratic transformation, and rejecting any mediations for the sake of calm and later negotiation, actually raises many doubts about The future, especially the political process and the Quartet, UN and African mediations, and how they did not take into account these harmful sensitivities and ambitions, and imagined that the self-propulsion force of the framework agreement could overcome all these deep problems, and that the exclusion of some Sudanese components that had reservations about important parts of the framework agreement, It does not cause obstacles that should have been dealt with more seriously to make the political process inclusive and non-discriminatory, before rushing into incomplete steps.

On the one hand, it is inconceivable that a force of no more than 100,000 irregular fighters, with no more experience and no more than armed weaponsGuerrilla wars, the practice of violations against citizens, and the creation of crises, are mild, to be able to extend their control over regular forces with greater armament and greater combat, administrative, and communications experience. They can then extend control over a country as diverse and geographically large in size as Sudan, and impose a political system that reflects the whims of its leaders. It is likely that the fighting will happen Rejecting any mediation will actually last for several days, if not several weeks, and will lead to the destruction of the RSF's infrastructure and its dissolution, treating those who refuse as a rebel militia against public law, and subjecting its leaders to But if mediation is accepted after that subsequent trials.

A few days of fighting, as the multiple mediators working inside Sudan hope, will only be a breathing period, as the element of trust between the armed forces and the Rapid Support Forces, as a whole, is just as the confidence of the civilian component in

And not only between the leaders here and the leaders there, it has become absent The professionals of coups and the tendency to destroy the country have become broken and cannot be repaired except through suffering. Severe.

The components of the Sudanese situation, as mentioned above, refer to a major leap towards the unknown that no one knows except God Almighty. In one case, there may be some glimmer of hope, which is that the fighting will end as quickly as possible, and there will no longer be any factions or irregular armed groups in any way.

Forms, and with them disappear unprecedented personal ambitions to plunder and destroy a large country, which deserves better company

With pride and dignity.

His people are welcome

On Monday, October 25, 2021, the Sudanese army took an expected step to dissolve the transitional government institutions and end the partnership with the Forces of Freedom and Change, which raises concerns about the future of political reform in the country. This move came just weeks after a failed coup attempt to seize power by loyalists to the regime of ousted President Omar al-Bashir, and amid repeated warnings that tensions between civilian and military leaders in Sudan had reached the brink of collapse. Perhaps all of this raises many questions about the future of the political transition in Sudan amid an extremely complex and intertwined regional environment.

It is clear that there are indications of support from popular sectors for the army's corrective movement, as described by Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Commander-in-Chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces. The Justice and Equality Movement has blamed the government of Abdalla Hamdok and that it represents the main reason for the army's intervention. She said that a few officials monopolized decision-making and refused to engage in dialogue. The group, headed by Finance Minister Jibril Ibrahim, was the first to publicly express its support for the army but also urged it to end the state of emergency and release prisoners. detainees and appoint a civilian government to run daily activities.

Earlier this October (2021), the group participated in a pro-military mass sit-in in Khartoum that was demanding the dismissal of the transitional government. Another pro-military group that broke away from the Freedom and Change Movement also welcomed these exceptional measures, saying that it was organized by I hope the presidential palace supports the army because its mission has been achieved. On the other hand, the All-Beja Council of Glasses, led by Mr. Turk in eastern Sudan, will end the sit-in.

The most prominent defenders of the army were their reopening of Port Sudan and ending the closure in the cities of the East.

Dual leadership in the military institution

It is important to point out the nature of the military institution in Sudan, as it includes, in addition to the regular forces based on discipline and the values of military professionalism, the Rapid Support Forces, a paramilitary unit that emerged from the Janjaweed militias previously supported by the Bashir regime and which She was accused of committing violations during the Darfur conflict. Here we find a dual military leadership: Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Commander-in-Chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces, on the one hand, and Lieutenant General Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), Commander of Rapid Support, on the other hand. The official record of al-Burhan appears to be that the finger of accusation is being pointed at him by the International Criminal Court in The Hague. , where, and it did not happen Al-Bashir and others were accused of committing crimes against humanity during the conflict in Darfur in

Early 2000s. Proof is also not counted in rows

Islamists, which is rare among senior generals during the Bashir regime, which was loyal to the Muslim Brotherhood.

This may have helped Sudan emerge from the international isolation that the Bashir regime suffered from. Behind Burhan is General Hemedti, commander of the Rapid Support Forces. Al-Burhan has a long relationship with Hemedti. Al-Burhan was a commander in Darfur, where he launched the army and support forces

thousand people were displaced and about 2.7 million people were displaced. Rapid violent campaign to counter the insurgency. 300 Moreover, a million people became estranged from the military campaigns and bloody conflicts that Darfur witnessed. And with "I am not responsible for any actions" Al-Burhan himself spoke of the atrocities that were committed, and once said: "Just as all regular forces do." Disgraceful in Darfur... For me, I was fighting an enemy

In 2015, Al-Burhan and Hemedti coordinated the deployment of Sudanese forces and Rapid Support fighters to Yemen to fight with Saudi Arabia-led coalition forces against Houthi rebels allied with Iran. The two men are credited with the fact that during the uprising against Al-Bashir, they refused orders

They dispersed the demonstrators using violence, but they met them in the sit-in camp.

The dialectic of course correction and corrective revolution

Controversy arises over the description of the Sudanese army's movement on October 25, as the message sent by Due to the state of chaos and severe division between... Lieutenant General Al-Burhan was that it was a course correction given Components of the transitional government. Al-Burhan did not suspend work on the entire constitutional document, but it did Implementing some articles that stipulate partnership with the Forces of Freedom and Change. He announced the suspension of the provisions of Articles 11 and 12 regarding the formation and powers of the Transitional Sovereignty Council. This means that Al-Burhan will become the undisputed head of state and commander-in-chief of the armed forces Forces of freedom and change. Al-Burhan was supposed to relinquish the presidency of the Sovereign Council to a civilian president on November 17, 2021. One of the most prominent articles canceled was Article 15 regarding the appointment and powers of the Transitional Council of Ministers, as the Forces of Freedom and Change had the authority to appoint the President of the Council. According to this disruption, Al-Burhan becomes able to appoint a government of qualified figures, Article 2A national organization with a broad popular base and characterized by efficiency and independence. As it was Paragraph 3, which stipulates that the Transitional Legislative Council shall consist of 67% of those chosen by the Forces of the Declaration of Freedom and Change and 33% of the forces other than those who did not sign the Declaration of Freedom and Change. Thus, the army becomes free to form the transitional legislative council, which Al-Burhan promised would be composed of young people.

What calls for careful consideration is that Al-Burhan abolished Article 71 regarding the dissolution of the Military Council, which means that it can return to exercising an effective oversight role in managing the transitional process. The paradox that brings to mind the experience of Tunisian President Kais Saied in interpreting the constitutional text is confirmation The proof is that he based his decisions on the constitutional document, as Article 78 stipulates that this constitutional document may not be amended or canceled except by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Legislative Council. And in

In the event of the absence of this council, the Sovereignty Council and the Council of Ministers temporarily passed legislation and laws.

In African tradition, this is when the political scene reaches a state of blockage, when the potential is exhausted
For application In all other legitimate democratic ways, it may not be a "corrective coup."

Not only that, but it may be the only option. The African National Congress in South Africa took up arms against the apartheid regime in their country from the 1970s until the early 1990s. Thomas Sankara likewise carried out a revolutionary coup against the fanatical elite in Burkina Faso in 1983. The most prominent "corrective coup" scenario was the Ghanaian experience under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel John Jerry Rawlings (1981-2001). Ghana was able, with the help of international financial institutions, to establish a new beginning. Today, the country is considered a model

Its approach to good governance and democracy is emulated by most other countries in Africa. Former US President Barack Obama confirmed this during his historic visit to the capital, Accra, on his first African tour. Is Burhan's behavior real goals, as the African Union has frozen Sudan's membership until the institutions of civilian rule are restored. consistent with these traditions? This may seem regardless of the

Introductions and reasons for army intervention

The Forces of Freedom and Change and the Transitional Military Council reached power-sharing arrangements within a month to form a sovereign council in Sudan, which was agreed to continue for a 39-month transitional period. A month However, during the first The rules of the arrangement also stipulated that as of August 20, 2019, 21 of the aforementioned period, a military president would be chosen by the army, who would then succeed him for a period of 18 The next election will be a civilian president, provided that elections will be held after the agreed-upon period for sharing A month Authority. The Prime Minister, who will be nominated by the Forces of Freedom and Change, assumes the presidency of the Council of Ministers, with the exception of the ministers who lead the Ministries of Defense and Interior, where the transitional government headed by Abdalla Hamdok is the first since they were nominated by the army. The 1989 coup that does not reflect the traditions of the dominant military regime.

Hamdok's government agreed to various progressive reforms, such as abolishing any law that restricts women's rights to study or dress however they want. It also criminalized the practice of genital mutilation However, it failed to turn around the faltering economy. The Feminization through the custom of female circumcision. various policies of the Hamdok administration have been subjected to severe criticism, such as canceling fuel subsidies, increasing electricity fees, and increasing spending on security forces and government agencies. However, the disagreements within the Sovereignty Council were not over the economy, but rather over the structure of the Darfur war. Sudanese army and the forces Security and war crimes committed during the

There are demands from the International Criminal Court to try Al-Bashir and other members of his administration for between human rights crimes in Darfur in 2003 onwards. The division has become clear

cooperated with the The parties to the transitional government, where the civilian faction in the government 2021 in the cases against International Criminal Court to move forward. They both signed an agreement in August The accused, including deposed President Omar al-Bashir. This is certainly not consistent with the army's vision, as because of Al-Bashir's trial, many of the military themselves will be exposed and accused of committing crimes against humanity. Lieutenant General Al-Burhan explicitly refused to hand Al-Bashir over to the International Criminal Court. Therefore, while the Council of Ministers agreed to hand over suspects to the ICC, the State Security Court, which has a military component, did not do so.

Another source of division may be represented by the investigation into the Khartoum massacre in June "Rapists and murderers," according to the Forces of Freedom's accounts , 2019, which is also depicted And change. In fact, the head of the investigation committee, Nabil Abed, himself stated on May 4, 2021, that "the outcome could lead to a coup or mass unrest in the streets."

September 21 An attempt by remnants of the previous regime to seize power. in There was also the past, when the Sudanese government announced that it had thwarted a coup attempt by forces that were still loyal to Bashir. The coup plotters tried to take control of the radio building in Omdurman, but they failed. Forty soldiers were After Prime Minister Hamdok insisted that arrested Oh Because of the attempts of the remnants since the fall of the previous regime to abort The failed coup attempt was an extension Civil democratic transformation.

Implications and question for the future

1- Economic and security repercussions : There are likely to be serious consequences of army intervention. Sudan was recently removed from the US list of states sponsoring terrorism. The United States promised to provide financial support to the transitional government. The International Monetary Fund and Hamdok's government agreed on a debt relief settlement worth \$50 billion. All of this was put at risk after the exceptional decisions and the dissolution of the partnership with the Forces of Freedom and Change. There are fears that Sudan today will fall into a state of chaos, if the masses are mobilized and the intensity of popular protests in the Sudanese street escalates.

Since 2019, the measures taken by the transitional government to revive the country's battered economy have been deeply unpopular among some broad sectors of the population. Accordingly, sentiment on the ground is divided as some people who are experiencing increasing hardship due to the IMF-backed reforms favor the fall of Hamdok's government. At the end of September, the World Bank conducted its first visit to Sudan in nearly 40 years when With Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok, and Council Chairman David Malpass engaged in talks on the freeze of aid, His Excellency Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan and Finance Minister Jibril Ibrahim. With the Foreign Ministry, after the army seized power, it will have major repercussions on the economy, and Sudan may witness another "revolution of the stomachs." US Senator Chris Coons wrote on...

3 - The future of the relationship with Israel : How can the army's seizure of power in Sudan affect normalization with Israel? Some may argue that if the Sudanese army's goal when signing the normalization agreement with Israel was to get rid of American sanctions, then the army's recent decisions are likely to lead to the return of these sanctions and the postponement of the agreement.

The 1958 law prohibiting any diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv. Although the normalization process argued the Sudanese leadership, however, was slow due to the chronic disputes that existed

In conclusion, the greatest fear is that Sudan will slide into a state of chaos and violence if the state of severe political polarization continues. It is also not possible to rule out the possibility of groups not affiliated with the Juba Peace Agreement returning to bear arms. In Darfur, there is the Sudan Liberation Movement, headed by Abdel Wahid al-Nur, and in the Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan, there is the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North, led by Abdel Aziz al-Hilu. Both enjoy popular support and have demonstrated considerable military strength. They were both engaged in peace talks with the government and had confidence in Abdullah Hamdok. The army's recent actions may herald renewed conflict.

The most pressing issues in Sudan remain the economy, democracy and peace, perhaps. The absence of national consensus leads to more violence and bloodshed. In July 2019, in the aftermath

violent events, the international "Quartet" consisting of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Kingdom Together with the Union of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates intervened, which worked together The African Union, to press for a negotiated solution, which was done following the overthrow of the Bashir regime. There may be a need for a similar process, albeit with new civil parties, to achieve national consensus and return Sudan to the path of sound political transition.

Articles

Not at all, it was read from one side

The current crisis in Sudan has not been resolved

Everyone: Sudanese political forces, the international community, most experts and observers, and even its flights to the capital, Khartoum, three days ago. And look Airlines that fly

The preliminaries of this crisis have crystallized in three stages: The first is related to the determinants of the relationship between the parties, which is the constitutional document that was signed in August 2019. The second is related to managing the interactions between the political parties themselves after the failed coup attempt that took place on September 21 last. The third focuses on the crises in eastern Sudan and the repercussions of the failed coup attempt that took place at the end of last September.

During these three stages, there are direct reasons for the confusion in the Sudanese political scene over a period of more than two years after the success of the Sudanese revolution in ending the rule of Omar al-Bashir, and they can be detailed in the following.

The crisis of the constitutional document

Following the Sudanese Armed Forces' bias towards the Sudanese revolution and the removal of former President Omar al-Bashir from power on April 11, 2019, an initial political agreement was finalized between the military council headed by Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the Forces of Freedom and Change, which consisted of Sudanese parties and professional unions represented by the Association of Professionals. Following the removal of Al-Bashir, it was agreed to form a joint sovereign council that would possess the powers of the President of the Republic and lead a three-year transitional period after which general elections would be held.

However, this council took place during the months of April and May 2019, as a battle insisted on who would lead the military body over the years. He took the helm of leadership, and the civilians rejected that and announced the end of the negotiations in this regard on May 19, 2019. The Forces of Freedom and Change relied on their day support of the masses, and resorted to the street to resolve the conflict. Indeed, revolutionary processions rushed towards the headquarters of the General Command of the Army to pressure it, in an open sit-in that was dispersed in June 3, 2019, causing casualties and cases of rape.

The relationship between the parties to the Sudanese political equation: This crisis extended for several months until it was resolved within the framework of a constitutional document signed in August 2019, which gave civilians the right to preside over the sovereign council, but two years after the military component assumed this leadership. And it can

To regulate the relationship between the parties. It is said that this document was characterized by fragility and was not decisive

The first reason for this fragility is that it has been compromised due to two factors:

The first is the pressure of marginal forces and armed movements so that political agreements with them to achieve peace prevail over the constitutional document, as the Juba Peace Agreement signed in October 2020 between the Sudanese government and the armed movements resulted in exceeding the three-year period of the transitional period to extend to four years, and the Sovereign Council was expanded, And the formation of new councils as partners for the period with the center. The direct transitional result of the political elites from the reconciled fringes accommodating the extension of the transitional period for one year is the occurrence of a crisis regarding the item of when the Council presidency will be 2022 because handed over to the first rank or June. Presidential Council for the Civil Component: Is it November 2021 to extend the transitional period?

Second, failure to fulfill the requirements of the document, especially with regard to completing the structures of the transitional period From a legislative council, a constitutional court, etc., and therefore the constitutional document is no longer a solid determinant It is invoked by the parties, as accusations have been exchanged between the civilian and military components regarding each party's responsibility for obstructing the crystallization and inauguration of the structures of the transitional period.

Imbalance of power between the parties to the equation

A number of political actors 2020 with

For the meetings I had in Khartoum in December

According to Al-Sudania, it can be said that the beginnings of the revolution against Al-Bashir in 2018 were crystallized by the direct influence of the revolutions in the Arab region at that time, as professional organizations began arranging their papers to lead an opposition against Al-Bashir whose ultimate goal was to weaken the regime and revolt against it.

In this context, the Sudanese Professionals Association took shape and attempted to remove Al-Bashir in September 2013, when anger broke out against the Sudanese regime with massive demonstrations, but it was able to cordon off these demonstrations with brutal security intervention, with more than 200 people falling victim. The Professionals Association continued its political struggle, but on the basis of demands related to wages, and these foundations developed in 2019 with the intervention of the National Consensus Forces (one of the opposition alliances against Al-Bashir).

The Professionals Association led the Sudanese revolution within a broad framework that took place on January 1, 2020 and was named the Freedom and Change Alliance. It is the alliance that led the revolution and included all political parties, social movements, and civil society organizations, and its solid nucleus was the Professionals Association. Over the course of two years of the transitional period, the Freedom and Change Alliance and the Professionals Association were exposed to factors of erosion and division, for a number of reasons, including:

- **The role of the military component in making the Juba Peace Agreement in 2020**, and what resulted from that with the armed movements, in a way that prompted both... From gaining weight, especially in the context of his relationships

The Governor of Darfur, Minni Arko Minawi, and the Minister of Finance, Khalil Ibrahim, for siding with him in leading the rest of the transitional phase and announcing their disengagement from the Freedom and Change Alliance, which was called the Consensus Charter.

The national division, which crystallized demonstrations on October 16, and whose supporters staged a sit-in in front of the Republican Palace.

- **The Communist Party disengaged from the Freedom and Change Alliance**, against the backdrop of the joint sovereign council formula between the civilian and military components, considering this a strategic error based on what He called it blood partnership. This withdrawal contributed to the division of the Professionals Association against the backdrop of internal elections that produced only members of the Communist Party, which was rejected by the rest of the components.

- **The tendency of some components of Freedom and Change from parties with a nationalist character to support the military component in political interactions**, and to contribute to raising its weight vis-à-vis other political parties, which resulted in a slackness in Freedom and Change, the political incubator of the executive government led by Abdullah Hamdok, in a way that made the latter adopt an initiative seeking For the unity of freedom and change in order to maintain its weight Politics in the equation.

- **The Professionals Association split between supporters of the Communist Party and other Freedom and Change parties**, with the first group exerting political pressure on the rest of the components under the umbrella of the state of change.

The partnership that was approved in the constitutional document between the civilian component and the military component To disable in "is based on it." "Blood partnership Managing the transitional period, a partnership that has been named Committees investigating the events of the sit-in at the General Command of the Armed Forces, which was forcibly dispersed on June 3, 2019, resulting in deaths.

In the balance of power in favor of the component The end result of these extended interactions was a failure Concerning weakening Military, despite many pressures that have been developed internationally

2020 agrees to it his abilities; At the American level, Congress issued a law in December

The Democratic and Republican parties obligate the US State Department to detail its policy and procedures in the areas of supporting human rights and transparency, especially at the level

The US President is also required to submit a quarterly report on the progress of his administration in this process, as well as the overall support policies and procedures for the transitional period and democratic transformation.

Eastern Sudan crisis

The problem of eastern Sudan has emerged as a direct cause of the extent of distress and pressure caused by the Empowerment Removal Committee to elements of the Bashir regime at the political and economic levels, as well as the desire to weaken the civil component, as Muhammad Al-Amin Turk, head of the Supreme Council of Beja Councils in Eastern Sudan, called for an end to the work of the Empowerment Removal Committee, The formation of a new military council to represent the six regions of Sudan, as well as the change of Hamdok's government, all under the umbrella of the demand

By canceling the East Track in the Juba Peace Agreement signed between the government and the armed factions in October 2020

The three demands for the Eastern Sudanese region resulted in confusion in the political scene and the exchange of accusations regarding the parties responsible for its expansion, despite its threat to Sudanese national security, as the Eastern Region controls Sudan's communication with the world from the Red Sea platform, and its closure affects the state's vital supplies, which meet 70% of its needs from abroad, especially from Fuel, food, and medicine, which are supplies that have become scarce in the markets during the past period. The closure of the Eastern Sudan region also affects the economies of the state of South Sudan through the export of oil, whose resources constitute the port of Bashayer, which almost the majority of the South Sudanese budget and are exported from Which was closed along with all eastern Sudan ports. In this context, a part of the Sudanese political street considered that the events in the East were made with the aim of not handing over the presidency of the transitional authority to the civilian component.

The crisis of the failed coup attempt

In the wake of the failed coup attempt that was announced on September 21, both sides of the Sudanese political equation sought to exploit the event to their advantage, as the civil component was held responsible for the failed coup as a result of the failure of the government and its political incubator to confront the worsening crises on the economic level affecting people's lives. daily, and preoccupation with sharing positions, while the civil component considered these accusations as a prelude to a realistic coup against it.

The American support for the civilian component in this battle contributed to the crystallization of the Professionals Association's demand to end the partnership with the military component and hand over all authority to the civilian component, a step that was recommended by the Secretary of State for the Security of the Sudanese People. The military component responded by saying,

"The armed forces and the withdrawal of the joint security forces' guards from Empowerment Removal Committee and about 22 sites Economically, it was under its jurisdiction. He also stopped meetings with the civil component, and accused some of them Its members had "dual loyalties," and the First Deputy Chairman of the Sovereignty Council, Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, said: "We have a street," in response to the bullying of freedom and change in the Sudanese street, including It portends the possibility of confrontations breaking out between the revolutionary forces and affiliates of the Bashir regime and the National Islamic Front, under the umbrella of the weapons accumulation in the Sudanese capital and other regions.

In this context, Jibril Ibrahim, the Minister of Finance, and Minni Arko Minawi, the governor of the Darfur region, announced their demands to change the government and expand the base of political participation, as some tribal formations staged a sit-in October 16 with the support of the Republican Front, at a time when Prime Minister Dr. Abdullah Hamdok made attempts to end the political crisis, by forming a seven-party committee, as the Central Council of the Freedom and Change Alliance responded by rejecting proposed axes for political dialogue, especially with regard to the scope of expanding political participation, which was stipulated that it should not be from the old regime. Yasser Arman said that the expansion may be from the old regime.

The Resistance Committees and the Communist Party, in the last press conference for Freedom and Change, where the Central Council relied on its popular bases that had already come out to support the principle of transformation on October 21, which carries great symbolism in democratic political history, in large crowds on Sudanese Day, despite the government's well-known mistakes. Sudanese and its political incubator Freedom and Change.

The end point of the crisis political interactions between the civilian and military components was set by Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, President of the Sovereign Council, in a statement he issued hours ago announcing the dissolution of both the government and the Transitional Council and the imposition of a state of emergency while suspending some articles of the constitutional document, after a massive arrest campaign of members of the Council. The Sovereign Council, the government, and some political party leaders.

In this statement, reassurances were provided at the internal and external levels. On the internal level, he announced the formation of a competent government after a period of what he called "political disagreement," and commitment to the Juba Peace Document, as well as resolving the crisis in the East and inaugurating the transitional structures of a legislative council, a constitutional court, and others. On the external level, he committed to handing over power in accordance with... constitutional, but in 2023

In general, it can be said that the extent of the ability to create political stability in Sudan will be tested in the next stage, in light of two factors: **First**, the position of the international community in particular. The United States was aware of this development that took place while US President Jeffrey Feltman's envoy was in Khartoum, which will result in the state of regional interaction in terms of whether or not to support the dissolution of the government and the sovereign council.

The second is the internal position, at the public level, on this development and the state of interaction with it, especially in light of the raging economic crisis that the general public is suffering from, and which they aspire to end.

The presence of youth committees in Sudanese neighbourhoods, the outbreak of some demonstrations, and the disappearance of the second row of Sudanese party leaders, which may result in expected confrontations that may take on a violent nature.

components A major reason for the Sudanese civil wars that have extended since 1955 is the multiplicity of The Sudanese military, including open possibilities for political instability. This crisis has now risen to the surface with the refusal of the Commander of the Rapid Support Forces, Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan They decided to integrate into the official military institution, in light of the clearly visible tensions between the two components.

In this context, we discuss the features of the Sudanese military components, and the nature of their political and military weights. We are also exposed to the political repercussions associated with this military multiplicity within Sudan and its diversity between an official institution, on the one hand, and formations whose classification ranges between armed factions and militias, on the other hand.

Features of military formations

Sudan knew irregular military formations in an early period of its history, following the outbreak of the civil war between North and South Sudan in 1955, which resulted in the existence of the "Ananya 1-" and then "Ananya 2" movements, which fought the civil war against the center in Khartoum until the year, 1972 until a peace agreement was concluded under which the military components were integrated Irregulars in the official army, and there is the possibility of South Sudanese citizens joining the National Army of Sudan. But after A new rebellion broke out against the center, led by John almost a decade Garang in 1983, forming the "South Sudan People's Movement" when he held the rank of captain in the national army, a war that continued until 2005.

In the same way, irregular military components were generated in Darfur, the Nuba Mountains, and the Blue Nile, as a direct result of the war on Darfur that broke out in 2003, in addition to the neglect of both the Nuba and the Blue Nile in the Naivasha Peace Agreement. Most of the formations were taken by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of each region according to its name, as they became involved in conflicts Military is the name of an armed force against the Sudanese Armed Forces for reasons related to political and development marginalization.

The nature and extent of its demands The military and political weights of all these components varied depending on the situation Its expression of the population blocs it represents, as well as the amount of external support it received. But the irony is that the Sudanese government itself, during the era of Al-Bashir, resorted to forming an irregular militia according to an official decree in 2013, for reasons related to two matters: first, to **reduce** the burden on the regular forces that were fighting the components opposing them on more than one side in Sudan.

This affected its effectiveness. **Secondly**, former President Omar al-Bashir sought to secure his political system from the army turning against it.

At the time of its formation, the size of the Rapid Support Forces reached 5,000 members, most of whom came from the Arab "Mahamid" and "Mahariya" clans, as well as the forces of Muhammadin Ismail from the "Zaghawa" tribe, which split from the Sudan Liberation Army in Darfur, along with the "Zaghawa" tribe. Immediately.

The formation of the Rapid Support Forces took shape over approximately a decade, beginning with the government's asylum for the Arab tribes that were called "Janjaweed" to engage in a proxy war on their behalf in the Darfur region, international pressure on Khartoum led to the abandonment of the "Janjaweed", and the payment of their salaries was stopped, until a qualitative development took place in 2007 for these forces with the strengthening of the position of the new forces commander. Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), and the forces now operate under the jurisdiction of the Sudanese Intelligence Service and have powers to protect the borders.

The discovery of gold in North Darfur state in 2012. The Janjaweed forces, which had been With Musa Hilal (Hemedti's uncle) on his positions, 800 people were killed in this battle Driving it at the time 2017 The gold supplier became 40% of the government's resources. And with the advent of the year In person Sudanese, where Hemedti controlled the mining areas, and played the role of agent for the government, his uncle, who was arrested in November of the same year. As for Ali with Sudanese government to sell gold after competing at the military level. The Rapid Support Forces now have regional roles with the Sudanese government's Yemen. approval in 2015 to send a battalion of regular forces to serve with the Arab coalition forces in

The outcomes of regional relations and the financial capabilities of the Rapid Support Forces resulted in the formation of a financial empire for Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo, and military forces estimated at 20,000 members that carried out combat operations, and also seized control of the United Nations camps in Darfur, from which they withdrew after the end of the peacekeeping mission at the beginning of this year.

On the political level, Hemedti's change of political allegiance and his alignment with the Sudanese revolution camp in 2019 resulted in a shift in the balances that led to the overthrow of former President Omar al-Bashir, which ensured Hemedti great political influence in the post-revolution equation.

Reinforce it with media voices from newspapers and websites that have influence within Sudanese public opinion and influence political interactions.

The problem of military pluralism

For military cooperation between the Sudanese Armed Forces and some The Juba Peace Agreement formed the basis Irregular military organizations in Sudan, as the agreement stipulated the integration of these organizations into the official armed forces, in accordance with specific procedures. But the support forces

Al-Suriyya was not a party to this agreement, and it is the most common type of irregular military organization. Recently merged, on . Perhaps this explains the practical refusal of its leader, Hemedti weight on the ground currently. That his forces This is posing a problem for the future of political stability in Sudan, in particular

A partner in security arrangements related to peace in Darfur.

It can be said that Hemedti's position is based on a state of bullying carried out by the Rapid Support Forces against the military institution in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, with the support of the Forces of Freedom and Change, whether political parties or civil society organizations, which are forces that fear the control of the forces. armed forces to rule, especially since the elements of the official military component mainly belonged to a committee that was ", meaning the removal of Al-Bashir politically called at the time "the soft landing." The wish that was concerned with what a As his regime continues.

To the President of the Transitional Council, Abdel Fattah These political balances prompted Hemedti not to be a representative. The proof is that there is talk about integrating the Rapid Support Forces into the armed forces, and that the peacekeeping forces in Darfur involved in implementing the Juba Salem Agreement are joint security forces from both sides. This situation allowed Hemedti to have a political presence in all internal files, especially the Sudanese peace files. This situation For the military establishment and opinion constituted a provocation

This year is due to many considerations, the most prominent of which is that the Rapid Support Forces have confiscated mineral resources are according to the data of the military institutions. They are not militarily qualified to work for it, and its members Known at the academic and technical levels.

In public opinion It can be said that the escalation of tension between Al-Burhan and Hemedti appeared noticeable and external observers, in light of two steps : **the first**, the release of Hemedti's uncle, Moussa, on orders from Al-Bashir. He was not released after the revolution, and he is one of the most important Hilal, who was imprisoned. **The second** is that Hemedti himself competes with it. For Hemedti himself competes with it. Issuing proof is an order outside the country without permission. This seems to be the case. The decision came in the context of comprehensive engineering to reduce Hemedti's influence, and prevent him from exercising political roles, especially in the Sudanese peace files, as the government is currently negotiating with the Abdel Aziz movement. One of the most important Darfur armed movements led by Al-Helu is in the Nuba Mountains, and it is expected that Al-Salem's file will be opened with Abdul Wahid Nour.

It seems that Hemedti paid attention to the attempts to undermine him, which prompted him to challenge the decision issued by the President of the Transitional Council and travel without permission to Turkey, and to conclude economic agreements with the latter, which was responded to by leaking a video of Hemedti's brother's participation in dispersing the sit-in of the General Command of the Army during the revolution. The Sudanese operation, which is still the subject of an extended investigation, has not yielded any results. No specific results so far.

It seems that this state of tension may portend armed friction between the two sides of the Sudanese military component, especially since Al-Burhan, and behind him the armed forces, have become supported by forces

Many regional and international issues, especially the United States of America, which issued a statement the evening before Demonstrations in support of the rights of the martyrs of dispersing the sit-in, indirectly referring to the Rapid Support Forces in a negative way.

Two main paths

Under the umbrella of this tension, the camps of each party are witnessing a process of maximum preparation, especially since it has spread to the channels of public opinion, and the scene has become open to a number of scenarios, all of which lead to... In the category of political instability, and perhaps ending the transitional period, the most prominent of which are two paths:

The first is to put more pressure on Hemedti, from the channel of evidence of the investigation committee into the sit-in dispersal incidents, which may result in an armed conflict that threatens the entity of the state, and the armed forces may resort to seizing power in this case to resolve the situation, which is a scenario pushed by the leaders of the old regime. .

The second is for the clash to occur, but within a calculated framework, between the two sides of the Arab tribal leadership, Musa Hilal and his nephew Hemedti, and for it to be limited to exhausting the Rapid Support Forces present in Darfur, which weakens its military capabilities, but this reduces the risks of the clash going beyond the limits of the engineering of its parties, and exploding on a larger scale to be between the official forces in the military institution, and other irregular institutions, which will impose influential repercussions not only on Sudan, but also on the region in general. general.

The current Sudanese interactions appear to be open to critical balances and uncertain future directions, despite the removal of President Omar al-Bashir from power, and then the success of the protest movement in removing Defense Minister Awad Ibn Auf within the next 24 hours. Perhaps the source of these doubts is linked to a number of facts. The first is the nature of the Military Council's tendencies itself, and the extent of the movement's forces' confidence in the issue of handing over power to civilians. The second factor is the tension between political forces regarding the future political equation in Sudan and the nature of its elements. The third factor lies in the forces carrying weapons inside the Sudanese capital, the extent of actual control over weapons stores, and whether there are other forces that have armed capabilities.

Finally, the position of the armed movements in Darfur and the Nuba Mountains seems different from the "Freedom and Change" movement, and it is not an integral part of this movement or its political proposals. Perhaps this explains the absence of the first negotiating delegation from the "Declaration of Freedom and Change" with the Military Council of representatives. The forces of the so-called margin in Sudan. This resulted in a negative stance on the part of Abdel Wahid Mohamed Nour - the leader of the Sudan Liberation Movement in Darfur - against the movement.

The regional context in these interactions also appears to be relatively different, as both Saudi Arabia and the UAE support the current military council on the economic and political levels, against the backdrop of both the president of the council and his deputy assuming responsibility for the tasks of the Sudanese forces in the coalition to support Egypt by "supporting the choices of the Sudanese people," and "Its confidence in the legitimacy of Yemen, while it clings to the army," and anticipates the dangers of tension between political forces to the safety and stability of Sudanese state institutions.

In this context, it can be said that the political interactions between the two sides of the current political equation in Sudan are still far from consensus in the foreseeable future, and may herald the continuation of the movement for a long period to come during which Sudan may be exposed to armed confrontations, especially in Darfur. The soft abdomen in which you usually test the balance of forces between the limbs.

There are a number of reasons behind the current crisis situation between the parties to the internal Sudanese equation, which we summarize as follows:

First, the composition of the military council itself; Although its president - Abdel Fattah Burhan Abdel Rahman - enjoys acceptance based primarily on regional support, given his role in supporting the legitimacy coalition in the Yemen war, three of the members of this council are indicated to be in agreement with the nationalist movement.

The Islamic Revolution, such as Lieutenant General Omar Zain al-Din, who worked as director of Nafi's office, Ali Nafi, the powerful security man, or Jalal al-Sheikh, who worked as a deputy for Gosh, the most famous Sudanese intelligence director, as well as Tayeb Babiker, director of the police force.

Secondly, the policies of the military junta linked to the Omar al-Bashir regime. Despite the Council's announcement of the arrest of Omar al-Bashir and symbols of his regime and their placement in Cooper Prison, and the seizure of large sums of money from the former president's residence in his residence, there is no evidence of this yet, as no one has visited these detainees and no pictures have been broadcast from their detention areas, while rumors are spreading about the presence of detainees. On private farms in the Soba area, which puts the credibility of the military council at stake.

Third There is a crisis of confidence between the head of the military council, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the civilian forces over several issues, and these forces' belief that he doubts their ability to assume power, and their lack of confidence in his desire to do so, despite the council's announcement of its readiness to hand over power after studying the proposals that were presented to it.

Fourth, the Military Council sought more than once to dismantle the sit-in at the General Command using soft methods, and then recently explicitly announced the necessity of dismantling the barricades around the General Command to open the way for movement and transportation.

Fifthly, postponing the repeal of the public order law, which gives the police the authority to control citizens' social lives and their personal choices, constitutes an opportunity to cast suspicions about the ideological tendencies of the military council and the extent of its bias towards some policies attributed to the Islamic National Movement in Sudan historically.

Sixth, the tension occurring between the protest movement, on the one hand, and the elites of the Islamic National Movement with interests in the former regime, on the other hand, which own the basic sources of wealth and control the country's economic paths, as these forces seek to be part of the future political equation. To this end, it does two things: First, it communicates with the Military Council, puts pressure on it, and presents approaches to the desired form of regime. The second is the attempt to dismantle the Forces of Freedom and Change, under which the Sudanese political forces, both historical and modern, are included, as well as the Professionals Association, by trying to demonize the latter (the core of the main opposition) as a representative of the communists, as their speeches say on platforms or on social media.

Seventh, the position of the Military Council on the excessive use of force that the Sudanese authority is now practicing against any support for the protest movement in Khartoum in the Darfur camps.

Eighth, the Military Council decided to appoint new employees in some positions, especially the media, from elites affiliated with the former regime, perhaps due to a lack of knowledge of the professional elites in the country.

Various fields against the backdrop of the rift between the previous regime and its elites belonging to the Islamic National Movement, and the rest of the professional elites.

It seems that the discourse that involves a kind of extremism and condescension towards the protest movement could open the door to the dangers of the current equation of actors disintegrating and reaching a more fluid state, due to considerations related to the composition of the military council on the one hand, and the capabilities of the protest movement on the other hand, and the problems of tension between the political forces. On the third hand. At the level of the Military Council, the Vice President of the Council - Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo Hemedti - Commander of the Rapid Support Forces, is characterized by his approach to a type of shifting, unstable alliances, and in most cases he will not side with the military council's hard-line policies against the protesters. On another level, the presence of symbols of the old regime within the council that are rejected by the street makes the possibility of disagreement possible, which threatens the cohesion of the military council itself.

As for the level of the protest movement, it is noticeable that it is present in the regions and neighborhoods of the capital, in addition to the sit-in at the General Command. It also has a leadership that has accumulated political experience over the last fifty years in the field of making uprisings, formulating alliances, and negotiating with the Sudanese military establishment, all of which are factors that make this movement likely to decline in the eyes of the military council.

Certainly, the most dangerous scenarios will be those related to confrontations in the streets between the Islamists and the rest of the political forces mobilized against them.

It seems that changing the political system in Sudan has become inevitable as a result of its failure to carry out its basic functions towards the Sudanese people, on the one hand, and the continuation of protests against it for more than a week across a wide area of the national territory of the State of Sudan, on the other hand. However, the size of this change, or the degree of its radicality, is still unclear until the moment, due to the intertwining of many factors, most of which are internal, although regional and international factors have an influential role in view of the repercussions that the state of power vacuum in Sudan could have on regional and international security. It may be important in the beginning to monitor the state of the protests and their causes, then their transformations, before we move to the potential limits of change.

Development of protests

Protests against the Sudanese regime erupted from the city of Atbara in northeastern Sudan for direct reasons related to the scarcity of both bread and fuel, and the shortage of cash in banks to the point that people no longer have the ability to obtain their savings. The series of protests increased to extend to the cities of Al-Ghadaref, Madani, Al-Rabak, Botsudan, and then Khartoum over the past days.

It can be said that these protests were popular protests par excellence, and were later joined by political parties and the Professionals Union. It began with a socio-economic nature, but quickly crystallized political demands calling for changing the political system, especially in light of its direct responsibility for the deterioration of living conditions, and President Omar al-Bashir's aspiration to run for a new presidential term that may be open in the 2020 elections, and the Islamic Movement's support for this approach, which is what it confirmed in its recent ninth conference: In which it announced its support for Al-Bashir's candidacy for a new term; This is despite the fact that Sudan has reached 30 years of rule, which prompted demonstrators to burn the headquarters of the ruling National Congress Party in all the cities where protests broke out, in addition to seizing the contents of the Zakat Office of goods and food supplies and distributing them. To confirm their participation in the protests, the Unionist and Nation Parties issued statements in support of these protests, and on their sixth day they were led by the Sudanese Professionals Union, which adopted the submission of a memorandum to the Presidency of the Republic that included a single item, which was to demand that President Omar al-Bashir step down from power. In this context, the Union circulated this memorandum to representatives of the European Union and the embassies of many international capitals, during which demonstrations by Sudanese communities also broke out in front of the Sudanese embassies to support the demand for President Al-Bashir to step down.

Despite the government's disruption of studies at all levels in both Khartoum and Sennar State, the protests maintained their continuity and their quantitative and geographical expansion. These protests caused confusion in the presidential and governmental positions regarding them. While intelligence chief Salah Gosh accused the protesters of being a tool in the hands of Israeli intelligence, or Darfuri cells affiliated with the oppositionist Abdel Wahid Nour, President Al-Bashir tried - on the eve of submitting the memorandum of resignation to the Republican Palace - to contain the demonstrators by recognizing the legitimacy of the citizens' movement and promising radical reforms and development projects. But he quickly reversed his position, accusing the opponents from Gezira State of being "traitors" and "agents," moved by foreign hands, given what he described as his "principled" position and the West's siege of Sudan!!! The escalatory stance on the part of President Al-Bashir was linked to the security's ability to prevent the demonstrators from reaching the Republican Palace and his assessment that the security tools of repression are still effective.

At the level of the security services, we also note a degree of disparity and confusion, as the biases of army commanders towards the protests emerged in Atbara during the first days, which reinforced fears about the possibility of a military coup led by elements affiliated with the National Islamic Front, with the aim of containing the mass protests and making a formal change. By uprooting his head, the regime only exiled Mohamed Hamdan, which allows the interests of the existing elites to be preserved. It coincided with Dagalo Hemedti, the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, playing any role in suppressing the protesters. But the National Army quickly issued a statement the day before the palace demonstration in which it affirmed its rally around its leadership, and the cohesion between all the state's security services: the army, police, Rapid Support Forces, and the Internal Security Service. However, Hemedti returned once again to announce his dissent from this situation, and even criticized the existing conditions, stressing once again that his forces were not involved in suppressing any protests by the Sudanese, while giving a sense of legitimacy to these protests, and demanding the need to improve the lives of the Sudanese.

Open scenarios

The recent popular uprising does not seem surprising to observers of Sudanese affairs, as the political tensions in Sudan have been long-lived, and the security instability in both Darfur and South Kordofan has had a negative impact on the state's stability. In addition, the absolute power exercised by President Al-Bashir during the last period has become a subject of international concern. There have been many regional initiatives to address these congestions, both at the African level and what is known as the South African President Mbeki, or the Gulf initiatives since the 2015 elections, which were based on providing a safe exit for Bashir in exchange for securing him from prosecution by the International Criminal Court. However, these initiatives did not succeed in addressing the crisis of the Sudanese regime. Mbeki's initiative failed one week before the outbreak of demonstrations due to rivalries between the forces of "Sudan Call" (an opposition coalition). The Gulf initiative also failed to achieve its goal due to the inability of the parties to reach

Agree with Al-Bashir.

The security situation in Sudan is further complicated by the strong relationship linking the regime with political Islam organizations, most notably the Muslim Brotherhood, and the presence of sleeper cells for ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and the Islamic Liberation Party, not to mention the incursion of Salafism into aspects of daily life in Sudan, some of which are turning into the style of jihadist Salafism in particular. In the regions of East and Central Africa.

In this context, it does not seem that the international and regional position will allow the regime to expand its use of violence against the Sudanese people this time, for several reasons, including that the Sudanese popular protests and demonstrations seem to be continuing, and specific leaderships have been formed, represented so far by the Union of Professionals, in addition to its expansion. Geographic. Under the umbrella of this comprehensive state of protests, leaks emerged - unconfirmed - in the political street about the involvement of members of the Popular Security Service (a secret service) in liquidating unarmed protesters with live ammunition, and perhaps this explains the fall of casualties estimated by Amnesty International at 37 deaths as of yesterday (25 December), and the Sudanese government recognizes this number, even though it admits that there were only eight deaths. The shift to the physical liquidation of civilians means the possibility of Sudan opening itself to an armed civil conflict, especially in light of the spread of weapons within Sudanese society due to the spread of conflicts on the one hand, and the presence of trends among the elites. The ruling and influential Sudanese government may rely on weapons to protect itself and its property from the wrath of the Sudanese people.

In the event that Sudan opens up to the scenario of armed conflict, this will mean the occurrence of a power vacuum, as this brings sources of threats that will allow Sudan to turn into a state of complete collapse, with security for all the countries surrounding Sudan, which will have a direct impact on the opening of Darfur to a state of security chaos in addition. in Libya, which would entail a threat to the interests of neighboring countries, especially Egypt and Chad, and in support of the fluid security situation in the Sahel and Sahara region, a situation that must be resisted by both Paris and Washington. This power vacuum will undoubtedly affect the security of the Red Sea and the Yemeni file, which is what worries Egypt and the Gulf states. These reasons can explain to us Qatar's failure to move forward in supporting Sudan, despite its hint of doing so in a call between Prince Tamim and President Al-Bashir. It also explains the important visit of Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry and Director of Intelligence, Major General Abbas Kamal, to Khartoum.

First of all, the writer of these lines firmly believes in the Sudanese solution to the escalating Sudanese political crisis, to break with the past and sustain the desired stability. In other words, the Sudanese alone and no one else should take the lead and own the solution to their crisis and the future of their country. Therefore, the unity of the Sudanese is in accordance with a new, tight political, constitutional and social charter. It is vital for resolving the crisis and for the success of laudable efforts to find a strategic solution to it.

On the other hand, we must be realistic and objective as well, as the Sudanese crisis has significant regional and international ramifications. For example, there is a need to take into account dozens of UN Security Council resolutions that were issued in the past under Chapter Seven of the United Nations Charter with regard to the Sudanese conflict in Darfur, the most important of which is UN Security Council Resolution 1593 issued under Chapter Seven, which referred the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court in The Hague in 2005, and there is also a US Congress resolution entitled "Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of Darfur and Peace Accountability Act."

(2006, which is an original American legislation.

There are also many decisions and statements issued by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, in addition to the fact that Sudan represents a fixed item in the meetings and corridors of the African Peace and Security Council, the institutions of the European Union, and the Human Rights Council.

Above all of this, the UN political mission known as UNITAMS stands out.

It was mandated pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2524 issued under Chapter VI of the UN Charter in June 2020, in order to help the Sudanese achieve a democratic political transition and peace. This is what prompted the UN mission these days to engage in encouraging the Sudanese to dialogue among themselves in order to find a solution to their crisis. .

It is also mentioned in this context that most international resolutions and international dealings with the Sudanese crisis are based on a firm position that the situation in Sudan represents a threat to regional and international security and peace, especially in light of the crises and wars in its neighboring countries such as South Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Libya, Chad and Central Africa, in addition to Fragile situations in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel region in general.

Therefore, no one is surprised by the regional and international efforts to help the Sudanese find a solution to their political crisis that threatens the collapse and fragmentation of the state, especially in light of the escalation of the revolution against the coup, and its high cost in lives and lives among young people, due to the suppression of the authorities.

The coup blocked the horizon of a political solution and "entrenched" it in governance, in an attempt to fortify and protect the coup leadership from national and international accountability measures and procedures through the International Criminal Court.

Announce

This background clearly confirms that the intersection between the national, local, regional and international is in dire need to untie the scope of the Sudanese crisis, and this phenomenon has been inherent in Sudanese affairs for more than 30 years, that is, since the era of the defunct Bashir regime, which indulged in grave violations of the rights of Sudanese citizens, in addition to its involvement in In negative and reckless interventions with a regional and international dimension that represented a flagrant violation of international law, which exposed Sudan to international sanctions, which is what

Breaking the country's isolation during the era of the former authoritarian regime.

After the success of the glorious December Revolution that toppled the Bashir regime in April 2019, many regional and international powers descended on Sudan, trying to contain or exploit the new regime that was formed after the overthrow of the Bashir regime, in accordance with their interests and strategic priorities. There is no doubt that this external lust for...

The Sudanese case clearly shows and embodies the contradiction of regional and international interests on the one hand, and Sudanese vital and strategic interests on the other hand.

It is true that the interests and strategies of regional and international powers are not necessarily identical or homogeneous regarding Sudan, but most regional and international interests fall short and diminish in front of the "ceiling" of the aspirations and longings of the Sudanese people for a complete, successful revolution or radical revolutionary change.

Therefore, this political movement at the center and margins of the crisis remains a great challenge to the success or failure of regional and international efforts in helping to resolve the Sudanese crisis.

In this context, there are some examples that reflect the reality of dispute and conflict between regional and international axes and parties regarding the Sudanese crisis, which in turn has had a negative impact on the unity and independence of the Sudanese parties:

- The Arab tripartite axis, which consists of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Emirates, was his

Almost coordinated approaches and positions towards the Sudanese crisis and its parties during the beginning of the fall of the Bashir regime and the formation of the civil and military partnership system that rose from its ruins, within the

framework of the axis approach in the region and the world, except that there are real discrepancies and differences that emerged in the approach of one country and another in this axis with regard to With the advent of the crisis, Egypt, which is characterized by a deep historical relationship with Sudan, has multiple

For example there

dimensions, the most important of which is the direct border neighborhood, in addition to the determinants of the conflict

over the waters of the Nile, in addition to the vital considerations of the historical conflict between the Egyptian state and the Ethiopian state,

All of these strategic data and facts link any Egyptian approach to the situation in Sudan to a matter directly related to Egypt's strategic national security. Therefore, Egyptian officials often defend their policies regarding Sudan by saying that if Sudan burns, the spark and fragments will reach directly to their country.

In this, they try to distinguish between the sensitivity and right of the Egyptian role and the roles of some other secondary regional countries involved in Sudanese affairs, but the reality is that the Egyptian approach and positions are based on excessive sensitivity towards the Sudanese revolutions that involve the agendas of democratic civil rule, which makes official Egypt distrustful of civilians.

The quarrelsome, and therefore historically prefer to support the rule of the official Sudanese military establishment exclusively.

Therefore, many Sudanese and international parties say that Egypt is adopting Burhan's coup, but they are upset by his weakness and lack of rigor in resolving matters.

Of course, this support and Egyptian adoption of the leadership of the military establishment does not include the Rapid Support Command. Egypt views with caution and clear suspicion the personality of the Rapid Support Commander, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, but this does not mean that it does not deal with the Sudanese civilian leaders of the leaders of the armed Political leaders, and these leaders are often hosted within parties and movements, as it has relations with Efforts to resolve the crisis.

- On the other hand, the UAE's approach is based on considerations of fighting political Islam movements and economic interests and advancing its influence in the Horn of Africa and the African continent in general, in addition to geostrategic considerations and requirements related to its war in Yemen and its need for Sudanese fighters. Therefore, although the UAE has penetrated the civilian political elite Like Egypt, it prefers military rule in Sudan, and therefore supports the military leaders, especially General Hemedti, commander of the Rapid Support Forces. As for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, its priority is its existential war in Yemen, in which it brings in Sudanese soldiers, in addition to considerations of economic interests and regional influence. In the region, which prompted Saudi Arabia to follow the same path as Egypt and the UAE: not to underestimate the American pressure and involvement in supporting the military, but the European and international forces that ask these countries to pressure Al-Burhan and Hemedti to withdraw from the coup and make way for full civilian rule.

- In the context of the African continent, its union plays an important role in resolving the Sudanese crisis, as it is the regional organization with the competence and mandate to preserve and maintain African peace and security. This was clear in the African Union's mediation between civilians and the military and the completion of the fragile partnership between them in accordance with the constitutional document, which lasted for two years until it was aborted by proof. With his coup on October 25, 2021, but there is criticism of the role of the African Union in the Sudanese crisis, as many see its approach to the crisis as leaning toward

The military, because this union is a club of some dictatorial presidents who do not necessarily prefer civilian and democratic rule in Sudan.

- On the other hand, there is Israel, which entered the Sudanese crisis line. It was initially brought in by the military, with the aim of securing their position in power on the assumption that it is the fortified crossing to the American administration. It is true that Hamdok's government proposed relations with the Israeli side, but it was an attempt that did not take off. From a strategic basis or a solid foreign policy, so some observers say that the efforts of the previous Hamdok government were within the framework of the conflict between the civilian and military components over the management of the foreign relations file, in addition to considerations of satisfying some of the regional parties involved in normalization with Israel, but the "Hebrew state" It does not have deep influence in Sudan, as its relationship is superficial and limited to the leadership of the factions of the military establishment.

- In the international context, the Troika countries (the United States and the United Kingdom) made efforts and Norway), in addition to France, made a significant effort to support the transitional government led by Hamdok, which helped Sudan integrate into the international financial and economic system, as this distinguished situation continued until the October 25 coup, and the efforts of the Americans and Europeans helped put pressure on Burhan. To reduce violence against peaceful civilian demonstrators, there is no doubt that the efforts of the Biden administration and its involvement in the crisis are worthy of praise. However, the American administration still lacks a unified strategic vision regarding the crisis in Sudan, as efforts and approaches are scattered between both parts of Congress, the State Department, and the American intelligence community.

Finally, for the UN mission's initiative to resolve the crisis to succeed, it is necessary to work to put pressure on Al-Burhan to stop the violence against peaceful demonstrators, in addition to curbing violence against civilians in conflict areas that are witnessing a security collapse, such as the case of Darfur. It is also necessary to pressure Al-Burhan and his partners to back down. About the coup procedures.

On the other hand, the unity of the Sudanese parties in accordance with a new political and constitutional charter and a unified leadership center is a key step to the solution. Representation of political parties and armed movements is an important entitlement, but the map of revolutionary and political action has changed radically, so it is necessary for the youth of the resistance committees and the victims of wars to take the lead. The displaced, refugees, and social forces that emerged from the womb of the crisis, efforts and solution formulas, and this step is key in light of which the success or failure of national, regional, and international efforts in this context is decided.

Which witnesses intense internal and external political interference.

It is important to focus on the major issues related to the roots of the crisis, such as issues of justice and accountability, achieving comprehensive peace, the economy, and electoral entitlement, so that the international political initiative or process does not turn into a new quotas process that deepens and complicates the crisis, just as pressure on the countries of the region is inevitable. So do not continue to deepen

Disagreements between the Sudanese or encouraging the military's ambitions to abort the aspirations of the Sudanese for democratic civil rule. It is also important for the unity of the regional and international community in its conciliatory efforts, and above all, refraining from employing the conflict between the axes between them in Sudan for the sake of democratic civil rule there.

The repercussions of the conflict between the Rapid Support and the army on the political process in Sudan

This analytical paper deals with the repercussions of the conflict between the army and the Rapid Support on the political process in Sudan after fears grew of the outbreak of armed confrontations between the two forces after disputes surfaced between Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo and Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, disputes related to internal and regional issues.

The pace of disagreements escalated between some of the leaders of the Sudanese army, Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, Shams Al-Din Al-Kabashi, and Yasser Al-Atta, and between the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, Hamdan Dagalo, and his brother, Abdel Rahim Dagalo (1) . After a series of media exchanges over the past weeks; It touched on the most prominent controversial issues related to the necessity of integrating rapid support into the armed forces, as well

On the future of the political process, especially the points related to completing the path of democratic civil transition; By forming a civilian government that will manage the transitional period until its end by holding free and fair elections (2).

Fears of the outbreak of armed confrontations between the Rapid Support Forces and the Armed Forces increased after disputes surfaced between Muhammad Hamdan Daglo and Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, disputes related to internal and regional issues (3). Based on the above, this analytical paper will address the repercussions of the conflict between the army Rapid support for the political process in Sudan.

First: Rapid Support: emergence, rise and influence

It is not a recent thing in Sudan to resort to militias, military formations, and irregular armed groups. These forces actively participated in the civil war in South Sudan: the Popular Defense, the Peace Army, and the friendly forces, until the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Nairobi (4).

Following the outbreak of the rebellion in Darfur in 2003, the government again resorted to and often relied on armed militias. Due to many factors and considerations, including: the nature of the war chosen by the armed movements; It relied on the blitzkrieg strategy, which is based on the rule: "Hit and run," and regular armies often fail.

Achieving victories in that war (5) . We should not forget the ethnic and civil dimension that cast a shadow over those wars, represented by the presence of large numbers of members of the groups that rebelled within the armed forces as soldiers and non-commissioned officers, which made the government fear a rebellion within the army. In the event of carrying out military operations that exceed military custom and the rules of international humanitarian law (6).

It was necessary to create forces that followed the same method to confront the armed movements that resorted to wars of attrition. As it is not based on controlling or retaining cities and villages, but rather on exhausting and draining the ruling authority (7) .

The armed militias that the government used in Darfur to suppress the rebellion of the armed movements have developed, starting with the Janjaweed militias, then moving on to the border guard forces operating under the command of Armed forces. Finally, in the year 2013, the Rapid Support Forces were formed, which absorbed all the elements of the border guard forces and all other militias in Darfur (8). They became affiliated with the National Security and Intelligence Service under the leadership of Brigadier General Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo. This was a strange thing; No militia leader was given a military rank. These forces participated in decisive battles. Which contributed to the increase of its influence, such as the Battle of Goz Dongo in April 2015, in addition to battles with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in the Blue Nile and South Kordofan (9).

A decree was issued in April 2016 placing these forces under the supervision of the President of the Republic, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. In January 2017, Parliament passed the Rapid Support Forces Law; As independent forces affiliated with the Presidency of the Republic (10).

In any case, it cannot be hidden from the regional and international roles that directly contributed to their role in limiting the spread of The rise and recognition of the Rapid Support Forces, especially cross-border organized crime such as human trafficking and illegal immigration, especially in the Sahara Desert following the collapse of Muammar Gaddafi's regime in October 2011. This is in addition to the active participation of the Rapid Support Forces in Decisive Storm in Yemen to Forces side The Arab coalition in March 2015. There is no doubt that the rise of the Rapid Support is also related Hey inWith the clash of wings within the Sudanese government; Where Taha Othman Al-Hussein played a pivotal role That (11).

During the protests and demonstrations that broke out in Sudan from December 2018 until the fall of President Omar al-Bashir's regime in April 2019, and the accompanying bias of the Security Committee towards the aspirations of the street seeking to overthrow the regime of Omar Hassan al-Bashir, accusations emerged against him of responsibility for... General Command massacre in There was a change, as well Rapid support in support of June 2019 (12).

! Oh, in the negotiation that led to the signing Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, played a pivotal role On the constitutional document, in August 2019, after which the military component (the army and support) and the political forces (the Forces of Freedom and Change) entered into a partnership at all levels of government. Also The Commander of the Support Forces, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, was able to contribute directly to the success of the discussions that took place in the capital of South Sudan, Juba, and resulted in the signing of the Sudan Peace Agreement between the transitional government and the armed movements (Justice and Equality - Liberation Army).

Sudan, led by Minni Arko Minawi, the Sudanese Alliance (Alliance of Liberation Movements), in October 2020. The Rapid Support was also able to create an economic empire through gold trade and control of the mines of Jebel Amer, Sango, the Nile River, the Blue Nile, and South Kordofan, as well as companies related to construction and contracting. (13).

Second: Points of contention between Rapid Support and the army

In June 2021, the resigned Sudanese Prime Minister, Abdallah Hamdok, launched an initiative to strengthen the path of the democratic civil transition; He stressed the need to reform the security and military services and overcome points of disagreement.

Which confirms that the points of disagreement are old and renewed (14), and the most prominent of these points are:

1. Integrating rapid support into the army

The framework agreement was signed between the military component "the Army and Rapid Support" and the political forces "the Forces of Freedom and Change and the Central Council" on December 5, 2022, and one of its most important provisions was a plan for security and military reform, which is supposed to take place through a conference in which the political forces participate. Adhere to the Juba Agreement Civilian and armed movements

For peace, this will be achieved by initiating the process of integration and demobilization of elements of the Rapid Support Forces and the Armed Movement Forces. At the same time, the framework agreement indicated that the President of the State is the Supreme Commander of the Rapid Support Forces (15) .

Some analysts believe that the dispute between Al-Burhan and Hemedti is about the political future of both of them, and this is evident from Al-Burhan's demand to integrate the Rapid Support into the army as a condition.

To continue the political process. Although this was referred to in the Framework Agreement, there were deeper differences, and in the same context It will be agreed upon, and perhaps it will be the input to the timetables for the Rapid Support demands to restructure and reform the army, as stipulated in the Juba Peace Agreement (16).

Some believe that merging the Rapid Support means that Hemedti and the leaders of the Rapid Support will lose the gains that have accumulated since his rise in the late era of the deposed President, Omar al-Bashir, in addition to the risks that arise.

There are threats to him as a result, such as the possibility of being tried on charges related to crimes and violations in Darfur. And the Blue Nile and the dispersal of the General Command sit-in in 2019. The process of integrating rapid support will not be easy, as it is not only related to developing a technical plan, nor even the availability of financial allocations, but rather a close (17). to the position of its leaders, especially Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, in the political scene plan. It is closely linked

2. The political process

From the first moment, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo confirmed his support for the political process and the handover of power to a civilian government. Accordingly, it can be said that he is in a constant attempt to gain legitimacy and recognition

By political forces in order to remain effective in the political scene. To do this, he built a network from political alliances, sometimes with the army and other times with the forces of the Declaration of Freedom and Change, and as a result he achieved great political gains. He stressed on many occasions the necessity of handing over power to civilians, and not allowing demonstrators to be attacked. He also confirmed his remorse for participating in the coup of October 25, 2021 (18).

Perhaps Hemedti's interest in demanding the transfer of power to civilians is to obtain recognition by the political forces of him as a partner in the transition, and to work with them to confront the pressures of the armed forces. and since With the formation of the first transitional government, Hemedti began his first steps towards establishing the foundations of control over the civil service, by controlling public work and employees, especially in the teachers and electrical workers sector (19).

Some reports have revealed that there are a number of employees working with Hemedti; It employs about eight thousand people in various specializations, and they work in commercial, industrial, and media companies and in civil organizations, and these employees receive about six thousand dollars. The army's concerns stem from this development, especially since the Rapid Support has special relations with the movements

He insisted on the Sudan peace agreement in Juba, as well as presenting himself as an adversary The armed one He flirts with them sometimes. However, the crux of the dispute lies in the context of the framework agreement To the Islamists, although the Rapid Support, led by Hemedti, is committed to forming a limited civilian government, while the army is committed to forming a broad-based government with [national consensus \(20\)](#).

Third: The external role: Arab

countries, such as Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, are seen as allies of the whole The ruling military forces in Sudan led together by Al-Burhan and Hemedti; So the positions of these countries It varies in the event of a dispute between the two men. Egypt in particular is believed to be the establishment's most prominent ally Military, and this trend increased after Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi assumed power. The scene of Al-Burhan giving the military salute to Sisi in Cairo will not be forgotten. It was understood from that picture that... It reflects the intimacy of the relationship between the two parties. Patrick Smith, editor of Confidential Africa magazine, says that the Egyptians prefer Al-Burhan because he received his military training in Cairo (21).

Although the United States of America is closer to the Sudanese civil forces, and supports the democratic transition, with the possibility of a conflict erupting between the army and the Rapid Support, its position will be decisive in favor of the army. Cairo seeks to strengthen Washington's relationship with the forces supporting Al-Burhan Via Saleh Gosh, former intelligence director, who lives in Cairo (22).

As for the relations between Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan and the two countries of the Emirates of Saudi Arabia, they are distinguished and have mutual cooperation in various fields. However, the relationship between Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo, Commander of the Rapid Support Forces,

With the United Arab Emirates, it is special; Where the Rapid Support exports gold to it, which is Hey. Hemedti and his family control mines Exports valued at \$16 billion annually Gold in Darfur through Al-Junaid Company, which invests huge sums of money, probably makes Hemedti The richest man in Sudan (23).

In February 2022, the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, conducted a week-long visit to Moscow. The discussions with the Russians dealt with reconsidering the agreement Establishing a Russian base in Sudan. The military agreement between Sudan and Russia includes allowing the retention of four naval ships, and the establishment of a naval base with a strength of up to 300 Russian soldiers, including nuclear-powered ships in Port Sudan. Thus, the base guarantees a permanent presence automatic extension for ten years.of the Russian Navy in the Red Sea for a period of 25 years, with an years, in exchange for supplying Sudan with weapons and military equipment, and mining is considered one of Russia's strategic interests in Sudan (24).

In 2019, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo signed a contract worth six million dollars with Alaqat Company.

Its owner is Ari Ben Menashe, a former Israeli intelligence officer, who is closely affiliated with pressure groups and lobbies in Canada, and some reports indicate that he works for the Sudanese Rapid Support within Israeli and international institutions. In November 2022, media reports indicated that the Rapid Support Forces had obtained modern spying systems and technologies from Israel. They also confirmed that the Rapid Support Forces were among the most important supporters of the path of normalization and the signing of the Abrahamic Agreements between Sudan and Israel (25).

Fourth: Expected scenarios

After weeks of disagreements and escalation, Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, and the Forces of Freedom and Change met, and it was agreed to form a joint military committee to manage the security situation in the country. Which opens the door to completing the political process after the stalemate that witnessed the relationship between the two military parties, as a result of the difference in views between the army and the Rapid Support (26).

In light of the above, we are trying to present expected scenarios, which are as follows:

First scenario

It means completing the course of the political process, and moving forward with the integration and demobilization file, in particular Review of the Juba Peace Agreement within the framework of Related to the Rapid Support Forces and armed movements A broader plan to reform the institutions of the military and security sector, until reaching a national army with a combat doctrine. In order to achieve this, political and civil forces rely on increasing international pressure, which includes imposing sanctions on the Rapid Support leaders and their affiliated companies operating in wide sectors such as mining, construction, roads, bridges, and others. And from

Oh, and that's via configuration. During this scenario, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo can remain politically active
Oh, and win the election. What a country! Oh and regionally. A political party and making use of the alliances it has built

Coming.

Second scenario

This means the occurrence of large-scale armed confrontations and urban warfare in Khartoum and elsewhere, after the arrival of military reinforcements by the Rapid Support Forces, a wide military deployment by the armed forces, and an increase in focal points and inspection points in the cities of the capital, Khartoum. The results of this will be either the Rapid Support taking control of power in the country, and this will only happen by controlling the armed forces and removing their current leaders who have reservations about the Rapid Support and its legitimacy, or the army's victory over the Rapid Support, and then liquidating it, integrating some of its elements into the army, and bringing its leaders to trials. Military charges on charges of undermining the constitutional order and rebellion against the state, as happened when the rebellion of the Operations Authority of the Security and Intelligence Service arose in January. .2020

Third scenario

! Oh influential. No, the army may play a political role. The continuation of the Rapid Support Forces means an independent entity. This is through partnerships and agreements with some army leadership, as well as distinguished relations with the political and civil forces, Sufi orders, and civil administrations, especially after Hemedti's recent statement that participating in the October 25, 2021 coup was a mistake and that he regretted it; This means adopting the completion of the political process and handing over power to civilians. Through this, Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo aims to gain legitimacy and recognition for himself and the Rapid Support Forces, independent of the army, in order to preserve his gains and the gains of the forces allied with him, and so that he can confront the leaders of the armed forces.

Conclusion

It should be emphasized that the military and security sector in Sudan needs comprehensive reform. The Sudan Peace Agreement in Juba, as well as the framework agreement, confirmed this, but it seems that many of the leadership of the army and the Rapid Support Forces, and even some political and civil forces, do not want to implement this. The formation of a national army with a combat doctrine that defends borders and achieves security. Y This means Sudanese nationalism, and the integration of the Rapid Support and other armed groups into a national army weakens the Rapid Support and limits its influence and rise, which means the disappearance of its gains for the benefit of the state. In addition, it makes the projects of some regional and international powers decline in Africa, especially the United Arab Emirates and Russia. . Therefore, the issue of integrating rapid support into the army is a complex issue with regional and international dimensions, and implementing its integration requires will and determination, which is not what all parties to the crisis have.

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After a complex crisis that extended for more than a full year, the Sudanese military component signed an agreement with a number of the political forces affiliated with the faction of the Central Council of the Forces of Freedom and Change on December 5, 2022 was called the "Framework Political Agreement" with broad international and regional support. Against the backdrop of the complexity of the Sudanese political scene in recent months, many concerned parties at home and abroad view the signed agreement with a degree of cautious optimism, given that this step constitutes the third expanded agreement to be signed in Sudan since the beginning of the transitional phase in April 2019, after the constitutional document and the agreement. Salam Juba, which confirms the problem that the transitional phase in Sudan suffers from, which is a surplus of agreements and documents resulting from them, in exchange for a severe deficit in implementation and tangible progress on the ground. And while he was pregnant

The level of form and content, but it was revealed in ^{yes}One of the striking features of... At the same time, the framework agreement highlights a number of internal discrepancies that are important in anticipating the future of the agreement.

Support and opposition

The framework agreement was signed between Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and Lieutenant General Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo, Commander of the Rapid Support Forces, representatives of the military establishment, along with a number of political forces under the umbrella of the Central Council faction of the Forces for Freedom and Change, which is issued by the National Umma Party and the Sudanese Congress. As well as a number of Political parties, movements, and organizations with ethnic and regional orientations.

The interactions prior to the signing of the framework agreement revealed important shifts in the map of Sudanese political forces that led to the Central Council faction of the Forces of Freedom and Change regaining its influential position in the settlement trends, which came at the expense of the National Charter faction, which was originally formed from the armed factions that supported the decisions of the President of the Sudan. Transitional Sovereignty Council in October 2021

The signing of the framework agreement was also preceded by the leadership of the National Umma Party, a series of interactions aimed at rapprochement with a number of forces affiliated with traditional Islamic movements, led by the original Unionist Rally Party, the Popular Congress Party, and the Ansar al-Sunna group, which was reflected in the emergence of partial support from some Elements of the three entities of the framework agreement.

But on the other hand, the framework agreement enjoyed a limited degree of compatibility among all the political understandings and agreements signed between the parties in Sudan since the removal of Al-Bashir in April 2019.

This is compared to the agreement that led to the issuance of the constitutional document in August 2019, or the Juba Peace Agreement signed in October 2020. The list of opponents to the agreement expanded to include some influential forces that played a major role in opposing Al-Burhan's decisions to dissolve the Council of Ministers.

Since then, on top of it The Communist Party, which adopted a hard-line political stance in October 2021, as well as the resistance committees, which have a tangible influence on the ground, especially in urban areas, despite their lack of organizational cohesion.

A number of parties with Islamic orientations also continued to oppose the framework agreement as it constitutes an extension of their exclusion from effective participation in any of the main agreements in the region.

Sudan since the fall of Al-Bashir, and this is the same position adopted by a number of native administration entities. Likewise, the attempts of the National Umma Party to reach rapprochement with one of the symbols were not sufficient to attract full support for the framework agreement, as Kamal Omar's support for the agreement led the party's body to issue an official statement opposing To agree, which is what it.

Muhammad Al-Hassan Al-Mirghani, who supported the agreement at the time the Federal Party announced, officially reiterated its .opposition to the agreement.

But what is noteworthy is that the list of opponents of the framework agreement has expanded to include the National Charter faction, For decisions with the military establishment being a major source of support. The Forces of Freedom and Change, which formed its alliance in October 2021 and thereafter, when the Justice and Equality Movement, headed by Jibril Ibrahim, and the Sudan Liberation Movement faction, headed by Minni Arko Minawi, announced their sharp opposition to the framework agreement, which adds the two movements to the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North, which is led by Abdel Aziz. Al-Hilu and the Abdel Wahid Muhammad Nour faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement, which are two of the most important armed movements in Sudan in terms of military capabilities, have refused to sign any previous agreement since the fall of Al-Bashir, as each of them adopted a strict list of demands.

This new situation would reinforce the polarization between the center and the margins in Sudan, as the latest agreement lacks any direct support among the influential armed factions in the peripheral regions of Sudan. However, approving the framework agreement to continue preserving the integral outcomes of the constitution that will be prepared remains one of the paths The agreement is considered part of the open-ended Juba Peace Agreement to reintegrate the factions that signed the 2020 Juba Agreement into the consensual political process again, regardless of their position on the framework agreement.

Decisiveness and postponement

Article Fourteen of the General Principles Clause of the Framework Political Agreement in Sudan approved the principle that "the transitional authority is a complete democratic civil authority without the participation of regular forces," which comes to resolve much of the controversy that obstructed the transitional path at the level of previous documents and at the level of interactions as well. But it is clear that this principle constituted the only decisive treatment in the signed document, which was characterized by the nature of postponement and referral of the main transitional tasks.

To subsequent periods of time, or contingent on achieving further political progress at the level of expanding the consensus base or the new government achieving tangible successes in the near future.

While the framework agreement approved a specific time period estimated at two years after which the transitional phase would end, the drafting of the text began to count the two years after the new prime minister assumed his duties, which means that the extension of the dispute regarding naming the prime minister between the various political forces will automatically prolong the duration of the transitional phase. In light of the vacancy in the position of Prime Minister in Sudan for about 14 months since Al-Burhan's decisions in October 2021 and the subsequent deep disagreements regarding the nomination of a new Prime Minister, the transitional phase in Sudan may extend to the year 2025, which qualifies it to become the longest transitional phase among the various African experiences.

On the objective level, the most prominent manifestation of the lack of resolution is evident in the repeated referral to a subsequent document, the constitution, as the agreement placed the constitution-making process under the supervision of a constitutional commission among the issues and tasks of the transition without resolving them. Not just consensus on the constitution. However, that is implicitly intended sufficiently. Although this is not explicitly stated. The new constitution will also concern itself with a number of tasks that fall within the framework of the transitional arrangements, as stated in subsequent articles, such as those that define the structures of the transitional authority and stipulate that the constitution determines the tasks. The size and criteria for selecting members of the National Transitional Legislative Council, as well as the case for regional, state and local governments, the Security and Defense Council, and the Interim Judicial Council.

Also, in its last section, the document acknowledged four issues that it was unable to address, and still needs to work on "developing the framework agreement" according to the text included, which are the issues of justice and transitional justice, security and military reform, the Juba Agreement, completing peace, and dismantling the rescue regime, in light of The need for expanded consultations including various stakeholders.

By this logic, the absence of decisive solutions to the four issues limits the added value of the framework agreement to settling the extended dispute between the faction of the Central Council of the Forces for Freedom and Change and the military component in Sudan, which confirms the need for a series of rapid breakthroughs in order to ensure a minimum level of success for the recently signed agreement.

Continuity and change

The signing of the framework political agreement in Sudan revealed many aspects of continuity with the general logic by which previous agreements were made and by which the transitional phase was managed from the fall of Al-Bashir until the present moment. The agreement was based on reviving the logic of comprehensive power-sharing, which is based on multiple, parallel and intersecting criteria, which may lead to

To the complexity of the process of building consensus and drafting it in the form of a binding document, it ultimately ensures the

Longer. representation of a large number of parties in a way that ensures the longevity of the agreement.

Between the political and civil forces of

On the one hand, the framework agreement emerged as an agreement

On one side, and the Sudanese military establishment with its two branches, the General Command and the Rapid Support Forces, on the

other side, which means that this agreement enjoys the support of both civilian and military elements. On the other hand, the agreement

reflects the logic of partisan political sharing by referring a number of influential decisions to the agreement of the "revolutionary forces

that signed the political declaration," most notably the nomination of the Prime Minister who holds the most important executive position in the

transitional phase and the nomination of members of the government according to a partisan quota whose criteria were not announced in the

transitional period. Signed agreement.

Finally, the agreement reflects the adoption of the logic of ethnic sharing in light of its recognition of the validity of the Juba Peace Agreement

and the emphasis on the importance of implementing its decisions, including the most procedurally complex articles.

Such as integrating forces affiliated with ethnic armed factions into the structure of the military institution.

Also, the trend continued towards formulating consensus in the form of detailed documents that included many procedural aspects, at a

time when it was possible to suffice with a general declaration of principles that would reassemble the largest number of national forces,

while launching multiple sub-negotiating paths that would separate the different files and issues and produce understandings. Details later.

This trend comes in the nature of the document that was agreed upon to address the constitutional deficit existing in due to the absence of

complete legitimacy from any of Sudan since the beginning of the transitional phase, which arose the documents agreed upon between

the various political forces, none of which were subject to a referendum in a way that provides them with legitimacy and immunity from legal

procedures. Anti.

Although there are many manifestations of the continuity of the prevailing logic since the beginning of the transitional phase in drafting

the last agreement, the most prominent manifestations of the change it brought about were the clear definition of roles, and holding the

civilian political forces that signed the agreement fully responsible for forming the transitional governance structures, represented by the

Council of Ministers and the Council. The legislative, independent commissions and the sovereign level, without any form of organic

participation with the military component "regular agencies" that do not exercise any of the tasks

whose structure and jurisdiction were defined under the name

Governance, which includes the armed forces, the Rapid Support Forces, the police, and the General Intelligence Service, provided

that the only organic meeting point in the institutional structure of the transitional government is the Security and Defense Council, which will be

chaired by the Prime Minister, with the membership of the leaders of the regular services and the relevant ministers.

These new arrangements establish a new situation in which tensions between the military and civilian components are supposed to be

reduced to a minimum after they caused multiple setbacks over the years. It was announced in the agreement that does not in itself

guarantee the containment of internal tensions between past. However, what a

With the absence of an explicit text on the quota mechanism and the distribution of positions between the various civilian components among these components, and the absence of the armed factions from signing the latest agreement, contentment with a stipulation of the continuation of the Juba Peace Agreement. This shortcoming is in addition to the inability of the agreement in its declared text to address the pluralism of the leadership structure in the military institution by continuing to distinguish between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, and only stipulating the goal of unifying the military entities by integrating the Rapid Support Forces into the structure of the armed forces according to "agreed upon timetables." Without any reference to specific procedural steps or announced time frames, which leads to more internal tensions between the military components and each other. The door might also open. Some.

ins and outs

There has been no significant change in the Sudanese balance of power since the October 2021 decisions that overthrew the second government of Abdullah Hamdok until the time of signing the framework agreement. Deep divisions are still affecting the majority of Sudanese political forces, and betting on the option of protest mobilization no longer has any effective value in light of its transformation into one of the constants of the Sudanese equation, which confirms the crisis experienced by the various political forces in charge, instead of forming a parallel indicator. To test its relative strength. The armed factions that signed the Juba Peace Agreement also tended to adopt more specific work programs after the failure they faced in their attempt to^a occupy the central location. In power, based on the outcome of the experience of the alliance between the military component and the National Charter By dividing it into two balanced components faction of the Forces of Freedom and Change. As for the military component, it is still affected Considerations of interest force them to adopt coordinated positions despite the continuing deep differences that exist between the armed forces and the Forces of Freedom and Change.

In the face of this situation, the interactions between the Sudanese forces would not have produced any form of consensus or fruitful attempts to contain the crisis without the effective contribution of international powers, whose role is strongly embodied in the nature and content of the consensus. The tripartite mechanism led by the United Nations Integrated Mission to Support the Transitional Phase in Sudan (UNITAMS), alongside the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), has contributed to keeping channels of indirect communication open between the Sudanese parties even in the wake of the October 2021 crisis. It has also been able to build a consensual solution. Based on its espoused necessity of entrusting the management of the remainder of the transitional phase to civilian authorities, while maintaining an influential and supportive role for the military institution, without raising any controversial issues. Which would push the military establishment to adopt radical positions regarding the transitional path.

The external variable also contributed to providing a favorable environment for reaching the framework agreement indirectly, in light of the "conciliatory wave" that the East African region has been witnessing for months, which began with the election of the new Somali President, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, in May, after a faltering period that extended for more than a year, according to William Ruto. In Kenya in August, following elections and the successful transition of power by

Overall, it set a rare precedent in the country's history in terms of a significant decrease in indicators of electoral violence, and ended with the signing of an agreement to stop hostilities between the Ethiopian federal government and the Tigray Liberation Front in Pretoria, South Africa, early last November. Just as the escalating regional tensions since 2020 contributed to the worsening of the internal situation in Sudan, the recent wave of calm opened the door to a positive step in the complex transitional path, especially since all of these measures at the regional level received direct international support as a result of the calculations of the major powers that see... The East African region is a natural extension For the surrounding area

Indo-Pacific, and close proximity to the theater of operations in Eastern Europe.

Overall, the signing of the Political Framework Agreement in Sudan constituted a positive and reliable step in launching a new phase of the transitional phase that could be more regular and stable than

The previous stages occurred after the clash between the civil and military forces, which sparked a rivalry, was resolved

The influence and specialization between the two components grew and extended for a period exceeding three years. but what

The framework agreement's campaign of multiple discrepancies revealed many of its shortcomings, which qualify it to be merely a first step toward successfully ending the Sudanese transitional phase, leading to a new consensus that enjoys broader support,

addresses various issues through decisive formulations, and bears aspects of positive qualitative change. Compared to previous incomplete treatments, it also reflects internal tendencies towards settlement more than it reflects international balances.

One day into the bloody conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid ^{a hundred} after Support Forces, hope for a peaceful settlement remains elusive. Thousands of people lost their lives and and-run nature of urban warfare, it may be exposed millions were displaced. Given the hit- Both sides suffered major setbacks, at a time when the armed forces lost control of various regions in Sudan. Complex sectarian tensions, political interests, and ethnic alliances between armed groups in Darfur, Kordofan, and Blue Nile raise troubling concerns about the prospect across Sudan. If all the rulers of the escalation of the conflict into a comprehensive civil war in all of Sudan came from the elite stationed in the middle of the Nile, the only exception is Caliph Abdullah bin Muhammad al-Taayshi (1885-1898), who came from Darfur during the time of the Mahdist state.

There are those who believe that the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), seeks to repeat the experience of the Caliph Al-Taayshi and restore the authority of the Sudanese parties after a century, and distance the center of power from the people of the Nile. It is clear that there are persistent attempts to portray Hemedti as a man and that he will work He worked hard to reform the 1956 state "A champion of the deprived" "Champion of the marginalized" and Inherited from the colonial era in Sudan. It is the idea of a secular new Sudan that was raised by John Garang.

On the other hand, the prevailing view among many people living on the outskirts of Sudan is still associating the inhabitants of the Nile Valley with the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists. This also applies to commanders of the armed forces. So Hemedti is building his propaganda campaign Outward and aiming at On slogans of fighting Islamists. These slogans are also directed Gaining the sympathy of both the West and all countries opposed to Islamist rule.

Fears of civil war

Perhaps the most dangerous threat looming on the horizon after the war in Sudan enters its fourth month is the According to UN envoy Volker Perthes, the situation in Sudan has reached... harbinger of civil war. According A critical point, where a mere disagreement between two generals could turn into an ideological and ethnic conflict, pushing the country closer to a devastating civil war. All approaches of international and regional parties, including the Jeddah Negotiations Mechanism, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and Sudan's neighboring countries in Cairo, have realized the futility of a military victory for any party concerned, and have called for an immediate cessation of hostilities to begin a much-needed political process. The danger of a civil war extends Beyond Sudan's borders, where neighboring countries could be attra

Conflict, which further destabilizes the region. In this context, we can point to two important developments:

First: Opening new battle fronts and front lines

Since the Abdelaziz al-Hilu faction, which emerged from the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), unilaterally declared a cessation of hostilities in July 2019 following the overthrow of former President Omar al-Bashir, it has remained relatively inactive in the country's scene of political violence. Since during the period from August 2019 to May 2023, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) recorded only eight incidents of political violence in which the group was involved. However, at the beginning of last June (2023), reports began to emerge that the Al-Hilu faction had attempted to take control of several Sudanese Armed Forces bases in South Kordofan State. This armed group attributed its involvement in the conflict to the resulting insecurity, and with the aim of protecting civilians as well. The attacks of the Abdulaziz Al-Hilu faction in the Blue Nile region on June 26, 2023 are confirmed.

For its strategic gains in at least ten locations within the state. In response, Continuation
The Sudanese Armed Forces launched air strikes in Dilling and Kadugli localities, likely targeting Al-Hilu faction forces.

It is also worth noting that a new front emerged in Blue Nile State, where the Al-Hilu faction succeeded in controlling villages in Kurmuk locality on June 26, after two days of clashes with the Sudanese Armed Forces. These armed clashes highlight the risk of escalation in Blue Nile State, which has long been marginalized in this conflict. It should be noted that both South Kordofan and Blue Nile states have armed groups

They suffer from complex societal divisions. SPLM-N rebels mainly come from these two states along the border with South Sudan. As the group's militarily dominant bloc, Al-Hilu's faction controls a large area of...

Defense Forces in South Kordofan mobilized and recruited their forces Lands. In parallel, the Popular Arab herder groups such as the Misseriya and Hawazma have been fighting the SPLM-N since 2011. These forces in Blue Nile have also recruited Hausa and Falata ethnic groups for the same reason.

Second: The Rapid Support Forces strengthen their control in Darfur

Over the past month, violence in Darfur has escalated, spreading to new areas beyond the initial hotspots recorded in the early stages of the conflict. They became southern and central states

Darfur is a new hotbed of violence, with the Rapid Support Forces gaining a strong foothold in the region. And it has New actors have become involved in the conflict, with clashes between the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Abdul Wahid Mohamed Nur faction in Central Darfur, and leaders from South Darfur communities calling on their followers to join the fight against the Sudanese Armed Forces. It is no secret that

Consolidating the growing influence of the RSF in South Darfur with declared support from leaders of many tribal communities may lead to increased sectarian divisions and possibly lead to more violence. A disturbing development affecting regional security occurred when clashes between Arab militias and the Sudanese Alliance Movement in the Shukri region resulted in artillery shelling by Chadian military forces on June 30. This incident occurred during the exodus of civilians to Chad, and other clashes took place between unknown gunmen and Chadian soldiers near the border town of Adekun.

The importance of not internationalizing the war in Sudan

In the face of this absurd panorama, it is worth noting that the conflict in Sudan is considered a conflict of international humanitarian law, because it is a situation in which armed groups fight According to a non-international armed group Within the same state each other. The Egyptian approach, through the conference of Sudan's neighboring countries in Cairo, succeeded in thwarting the plan to internationalize the Sudanese conflict by the IGAD group. It is known that Sudan ratified the four Geneva Conventions (September 23, 1957) and the First and Second Additional Protocols to the Conventions (March 7, 2006 and July 13, 2006).

Accordingly, Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II can be applied with regard to the regulation of internal conflicts.

In this sense, it should be made clear that the war in Sudan can be regulated under Article 3 Common and Additional Protocol II. Perhaps the difference between them is that the protocol provides regulation The concept of internal conflict, but its application to a specific situation is subject to a greater application threshold More complete Strictness. In the case of Sudan, the criteria for use of Additional Protocol II are met, which are as follows:

1-The conflicting parties, namely the National Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Militia.

2-The Rapid Support Forces have a responsible leadership headed by Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo.

3-Both parties have territorial control over certain areas of Sudan.

4-The parties carry out continuous and coordinated military operations, mainly in large cities.

5-Both the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces have the ability to implement the provisions of Additional Protocol II.

In relation to the above, it is necessary to remember that warring parties to an armed conflict are responsible for protecting civilians in the territories and areas under their control. It should also be noted

Pointing out that international humanitarian law is not based on the principle of reciprocity. In this sense, then The failure of one of the warring parties to comply with the provisions stipulated in international laws

regulating armed conflict, this does not mean that the other party may be unaware of its obligations in this area.

In addition, the principles of distinction, humanity and proportionality must be taken into account. The first of them states that there is no principle of humanity. **Attacking people who are not participating in hostilities.** According to Respect all persons (combatants and non-combatants) and treat them humanely. Finally, it stipulates An effort must be made to find a balance between achieving military objectives and harm resulting from the principle of proportionality. In this sense, care must be taken that the military actions undertaken cause as little damage as possible in terms of loss of human life, number of wounded, critical infrastructure, etc.

Perhaps this understanding is what prompted the United Nations Integrated Transitional Assistance Mission in Sudan to issue its statement, last June 28, condemning the actions of some parties, saying: "The Rapid Support Forces and their allied militias are still responsible for acts of violence against civilians, rape and looting in the areas they control." countries, including Khartoum, and ethnic violence against civilians in Darfur (...).

Negative zero match

Despite each party's attempt to achieve a decisive victory that strengthens its negotiating position, the complexities of the conflict in Sudan and the intertwining of its dimensions leave us facing a manifestation of a negative zero-sum game in which everyone loses. It is certain that developments in the conflict on the ground are changing. It is unclear how long the forces around the two opposing generals can hold out without fresh supplies. Assuming the fall of the army complex, as dramatic as that would be, it may not. The war ends, because the army still controls large areas on the outskirts of Khartoum, including large areas of the city of Omdurman, as well as in the rest of the country, especially in the east and north. In contrast, the Rapid Support Forces suffer from weaknesses of their own, including twisted supply lines from Darfur in the west, their lack of air power, and the deep hostility that their fighting practices arouse among many Sudanese, including most Khartoum residents, which makes them lose their support. Popularity.

And he pledged "Victory is at hand," he declared. On July 17, Hemedti issued a statement By eliminating the militias linked to the old regime of Omar al-Bashir, which were mobilized alongside the army. Otherwise, it seems that the army infantry is unable to resolve the battle quickly, and it returns A few of his soldiers come from the central river areas, the army's stronghold of support. to Partially so, the inevitability of ending this ugly war does not obscure the fact that any ceasefire or deal between - It Sudanese. these two warring parties will be unpalatable to many may be difficult to implement on the ground. Horrific atrocities have been committed. On June 28, the features of the crisis became clear.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees published a report

The humanitarian crisis that Sudan is witnessing as a result of this senseless war. In the period from April 15 to 20 million internally displaced persons last June, 2.48 million displaced people were reported, including 1.97 thousand displaced people across the border. Likewise, it is estimated that there are more than 140,000 refugees and asylum seekers fleeing the main cities where the conflict is taking place. On the other hand, the report includes information provided by the Sudanese Ministry of Health, which stated that there is no less than that. It should be noted that there is a possibility of 8,000 deaths and 6,000 infections so far. And with The actual is much higher. To be numbers great

In conclusion, Sudan's strategic location in Africa makes the development of the current conflict decisive

For the Libyan scenario, it could Due to its large size and possible division according to... stability of the continent. And in view Sudan's crisis has disastrous repercussions for neighboring countries, many of which are already suffering from their own transition challenges. Therefore, the international community cannot ignore the escalating situation and must take decisive action to prevent further escalation. There is a need for the international community, especially Europe and the United States, to support and actively participate in the Egyptian and African approaches calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities. The ongoing humanitarian crisis in Sudan also requires significant assistance within the country and in neighboring countries such as Chad, Egypt, South Sudan and Ethiopia, which are already absorbing a large number of refugees Sudanese. Until a negotiated settlement is reached, both the armed forces and the RSF have responsibilities under international humanitarian law that must be observed and complied with. For this reason, it is important that all of us, as part of the international community, remain vigilant We are interested in what is happening, and to do our best to understand the repercussions of the dangerous situation that Sudan is going through, and to help reach a negotiated peace settlement. The crisis situation requires collective action and solidarity to prevent further bloodshed and help Sudan chart a .path towards a more stable and prosperous future.

Sudanese-Russian rapprochement: challenges and risks

The Russian presence in Sudan is linked to Moscow's strategic interests, as Khartoum is a link between the countries of the continent, and the completion of the Russian base project in the Red Sea will serve as a huge storehouse for the flow of weapons and military equipment to the centers of Russian influence on the African continent.

Since the beginning of the sixties of the last century (during the era of the Soviet Union), Sudanese-Russian relations have witnessed steady development, as a number of agreements were signed that directly contributed to In developing relations between the two countries at various levels. In the early seventies, the authorities severed relations with the Soviet Union after the Sudanese government, led by the deposed president, Jaafar Numeiri, failed to break relations with the coup of Major Hashim al-Atta, supported by Moscow. After the fall of the May regime, relations began to return little by little. During the era of the regime of the deposed President, Omar al-Bashir, relations reached a point It reached its peak between the two countries, as the countries allied in international institutions and supported the National Congress Party regime's occupation and annexation of the Crimean Peninsula to Russia. However, in the year 2017, relations between the two countries became the closest among the countries of the Horn of Africa, as the deposed President, Omar al-Bashir, asked the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, publicly protecting him from what he called American hostile actions. During the transitional period led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Mohamed Hemedti, his deputy, there was an accelerated rapprochement on fundamental issues that we monitor in this analytical paper.

Sudan: Geostrategic Importance

Sudan's strategic location, located in the northeastern part of the African continent, plays a role, a link between the countries of the north, south, east and west of the continent, In strengthening its position as Axis O important and many countries: Egypt, Libya, Chad and Africa. In addition, Sudan has borders Central and South Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea. Therefore, Sudan's geopolitical importance includes influence Such as the Sahel region, the Middle East and the Gulf over the region. In large areas witnessing global competition The Arabian Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, especially the Red Sea, and the Horn of Africa (1).

Sudan represents a starting point for the Horn of Africa and the security of the Red Sea. The region gained its importance through regional and international approaches, equations, and interactions seeking to control the countries of the Horn of Africa. Moreover, Sudan has the second longest coastline on the Red Sea (its length is about 720 km). Therefore, Sudan is a pivotal and essential country for ensuring the security of the Red Sea, and its security could be threatened by affecting navigation that passes through the Bab al-Mandab Strait at the southern entrance to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal in Egypt: In general, the Red Sea is considered one of the most important Sea lanes, through which an estimated \$700 billion in international trade passes; Which makes Sudan closely linked to the interactions of the regional and international system (2).

Sudan gains its importance because of its size, as it is the third largest country in terms of area in Africa.

to its land outlets that overlook seven countries. In addition, after the secession of the south in 2011, it has an outlet to the Red Sea. It derives its importance not only from being the country's only outlet to the sea, but also from being an outlet for some closed neighboring countries (Chad, South Sudan, Central Africa, and Ethiopia). There is also a port of Port Sudan, which is considered the largest and main port through which Sudanese trade and maritime traffic passes, while the city of Port Sudan is a logistical center.

Major oil refinery. South Sudan's oil is transported through this port and goods are exported from it. Which makes it of great importance to the Sudanese economy. Through this port, the value of about 8 billion dollars annually

For the Sudanese economy. Therefore, Port Sudan is a strategic maritime gateway, a first-class economic city, and a tourist destination for Sudanese (3).

Sudan has an abundance of natural resources and wealth, such as uranium, gold, cobalt, and oil. Sudan has the third largest reserve of uranium in the world and also ranks the same in gold production on the African level and thirteenth in the world. With an annual production volume of about 300 tons, in addition to 220 million arable acres and livestock estimated at more than these resources, the world's food if exploited 150 million heads, which qualifies it to become and achieve food security at the regional and international levels (4).

Russian ambitions and interests

Since the beginning of the new millennium, Russia has been strengthening its efforts to impose its presence on the African continent through more than one window, as it has succeeded in the past seven years in particular in finding a foothold in the north of the continent through the Libyan file, which served as a starting point towards the rest of the vital regions in Africa. Since the fifties of the last century until today, the Russians have set their eyes on the Red Sea so that they can obtain a naval base there that will transport them to warm waters. Therefore, Russia has not stopped striving to achieve the old, renewed dream, after the failure of their previous attempts to establish a base for them on African land overlooking a body of water the size of The importance of the Red Sea (5).

Russian efforts resulted in signing a military cooperation agreement between Moscow and Khartoum to establish a base in the Red Sea, in November 2020, this agreement aims to achieve Russian interests in the African continent and a point to facilitate access to areas of Russian influence in Central Africa, Mali and Mozambique, as well as linking their naval stations in Syria and Madagascar. The duration of the (6) . agreement is 25 years, subject to renewal

The agreement granted the base (free) to Russia, and allowed it the freedom to use Sudanese airports for transport of weapons, ammunition and military equipment necessary for the base, in addition to allowing the sending of 4 ships and a maximum of 300 personnel to the port. This is Russia's first naval center in Africa. And despite

Despite the denial of the Sudanese authorities and the claim of some media outlets that the Sudanese Transitional Authority had canceled the agreement, Moscow reinforced its denial with the arrival of a new warship in May 2021. It was not

Military influence and strategic positioning is the only goal of Moscow's efforts to establish a military base in Sudan. Indeed, controlling Sudan's mineral wealth, especially gold and uranium, in addition to the enormous energy resources and agricultural potential, is the primary goal of the Russians' moves to strengthen their influence in Sudan (7).

Although the signing of the establishment of the Russian naval base came within an old military cooperation agreement inaugurated by the deposed President, Omar al-Bashir, in Moscow five years ago, it was done by Sudan in late June 2019, that is, after the crime of dispersing the sit-in and the attempt of the military council at that time to take refuge in Russia. It does not seem that there is a Sudanese interest in rapprochement with Russia other than establishing military relations between the two countries and supporting the existing regime. Previous agreements were Oh, and also buy weapons and wheat from Russia. A sea Sudan received a number of Russian tanks and a boat. It is carried out on a commercial basis and at exorbitant prices, from which only the Russian side and the brokers from the former and current Sudanese regimes benefit. It seems that the goal of protecting regimes is Moscow's main entrance to Africa. We note that the idea of the base came from the deposed Sudanese president, Omar al-Bashir, who had proposed to Vladimir Putin in the Russian resort of Sochi the establishment of a Russian military base in the Red Sea in Sudan that would be used by Russian soldiers to protect Khartoum from America. Although this is the main goal of the current authority, it is trying to cover it by claiming that the various active parties, especially the military component, are seeking to diversify its relations with the international community (8).

Relations after the October 25 coup. Moscow

was able to maintain the agreements it concluded with the Bashir regime because the same generals remained in power, during the period of the partnership government between the Forces of Freedom and Change and the military in power, while relations were deeply strengthened after the October 25, 2021 coup. ; Russia now supported the military model and continued its efforts to build its influence by trying to influence Sudanese public opinion to support its military allies, and under the pretext of supporting stability in the country, it worked and is working to legitimize it, by directing social media and some Sudanese newspapers (9) .

During the last two years, Moscow has unveiled some projects with Khartoum in the security field. At the Sochi summit in October 2019, President Vladimir Putin pledged to implement a wide range of Russian-Sudanese defense agreements aimed at reforming the Sudanese military and security services and enhancing their capabilities and forces. Russia also announced that it would cooperate in the peaceful nuclear field under an agreement with The Sudanese government, in May 2019, an announcement that appears to be purely propaganda in nature. In general, Moscow has many... Economic interests in Sudan, as Khartoum is the second largest importer of Russian weapons during the past two decades, and the volume of trade between Russia and Sudan reached about five hundred million dollars.

With a trade balance strongly tilted in favor of Moscow; Russia imports some goods from Sudan, such as cotton, sesame, and peanuts, while Sudan imports weapons and wheat from it (10) .

Over time, Russia's efforts to deplete Sudanese gold have increased, as the Russians have intensified their projects in this sector, as the Russian mining companies MInvest, Marawi Gold, and Esimath are active in gold exploration operations in Sudan. The involvement of these companies began in 2015 (after the occupation of the Crimean Peninsula and the first Western sanctions, and then Putin sought to provide gold reserves that would protect him from any subsequent sanctions). At the forefront of this was 2015 to produce 46 tons of agreement sold gold, and in the year the companies Cyprin Company, which a year ^{Our} ^O In 2017, companies entered to work in the Nile, Red Sea, and Northern states, such as Marawi Gold Company, which is linked to the Russian businessman, Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of the Russian Wagner Group (11).

The Wagner Group is guarding the Sudanese gold mines in the areas of Jebel Amer and Senangu in partnership with the Rapid Support Forces led by the Vice President of the Sovereignty Council, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti). Within the framework of the alliance between Russia and the generals in general and the Rapid Support Forces in particular, Mohamed's visit falls within Hamdan Dagalo, Vice President of the Sovereignty Council, recently headed a high-level delegation to Moscow on the eve of the start of... The Russian attack on Ukraine, and his statements in support of the invasion within the framework of this rapprochement and in a way that serves Russian interests and contributes to expanding Russian influence in Sudan (12).

The Sudanese-Russian rapprochement: challenges and

dangers On March 1, 2021, the American destroyer "Admiral Churchill Winston USS" docked face to face with the Russian frigate (Face "Admiral Grigorovich" (Admiral Grigorovich) in Port Sudan overlooking the Red Sea. That scene, in its form, was a precedent that had never happened before, and it brought to mind the Cold War between America and the Soviet Union. It also carried size many connotations that reveal the rivalry between Washington and Moscow on the coasts of the Red Sea in Sudan (13) .

! To expand its influence ^{Oh meh} Washington saw the change that occurred in Sudan as a strategic change It weakened the Chinese and Russian presence in Sudan and adopted an approach based on supporting the democratic civil transition and lifting sanctions on the Khartoum regime. Within the framework of American support for the civilian government led by Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok, Congress approved, in January The Democratic Transition, Accountability, and Financial Transparency Act of 2021, which includes the strategy of American support for the process of completing the democratic transition, which tightens oversight of government agencies. Military and security and restoring its doctrine (14).

American support for the Sudanese government led by Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok emerged, which was described as... With Washington on Hey; Where you signed, politically it is strongly pro-Western and economically supported by it

signed a memorandum of understanding that would enable Sudan to... One billion dollars and Obtaining a loan worth 2 billion dollars from the World Bank. Washington also became the largest donor of humanitarian aid to Sudan in 2020, with approximately 437 million dollars (15) .

In a related context, the United States of America sought to find an approach to cooperation with the Sudanese military establishment. After announcing the establishment of the Russian base in the Red Sea, the American embassy in Khartoum announced that it wanted to strengthen close military cooperation, and the American military attaché, Jacob Day, confirmed that he was communicating with the Sudanese army to strengthen bilateral relations; Where the Commander of the Sudanese Naval Forces, Rear Admiral Haj Ahmed Youssef, met with the Sudanese Navy in the Red Sea at the naval base and discussed with him the frameworks of bilateral military cooperation (16).

In light of the ongoing conflict between the United States of America and Russia, an assistant minister warned The US State Department for African Affairs, Molly Vee, said that Russia's victory in Sudan would mean dire humanitarian consequences in the Horn of Africa region, and she said this before the Foreign Relations Committee of the US Congress, in February 2022. Therefore, Washington is seeking to reformulate its policy towards Khartoum so that it is based On the basis of confronting Moscow (17).

Following the coup of October 25, 2021, and the overthrow of the civilian part of the transitional government headed by Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok, Russia took a implicitly supportive position.

For coups; Russia's Deputy Representative to the United Nations, Dmitry Polyansky, stated that he is one of the... events that occurred in other regions. Was this a coup or not, considering that there were similar It is difficult to say whether there will be another coup in the world without calling it a coup. On a related note, a minister returned The Russian Foreign Ministry, Sergei Lavrov, referred to the state of instability in Sudan due to actions that led to the erosion of the country's territorial integrity and destabilization by Western powers and Disruption and the imposition of democracy, in a direct accusation against Western countries.

Russia views the frictions between Sudan, the United States of America, and the European Union that occurred after the coup as an important opportunity to strengthen its presence in Sudan, complete the Flamingo base project in the Red Sea, and conclude broad partnerships in the gold mining and raw resources sector (18) .

Expected scenarios : The

scores danger of the Sudanese-Russian rapprochement is that it makes Sudan a scene for settling And conflict with other countries, especially the United States of America, France, Germany, and to some extent China. All these countries have ambitions in Sudan, especially the coast along the coast of Saudi Arabia and other countries in the Red Sea There is also regional pressure from the Kingdom The Riyadh Security Agreement was signed in 2014 The eight overlooking the Red Sea in 2020, which

Provides for the removal of foreign influence from the Red Sea; Therefore, Sudan faces pressure from countries

Overlooking the Red Sea because foreign bases are not allowed (19) .

In general, in light of the Sudanese-Russian rapprochement, we attempt below to draw some scenarios about anticipating the future of the Russian presence in Sudan as follows:

Every pressure on the American administration causes it to ease - the Sudanese-Russian rapprochement may...

With the Forces of Freedom and Change, there is a covenant of its tone and sanctions towards the military component allied with the National Accord, in an attempt to contain it if its attempts related to restoring the path of democratic transformation and forming a consensual civilian government between the political forces fail, in the hope of ensuring its loyalty to it and blocking African Union through the Sudan Gateway (20). the way for any Russian ambition to expand in the century. The

-ÿ Return to the box of US sanctions and influence and pressure on international financial institutions

Such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and returning the Sudanese regime to the stage of isolation and siege. In order to achieve this, the United States of America froze aid worth seven hundred million dollars, and the World Bank stopped its development grants worth two billion dollars to the country (21).

-ÿ After the coup of October 25, 2021 and the war in Ukraine, Russia believes that the time has come to effectively consolidate its presence in Sudan to achieve its strategic interests and benefit from the state of decline witnessed in US-Sudanese relations, as Washington tightens the siege on the Khartoum regime until it returns to the path of democratic civil transition. . In this context, Russia vetoed a draft resolution condemning the proof procedures and describing them as a coup. On the other hand, Sudan refused to vote on the draft resolution of the United Nations General Assembly condemning the Russian aggression against Ukraine.

From this standpoint, I believe that the visit of the Vice-President of the Sovereignty Council and Commander of the Rapid Support Forces, Mohamed Hamdan (Hemedti), in February 2022 will have its aftermath, as he stated after...

Upon his arrival at Khartoum Airport, he discussed with Russian officials cooperation in the field of national security, political issues, exchange of experiences, joint cooperation, combating terrorism, and training. Regarding the fate of the Russian naval base in the sea, he said: There are African countries that have bases, and I do not know the reason behind the increasing interest in this base, and he stressed that Sudan must search for its strategic interests (22).

Conclusion

The Russian presence in Sudan is linked to Moscow's strategic interests, as Khartoum is considered a link to protect the Russian presence in It connected the countries of East, Central and West Africa, and was an important axis Central Africa and an attempt to penetrate South Sudan, Chad...etc. Also completing a project

The Russian base in the Red Sea will serve as a huge warehouse for the flow of weapons and military equipment to the centers of Russian influence on the African continent in Mali, Mozambique, and the Congo, and Continuing cooperation as well as being used as a possible Western involvement between Russia and the Wagner the continued flow of large quantities of gold (and uranium) in ways that do not achieve any gains for the Sudanese economy and serve only to support Russia's project based on providing huge reserves of gold and minerals. In light of the two regimes' inclination towards totalitarianism and war, their hostility to the aspirations of the people, and the prevalence of corruption in all From them, I believe that the Khartoum and Moscow regimes will cooperate more and more in the coming period.

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On the evening of January 2, 2022, Sudanese Transitional Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok ended the controversy over his political future after he officially announced his resignation in a broadcast speech.

Sudanese official television. In his speech, Hamdok referred to the problems his government faced, most notably the distortion of the economy, international isolation, corruption, debt, and internal conflicts. He also enumerated the initiatives he announced to resolve the crises, the most recent of which was the Way Forward Initiative, stressing his continued approach to calling for dialogue and consensus. However, he considered that the biggest problem was in comprehensive dialogue on the political, civil and military components, calling for a Sudan is the problem. I am a representative of all Sudanese forces to draw a road map for completing the democratic transformation.

In addition to the fact that Abdullah Hamdok's resignation represented a direct reason for the deterioration of the transitional phase in Sudan in a way that opens the door to talking about real prospects for the complete collapse of the transitional path, this resignation revealed a number of deep structural problems that will face any other transitional arrangements that may be agreed upon. In the future, effective mechanisms must be sought to overcome them in order to spare Sudan from extremely dangerous consequences. The list of problems revealed by Hamdok's resignation includes the following:

1 - Severe distortions in the civil-military partnership model: Since its inception, the civil-military partnership model in Sudan has suffered from a number of distortions that have hindered its progress since its launch, through a number of aspects, most notably the circumstantial nature of the emergence of the partnership without any precedent of agreement on the governing principles and lines. The broad plan for the transitional phase, in addition to the lack of clarity of a decisive mechanism for determining the relative weights of each of the civil forces, none of which was based on determining its share of the election fund, in addition to the faltering formation of the Transitional Legislative Council and the participation of the Sovereignty and Council of Ministers in exercising its duties.

The civilian and military components in Sudan entered into a partnership that began in August 2019. By signing the constitutional document after about four months of escalating disputes, during which it was proven that both parties were unable to remove the other from participating in leading the country during the transitional phase. Since then, the relationship between the two sides has witnessed repeated stages of rapprochement and divergence. complex in 2020, Since the signing of the peace agreement in Juba in October of the year. However, it became more which resulted in the integration of armed factions into the structure of transitional governance institutions, which led to the expansion of the Transitional Sovereignty Council and the restructuring of the Transitional Council of Ministers at the beginning of 2021. This is in addition to the complexities associated with the hybrid nature of the armed factions, which combine political and military characteristics at the same time. One.

The integration of armed factions into the governance structure in Sudan provided a new margin of maneuver for the military and civilian components, which provided a measure of support for the decisions of October 25.

The past, which included dissolving the government and calling for the formation of a technocratic government. Despite the attempt to restore the relationship between the civilian and military components through the signing of the framework political agreement between the President of the Sovereignty Council, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan and Abdullah Hamdok on the twenty-first of last November, Hamdok's resignation about five weeks after the signing of the agreement revealed the erosion of Trust between the two sides in a way that may be difficult to overcome in the near future after the many manifestations of disagreement regarding the implementation of the provisions of this agreement, which was seen as a last opportunity to restore consensus between the partners of the transitional government in Sudan, which the two sides did not exploit well.

2 - A surplus of agreements and a deficit in implementation: Abdullah Hamdok's resignation did not come as a result of a sudden, unexpected decision, as it was preceded by a number of early announcements of his intention to resign and accompanied by multiple meetings held with various participants in the transitional government. The decision to resign is due to the lack of commitment to the terms of the framework political agreement signed in November, which was embodied in the continued inability to agree on the new political declaration, the delay in starting serious investigations into the events that accompanied the demonstrations, and the growing disagreement regarding the decisions that Hamdok began to take to appoint new deputy ministers and officials in the states. And its cancellation of previous decisions to suspend the work of a number of ambassadors abroad, in addition to the dispute over the powers of the intelligence service.

Bypassing the terms of the framework political agreement is not a precedent in the history of the Sudanese transitional phase, as all the consensual documents that were approved have previously been bypassed. Although the document is very precise and specific about

The constitutional stipulations signed in August 2019 included a time frame for the timing of taking all necessary steps to complete the transitional process. These texts were bypassed due to the delay in forming Abdullah Hamdok's first government, and the continued absence of the Transitional Legislative Council until now. While the Juba Peace Agreement was viewed as the most complete document regarding the nature of the relationship between the center and the parties in Sudan, provisions were exceeded in order to challenge the nature of the relationship between the center and the parties in Sudan.

The agreement was delayed through the delay in completing the procedures related to the restructuring of the joint security units in Darfur, as well as the collapse of the East Track after a series of escalating protests, which may

It opens the door to structural reviews of the agreement, the negotiation process that led to it, and the nature of its participants.

The resignation of Abdallah Hamdok highlights the great contradiction taking place at this stage. On this basis, repeat The Sudanese transitional period in light of the presence of a surplus of consensual documents regulating the transitional phase in its various dimensions, but with a large deficit in the procedures that embody these documents on the ground, as a result of the multiplicity of decision-making centres, the internal conflicts between the various components and within each component, and the accumulated structural weakness of the Sudanese state. Since independence, the severity of which was exacerbated by Al-Bashir's policies during three full decades.

3- The rapid consumption of political funds: In addition to his failure to overcome the severe political crisis in Sudan, Abdullah Hamdok's signing of the framework political agreement with General Abdel Fattah Al-

Burhan sparked a wave of sharp division between the non-military parties represented by the various political forces and factions that signed the Juba Agreement. For peace, as some supported this step in light of what it approved of the continuation of the constitutional document signed in August 2019 as a basic reference for governance during the remainder of the transitional phase, and the reversal of the decisions of the twenty-fifth of last October. However, a large percentage of the civil forces responded to the announcement of the framework agreement. With a lot of sharp rejection. The recent crisis has not only revealed how deep divisions have become between and within civil forces, but it has also revealed the erosion of much of the balances of these forces during the past two years. The Forces of Freedom and Change were afflicted by a series of sharp divisions between its components, embodied in the emergence of two separate wings, namely the wing of the Central Committee and the wing of the National Consensus Charter. This is a crisis that some parties are trying to resolve by signing a unified internal charter that does not yet enjoy complete consensus among

the various parties. Although the decisions of the twenty-fifth of last October contributed to changing the balance of power at the level of the civil component, to enhance the role of the forces that are not politically regulated, represented

In the resistance committees, in contrast to the decline of party forces in particular, the crisis in its more advanced eruption of an additional problem embodied in the efforts of some party forces to **ON** stages resulted in the impose their hegemony over the resistance committees, which prompted the Supreme Coordination of the Resistance Committees to issue a statement denouncing the attempts of the Sudanese Communist Party seeking to "hijack Resistance committees. As such, the accelerating crisis in Sudan contributed to a sharp erosion of the power assets of the civil forces, a matter whose negative effects were exacerbated by the resignation of Abdallah Hamdok.

4 - Civilian leadership crisis: Hamdok's resignation imposed an urgent need to find an alternative, whether at the level of presidency of the transitional cabinet, or at the level of the emergence of a consensual figure who enjoys the consensus of the various political forces as an acceptable symbol of the political and civil forces. At the level of the Prime Minister, many of the proposed names are still being circulated, which are primarily due to a number of Sudanese experts with extensive international experience, such as the Indians of Abia Kadouf, Kamel Idris, Muhammad Hussein Abu Saleh, and the Minister of Finance in Hamdok's first government, Ibrahim Al-Badawi, in an attempt to reproduce Hamdok experience. However, it is noted that all of these names presented do not enjoy any support from the main political forces, which may push the committee formed by the Sovereignty Council, jointly chaired by Lieutenant General Yasser Al-Atta and Malik Aqar, members of the Council to search for nominations for ministerial positions, to move toward choosing an experienced alternative who has a base of support. The political path is the path in which Jibril Ibrahim, head of the Justice and Equality Movement and Minister of Finance in Hamdok's second government, has strong opportunities, but it remains one of the difficult options that may cause additional complications to the government.

Aside from heading the Transitional Council of Ministers, Abdallah Hamdok's stagnation in the last month led to...

Between the conditional acceptance of the decision to dissolve the government and the formation of a technocratic government, and then his eventual resignation, he lost a measure of his standing with the political forces, which exacerbates the already existing leadership crisis, whether at the level of the Forces of Freedom and Change as a whole or at the level of each of them more deeply in light of the influence The great worker of the generation, Its main components. This crisis has a dimension The Sudanese parties are unable to compensate for the departure of their historical leaders after the rescue policies in the past three decades hindered the process of the rise of a new party elite inside Sudan, a crisis of which the reality of the National Umma Party after the departure of its historical leader, Sadiq al-Mahdi, is the most indicative case.

To international actors: Since the fall of Al-Bashir, developments in the situation in Sudan have occupied **a confusing role - 5**

A priority on the agenda of international powers with multiple interests in East Africa. But what is noteworthy is that this international interest was only embodied in some limited and slow measures. Even the most prominent sign of Sudan's clashes with abroad during the transitional phase related to removing Sudan's name from the American list of states sponsoring terrorism did not take place until after lengthy and complex negotiations. In the wake of Abdullah Hamdok's announcement of his resignation from the Prime Minister's Office, there were many aspects of international interaction with the Sudanese crisis, but it was limited to emphasizing the ruling principles that are accepted by Western powers in particular, without a real clash over the issue.

Procedural level. On January 4, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan met with Volker Peretz, representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and head of the United Nations Integrated Mission to Support the Transition, an American who included officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Sudan (UNITAMS). Al-Burhan also received a delegation The State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Deputy Chairman of the Sovereignty Council, Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, received a phone call from the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.

Molly in.

The American position, according to which preliminary statements were issued by Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and a joint official statement with Britain, Norway, and the European Union, is based on calling for an urgent dialogue between all Sudanese parties in light of what the United States sees as the inability of any Sudanese party to lead the transitional phase alone, and on emphasizing the Avoid the military component being alone in naming the head of the new government and its members, as this constitutes a violation of the constitutional document. Despite the sharp tone in which the joint statement was issued, which held the military establishment responsible for the faltering phase of the transition, the statement itself included flexible phrases such as the signatory countries' refusal to support a prime minister without broad participation from civilian stakeholders, which goes beyond any reference to the Forces of Freedom and Change as the main representative of the civilian forces. The party that signed the constitutional document and has the authority to nominate the Prime Minister and members of the government in accordance with its texts. This type of ambiguous situation adds more complications to the crisis in Sudan, as it is not welcomed that the Sovereignty Council assumes the task of naming

The new Prime Minister also does not propose a specific procedural mechanism to carry out this difficult task at the same time.

Aside from the intense attention that the issue of forming a new government in Sudan will receive in the coming period, the sustainability of any consensus being formed in successfully completing the political transition cannot be guaranteed without addressing the deep-rooted structural problems that led the country to the current crisis. While addressing the structural problems of the political transition in Sudan, we must take into account the priority of some of these problems over others. For example, it is necessary to work on finding a new formula A gathering of partisan and civil forces before talking about a new formula for civil-military partnership. It is also important for all the various Sudanese parties to begin urgently addressing the problems that are most amenable to reform. For example, direct influence on the behavior of external actors, especially from major countries, is among the unachievable goals at the present time, which requires Sudan to accumulate many playing cards on the regional and international arenas. Every success achieved by the parties to the Sudanese crisis - individually or collectively - in addressing structural problems will enhance the chances of overcoming the government formation crisis that was exacerbated by Hamdok's resignation and other problems expected to appear in the transitional phase, which over time will prove to be one of the most complex political transition experiences in comparison. With previous Sudanese experiences or with multiple experiences witnessed by Sudan's Arab and African neighbourhood.

Hemedti: Who is he and how did he become a major player in the political equation in Sudan?

April 15, 2023

Last updated April 17, 2023

What the Sudanese feared happened, as widespread military confrontations broke out in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, and other cities between the Rapid Support Forces led by Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, and the Sudanese army, led by Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who is in charge of the Transitional Sovereign Council that has ruled Sudan since the overthrow of the government. Abdullah Hamdok in October 2021.

Tensions have escalated between the two parties recently, and each party has strengthened its military positions in

The capital, due to a dispute between the two parties over the timetable for the transition to civilian rule under the framework agreement. Which was signed late last year, integrating the Rapid Support Forces into the Sudanese army and who leads the military institution that results in the merger of the two forces.

Following the overthrow of President Omar al-Bashir in a military coup in 2019, after months of mass protests, the Transitional Military Council was formed and all of them were members of the military institution except Hemedti, who had never been a member of this institution, even though he held the rank of Lieutenant General.

The first was decided by Al-Bashir himself. Weeks ago, Hemedti criticized the 2021 coup and said it was a "mistake" and that it opened the door to the return of supporters of President Al-Bashir. He explained: "Unfortunately, (the coup) has become a gateway to the return of the previous regime."

He warned that allies of former President Al-Bashir, who ruled the country for nearly three decades, were regaining their political foothold.

Who is Hemedti?

On April 13, 2019, Lieutenant General Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo, known as "Hemedti," was promoted to head of the Transitional Military Council, which was headed by Lieutenant General al-Burhan. He held the rank of first lieutenant general, and was appointed deputy

Corner of Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, following the ouster of Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir on April 11. This came hours after Hemedti announced his refusal to participate in the Council, "until the people's requirements are met and initiated." On August 20 of the same year, the Sovereign Council to Lead the Transitional Phase was formed with 11 members - six civilians and five military personnel.

A month For 39

years, Hemedti was the First Vice President of the Council, which Al-Burhan also headed

From camel trader to leader of a powerful

militia, Hemedti's path to the forefront of the political scene in Sudan seemed strange, as he came from outside the country.

The military establishment and traditional political parties.

Hemedti is considered one of the main elements that overthrew former President Al-Bashir, whom he had brought close to, supported, and legitimized the tribal militia he was leading, integrating it into the military

establishment under the name of the "Rapid Support Forces."

Hemedti comes from the Rizeigat tribe of Arab origins that inhabit the Darfur region in western Sudan.

He left school at an early age and worked in his twenties mainly in the camel trade between Libya, Mali and Chad, as well as protecting commercial convoys from bandits in areas controlled by his tribe. Hemedti made a great fortune

from this work in the 1990s, which enabled him to form a tribal militia with other tribal militias, and when gold was discovered in Jabal Amer, his own militias took control of his mines. Hemedti's story begins in 2003, when the Bashir government

mobilized forces of Arab herders to fight African rebels in Darfur. The nucleus of these forces, which were later known as "Janjaweed," was composed of camel herders from the Mahamid and Mahriya clans, from the Rizeigat tribes in North Darfur and adjacent areas. Her in Chad.

During the brutal war in Darfur between 2003-2005, the most famous and notorious Janjaweed leader was Musa Hilal, the leader of the Mahamid clan. Hemedti, who was working alongside Hilal, rose to prominence when he was able to expand the Mahariya militia he led and include other tribes in it, to compete with his former leader Hilal, and Bashir later sought help from the latter. Following a dispute,

Al-Bashir legitimized this militia by naming it the "Rapid Support Forces" according to a presidential decree he issued in 2013. Its main strength consisted of 5,000 members, who had been armed and active long before that. The army chief of staff did not like this, as he wanted the money to go to strengthening the regular forces, but Al-Bashir was wary of putting too much power in the hands of the National Security and Intelligence Service, after he had just fired its director on charges of conspiring against him.

So the RSF became accountable to Bashir himself, and Bashir gave Hemedti the title "himati," meaning "he who protects me." The Rapid Support Forces

participated in a number of regional conflicts, most notably their role in fighting within the Saudi-led coalition forces in southern Yemen and along the Tihama Plain - which includes the coastal city of Hodeidah. Hemedti also provided units to help guard the Saudi border with Yemen. Reports indicated that the number of the Rapid Support

Forces led by Hemedti reached more than 40

One thousand people in 2019

Darfur unrest The

rebels in Darfur accused Khartoum in 2003 of marginalizing their regions economically and politically, which led to the outbreak of an armed conflict between the two parties. The United Nations said that nearly 300,000 people were killed in that conflict and millions were displaced from their homes. In 2014,

of his criticism the Sudanese government arrested Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi, the leader of the Umma Party, because of the practices of the Rapid Support Forces, which were fighting alongside the government in the Darfur region.

Until 2017, the Rapid Support Forces were affiliated with the Security and Intelligence Service and then became affiliated with the Army, although most of its members are not military personnel. **The duo of gold, mercenaries, and the largest “political budget” in Sudan**

The rivalry between Hemedti and Hilal intensified when gold was discovered in Jabal Amer in the northern state of Darfur in 2012

This came at a moment when Sudan was facing an economic crisis because South Sudan had seceded, taking 75 percent of the country's oil. It seemed like a godsend.

Hilal militiamen forcefully took over the area, killed more than 800 people from the Beni Hussein tribe, and became wealthy by mining and selling gold. By 2017, gold sales amounted to 40 percent of Sudan's exports. Hemedti was keen to control it. He already owned some mines and established a trading company known as Al Junaid. But when challenged

To cheer President Bashir once again, and to prevent the government from reaching the Jebel Amer mines, Hemedti's forces launched a counterattack. In November 2017, his forces arrested Hilal, and the Rapid Support Forces seized Sudan's most profitable gold mines. Overnight, Hemedti became the country's largest gold merchant and - by controlling Chad and Libya - its largest border guard force, and Hilal remained in prison.

Borders With **a rapid political rise** in the wake of Bashir's dismissal, Hemedti appears weekly in the news distributing money to...

Policemen to return them to service on the streets, workers in the electricity sector to return them to their work sites, teachers to return to their schools, or distribute cars to tribal heads. The Rapid Support Forces took control of the camps of the African Union peacekeeping force, which began to withdraw from Darfur, before the United Nations stopped this withdrawal.

Hemedti said that he had increased the number of Rapid Support Forces participating in Yemen, and deployed a brigade in Libya to fight alongside Khalifa Haftar's forces.

With the "General Command Massacre" The Rapid Support Forces were accused of participating in what was known in the media

When armed forces said to be affiliated with the military council and support forces dispersed a peaceful sit-in on June 3, 2019, killing more than 120 people, and many more were killed at that time, says Willow Burrige, author of The Nile River. Y the book “Civil Uprisings in

Modern Sudan.” Professor of History at Newcastle University in Britain, “The Rapid Support Forces committed atrocities in Darfur, and their movement after the overthrow of Bashir arouses suspicion among many, especially the rebels in Darfur.” Al-Burhan served in the Military Council, then as a member of the Sovereignty Council

Since Hemedti was appointed as deputy

During the transitional period headed by Al-Burhan, media reports appeared from time to time about disagreements between the two men.

Despite many statements issued by the Council to confirm that there is no conflict, and the same proof that the Armed Forces (of which Al-Burhan is Commander-in-Chief) and the Rapid Support Forces (led by Hemedti) are "at the heart of one man," there were echoes of disagreements between them over a number of issues. , including the movement and deployment of support forces in Khartoum and other states, in addition to what was reported about the Rapid Support's attempt to conclude deals of an economic nature Number of with international companies without the knowledge of the state.

Media reports, citing military sources, also stated that the conflict is mainly focused around...

Between the armed forces and the rapid support, this appears to be the case Personal influence is more than a struggle

Which led to the recent intensification of the conflict between the two men.

Sudan is facing a stifling crisis reinforced by the state of political impasse, which was exacerbated by the outbreak of armed clashes on April 15, 2023, in a number of Sudanese states and cities between the armed forces led by Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces led by Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), amid the failure of... In containing the conflict despite regional and international movements to find a way out of the crisis in the country.

Developments in the operational scene in the Sudanese arena reveal the insistence of both sides of the conflict and ignoring the calls of the international community to stop the raging fighting in the country. On his decision, Askar Hoping to begin negotiations on a final settlement of the conflict, which reinforces my fears Countries directly neighboring Sudan from the continuation of the conflict that threatens the stability of the region as a whole.

Features of the current Sudanese scene

The general context in Sudan is characterized by greater complexity, a feature that has accompanied the Sudanese to the outbreak of the current military conflict in scene since the overthrow of the Ingaz regime in April 2019 The country. The most prominent features of the current scene in Sudan can be noted as follows:

1- A battle for influence between two opposing projects : two projects led by Al-Burhan and Hemedti "Rasin" after the fall of Even Sudan is seen as having a transitional government system The rescue regime in 2019 and the start of the transitional phase, which led to the outbreak of a political conflict that quickly turned into a military clash between the two most influential parties inside Sudan during the last four years.

Each party aspires to overthrow the other party with the aim of imposing its vision on the Sudanese scene and shaping its future in preparation for seizing power in the country after the end of the current transitional phase.

In light of the difficulty of the two projects meeting in a common space for dialogue, at least in the foreseeable future, the military confrontation is likely to continue until one side of the conflict excludes the other from the conflict. The entire political scene.

2- Continuing armed clashes : Since their outbreak in the capital, Khartoum, the armed confrontations between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces have focused on a number of strategic locations, such as

Airports and some sovereign headquarters, in an attempt to control them in order to assert qualitative superiority at the expense of the other party. The confrontations quickly expanded to a number of Sudanese states and cities, in an expected ^[1] escalation of the conflict.

This caused the death of about 387 people and the injury of 1,928 others, according to statements by the Sudanese Doctors Syndicate. Despite the attempts of the international community to reach humanitarian truces between the two sides of the conflict since its beginning, fighting continued between the warring forces in some Sudanese regions such as Khartoum, ^[2] Omdurman and Darfur, amid mutual accusations by both parties of violating the truce.

3- Information War : It is a battle parallel to the military conflict taking place in the country, through which both parties to the conflict, especially the Rapid Support, attempt to hide the truth about developments in the operational theater with the aim of A of exercising more misleading Sudanese public opinion and neutralizing the international community out of fear. Pressure on both sides of the conflict, in addition to weakening the morale of Sudanese soldiers in preparation for their possible withdrawal and the final resolution of the conflict.

On the other hand, the Sudanese army paid attention to the Rapid Support Forces' efforts to distort its image at the local and international levels by spreading misleading information, and launched a counter-campaign by issuing several successive statements to deny the allegations made by the Rapid Support Forces regarding developments in the conflict on the It undermines confidence and instills fear in people ground and to reassure Sudanese public opinion out of fear. Citizens.

4- The absence of political forces from the scene : Both sides of the Sudanese conflict continue to ignore repeated calls by most Sudanese political forces and parties to stop the fighting immediately and begin ^[3] This led to the internationalization of the conflict In a negotiation process to end and settle the conflict Internal attempts at containment, as the weight of these forces is diminishing at the present moment as they are considered In the midst of developments in the current military conflict. The future may be affected the least influential party The political and civil forces in the Sudanese political scene during the next stage and what the current conflict will lead to.

5- The continuation of evacuations of foreign nationals : This is an important indicator that reflects the scale of developments at the level of the field theater in the combat zones. It also portends an escalation of armed clashes between the two sides of the conflict in the near term. A number of countries have announced the evacuation of their nationals from Sudan during the past few days, such as the United States of America, China, France, Britain, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Turkey, Japan, Spain, Greece, Libya, Jordan, South Africa, Kenya, and others.

6- Deterioration of the health system : The conflict caused dozens of victims and hundreds of injuries, which put 71% of them are out stopped about pressure on Sudanese hospitals, which of work in combat zones, according to statements by the Sudanese Doctors Syndicate, due to a shortage

Medicines and medical aid, which threatens the collapse of the health system in the country, and its repercussions on societal security there.

Accounts of Al-Burhan and Hemedti in the conflict

The tactics and policies of both parties since the outbreak of armed clashes in the country reflect the transformation of the conflict into a zero-sum game ^[4] that may prolong its duration during the coming period. Each party has its own strategic calculations in this ongoing conflict in the country. On the one hand, the Sudanese army G him inside, realizes the necessity of monopolizing the military force, and not allowing the presence of a large army In favor of the Sudanese army, it gives it more legitimacy and influence The conflict was resolved by military means inside Sudan.

Therefore, the army is strengthening its efforts in the midst of this conflict to strip the political legitimacy on which the Rapid Support Forces rely to legitimize its presence in Sudanese reality, and to push towards its dismantling or at least forcing it to integrate into the Sudanese Armed Forces on the latter's terms, which may result in the exclusion of Hemedti from the scene. The entire political process during the next stage, in addition to eliminating the regional and international incubators supporting its forces, in addition to protecting Sudan from the dilemma of regional and international alignment and becoming an open arena for tensions between countries, while at the same time supporting the political ambition of the institution aspiring to play a regional role in the region. The Sudanese military has requested that it present a candidate whose chances of winning the upcoming presidential elections in the country will be enhanced.

On the other hand, Hemedti is strongly seeking to confirm the legitimacy of him and his forces as a difficult figure in the political and military equations inside Sudan, in the context of the growing political ambition of the Rapid Support Commander, perhaps to lead the country in the future after the end of the transitional phase, which is What prompted him to justify his involvement in this conflict with his claims about defending democracy, protecting the democratic transition in the country, and the transfer of power to civilians. Hemedti is also well aware that strengthening his military power and balancing it with the Sudanese army will serve his future ambitions in the Sudanese scene.

Therefore, Hemedti is trying to shake the confidence of a large segment of citizens in the armed forces, and to turn public opinion against its leaders in light of more accusations against them of belonging to the former regime and targeting civilians in aerial bombardment, taking advantage of the media mechanism possessed by the Rapid Support Forces. Since the beginning of the conflict, which indicates the possibility of using a network of experts in the media field to manage the battle through the media and social media at the local and international levels. Even if the conflict is not resolved, the international community may press for negotiations between the two sides of the conflict, which may represent an opportunity for Hemedti to bargain for his stay in the political scene without making major concessions, and to obtain guarantees regarding the future of his forces and his future during the next stage.

Accounts of neighboring countries in the conflict

Sudan's neighboring countries have their strategic calculations regarding the escalation of the military conflict and the possibility of it extending beyond the Sudanese borders, threatening regional security and stability, especially since Sudan is of growing strategic importance thanks to its geographical location, which makes it a strategic point of contact between the East African region - including the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. - And the Sahel and Central Africa regions, where Sudan is in contact with five countries in sub-Saharan Africa: Eritrea, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Central Africa, and Chad. These countries' calculations towards the Sudanese conflict can be referred to as follows:

1- South Sudan : It is considered the most affected by the continuation of the conflict inside Sudan, especially as it threatens about 800,000 refugees from South Sudan who are stationed in Sudanese territory to return again to Juba, which represents increasing pressure on them in light of the weakness of the infrastructure and the increasing

Poverty rates and the fragility of the political and security conditions there. Juba fears the expansion of the conflict to reach the border between it and Khartoum, which may witness the infiltration of some armed elements into the southern territories to escape the fighting, which may further destabilize.

The continuation of the conflict also negatively affects the oil industry, as it hinders the process of transporting oil from... Oh - which exacerbates South to Port Sudan, eastern Sudan - 170 thousand barrels per day the economic and financial losses for both countries. While South Sudan's fears are increasing about the future of the fragile peace agreement concluded in 2018, especially since Sudan is one of the guarantors of this agreement, which pushes it towards bringing the views of the warring parties in Khartoum closer in hopes of a ceasefire and beginning to settle the conflict.

2- Ethiopia : Addis Ababa fears increasing activity of armed movements on the border with Sudan in the event of an expansion of the conflict in the country. It also fears the possibility of the presence of the Wagner militia in Sudan during the coming period, as it does not accept the presence of more international powers in its immediate neighborhood because of the threat they pose to its stability and Ethiopian influence in the region. Addis Ababa is also increasingly concerned about the return of Ethiopian refugees who were displaced to Sudan in the midst of the recent Ethiopian war to their country again, which represents pressure on the Ethiopian federal government and may exacerbate conflicts.

And ethnic conflicts in some Ethiopian regions.

The Sudanese conflict affects the vital roads leading to Ethiopia, especially as it relies heavily on the port of Port Sudan for trade with the outside world via the Red Sea.

Ethiopia may view the conflict in Sudan as a new starting point for regional influence in East Africa, through its efforts to play a role in mediation in the hope of stopping the fighting between the two sides.

The conflict, which Addis Ababa may use to disengage between Sudan and Egypt regarding...

The Ethiopian dam file during the coming period, in addition to easing the Sudanese position towards the disputed Fashqa region crisis between the two countries and reaching friendly understandings regarding it.

3- Eritrea : Eritrean concern is increasing about the possibility of the return of more than 234,000 Eritrean refugees from Sudan as a result of the worsening conflict there. Asmara fears the threats of armed movements - which may be active due to the Sudanese conflict - to the Eritrean interior. Some Eritrean elements may become involved in the conflict - if the situation worsens in the next stage - in fighting alongside one of the warring parties, especially the Rapid Support, in an attempt by Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki to enhance his influence in the settlement equation.

It is inside Sudan to become part of the conflict in the future.

4- Chad : It is also more vulnerable to risks, especially since it shares more than 1,400 kilometers of borders with Sudan, which reinforces fears of more rebels infiltrating Chadian territory, and the possibility of some Chadian rebel movements joining the conflict in Sudan for the benefit of one of them. Its outskirts, which may form the nucleus of future rebel groups to threaten the Chadian state. N'Djamena fears the possibility of a decline in rapid support to the Darfur region, and the security repercussions it could impose that threaten the security and stability of the Chadian side, which also fears the dangers of the Russian Wagner security group getting involved in the conflict, making it on the outskirts of the Chadian border from three sides: Libya, Sudan, and Central Africa. In addition to growing concern about the possibility of establishing cooperative relations between Wagner and some Chadian armed movements active in the region.

The Sudanese conflict also hinders the Chadian state from benefiting from Sudanese ports, especially the port of Port Sudan, which may constitute an economic crisis for Chad as it is a country landlocked in the Sahel. Meanwhile, Chadian fears are increasing about the conflict spreading to its borders in areas receiving refugees, especially since Chad has so far received more than 20,000 Sudanese refugees, which may increase economic and security pressures on the N'Djamena government during the coming period.

5- Central Africa : Fears the exodus of large numbers of Sudanese refugees into the country, and the pressure it poses on the weak infrastructure and the national economy. In addition to the fear of the activity of many armed movements on the border between the two countries, and the possibility of some of them getting involved in the Sudanese conflict, which may exacerbate with the security situation there in addition to tense relations with Khartoum. On the other hand, Wagner's involvement in the conflict and its deployment in Sudan may represent a message of reassurance to the ruling regime in Bangui, which is using Wagner's forces to confront the rebel armed movements in the country and secure the ruling elite there.

6- The Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) : The Authority presented an initiative on April 27, 2023, in an attempt to find a way out of the Sudanese crisis, and within the framework of working on the principle of African solutions to African crises adopted by the African Union. The initiative included two proposals

It is essential to extend the humanitarian truce for an additional 72 hours in the country with the aim of continuing evacuations of foreign nationals in the country and continuing efforts to achieve a ceasefire. In addition to sending representatives of the Sudanese army and rapid support to South Sudan for negotiations.

O Sudan (the ruling Transitional Sovereignty Council) and enjoy The Ejad Initiative - which you are currently chairing - aims to...

In which Ethiopia has a strong influence - to strengthen its presence in the Sudanese arena in an attempt to bring the views of the two sides of the conflict closer together in preparation for reaching a ceasefire agreement soon, especially after What is happening is an internal Sudanese matter that can be resolved through organizations. The UN Security

Council recognized that what is regional, which closes the scope for international intervention - at least at the current stage - and expands the scope for the African regional parties to contain the conflict and its parties in the hope of finding

Therefore, one of the problems facing the initiative is a comprehensive settlement in the near term. Despite the ambiguity of its possible paths, will it be limited to consensus on extending the humanitarian truce or will it actually have a role in reaching a political settlement?

Potential risks

The continuation of the current military conflict in Sudan may undermine the gains of the transitional phase that followed the fall of the rescue regime in April 2019, which will return the Sudanese state to square one, and threaten its future with more tension and political and security unrest, in a way that exacerbates the regional fears of neighboring countries about the expansion of the conflict and the threat to their security and stability. short term.

In light of the expansion of the conflict and the insistence of both sides to continue fighting until the battle is resolved, Oh, it may be difficult for there to be room for any mediation by the international community in this regard Askar

The foreseeable future, unless the major powers threaten to apply deterrent sanctions - within a short time frame - on the two warring parties to force them to comply with regional and international calls to end the fighting immediately.

The current moment's data is like a regional time bomb, especially

Overall, Sudan is in good condition

Within a regional belt rigged with crises and conflicts, which may make...

It is located geographically

The continuation and aggravation of the conflict is a pivotal point in Sudan's transformation into a regional hotspot for attracting more armed movements and terrorist organizations active in geographically neighboring regions such as the

Sahel region and Libya. Which in turn threatens the regional security of the immediate neighboring countries.

[1]. What to Watch for as Violence in Sudan Escalates, RANE, 21 April 2023, available at: <https://bit.ly/41Vm4zh>

[2]. Alind Chauhan, Why Sudan's latest conflict has led to concern among so many countries across the world, 24 April 2023, available at: <https://bit.ly/41vsCop>

[3]. Michelle Gavin, Sudan in Crisis, Council on Foreign Relations, 20 April 2023, available at: <https://on.cfr.org/3oHfsGi>

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Sudan coup: Why was Hemedti absent from the political scene?

Somaya Nasr • BBC

News Arabic

4 November 2021

Amid the internal and external pressure facing General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan to hand over power to a civilian government, questions have arisen about another military commander who has played a prominent role since...

To overthrow former President Omar al-Bashir, this leader is General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as “Hemedti,” the commander of the Rapid Support Forces. Why has he been absent from the scene since the coup? What is the nature of the relationship between it and the proof?

On April 13, 2019, Lieutenant General Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General, and the head of the Transitional Military Council, which was headed by Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah, was appointed Appointing him as deputy Al-Burhan, following the ouster of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir on April 11. This came hours after Hemedti announced his refusal to participate in the Council, “until the people's requirements are met and initiated.” A day before the arrest of a number of ministers and civilian officials in Sudan, including Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok, and the army commander, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, announcing the dissolution of the Sovereignty and the Council of Ministers, imposing a state of emergency in the country, and suspending work on articles of the constitutional document, the Sovereignty Council In the words of its First Vice President, Hemedti, he affirms support for the democratic transition process, all the way up

For the general elections in the country.

Al-Burhan was the face of the coup, and its only personality, while Hemedti disappeared from sight. **An undeclared role in the coup** Citizens across Sudan spoke of seeing members of the Rapid Support Forces alongside security forces during the demonstrations that followed the coup. And she says

Streets, side by side

Kholoud Khair, a Sudanese analyst residing in Khartoum, said, “It is likely that Hemedti and the Rapid Support leadership played a role in the coup.” A major security aspect in Sudanese politics since his arrival It is known that Hemedti has become a player

Khartoum In 2013, Al-Bashir legitimized the militias that Hemedti led in the Darfur region, and they were fighting rebels of African origin there, calling them the “Rapid Support Forces.” Massive security measures, including the detention of activists and politicians

The recent coup included an “element

To the Chairman of the Council Deputy And journalists,” according to the opinion of Kholoud Khair, who suggests that Hemedti also describes him

The dissolved sovereign had a major role in the coup, “even if he did not announce it.” The Rapid Support

With the “General Command Massacre” Forces were accused of participating in what was known in the media

When armed forces, said to be affiliated with the Military Council and support forces, dispersed a sit-in

Peaceful on June 3, 2019, killing more than 120 people, and many of the dead were thrown into the Nile River. These

accusations, which Hemedti considers unjust, may

have played a role in his decision to disappear from prison.

The Sudanese political scene at the present time. The ongoing investigation into that massacre has not yet identified those

anything that responsible, but he was “convicted in the court of public opinion,” as Khair put it, and he is careful not to do

might jeopardize his political future. At the same time, on

the relationship between Hemedti and

Al-Burhan, many observers believe that the relationship between Hemedti and Al-Burhan is complex. Although they belong to the

military entity that controls the reins of power in Sudan, their backgrounds and sources of influence are different. Hemedti

comes from the

Rizeigat tribe of Arab origins that inhabit the Darfur region in western Sudan. He left school at an early age and worked in his

twenties mainly in the camel trade between Libya, Mali and Chad, as well as protecting commercial convoys from bandits in areas controlled by his tribe. Hemedti made a great fortune from this work in the 1990s, which enabled him to form a tribal militia with other

tribal militias, and when gold

was discovered in Jabal Amer, his own militias took control of his mines. As for Al-Burhan, his roots go back to the Nile River

state, located north of the capital, Khartoum. He was born in the village of Qanduto into a religious family that follows the

Khatmiyya order, which is one

of the major Sufi orders in Sudan, and had a role in Sudanese political life, represented by the Democratic Unionist Party, the

traditional competitor. For the Umma Party. Al-Burhan graduated from the Military College and worked as an officer in the

infantry forces and other army units. He participated in the Darfur War, as well as the battles that preceded the secession of South

Sudan from North Sudan.

Al-Burhan served in the Military Council, then as a member of the Sovereignty Council Since Hemedti was appointed as deputy

During the transitional period headed by Al-Burhan, media reports appear from time to time about disagreements between the

two men. Despite many

statements issued by the Council, to confirm that there is no conflict, and to confirm the same proof that the Armed Forces

(of which Al-Burhan is Commander-in-Chief) and the Rapid Support Forces (led by Hemedti) “are at the heart of one man,”

disagreements have been echoed between them over a number of... Issues, including the movement and deployment of

support forces in Khartoum and other states, as well as what was reported about the Rapid Support’s attempt to conclude deals

Number of of an economic nature with international companies without the knowledge of the state.

Media reports, citing military sources, also stated that the conflict is mainly focused around...

Between the armed forces and rapid support.

Personal influence is more than a struggle

Because there are a lot of But it seems that the two have succeeded so far in putting aside their differences
Their common goals. The two men did not hide their ambitions to remain in power, and they greatly criticized Prime Minister
Abdallah Hamdok in the period preceding the coup. They also fear being held accountable for
human rights and financial violations if matters are restored to a civilian government in the country. These abuses relate to
the conflict in Darfur, the "General Command Massacre," and business empires allegedly owned by senior army generals.

To achieve their common goals of avoiding legal accountability, remaining in power, and preserving their economic
interests, the two powerful military leaders allied themselves. Al-Burhan also faces a major challenge,
which is maintaining the fragile peace with several movements
Armed rebellion in the Darfur region and the states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile, as well as threats
Possible secession in eastern Sudan. Hence, he needs to maintain his alliance with Hemedti and his forces, to
maintain peace with the armed movements, especially since the Sudanese Armed Forces are suffering from fragmentation and
splits in the opinion of many inside Sudan, including Hamdok. But political analyst Kholoud Khair believes that it is not clear
to what extent this will hold up due to its international rejection, and also, and most importantly, its rejection
The coalition, "given that the coup now appears faltering
internally".

Relations with regional powers Media
reports have long spoken of the close relations between Hemedti and both the Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Hemedti
has provided the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen with mercenaries from its forces. It was also reported that Hemedti provided units
to help guard the Saudi border with Yemen. Although proof has become increasingly important for these two
countries recently, as well as...

Because Egypt has a friendship with its President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, Khair believes that if he continues to grow Being an ally
With popular pressure on Burhan to step down, Hemedti may emerge as a better ally to some regional powers. "No one
trusts
Hemedti's silence, and there are those who say that he might do to Burhan what he did to Bashir. They will not sympathize with
For racial dynamics in him in this case...and given In 2019, but no one
He did not complete his education and comes from a region Sudan, it is unlikely that a relatively young man
Darfur will be accepted by the political and social elites in Khartoum."

On Monday, October 25, 2021, the Sudanese army took an expected step to dissolve the transitional government institutions and end the partnership with the Forces of Freedom and Change, which raises concerns about the future of political reform in the country. This move came just weeks after a failed coup attempt to seize power by loyalists to the regime of ousted President Omar al-Bashir, and amid repeated warnings that tensions between civilian and military leaders in Sudan had reached the brink of collapse. Perhaps all of this raises many questions about the future of the political transition in Sudan amid an extremely complex and intertwined regional environment.

It is clear that there are indications of support from popular sectors for the army's corrective movement, as described by Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Commander-in-Chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces. The Justice and Equality Movement has blamed the government of Abdalla Hamdok and that it represents the main reason for the army's intervention. She said that a few officials monopolized decision-making and refused to engage in dialogue. The group, headed by Finance Minister Jibril Ibrahim, was the first to publicly express its support for the army but also urged it to end the state of emergency and release prisoners. detainees and appoint a civilian government to run daily activities.

Earlier this October (2021), the group participated in a pro-military mass sit-in in Khartoum that was demanding the dismissal of the transitional government. Another pro-military group that broke away from the Freedom and Change Movement also welcomed these exceptional measures, saying that it was organized by I hope the presidential palace supports the army because its mission has been achieved. On the other hand, the All-Beja Council of Glasses, led by Mr. Turk in eastern Sudan, will end the sit-in.

The most prominent defenders of the army were their reopening of Port Sudan and ending the closure in the cities of the East.

Dual leadership in the military institution

It is important to point out the nature of the military institution in Sudan, as it includes, in addition to the regular forces based on discipline and the values of military professionalism, the Rapid Support Forces, a paramilitary unit that emerged from the Janjaweed militias previously supported by the Bashir regime and which She was accused of committing violations during the Darfur conflict. Here we find a dual military leadership: Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Commander-in-Chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces, on the one hand, and Lieutenant General Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), Commander of Rapid Support, on the other hand. The official record of al-Burhan appears to be that the finger of accusation is being pointed at him by the International Criminal Court in The Hague. , where, and it did not happen Al-Bashir and others were accused of committing crimes against humanity during the conflict in Darfur in

Early 2000s. Proof is also not counted in rows

Islamists, which is rare among senior generals during the Bashir regime, which was loyal to the Muslim Brotherhood.

This may have helped Sudan emerge from the international isolation that the Bashir regime suffered from. Behind Burhan is General Hemedti, commander of the Rapid Support Forces. Al-Burhan has a long relationship with Hemedti. Al-Burhan was a commander in Darfur, where he launched the army and support forces

thousand people were displaced and about 2.7 million people were displaced. Rapid violent campaign to counter the insurgency. 300 Moreover, a million people became estranged from the military campaigns and bloody conflicts that Darfur witnessed. And with "I am not responsible for any actions" Al-Burhan himself spoke of the atrocities that were committed, and once said: "Just as all regular forces do." Disgraceful in Darfur... For me, I was fighting an enemy

In 2015, Al-Burhan and Hemedti coordinated the deployment of Sudanese forces and Rapid Support fighters to Yemen to fight with Saudi Arabia-led coalition forces against Houthi rebels allied with Iran. The two men are credited with the fact that during the uprising against Al-Bashir, they refused orders

They dispersed the demonstrators using violence, but they met them in the sit-in camp.

The dialectic of course correction and corrective revolution

Controversy arises over the description of the Sudanese army's movement on October 25, as the message sent by Due to the state of chaos and severe division between... Lieutenant General Al-Burhan was that it was a course correction given Components of the transitional government. Al-Burhan did not suspend work on the entire constitutional document, but it did Implementing some articles that stipulate partnership with the Forces of Freedom and Change. He announced the suspension of the provisions of Articles 11 and 12 regarding the formation and powers of the Transitional Sovereignty Council. This means that Al-Burhan will become the undisputed head of state and commander-in-chief of the armed forces Forces of freedom and change. Al-Burhan was supposed to relinquish the presidency of the Sovereign Council to a civilian president on November 17, 2021. One of the most prominent articles canceled was Article 15 regarding the appointment and powers of the Transitional Council of Ministers, as the Forces of Freedom and Change had the authority to appoint the President of the Council. According to this disruption, Al-Burhan becomes able to appoint a government of qualified figures, Article 2A national organization with a broad popular base and characterized by efficiency and independence. As it was Paragraph 3, which stipulates that the Transitional Legislative Council shall consist of 67% of those chosen by the Forces of the Declaration of Freedom and Change and 33% of the forces other than those who did not sign the Declaration of Freedom and Change. Thus, the army becomes free to form the transitional legislative council, which Al-Burhan promised would be composed of young people.

What calls for careful consideration is that Al-Burhan abolished Article 71 regarding the dissolution of the Military Council, which means that it can return to exercising an effective oversight role in managing the transitional process. The paradox that brings to mind the experience of Tunisian President Kais Saied in interpreting the constitutional text is confirmation The proof is that he based his decisions on the constitutional document, as Article 78 stipulates that this constitutional document may not be amended or canceled except by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Legislative Council. And in

In the event of the absence of this council, the Sovereignty Council and the Council of Ministers temporarily passed legislation and laws.

In African tradition, this is when the political scene reaches a state of blockage, when the potential is exhausted
For application In all other legitimate democratic ways, it may not be a "corrective coup."

Not only that, but it may be the only option. The African National Congress in South Africa took up arms against the apartheid regime in their country from the 1970s until the early 1990s. Thomas Sankara likewise carried out a revolutionary coup against the fanatical elite in Burkina Faso in 1983. The most prominent "corrective coup" scenario was the Ghanaian experience under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel John Jerry Rawlings (1981-2001). Ghana was able, with the help of international financial institutions, to establish a new beginning. Today, the country is considered a model

Its approach to good governance and democracy is emulated by most other countries in Africa. Former US President Barack Obama confirmed this during his historic visit to the capital, Accra, on his first African tour. Is Burhan's behavior real goals, as the African Union has frozen Sudan's membership until the institutions of civilian rule are restored. consistent with these traditions? This may seem regardless of the

Introductions and reasons for army intervention

The Forces of Freedom and Change and the Transitional Military Council reached power-sharing arrangements within a month to form a sovereign council in Sudan, which was agreed to continue for a 39-month transitional period. A month However, during the first The rules of the arrangement also stipulated that as of August 20, 2019, 21 of the aforementioned period, a military president would be chosen by the army, who would then succeed him for a period of 18 The next election will be a civilian president, provided that elections will be held after the agreed-upon period for sharing Authority. A month The Prime Minister, who will be nominated by the Forces of Freedom and Change, assumes the presidency of the Council of Ministers, with the exception of the ministers who lead the Ministries of Defense and Interior, where the transitional government headed by Abdalla Hamdok is the first since they were nominated by the army. The 1989 coup that does not reflect the traditions of the dominant military regime.

Hamdok's government agreed to various progressive reforms, such as abolishing any law that restricts women's rights to study or dress however they want. It also criminalized the practice of genital mutilation However, it failed to turn around the faltering economy. The Feminization through the custom of female circumcision. various policies of the Hamdok administration have been subjected to severe criticism, such as canceling fuel subsidies, increasing electricity fees, and increasing spending on security forces and government agencies. However, the disagreements within the Sovereignty Council were not over the economy, but rather over the structure of the Darfur war. Sudanese army and the forces Security and war crimes committed during the

There are demands from the International Criminal Court to try Al-Bashir and other members of his administration for between human rights crimes in Darfur in 2003 onwards. The division has become clear

cooperated with the The parties to the transitional government, where the civilian faction in the government 2021 in the cases against International Criminal Court to move forward. They both signed an agreement in August The accused, including deposed President Omar al-Bashir. This is certainly not consistent with the army's vision, as because of Al-Bashir's trial, many of the military themselves will be exposed and accused of committing crimes against humanity. Lieutenant General Al-Burhan explicitly refused to hand Al-Bashir over to the International Criminal Court. Therefore, while the Council of Ministers agreed to hand over suspects to the ICC, the State Security Court, which has a military component, did not do so.

Another source of division may be represented by the investigation into the Khartoum massacre in June "Rapists and murderers," according to the Forces of Freedom's accounts , 2019, which is also depicted And change. In fact, the head of the investigation committee, Nabil Abed, himself stated on May 4, 2021, that "the outcome could lead to a coup or mass unrest in the streets."

September 21 An attempt by remnants of the previous regime to seize power. in There was also the past, when the Sudanese government announced that it had thwarted a coup attempt by forces that were still loyal to Bashir. The coup plotters tried to take control of the radio building in Omdurman, but they failed. Forty soldiers were After Prime Minister Hamdok insisted that arrested Oh Because of the attempts of the remnants since the fall of the previous regime to abort The failed coup attempt was an extension Civil democratic transformation.

Implications and question for the future

1- Economic and security repercussions : There are likely to be serious consequences of army intervention. Sudan was recently removed from the US list of states sponsoring terrorism. The United States promised to provide financial support to the transitional government. The International Monetary Fund and Hamdok's government agreed on a debt relief settlement worth \$50 billion. All of this was put at risk after the exceptional decisions and the dissolution of the partnership with the Forces of Freedom and Change. There are fears that Sudan today will fall into a state of chaos, if the masses are mobilized and the intensity of popular protests in the Sudanese street escalates.

Since 2019, the measures taken by the transitional government to revive the country's battered economy have been deeply unpopular among some broad sectors of the population. Accordingly, sentiment on the ground is divided as some people who are experiencing increasing hardship due to the IMF-backed reforms favor the fall of Hamdok's government. At the end of September, the World Bank conducted its first visit to Sudan in nearly 40 years when With Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok, and Council Chairman David Malpass engaged in talks on the freeze of aid, His Excellency Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan and Finance Minister Jibril Ibrahim. With the Foreign Ministry, after the army seized power, it will have major repercussions on the economy, and Sudan may witness another "revolution of the stomachs." US Senator Chris Coons wrote on...

3 - The future of the relationship with Israel :

How can the army's seizure of power in Sudan affect normalization with Israel? Some may argue that if the Sudanese army's goal when signing the normalization agreement with Israel was to get rid of American sanctions, then the army's recent decisions are likely to lead to the return of these sanctions and the postponement of the agreement.

The 1958 law prohibiting any diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv. Although the normalization process argued the Sudanese leadership, however, was slow due to the chronic disputes that existed

In conclusion, the greatest fear is that Sudan will slide into a state of chaos and violence if the state of severe political polarization continues. It is also not possible to rule out the possibility of groups not affiliated with the Juba Peace Agreement returning to bear arms. In Darfur, there is the Sudan Liberation Movement, headed by Abdel Wahid al-Nur, and in the Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan, there is the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North, led by Abdel Aziz al-Hilu. Both enjoy popular support and have demonstrated considerable military strength. They were both engaged in peace talks with the government and had confidence in Abdullah Hamdok. The army's recent actions may herald renewed conflict.

The most pressing issues in Sudan remain the economy, democracy and peace, perhaps. The absence of national consensus leads to more violence and bloodshed. In July 2019, in the aftermath

violent events, the international "Quartet" consisting of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Kingdom
Together with the Union of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates intervened, which worked together
The African Union, to press for a negotiated solution, which was done following the overthrow of the Bashir
regime. There may be a need for a similar process, albeit with new civil parties, to achieve national
consensus and return Sudan to the path of sound political transition.

In the context of the continuation of the war that broke out between the Sudanese army, led by Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces, led by Lieutenant General Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo, known as "Hemedti", due to the inability of either party to resolve the war in its favor on 4/15/2023.

Until now, this war has become open to all possibilities, especially in light of the ambiguity surrounding the military situation on the ground, as it is not known precisely who controls what, especially in light of the severe conflict in statements and statements issued by both sides, and the difficulty of Verify its validity based on future sources.

In light of this, the aim of this study is to monitor and anticipate future scenarios for the war between the army and the Rapid Support Forces, especially in light of the failure of both parties' bets on achieving a quick and decisive victory, as it appears that the military data and facts on the ground have not changed B on 4/15/2023 until now. The study will be based on the outbreak of heat much in their approach to the issue on the basis of Conditional scenarios, where the conditions and requirements for the realization of each scenario are monitored and analysed, identifying the most likely scenario(s).

There are several general observations that must be taken into account as a general framework for thinking about the future prospects of the war between the army and the Rapid Support Forces:

First, the war is taking place this time between the two largest military forces in Sudan, which were the And the Rapid Support Forces. Together they constituted the two wings of the military component, as the Rapid Support Forces are legally subordinate to the armed forces, and are subject to the orders of the commander Given the military capabilities and capabilities possessed by each party, this enhances the...and the superior. The possibility of the war continuing for a longer period of time, making its repercussions catastrophic for the state and society.

Secondly, the war is taking place for the first time inside the capital, Khartoum, in its three cities, and some other cities, while the wars that Sudan witnessed in the past took place in the outskirts and rural areas, whether in the south, Darfur, or eastern Sudan. Given that the capital has three cities It is the center of power and governance, where the headquarters of official agencies and authorities are located, the main headquarters of companies and banks, most of the major factories, and the headquarters of diplomatic missions. The outbreak of war inside the populated capital leads to catastrophic results in terms of the numbers of dead and wounded, and the extent of destruction of structures, infrastructure, and property. Public and private, as well as injury

The state is in a state of paralysis, isolated from the outside world in a sense. With the outbreak of war between the army and the Rapid Support Forces, many countries quickly evacuated their diplomatic missions and sponsors from Sudan, and closed their embassies and consulates. In addition, urban wars are usually complex and difficult to resolve.

Third, the experiences of internal wars that Sudan witnessed in the post-independence phase, whether in the South, Darfur, Blue Nile, or South Kordofan, clearly confirm that these wars continued for many years thanks to internal and external factors. For example, and here lies the danger regarding the current war, the war in the south has continued for decades. The army and the Rapid Support Forces, as it can continue for a long period, especially if it expands to other states, and tribal and ethnic forces and armed movements become involved, as well as the intervention of Some external powers, whether regional or international.

Fourthly, regardless of the direct causes of the war between the army and the Rapid Support Forces, this war cannot be understood in isolation from a number of major challenges and problems that Sudan suffered - and is suffering from - in the post-independence phase, most notably: the faltering process of building the national state. In modern times, the post-independence elites failed to build a democratic national state based on the foundations and principles of citizenship, and capable of absorbing societal pluralism, ethnic, tribal, religious, and regional, and transforming it into a source of strength and enrichment, instead of being a source of Conflicts and wars. In this context, it is possible to understand the many internal wars that Sudan witnessed in the post-independence phase, one of which ended with the secession of the south in 2011. Among the Expanding the political role of the army. During the period since Sudan's independence in challenges are also From 1956 until 2023, the military ruled the country for a period exceeding 55 years, which Dedicated to the phenomenon of politicization of the army. In addition to this, there are many divisions among the elites political, and its chronic inability to build a minimum level of national consensus, let alone a depth elite is controlled by the elite Differences and contradictions between the center and the margins or peripheries. Historically, the Nile On the keys to power and wealth, which led to a deepening of the state of political, economic and social marginalization in many regions of Sudan, which contributed to the emergence of armed rebellion movements and fueled civil wars and protracted conflicts.

Fifthly, internal wars usually require external interventions, whether by states or non-state armed actors. Sudan experienced this phenomenon during the wars that broke out in the post-independence period, especially the war in the south. If the ongoing war in support of the Rapid Forces continues for a long time, it is likely that external interventions will occur in favor of this between the army and the forces Currently, one party or the other, according to the agendas and interests of the intervening parties, which fuels the continuation of the war.

Taking the previous observations into account, there are several scenarios for the future of the war between... And with

The army and the Rapid Support Forces. The first is to resolve the war in favor of one of the parties. Secondly, both parties accept a permanent ceasefire and engage in negotiations leading to a political solution. Third, the war continues intermittently over the short term. Fourth, the slide into a comprehensive civil war.

The study addresses each of these scenarios in some detail.

First scenario: The war is resolved in favor of one of the parties

This scenario seems unlikely, as no party has been able to achieve a decisive victory so far. It does not seem that either of them has the ability to achieve this in the foreseeable future. And the reason

The main reason behind this is the nature and specificity of the balance of power between the two sides of the war, which enables them to continue fighting for a longer period. If the army possesses superiority in terms of air force, artillery, and other heavy weapons, then the Rapid Support Forces possess the ability to maneuver and speed in the first place.

Movement based on light and medium weapons. The theater of operations is also represented in the capital, Khartoum, with its three cities, and the Darfur region, it makes the ability to end the war in favor of this or that party more difficult and complex.

Although it is difficult to imagine the ability of the Rapid Support Forces to defeat the army, the latter cannot easily resolve the confrontation in its favor, as fighting within cities restricts its ability to use its heavy weapons on a large scale. Therefore, some field observers emphasized that the equation of war in Sudan has become based on the army's control of the airspace and the Rapid Support Forces' control of the ground, as the army uses airpower to bomb the headquarters and gatherings of the Rapid Support Forces, while the latter spreads within populated neighborhoods and practices hit-and-run. Therefore, the confrontation between the two sides appears to be close to a mobile war within cities and residential neighborhoods [\[1\]](#).

Also, the occurrence of a major split within the Rapid Support Forces in a way that is in the interest of the army and enables it to resolve the confrontation in its favor is unlikely, given the tribal structure of these forces on the one hand, and the loyalty of its members to Hemedti on the other hand. But even assuming that the army is able, during a certain period of time, to impose some kind of control on the capital, Khartoum, this does not mean the end of the war, as the Rapid Support Forces can continue a guerrilla war inside the capital through small groups, as well as opening other fronts for confrontation with...

The army, especially in the Darfur region, where the tribes to which many members of the Rapid Support Forces belong are based. The region has already witnessed - and is witnessing - confrontations between the army and the Rapid Support Forces, resulting in hundreds of deaths and injuries, in addition to the displacement of thousands.

In addition to the above, the ethnic and tribal composition of the Darfur region, and the legacy of the bloody conflict it has witnessed for years, make it a suitable environment for the continuation of a state of war, which will not be limited to the army and the Rapid Support Forces only, but will involve tribal and ethnic forces, and this is what actually happened between the two tribes. The Masalit people of African origin and some Arab tribes in West Darfur. The confrontations in the region brought to mind the Darfur War that broke out in 2003, and its disastrous repercussions [2].

The second scenario: Both parties accept a permanent ceasefire and enter into negotiations leading to a political solution

This scenario is also considered unlikely, due to the lack of conditions for its realization on the ground Reality, foremost among which is the conviction of both parties of the difficulty of victory in this confrontation, and therefore there is no alternative but negotiation, and the presence of real international pressure forcing them to stop the fighting and accept serious negotiations to end the war. In addition, there are other factors that make this scenario unlikely, including: the two sides have gone into the confrontation, exchanging sharp accusations, and the war between them has become a zero-sum match. Each party is at least trying to achieve a tangible military achievement that will strengthen its negotiating position in the event that it is forced to negotiate to end the war.

What indicates the weakness of the possibility of this scenario is the failure of both parties to adhere to the numerous truce agreements they agreed to, as each party began to accuse the other of violating these truces, which confirms their unwillingness to enter into serious political negotiations that would put an end to the war, as the war has become, in their view, tantamount to A fateful struggle. The army's inability to resolve the war in its favor puts its role and status at stake. The defeat of the Rapid Support Forces also means its end.

Within the framework of Saudi-American mediation, which was accompanied by an American threat to impose sanctions on individuals responsible for threatening security and stability in Sudan, the army and the Rapid Support Forces accepted negotiations in the Saudi city of Jeddah. The results of these negotiations, which began on 5/6/2023, revealed the lack of seriousness between the two parties in reaching a political solution that would put an end to the war. On 5/11/2023, the negotiating delegations of the two parties signed the "Jeddah Declaration", which is merely a declaration of principles, which stipulated the following: "We, the undersigned, the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, confirm, through this declaration, our basic obligations under international law." "[3] . Under the Jeddah Declaration, both parties commit to ensuring the protection of civilians at all times, including allowing them safe passage to leave areas of active hostilities on a voluntary basis in the direction of their choice, and to refrain from any attack that is expected to occur.

It causes incidental civilian damage, and the obligation to evacuate, refrain from taking over, respect and protect all private and public facilities such as medical facilities, hospitals, water and electricity facilities, refrain from using them for military purposes, and allow the rapid passage of humanitarian aid without any obstacles. The declaration prohibits both parties from recruiting children, arbitrarily detaining civilians, and all forms of torture[4].

Despite the importance of the principles contained in the Jeddah Declaration, it did not include the two parties agreeing to a humanitarian truce or a temporary ceasefire in order to implement these principles. After a second round of negotiations between representatives of the army and the Rapid Support Forces, the two countries sponsoring the negotiations announced in a joint statement issued on 5/20/2022 the signing of a short-term ceasefire agreement between the army and the Rapid Support Forces, to enter into force 48 hours after the start of the negotiations. The signature lasts for seven days, and can be extended for another period with the approval of both parties.

Although both the army and the Rapid Support Forces announced their commitment to the short-term ceasefire agreement, it remained a partial commitment, resulting in a state of relative calm.

Because both parties continue to violate it. This was confirmed by the two countries sponsoring the Jeddah negotiations, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States of America, in a joint statement issued on 5/27/2023, where the statement indicated that "both parties to the conflict informed Riyadh and Washington of their commitment to facilitating that, humanitarian assistance and restoring basic services for the benefit of the Sudanese people." Bans hampered those efforts.

Realizing that the current ceasefire has not been fully observed, the Sudanese Armed Forces have considered acts committed by the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces. "Both parties agree to extend it, even if it is not fully adhered to, to provide more time for humanitarian actors to carry out this vital work" [5]. Against this background, the army and the Rapid Support Forces agreed to extend the short-term ceasefire, which ends on the evening of Monday, 5/29/2023, for another 5 days. However, ceasefire violations continued[6].

Before the end of the five-day period, several important developments occurred related to the course of the war. On May 31, 2023, the Sudanese army announced the suspension of its participation in the Jeddah talks, under the pretext of the Rapid Support Forces' lack of commitment to implementing the requirements of the "Jeddah Declaration." In this context, the official spokesman for the Sudanese Armed Forces, Brigadier General Nabil Abdullah, stressed that the armed forces are ready to implement their constitutional and national commitment to eliminate the rebellion and secure the homeland and the citizen, and this will happen in the coming days [7] .

Al-Burhan had anticipated this decision with striking statements he made in his second appearance since the beginning of the war, during his inspection of some army forces sites, in which he stressed that "the armed forces have not yet used their full lethal force so as not to destroy the country, but if the enemy (the support forces) does not comply... (or respond), we will be forced to use our maximum force... and the armed forces will remain

It is ready to fight until victory, and that it completely controls all military sites in Sudan, and that the rebels will not be able to take control of this country, and that victory is inevitably near" [8]. This statement reveals an aspect of the complexities of the war in Sudan, as the goal of A quick victory on the part of the army has become far-fetched. Many also wondered about the lethal force that the Sudanese army has not used yet, especially since it has already used air force and artillery. According to these statements, the expansion of the use of heavy weapons by the army means more destruction in the capital.

Following the army's suspension of its participation in the Jeddah talks, the two countries sponsoring the talks, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States of America, announced in a joint statement issued on 6/1/2023 the suspension of the Jeddah talks between the army and the Rapid Support Forces due to repeated serious violations of the ceasefire by both parties. . The statement considered that both sides of the conflict "claim to represent the interests of the Sudanese people, but their actions have increased the suffering of the Sudanese and endangered national unity and regional stability." In their joint statement, the two countries affirmed their readiness to resume talks as soon as both parties implement the necessary steps to build confidence. Thus, this statement condemns the two warring parties and holds them both responsible for the continuation of the war War[9].

These developments led to the United States of America imposing, on 6/1/2023, sanctions on both the army and the Rapid Support Forces, with the aim of holding accountable those responsible for undermining security, peace and stability in Sudan as a result of repeated violations of the ceasefire agreement. These sanctions included imposing restrictions on granting entry visas to specific people, including officials from the armed forces, the Rapid Support Forces, and leaders from the regime of former President Omar al-Bashir, as well as economic sanctions that included - according to the US Treasury Department's website - two companies affiliated with the Rapid Support Forces, and two affiliated companies. For the armed forces[10].

Whatever the case, the US sanctions on Sudan represent a type of pressure it is exerting

Washington approached both sides of the war with the aim of forcing them to enter into serious negotiations in order to reach To reach a solution a permanent ceasefire agreement with a commitment to implement its provisions in preparation for this. Political conflict. Despite this, there are those who believe that these sanctions may not achieve the intended goal, in light of the long experience of Sudan and other countries with US sanctions. Although Washington imposed sanctions on the Bashir regime since the mid-1990s, these sanctions did not undermine the regime. Economic sanctions may also weaken the army and the Rapid Support Forces to varying degrees, but they may be able to circumvent them in various ways, as the Bashir regime did. Although the imposition of more sanctions on the two warring parties by the United States of America may push them to accept temporary truces to deliver humanitarian aid to those in need, this does not address the roots of the conflict, as it requires entering into serious negotiations, leading to a comprehensive ceasefire.

Fire paves the way for reaching a comprehensive political settlement that puts an end to the war, includes a road map to address its effects, and achieves a transition to democratic civilian rule [11]. Without this, it is likely that the current war will turn into a long and protracted conflict that may lead to the disintegration of the Sudanese state.

Despite the suspension of the Jeddah talks, and the escalation of battles between the army and the Rapid Support Forces, the negotiating delegations of both parties remained in Jeddah and engaged in indirect talks with the encouragement of the two countries sponsoring the negotiations. On 6/9/2023, the two countries announced that the negotiating delegations of the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces had reached a ceasefire agreement throughout the country for a period of 24 hours, starting at six (Khartoum time) in the morning of every Saturday, corresponding to 6/10/2023. According to the agreement, “the new truce will be under strict supervision. For both parties to adhere to this truce, the two facilitators will be forced to adhere to the intentions of the two parties... and in the event that they do not

Talks [12] due to the short period of time for this truce, it is not expected exam. Given the postponement of the Jeddah Talks [12] due to the short period of time for this truce, it is not expected exam. Given the postponement of the Jeddah Talks [12] due to the short period of time for this truce, it is not expected exam.

To have tangible effects on the course of the war, especially since the armed confrontations between the two parties were taking place on the eve of the armistice in the strategic military zone in the south of the capital, Khartoum, which includes the Armored Corps Command and the Yarmouk Defense Industries Complex, which is considered the most prominent military manufacturing facility in Sudan. Hence, control of facilities for the two warring parties. So once it ends It is an important goal for military industrialization

In the truce, confrontations resumed between the two parties [13].

Thus, the Jeddah negotiations, and the results they have yielded so far, revealed the existence of a wide gap between the army and the Rapid Support Forces, and their unwillingness to make real concessions, especially since Al-Burhan had anticipated the negotiations by emphasizing that their goal was to stop the fighting only, and that there was no room to talk about any Political action during this stage. He considered that the withdrawal of the Rapid Support Forces from residential and service areas is the correct basis for a ceasefire, and without that, there is no point in any negotiation, as he put it [14]. However, it is inconceivable that the Rapid Support Forces will leave residential areas within the capital and its three cities, as this provides them with combat advantages against the army, especially since their members are trained in urban warfare.

The army's insistence on removing the Rapid Support Forces from the cities is also being viewed by the Rapid Support Command as a violation of the ceasefire. Heavy weapons. Added to this is the fact that it is a plan by the army to target it outside the cities using heavy weapons. In addition, the multiplicity and overlap of points and areas of armed confrontation between the two parties in the capital and its three cities makes it difficult to implement a mechanism that ensures effective monitoring of the ceasefire.

But even assuming that a longer-term ceasefire is reached at a later stage, the main goal will likely be to address humanitarian issues and situations. Therefore, fundamental issues will remain unresolved, such as the rapid evacuation of cities, especially after they fought a war against the army, and the location of cities.

Armed forces, and the future of the support forces, the framework agreement regarding any arrangements for a political solution after a ceasefire, as Hemedti emphasizes the

It is necessary to return to the framework agreement, while Al-Burhan sees the necessity of formulating a new agreement, as the old agreement consolidates the status of the Rapid Support Forces as one of the regular agencies, while Al-Burhan dissolved it after It is a rebellious force. The old agreement also does not include some political forces the outbreak of the war, considering And armed movements, which is something the army emphasizes the need to address in a new agreement [15].

Third scenario: The war continues intermittently during the short term

This scenario is considered the most likely in the short term, especially in light of the continued absence The factors that force the two parties to accept a permanent ceasefire and enter into serious negotiations to reach a comprehensive political solution, as well as the inability of either of them to achieve a decisive victory. Accordingly, it puts an end to the war. In this scenario, the war will remain largely confined to... The army and the Rapid Support Forces, and that they will remain primarily stationed in the capital with its three cities, and a number of other cities, especially in the Darfur region [16].

Violence is less intense, especially in the event of exhaustion. Under this scenario, it is likely that the forces of both parties will become exhausted, and the resources and capabilities necessary for war will diminish for each of them. It is also not unlikely that external parties will intervene to provide military support to this or that party, according to their priorities and interests, which will fuel the continuation of the war. But in a country like Sudan, with its complex composition and the presence of a number of armed movements on its territory, tribal, ethnic, and regional, it is unlikely that the war will remain confined between the army and the Rapid Support Forces, and centered in the capital with its three cities, as it could descend into the worst or worst-case scenario. Rather catastrophic, a scenario of all-out civil war.

Fourth scenario: sliding into a comprehensive civil war

If the armed confrontations between the army and the Rapid Support Forces continue for a relatively long period, then... It could turn into a comprehensive civil war, especially in light of the depth of the vertical divisions in Sudanese society on the one hand, and the legacy of the extended civil wars that the country witnessed in the post-independence phase, the repercussions of which are still continuing to this day, on the other hand. This scenario is based on several elements, including: the absence of a central civilian authority, as there has been no government in Sudan since the coup led by Al-Burhan against the civilian component of the transitional authority, represented by In the government of Abdullah Hamdok on 10/25/2021, the Transitional Sovereignty Council was preoccupied with the war with the Rapid Support Forces, in addition to the fracture of the state's apparatuses and institutions due to the state of war, and what It results in chaos and insecurity.

This scenario also involves transferring the confrontations between the army and the Rapid Support Forces to other states and cities, and the intervention of tribal and ethnic forces, armed militias, and political organizations to support this or that party. The state of security chaos may push tribal and ethnic forces to engage in armed confrontations, similar to what happened in the Darfur region. In addition, the rebellious movements

Armed forces, many of which were expected to be integrated into the Sudanese army, may become active again. Some of them may be able to impose their control on some areas of Sudan, especially since the two forces that were cooperating to confront these movements (the army and the Rapid Support Forces) have turned into arch enemies and engaged in a war of attrition, which is likely to be long.

In addition to the above, the expansion of the scope of the war will allow external powers to intervene by supporting this or that party according to their interests and agendas, which will fuel the continuation of the war.

The history of civil wars in Sudan, Somalia, Lebanon, Libya, Yemen, and Syria is the best witness to [this \[17\]](#). It is known that parties involved in civil wars usually search for military and economic support from external parties, in order to enhance their ability to confront opponents and continue the war. The Sudanese wars also follow a horrific pattern

This war will happen to him. It begins with confrontations. Day after familiar day, the fate that has come becomes clear

. As it turns out It is fierce, and each party pledges a quick and decisive victory. This never happens

Before, it is difficult to reach and maintain a ceasefire. Both parties do not want to be in a critical situation, or if

"His ally" [18]. Stop believing that victory will occur

As for Sudan, it will lead to a state of chaos that may lead to...

This scenario is disastrous

The state is fractured and torn apart, similar to what happened in Somalia, Libya, and Yemen, where there is no central authority, and parts of the state's territory become under the control of militias and armed movements. This scenario will also result in an aggravation of the humanitarian situation due to the extent of destruction and devastation

in the infrastructure, which will result in an escalation of mass displacement and forced displacement, and perhaps massacres on ethnic lines, as well as turning the country into an arena for regional polarization.

and international [19]. This situation will also have serious negative repercussions at the regional level, especially in Sudan's neighboring countries. These meanings were expressed by former Sudanese Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok by saying: "If Sudan were to reach the point of real civil war, Syria, Yemen, and Libya would be just small duels"[20].

Conclusion

The data and developments of the war that broke out between the army and the Rapid Support Forces on April 15, 2023 suggest the possibility of this war continuing for a long period of time, and it may turn into a war that includes other states, and tribal forces became involved in it. Comprehensive eligibility if geographically expanded Ethnic and armed movements, and external parties, regional and international, intervened in them according to their agendas and interests. Thus, it will bring to mind the legacy of internal wars in Sudan, which continued for years and perhaps decades. This scenario will have catastrophic repercussions, not only on the state and society in Sudan, but also at the regional level. The disintegration of the Sudanese state, the absence of central authority, the militarization of society, and the expansion of armed non-state actors, all of this

And others will have an impact on Sudan's neighboring countries, especially since most of them suffer from fragile internal conditions.

Can this catastrophic scenario be avoided? This is the real challenge.

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Articles

Despite the state of optimism that accompanied the political process that began on December 5, 2022, to remove Sudan from the cycle of political stagnation that the Sudanese people have suffered from during the recent period, and the attempts it included to include various parties that did not join, a number of civil forces as well as armed movements, in preparation for the framework agreement, and for signing

Its final draft was completed during the month of April 2023. However, the outbreak of conflict between the National Army (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) since April 15, 2023, against the backdrop of their lack of agreement on the security and military reform arrangements included in the framework agreement, has led to a decline in hopes of overcoming the agreement. A difficult stage resulting from the exceptional measures adopted by the Transitional Sovereignty Council in October 2021, making the Sudanese people facing an unknown fate in light of the escalation of fighting between the two sides, in a way that raises important questions about the positions of many internal forces regarding the crisis, especially the armed movements, as these are numerous. The movements spread throughout all Sudanese regions.

Armed movements and the current conflict in Sudan

Sudan is replete with a large group of armed movements, as the national army does not have a monopoly on the use of force, as historical grievances and disagreements arise over issues of marginalization, racism, and struggles over power and wealth in many regions. This dilemma is considered one of the most important reasons for the continued factors of instability and the large number of separatist demands that put strong pressure on The ideas of national harmony and unity that the Sudanese people sought through their glorious revolution.

The idea of establishing a unified national army in Sudan represented one of the goals that the December 2018 revolution sought to achieve, and steps were taken to achieve this goal, as the Juba Peace Agreement included an emphasis on the integration of these movements and the Rapid Support Forces within the national army, as stipulated

The framework agreement, which came through consultations and workshops between the two components of government (civilian and military), to integrate these movements and the Rapid Support Forces within the framework of security and military reform, while emphasizing the importance of the military institution becoming a professional institution and moving away from political work, as this is The goal is one of the reasons that led to reaching a consensus between a number of parties from the civilian component and the military component during recent months, after the military institution announced its willingness to move away from the political process and return to its barracks.

With the outbreak of confrontations between the National Army and the Rapid Support Forces, the armed movements committed themselves to neutrality, and no movement declared its support for the National Army or the Rapid Support

Forces. This position could be due to the following reasons:

1- The sudden outbreak of conflict : Despite the escalation of disputes during the recent period between the Chairman of the Sovereignty Council, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Commander of the Rapid Support Forces, Lieutenant General Muhammad Hamdan Daglo, and the two parties sought to increase and spread their forces in some areas, the arrangements for the political process did not witness major problems, except when discussing security and military reform procedures, but reaching the stage of confrontations was not a scenario on the table, so I played it safe. Many political forces and armed movements refused to react quickly to these clashes.

2- The involvement of some armed movements within the arrangements of the transitional phase : Many armed movements seek to obtain gains in power and wealth during the post-Bashir period, and despite the tendency of some movements to use violence in their regions, this is primarily due to tribal reasons. While these movements being arranged in the country after the revolution, continue to be keen to participate in the political process that is these movements fear that participation in this conflict may lead to them losing the gains they obtained after the revolution.

A number of armed movements on the 3rd of October 2020. The Transitional Sovereignty Council signed a peace agreement in October 2020, where the Juba negotiations were based on five tracks: the track of the Darfur region (west), the track of the states of South Kordofan (south) and the Blue Nile (southeast). The eastern Sudan path, the northern Sudan path, and the central Sudan path, but many movements are still outside. Because some movements did not accept to join the agreement this agreement due to its failure to accept the bodies that represent its interests in the agreement, which exacerbates tribal and regional conflicts, especially in Darfur, Abyei, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile, in addition to the path East, which raises from time to time more tensions, and last February they occurred. The Sudanese government and armed movements agreed on an updated formula to implement the Juba Peace Agreement in the presence of the President of the Transitional Council, Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, and the President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir Mayardit. The armed movements that signed the new version of the agreement included the Justice and Equality Movement, the Sudan Liberation Army, the Popular Front for Liberation and Justice, and the opposition Beja Congress.

With the presence of armed movements that refused to join the Juba Peace Agreement, many attempts were made to include these movements, especially the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North, led by Abdul Aziz al-Hilu, and the Sudan Liberation Movement, Abdul Wahid Nur faction, to the peace process. They are the two largest armed movements outside the Juba Peace Agreement. Three armed groups were also formed in December in central and eastern Sudan, as these groups reject the Juba Peace Agreement, which is expected to be reviewed through the framework agreement.

Some armed movements joined the discussions held by the workshops to draft the final draft of the framework agreement, the principles of which the civilian and military components succeeded in launching on the fifth of last December (2022), as various efforts were made during the recent period to attract movements that reject the framework agreement, and the most important of these movements are Justice and Equality Movement

Led by Jibril Ibrahim, and the Sudan Liberation Army Movement led by Mona Arko Minawi, the two movements refuse to discuss the Juba Agreement because this could result in a redistribution of power that is not consistent with the interests of the two movements.

3- The presence of a number of armed movements supporting the National Army : Despite the rejection of the main civilian forces and a number of armed movements of the exceptional measures adopted by the Transitional Sovereignty Council in October 2021, there are some armed movements that supported the military institution, and did not reject these measures, and among them are These movements are: the Sudan Liberation Movement - led by Minawi, the Justice and Equality Movement - led by Jibril Ibrahim, as well as the Supreme Council of Beja Glasses, led by Muhammad Al-Amin Turk. These movements believe that the national armed forces can confront the attacks of the Rapid Support Forces.


SUDAN

Military Factions Enhance Their Power Amid Spreading Violence




Two developments have characterized violence in Sudan in recent months: an increase in peripheral violence and the rising involvement of paramilitary forces in ongoing conflicts. Further, demonstrations against the governing cabal continued in Khartoum. Violence in Sudan's peripheries – especially in Darfur and the disputed Abyei area – persisted, as did internal power struggles between the multiple military and paramilitary factions. West Darfur state remains the focal point of violence in Darfur, though violence has continued to climb in South Darfur state as well.

Peripheral areas became deadlier in the first half of 2022



Increase in intervention by security forces against protesters

Ongoing protests against military rule were frequently met with violent intervention from security forces during the first half of 2022, particularly in Khartoum. The paramilitary Central Reserve Police forces (a.k.a. Abu Tira) became increasingly involved in suppressing demonstrations, intervening in about 8% of all events recorded during the first half of 2022, up from just over 1% last year. As political instability continues, so too will demonstrations and the heavy-handed state crackdown.



Source, Sudan Mid-Year Update, Military Factions Enhance Their Power Amid Spreading Violence, <https://acleddata.com/10-conflicts-to-worry-about-in-2022/sudan/mid-year-update/>

Developments in the Darfur region due to the impact of the conflict

The armed confrontations that broke out between the army and the Rapid Support Forces cast a shadow over the tensions that the Darfur region is witnessing on an ongoing basis, as fighting renewed in West Darfur state, which suffers from continued conflict between tribes. Violent fighting broke out between the army and the Rapid Support Forces in El Geneina, the capital of West Darfur state. On the twenty-fourth of April 2023, but it quickly turned into a civil conflict in which heavy weapons were used, and two battles were taking place in

El Geneina: the first battle was between the army and the Rapid Support Forces, while the second war was taking place between Arab tribes and African tribes, led by the Masalit tribe. On April 27, 2023, armed militias launched a violent attack on El Geneina, in a new development.

The conflict between the Masalit and Arab tribes continued for the fourth day in a row.

Army and Rapid Support clashes broke out after they became active in the wake of the security vacuum that left Looting, theft, and attacks on citizens and their property. In the first days of the start of military battles between the army and the Rapid Support Forces, El Fasher witnessed bloody clashes in various parts of the city, killing 61 civilians, before mediation led by the governor of North Darfur, Nimr Abdel Rahman, and community leaders succeeded. In urging both parties to a permanent ceasefire.

Since the cessation of fighting, armed groups have appeared on motorcycles and four-wheel drive vehicles in the city's neighborhoods, carrying out widespread looting and assaulting citizens. They also attacked a prison. It released all inmates, including those accused of murder and drug trafficking. "Shaal"

Some fear that these fighters will support the army if clashes between it and the army are renewed Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in El Fasher, turning the conflict into a tribal one similar to the conflict taking place in El Geneina in neighboring West Darfur state, which claimed the lives of more than 100 people.

A joint force of five armed movements with 120 military vehicles was also formed, working to secure the headquarters of government institutions and international organizations and all areas west of El Fasher, to secure the city of El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur state. The movements that make up this force are the Sudan Liberation Forces led by Minni Arko Minawi, the Transitional Council headed by Al-Hadi Idris, in addition to the Justice and Equality Movement led by Jibril Ibrahim, the Sudan Liberation Forces and the Sudanese Alliance, which are the movements that signed the Juba Peace Agreement in October 2020, where this force came. In the wake of the intensification of battles between the forces of the two sides in West Darfur, the head of the Army Movement confir

Sudan Liberation Minni Arko Minawi said that the leaders of the armed movements decided to move a military force to the local authorities, To expand a circle in order to prevent Joint forces to separate the warring parties in cooperation with the outbreak of violence after the escalation of armed confrontations in Khartoum and their spread to a number of regions, especially ^[3] Darfur.

In the end , it seems that Sudan has entered into a vicious circle of violence and fighting that allows the security situation to explode in many of its regions, in light of what these regions are witnessing of the escalation of the struggle for subnational power between competing local political elites and militias, to establish local control over the land or to assert Power by force, and these conflicts do not depend on the support of internal groups and bodies only, but also extend to the reinforcements they receive from the regional neighbourhood, which makes it difficult to contain them and achieve their demands that are not unified or express all the groups that belong to the region in which they live, which creates cycles of violence. On an ongoing basis.

This is in addition to the presence of confrontations between the National Army and some armed movements in the past.

Also, the Rapid Support Forces fought alongside the army or alone against tribes and armed movements in many areas. Will some armed movements, especially those that did not join the framework agreement or the Juba peace agreement, allow their areas to be used in the conflict between the two sides, as is happening in Darfur, or will the days... The coming period could witness escalation by a number of armed movements

To distance its regions from conflict, which increases the arming of existing armed movements and their emergence in...

Its framework creates new armed movements, and also opens the way for the strengthening of separatist demands in some regions, such as eastern Sudan or the Darfur region.


with Here, the conflict between the army and the Rapid Support Forces must be described more accurately, in order to clarify the real goals of the two parties to the conflict. Are the two parties looking for greater political and economic gains during the next stage? Does each party agree to share the gains with the other? Or are the two parties conducting a zero-sum game in which each seeks to erase the other? Do both parties allow a return to the political process with the participation of the civil component? Or does either party imagine that it will win power without a partner? Will the civilian component of government allow the participation of the army or the Rapid Support Forces in the political process? Or will the leaders of this component consider that the crimes committed obliterate any participation of the military component in determining the future of Sudan? Finally, is it possible to launch

A political process to rule in Sudan without the participation of the army in light of the presence of this huge number of armed movements, which according to some estimates amount to approximately 87 armed movements.

Many are counting on regional roles and the extent of their impact on restoring stability in Sudan, and pushing both sides of the conflict to implement the truce, which was violated more than once without taking into account the catastrophic humanitarian conditions the Sudanese people have reached.

Areas of Operation of Identity Militias in Sudan

2022



Source, Context Assessment..New Political Deal Amid Rising Disorder in Sudan, 3 March 2023, <https://acleddata.com/2023/03/03/context-assessment-new-political-deal-amidst-rising-political-disorder-in-sudan/>

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Hemedti: Vice President of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council, between evasion and bias towards change

Muhammad Muhammad

Othman • BBC News Arabic - Khartoum

August 4, 2022

The interview conducted by BBC News Arabic with the Vice President of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council, Lieutenant General, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, sparked widespread reactions inside and outside Sudan due to his unusual and frank statements, perhaps the most prominent of which was his acknowledgment of the failure of the "course correction" step taken by the army in Last October, and his assurances that the security and economic conditions had become worse than they were before the move. Sudan: Did Al-Burhan put the civil forces in "trouble" by withdrawing from the political negotiations? The Sudanese army announces its withdrawal from the political dialogue

An open door .

Hemedti describes himself during his speeches and conversations as clear and honest and does not like to evade, twist and turn, but when I asked him directly about the possibility of his running for the position of president in the future,

His answer was evasive. He said that he is ascetic in power and does not want to run for office and hates politics and politicians, but he added that this matter is linked to the existence of a government that represents all Sudanese and is not inclined to the policies of the axes, "but if that does not happen and the country heads towards chaos and collapse, I will intervene."

His position on this matter appears ambiguous, in contrast to the position of the Chairman of the Sovereignty Council, Lieutenant General Abdel

Al-Fattah Al-Burhan, who has confirmed more than once that he will hand over power, will not run for office, and will devote himself to

agriculture, which

he loves. **A political joke** for me is his position on their former ruling partners, the Forces of Freedom and Change. What was surprising?

"Our brothers." Revealing that communications between them are continuing, he said that the differences between them are minor, and they and he are ready to enter into any possible understandings in order to overcome the current crisis. These statements seem like political spin, especially since Hemedti, until recently, was attacking this alliance with great ferocity and carrying it with the consequences of security and economic collapse.

What after Hemedti acknowledged the failure of military rule in Sudan?

Hemedti to the BBC: The army has failed to correct the course and Sudan is heading towards the worst

The Forces of Freedom and Change, which became the opposition after the military coup after being the political incubator of the transitional government, picked up the gauntlet and welcomed the pledges of the Vice-President of the Sovereignty Council regarding his departure from political work. The leader of the coalition, Al-Wathiq Al-Barir, told BBC News Arabic that Hemedti's pledges are positive and help in reaching a solution to the crisis, but he demanded

The proof is by taking the same step and explicitly pledging that he will return to the barracks and leave political work to the civilian forces. **The future of Rapid Support Forces** units of the Rapid Support Forces are protecting the Hospitality Palace building in the city of El Geneina, Western Darfur, where Hemedti has been residing for months. When I headed to the building where I conducted the interview, I noticed a heavy deployment of these forces in the city. They are equipped with the best weapons and have four-wheel drive vehicles fully prepared for emergency situations. Maneuver or serious talk: How do the Sudanese view what Hemedti said about handing over power to civilians? Who are the members of the Hausa tribe in Sudan and what are the reasons for the violence that has affected them recently? These forces - whose number is estimated at more than one hundred thousand fighters and are spread throughout almost all parts of the country - remained under the barrage of successive accusations of involvement in the dispersal of the sit-in at the army command, which left hundreds dead, and of siding with Arab groups during the bloody tribal conflicts in Darfur. Protesters against the military coup continued to demand its dissolution, while politicians called for its integration into the army. The commander of these forces, Hemedti - who preferred to wear his uniform during the interview - always confirms that his forces are part of the armed forces, and therefore part of the military system, but he expressed his willingness in the dialogue to integrate them into the framework of reforming the security and military institutions, and said, "No one rejects the idea of The presence of a national and professional army, and in this context we have no objection to integrating the Rapid Support Forces."

It does not seem that his approval of the step of integrating his forces into the army came with complete conviction, because he added, "I fear that a day will come when some of them will regret integrating the Rapid Support Forces into the army."

Dagalo: The military will not remain silent in the ongoing attack on them

September 26, 2021 - 12:46 Abu Dhabi time Kamal Abdel Rahman

- Khartoum - Sky News Arabia

Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, said that the military will not remain silent in the continuing attack on them; He threatened to publish recordings exposing the Sovereignty Council meetings.

Hemedti confirmed His ability to confront the street by mobilizing another street loyal to him, and he stressed that the civil administrations and the rest of the political forces cannot be isolated from participating under the claim of belonging to the Omar al- Bashir regime.

However, politicians considered that these statements confirm the existence of a deep crisis in the country, which requires the need to accelerate the restructuring of the regular forces.

Threats from the international

community and Hemedti's warning; In statements he made on Saturday during a social event in an area near the Sudanese capital, Khartoum ; From the threat to the international community; In reference to the strong reactions of the Security Council Support for of European countries. civilians issued by the United Nations And the United States Britain, Norway, and a number

He criticized the accusations that indicated that the military was seeking to block the completion of the civilian transformation process In the country by supporting the current security fluidity that the country is experiencing against the backdrop of the events that have been taking place for about 10 days in eastern Sudan . Which is led by Muhammad Al-Amin Turk , leader of the Beja tribe ; One of the population components in eastern Sudan; He is one of the elements of the deposed Omar al-Bashir regime, which was overthrown by a popular revolution in April 2019

While reports considered that the security laxity in the face of Turk, whose supporters closed the country's main port in the city of Port Sudan, ; It was a prelude to the coup against civil authority; Hemedti described these accusations as "hypocrisy."

Constant disputes

Hemedti hinted that there were disagreements between the military and civilian components within the Sovereignty Council Sudanese, Which includes 6 military personnel and 6 civilians.

In response to statements in which civilians indicated that their sitting with the military faction was a deduction from their political credit; Hemedti said, "Enough is enough. We are the ones who gave them power, and we will not remain silent about the truth."

He added, revealing that he had previously submitted his resignation from the Sovereignty Council three times: "They said that we were deducted from their political capital, where did they find power? We were the ones who gave them power. And in the end, they wanted us to be their guards."

Deep crisis

Politicians believed that Hemedti's statements indicate a real crisis. Madani Abbas Madani, the former Minister of Trade and member of the negotiating committee with the [Military Council](#), pointed out Following the success of the revolution; These statements are understood to be part of a planned escalation that seemed keen to deepen the crisis within [the Forces of Freedom and Change](#) By supporting splinter groups.

He told Sky News Arabia, "It is an escape from facing the real questions related to the extent of the military component's seriousness in [reforming the military institution](#)." Security and formation of a unified army with a national doctrine and subject to civilian sovereignty."

He added that security failure has continued to accompany them for the past two years, even though security was the justification for their participation in power.

In the same context, Amjad Farid, former advisor to the Sudanese Prime Minister, stresses the necessity of [reforming security institutions](#).

"The statements of mobilization and polarization must stop," Farid told Sky News Arabia.

For his part, Hisham Abu Raida sees: Leader of the Broad National Front and head of the Human Rights Office at the Association of Lawyers and Jurists in Britain. Hemedti's statements make it clear that there is something wrong

·What may happen, because the security situation is very fragile, which may open the door to many possibilities

Dying on the ground or in the streets: giving birth amidst war in Sudan



A one-day-old baby is treated for acute respiratory distress syndrome at Al Nada Hospital in Omdurman (New York Times)

War in this country, located in northeastern Africa, has forced pregnant women to move “through hell” to reach a dwindling number of hospitals and clinics, or to resort, exhausted from overwork, to give birth to their children at home.

Midwives

Days after fighting broke out in Sudan, Amna Ahmed received an urgent distress call from a pregnant woman. One year I told her she was about to die. Ms. Amna Ahmed, a 42-year-old midwife, said,

She ran through the gunfire that swept through her neighborhood in Omdurman, north of the capital, Khartoum, to reach the woman’s home. Arriving in the middle of the night, she quickly realized that the baby was stuck in the mother’s birth canal. However, there were no ambulances or taxis

To take her to the hospital.

The midwife said in a telephone interview: “We were choosing between death on the ground or death in the air, with the woman groaning: “The lady told me that the pain had flooded the streets,” noting that the mingling of the sounds of bombing forced her soul to leave her body.”

Several hours later, Ms. Amna Ahmed helped the woman onto a motorcycle and rushed her to a nearby clinic, where she was able to give birth to her daughter.



Al Nada Hospital in Omdurman (New York Times)

Pregnant women are victims of war

Across the country, the war that broke out in Sudan forced pregnant women to dodge artillery shelling and walk through checkpoints to reach the dwindling number of hospitals and maternity wards that remained open. The United Nations estimates that tens of thousands more have been displaced, trapped in their homes, or have had their babies delivered by midwives, family members, or no one at all.

The conflict is entering its second month, between the Sudanese army led by Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces led by Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo. On Saturday, the two sides agreed to a 7-day ceasefire, which took effect on Monday evening, despite the sounds of sporadic gunfire and explosions being heard in parts of the capital and its neighboring cities on Tuesday.

Doctors and relief workers say that the situation in Sudan, one of the largest African countries, is heading towards a humanitarian catastrophe. Sudan had already recorded one of the highest maternal mortality rates in the world

The world before the outbreak of fighting.

It is believed that there are more than 1.1 million Sudanese women who are pregnant. Of those in dire need of humanitarian assistance, 29,000 women are expected to give birth next month, and 4,300 women are at risk of death and need emergency obstetric care, according to the United Nations Population Fund. It is believed that at least

Suicide missions to rescue pregnant women

Dr. Muhammad Fath al-Rahman (33 years old), a pediatrician and general manager of the "Hospital," said Al-Nada" in Omdurman, and supervises the maternity ward: "Parents used to drive their cars across Hell to reach us, as if they were on suicide missions." Al-Nada Hospital is among the few remaining facilities in Greater Khartoum where babies are still being born, and its halls are crowded with pregnant women.

"Cars come to our hospital covered in bullet holes," Fath al-Rahman said in a phone interview. "These women are very anxious, under a lot of stress, and many of them are in advanced labor."

He said he had just released from hospital a woman who arrived in a reversed state, after spending hours at a checkpoint controlled by paramilitary forces, who were interrogating her husband. Dr. Fath al-Rahman added: "Unfortunately, it did not reach us in time, and it was not written

The child is saved."



A pediatric nurse treats a newborn at Al Nada Hospital in Omdurman (New York Times)

Increase in the number of births

He added that the number of babies born prematurely in the hospital had increased by nearly a third since the start of the fighting on April 15, with a small staff, it is estimated that the maternity ward has been damaged 600 new births last month, 20 times the usual number. And in d more than

For the first few weeks of the conflict, they were performing up to 50 caesarean sections with two newborns sharing the same incubator. Today, often

Fath al-Rahman said he was able to keep the hospital running through international funding from the Sudanese American Medical Association. The association has funded every caesarean section since the beginning Top to prevent them from dispute, and allowed Dr. Fath al-Rahman to provide wages to his remaining employees Escape.

His account was supported by aid workers from the United Nations, CARE, International Medical Corps, Doctors Without Borders, and Save the Children, who told the New York Times that the crisis affecting pregnant women represents A symbol of the collapse of a system

Throughout Sudan since the start of the fighting. Public health in all

“This is going to get worse,” said Adif Joseph Eji Seriki, global advisor on sexual and reproductive health at International Medical Corps, which trains health care workers across Sudan.

The poor health status of mothers also has consequences for pre-born children Colors. “Premature babies are more likely to develop lifelong defects, including intellectual disabilities, cerebral palsy, and hearing and vision impairment,” Seriki said.

Even before the outbreak of the current conflict, Sudan had a fragile health system that lacked adequate infrastructure and equipment, a shortage of skilled health professionals, and a limited supply chain.

270 deaths per 100,000 live births, compared to 21 deaths per 100,000 live births in the United States. According to the United Nations, the maternal mortality rate in Sudan reached about



60 percent of hospitals were closed

In Khartoum State, which is home to about 10 million people, about 60 percent of health care facilities are now closed, with only 20 percent of facilities fully operational, according to the United Nations. In El Geneina, the capital of West Darfur, all facilities were closed to Health is open.

The hospitals themselves turned into scenes of intense fighting. Armed groups were expelled 8 Patients were receiving care at a health center in Khartoum in order to use it as a base, according to the non-profit organization Save the Children. Many doctors and nurses who remained in the country were threatened and arrested.

Looting and robbery also spread, and many hospitals, pharmacies, and stores were looted. The Sudanese Medical Syndicate said that patients suffering from chronic diseases, such as cancer, heart disease, or diabetes, were unable to obtain medications for weeks, while dozens of dialysis centers closed their doors.

But few areas of Sudan's health system have been affected as severely as health care networks across the country to receive maternity care calls. As soon as the fighting started, midwives began to help the pregnant mothers.

"These women are increasingly becoming a vital lifeline for those women stuck at home," said Rania Hassan, head of the UN reproductive health team in Sudan, who is helping to support a network of at least 400 community midwives in the country. She added that their work "is particularly important in the area in and around Khartoum, where the fighting has been most intense, and where many women prefer to give birth in health care facilities."

Midwives are spread across cities and villages, entering women's homes to deliver newborns, and often responding to requests from neighborhood chat groups or hotlines.

For emergency.

Mrs. Amna Ahmed, who was riding with the pregnant woman on the motorcycle, is assisted by a midwife in children since the outbreak of fighting. Coordinating together, they have helped 200

She pointed out that midwives not only brave violence, but are often forced to work without work .Because of the clashes Access to phones or the Internet, services that have deteriorated significantly

Ms. Amna Ahmed said she had eight children during the conflict, but the chaos made it difficult to reach women and obtain medical supplies.

Her story was echoed by other women, such as Ahlam Abdullah Hameed, a 27-year-old midwife. She has 6 children in the city of Bahri, north of Khartoum.

"The situation is very difficult," Hamid said in a phone interview, adding that she moved to help after she followed a series of requests from pregnant women on the WhatsApp channel in the neighborhood where she lives.

While all of her parents were successful, she said she began to feel anxious about moving around in the middle of street fighting that gets worse and more unpredictable at night, when she usually responds to calls.

But she is still willing to take risks, she says, adding that she feels a strong sense of responsibility to help every time she hears a call from a woman in critical condition.

"Women's prayers for me to do well make me feel sad," she wondered: "How can I finally leave when they are constantly asking for help?"

Dagalo: "We will not return to Khartoum until we find a solution to the tribal problems in West Darfur."

Tuesday 06-21-2022 17:13 | Written by: Juma Hamdallah | The Vice President of

the Transitional Sovereignty Council in Sudan, Lieutenant General Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo, criticized those he described as frequenters of hotels and apartments in Europe who claim to struggle in its name, saying that these people will not offer anything because they are preoccupied with their own interests.

In his speech to the students of El Geneina University at the university headquarters today, in the presence of the members of the Sovereignty Council, Al-Taher Abu Bakr Hajar and Dr. Al-Hadi Idris Yahya, and the Governor of West Darfur, Khamis Abdallah Abkar, and Dr. Suleiman Sandal,

the Vice President of the Sovereignty Council stressed the importance of the role of universities in contributing to achieving peace, stability, and educating society about the dangers of tribal and regional conflicts, noting the government's interest and sponsorship of scientific institutions, especially university ones,

In that students are the mainstay of the future.

In his speech, which was broadcast by the media of the Transitional Sovereignty Council in Sudan, Lieutenant General

Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo called on the students to form committees representing all faculties to sit with the

components of El Geneina, and discuss the causes of the conflicts and conflicts that have struck the unity of society and find permanent solutions.

Students need to reflect what they learned among their families, and urge them to forget the past and rise above wounds

and resolve differences and conflicts, for the sake of lasting and stable peace. The Deputy Chairman of the

Sovereignty Council said: We came from Khartoum to address all tribal issues and problems in West Darfur state, and

we will not return until we find a solution to them.

He called on the students to pay attention to what the oppressed people who manage the agenda from outside Sudan are

plotting, and to look at the public interest, by contributing to the recovery of their rights, the return of the displaced to their

areas of origin, and reassuring them that the joint forces will protect them, stressing

The return from the camps must be final and not temporary during the fall.

He added, "Let us reject the hatred, rivalry, and malice of those outside, and solve our problems."

alone together".

Lieutenant General Dagalo pledged to support the University of El Geneina and contribute to creating the appropriate

scientific environment, enabling it to carry out its educational mission. He donated the construction of a modern hall at the

university that would accommodate the largest number of students, an integrated laboratory, ten administrative vehicles, and two buses for transport.

The student, creating an environment in residential complexes for the student, and ten opportunities for master's degrees outside Sudan.

A case against Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo in the European courts

Good greeting

The articles of the law related to the case are as follows:

Retroactive effect of the law.

4 (1) Notwithstanding the provision of Article 2, the law that was in force at the time of the commission of the offense shall apply.

(2) In the case of crimes in which a final judgment has not been passed, the provisions of this Act shall apply if it is the most suitable for the accused.

(3) The failure to implement any hudud penalty prior to the enforcement of this law is considered a suspicion that drops the hadd punishment, and the assessment of the penalty is reviewed for those against whom a final judgment has been issued, in accordance with the provisions of this law.

(4) Any final judgment for blood money issued prior to the enforcement of this law shall be

reviewed in accordance with its provisions regarding its collection.

Crimes committed in Sudan.

5 (1) The provisions of this Act shall apply to every crime committed, wholly or partly, in Sudan.

Crimes committed outside Sudan.

6 (1) The provisions of this Act shall apply to every person who:

(A) Absent from Sudan in an act that makes him the principal or accomplice in one of the crimes:

(i) directed against the State,

(ii) relating to the regular forces,

(Third) related to counterfeiting currency or counterfeiting revenue stamps if the offender is found inside Sudan.

(B) Inside Sudan, a joint act in an act committed outside Sudan is considered a crime in Sudan and a crime under the law of the country in which it occurred.

(2) No person shall be punished outside Sudan for any of the crimes for which he may be punished inside Sudan if it is proven that that person was tried by a competent court outside Sudan and fulfilled his sentence, or was acquitted by that court.

Criminal responsibility

The basis of criminal liability.

8 (1) There is no liability except for the designated person.

(2) No liability except for an unlawful act committed with intent or negligently. did the little one.

coercion.

13-(1) A person who has been compelled to act by force or by threat of death, or by immediate serious harm to himself or his family, or serious damage to his property, shall not be considered to have committed the crime of a

A person who has been forced to act by force or by threat of death and was not in his ability to avoid that by other means.

(2) Coercion does not permit the causing of death or serious harm or the commission of any of the crimes against the state punishable by death.

He was not able to avoid it by any other means.

(2) Coercion does not permit the causing of death or serious harm or the commission of any of the crimes against the state punishable by death.

Involuntary verbs.

14- A person who at the time of committing the act was not voluntary and was not in a position to control his actions due to force majeure or sudden illness, which made him unable to avoid that act, shall not be considered to have committed the crime.

necessity.

15- The person whom you have resorted to an act of necessity in order to protect himself, his honor or his money, or the life, honor or money

of others from a grave and imminent danger that he did not intentionally cause, and he was not in his power to prevent him by other means, is not considered to have committed a crime, provided that the act does not result in harm such as harm What is meant is protection from it or greater than it, provided that necessity does not permit killing except in the performance of duty.

Accidental accident.

16- It is not considered a crime that was accidentally caused by a legitimate act that took place in good faith and that resulted in an unexpected harm.

the satisfaction.

17. (1) An act is not considered a crime if it causes harm to a person in his body or his money when it is based on the express or tacit consent of that person.

(2) The provisions of subsection (1) shall not apply to acts likely to cause death or serious injury.

Factual error.

18. A person who believes in good faith, due to an error in facts, that he is authorized to

act, shall not be considered to have committed an offense.

Chapter Three

Criminal Attempt and Participation

chapter one

Getting started

Definition of initiation.

19- Attempt is to perform an act that clearly indicates the intent to commit a crime, if the crime was not completed by a reason outside the will of the perpetrator.

Punishment for initiation.

20- (1) Whoever attempts to commit a crime shall be punished with no more than half of the maximum penalty prescribed for it. If the attempted act constitutes an independent crime, the offender shall be punished with the penalty prescribed for it.

(2) If the penalty for a crime is death or amputation, the penalty for the attempt shall be imprisonment for a period not exceeding seven years.

Chapter II

criminal involvement

Participation in pursuance of a criminal agreement.

21- If two or more persons commit a crime in implementation of a criminal agreement between them, each of them shall be responsible for it as if he had committed it alone and shall be punished with the penalty prescribed for it.

Participation without criminal agreement.

22- If two or more persons commit a crime without a criminal agreement between them, each of them shall be responsible for his act, and he shall be punished with the penalty prescribed for the crime that constitutes that act.

Commanding the commission of a crime and coercing it.

23. Whoever orders a person who is not charged or of good faith to commit an act that constitutes a crime or coerces a person to

commit that act, he shall be responsible for it as if he had committed it alone and shall be punished with the penalty prescribed for that crime.

Criminal agreement.

24 (1) A criminal agreement is the agreement of two or more persons to commit a crime.

(2) With the exception of premeditated murder, enmity and crimes against the state punishable by death, the criminal agreement is not a punishable crime except with the attempt to commit the crime, and in all cases the retracted agreement is not a crime.

(3) Whoever commits the crime of criminal conspiracy shall be punished with imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years, and in the event that the crime is committed or attempted, he shall be punished with the penalty prescribed for the commission of that crime or the attempt, as the case may be. 2

agitation.

25. (1) Incitement is the temptation of a person to another to commit a crime or his ordering of a person charged under his authority to commit it.

(2) Subject to not exceeding the penalty prescribed for the crime, whoever abets the

commission of a crime shall be punished according to the following:

(A) In the event that the crime was not committed or attempted, imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years

(B) In the event that the crime was committed or attempted, imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years or a fine or both. If the penalty prescribed for the crime is flogging, he shall be punished with flogging not exceeding half the penalty.

(3) Whoever instigates the commission of a crime and is present at the time of its occurrence is considered to have committed that crime.

(4) Whoever incites a person to commit a particular act shall be responsible for the commission of any other act that constitutes an offense committed by that person if the other act is a probable consequence of the incitement.

auxiliary.

26- Whoever helps to commit any act that constitutes a crime with the intention of facilitating its occurrence, the provisions of Article 25 shall apply to him, and he shall be punished with the penalty prescribed for the instigator, as the case may be.

Chapter Four

Sanctions

chapter one

Penalties

execution.

27- (1) Execution shall be by hanging, stoning, or similar to that with which the offender was killed, and it may be hadd punishment, retribution, or retribution, and it may be accompanied by crucifixion.

(2) With the exception of hudud and qisas crimes, a person under the age of eighteen or over seventy may not be sentenced to death.

(3) It is not permissible to sentence to death with crucifixion, except in Haraba.

retribution.

28- (1) Qisas is the punishment of the premeditated offender with the same act.

(2) The right to retribution is established from the outset of the victim and then transferred to his guardians.

(3) In the case of murder, retribution is by hanging to death, and the offender may be killed with the same amount he was killed with if the court deems it appropriate.

(4) In the case of wounds, retribution shall be in accordance with the provisions of the First Schedule attached to this Act.

Retribution terms.

29 Conditions for the application of distribution to wounds:

(A) Achieving similarity between the two members in terms of gender, safety and quantity, so that only the equivalent of the victim's member shall be repaid, and the correct one shall not be taken with the crippled or defective, the complete with the missing or the original with the addition, and the entire place shall be taken in its entirety and some of it together, however retribution is required. And the

(B) The possibility of fulfilling the example without unfairness so that the retribution does not result in the death of the offender or the Transgression of the harm he inflicted on the victim.

Multiple punishment.

30- (1) One shall be killed by the group, and the group shall be killed by one.

(2) Retribution for wounds is multiplied by the number of asymmetric parts, and the smaller one is included in the larger one, unless the offender intends to retaliate against the victim, so he is requited with the smaller and then the larger pieces.

(3) If the offender cuts off identical premises from multiple victims and all of them lead to retribution, he shall be punished with retribution if any one of them demands it, without prejudice to the right of the rest to demand blood money in whole or in part, as the case may be.

(4) If the offender cuts off three or more premises from one victim or multiple victims, and all of them lead to retribution, he may take retribution from him with what was cut

off, or sentence him to death.

Retribution drops.

31- Qisas falls in any of the following cases:

(a) If the victim or his guardian is a branch of the offender,

(b) If the victim or some of his guardians pardoned, with or without consideration,

(c) If the wounds occurred with the consent of the victim,

(D) In despair of recovering the offender if he becomes insane after being sentenced to retribution,

(E) The loss of the place of retribution in the case of the surgeon.

Parents of the victim who have

The right to punishment.

32- (1) The guardians of the victim who have the right to redistribute his heirs at the time of his death.

(2) If the victim is not an adult, insane, or demented, his guardian, custodian or guardian may act on his behalf, and the court may wait for the puberty to reach the adolescent child if it deems it appropriate.

(3) The state is the guardian of a person who does not have a guardian, or whose guardian is unknown or absent, and there is no hope for his return.

(4) The guardian of the victim, in the case of premeditated murder or wounds, may demand

retribution, blood money, reconciliation on money, or a comprehensive pardon, and in both cases semi-intentional or wrongful killing or wounds, he has the right to demand blood money, reconciliation or pardon. He who is not of age, and whoever is in his judgment may pardon except in returning for a payment that does not decrease from the blood money.

(5) The tutor of unknown location or absent is proven to have his right to retribution, blood money or pardon if he appears before the execution of retribution or payment of blood money.

(6) A pardon may not be revoked if it was an express pardon issued by consent.

Imprisonment and alienation.

33- (1) Imprisonment includes:

(A) Life imprisonment for a term of twenty years, or

(B) To exile, which is imprisonment far from the area where the crime was committed and from the place of residence of the offender.

(2) Westernization, which is defining the residence of the offender away from the area where the crime was committed.

(3) With the exception of the limit of Haraba, a prison sentence shall not be imposed on a person who has not reached the age of eighteen years.

(4) With the exception of the term of Haraba, a prison sentence may not be imposed on a person who has reached the age of seventy, and if the prison sentence is rescinded or forfeited until the age of seventy reaches the age of seventy, the punishment of alienation shall apply to the prescribed prison term.

(5) When calculating the total period of imprisonment sentenced in one trial for multiple crimes, the total period of imprisonment shall not exceed the period of life imprisonment.

(6) If the crime is one that may be punished by a fine alone, the period of imprisonment decided by the court as an alternative to paying the fine may not exceed: 4

(a) two months, if the amount of the fine does not exceed one Sudanese pound,

(B) Four months, if the amount of the fine does not exceed five Sudanese pounds.

(c) Six months, in any other case.

the fine.

34- (1) The court shall estimate the fine in view of the nature of the crime committed, the

The extent of the illegal gain in it, the degree of participation of the offender and his financial condition.

(2) The court may order that the fine be paid in whole or in part as compensation to any person aggrieved by the crime, unless an independent judgment is awarded for compensation.

(3) When a fine is passed, an alternative penalty shall be imposed on imprisonment for non-payment. If the convict pays part of the fine, the alternative imprisonment period shall be reduced in proportion to what he paid to the total fine.

(4) The fine is waived by death.

Skin .

35- (1) With the exception of hudud crimes, flogging shall not be imposed as a penalty on a person who has reached sixty years of age, nor on a patient whose flogging ends his life or exacerbates his disease.

(2) If the penalty of flogging falls due to age or disease, the offender shall be punished with an alternative penalty.

confiscation and extermination.

36- (1) Confiscation is the ruling devolving private money to the property of the state without consideration or compensation.

(2) Extermination is the destruction of money without consideration or compensation.

Close the shop.

37- Closing the shop is the ruling prohibiting the use of the shop or engaging in any work in it for a period of not less than a month and not more than one year.

pardon the punishment.

38- (1) Execution of the hudud may not be waived by amnesty.

(2) The execution of retribution may not be abolished except with a pardon from the victim or his guardian.

(3) The punitive penalty may be dropped by pardon from the public authority, in whole or in part, in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure, without prejudice to the rights of any victim of the pardoned crime to obtain compensation.

Chapter II

Assignment of disciplinary punishment

Appreciation, multiplicity and promise

Determining and assessing the disciplinary penalty.

39- The court, when determining the appropriate punitive penalty and estimating it, takes into account all the mitigating or aggravating circumstances, in particular the degree of responsibility, the motives for the crime, the seriousness of the act, the seriousness of the damage, the seriousness of the offender's personality, his position, his criminal record, and all other circumstances surrounding the incident.

Multiple crimes and its impact on punishment.

40- (1) If a single act constitutes more than one crime, the penalties overlap and one punishment is imposed, which is the most severe punishment.

(2) If there are multiple offenses, the death sentence for one of them shall require all other penalties other than confiscation.

Oud.

41- (1) If a person is convicted of any offense that may be punished with imprisonment, and he has already been convicted of the same twice, the court shall sentence him to imprisonment.

(2) If a person is convicted of any crime that may be punished with imprisonment, and he has already been sentenced to imprisonment twice, the court sentence him to imprisonment with the obligation to give him a warning. For him, the court shall sentence him to imprisonment for a period not less than the maximum prison sentence prescribed for that crime.

Chapter III

compensation

blood money.

42- (1) The blood money is one hundred camels or its equivalent in money, according to what is estimated, from time to time, by the Chief Justice after consulting with the competent authorities.

(2) The blood money for those who inflicted wounds and injuries shall be estimated according to the second schedule annexed to this law.

(3) The blood money is multiplied by the number of victims, but it is not multiplied by the

number of perpetrators in the crime that necessitates it. Rather, it is distributed among them equally if their participation is in implementation of a criminal agreement between them. Otherwise, each according to his felony.

(4) It is not permissible with the blood money to require any other compensation for murder or wounds.

(5) The amount of blood money in the event of negligence, such as murder and injuries, shall be reduced to the extent of the victim's participation in causing the crime.

Judgment by blood money.

43- The court shall decide the blood money in accordance with the second schedule attached to this law in any of the following cases:

(a) In the case of intentional killing and wounding, if retribution falls,

(B) In the case of quasi-intentional killing and wounding,

(c) In wrongful killing and wounding,

(D) In the killing and wounds caused by a non-adult or a person who lacks discernment.

Whoever proves his blood money.

44- The blood money is initially established for the victim and then transferred to him

heirs according to their shares in the inheritance. If the victim does not have a heir, it goes to the state.

Who must pay blood money and how to meet it.

45- (1) The blood money is obligatory on the offender alone in the premeditated crimes of murder or wounds.

(2) Blood money is required of the offender and the female sane person in cases of semi-intentional or negligent homicide or wounding.

(3) The rationale includes the association of the offender's relatives or the party insured with it, the party financially with him or the party he works for if his crime was in the course of his work.

(4) Willful blood money from killing or wounding is obligatory in case, and it may be postponed or deducted with the consent of the victim or his guardians.

(5) The blood money shall be collected in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Procedures Law of 1983.

Refund of money, benefit or compensation.

46- When the accused is convicted, the court shall order the return of any money or benefit he obtained, and it may, at the request of the victim or his guardians, order compensation for any damage resulting from the crime, in accordance with the Provisions of the Civil Transactions and Civil Procedures Law. 5

Murder and its types.

129. Murder is causing the death of a living person, intentionally, semi-intentionally, or by mistake.

Murder.

130- (1) Murder is premeditated murder if the offender intended it, or if he intended the act and death was a likely consequence of his act.

(2) Whoever commits the crime of premeditated murder shall be punished with the death penalty, and if the retribution lapses, he shall be punished with imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years without prejudice to the right to blood money.

Semi-intentional murder.

131. (1) Murder is considered semi-intentional murder if the offender caused it by a criminal act on the human body and the offender did not intend to kill, and the death was not a likely result of his act.

(2) Notwithstanding the provision of Section 130 (1), murder is considered quasi-intentional murder in any of the following cases:

(a) If a public official or a person charged with a public service in good faith exceeds the limits of the authority conferred upon him by law and believes that his act which caused

death is necessary to perform his duty;

(b) If the offender commits murder, exceeding, in good faith, the legally established limits for exercising the right of legitimate defense,

(c) If the offender committed murder under the influence of coercion to kill,

(d) If the offender commits murder while he is in a state of necessity to protect himself or others from death,

(e) If the offender committed the killing based on the victim's consent,

(f) If the offender, while losing control of himself by a sudden severe provocation, kills the person who provoked him, or any other person by mistake;

(g) If the offender went too far or exceeded the authorized amount of the lawful act and death occurred as a result of that,

(h) If the offender committed the murder without premeditation during a sudden fight without taking advantage of the circumstances or behaving in a cruel or unusual manner;

(i) If the offender committed the murder under the influence of a mental, psychological or nervous disorder to a degree that clearly affects his ability to control his actions,

(3) Whoever commits the crime of semi-intentional murder shall be punished with imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years without prejudice to the right to blood

money.

Petition against:

- **Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, nicknamed Hemedti, Vice President of the Transitional Military Council**
- **Leaders of the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces (formerly Janjaweed)**
- **Members of the Janjaweed Organization in Sudan**

Indictment:

The so-called Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) and the leaders of the Rapid Support Forces (Janjaweed) committed the following crimes, which are punishable by articles of the Criminal Code in more than eight paragraphs of the articles of this glorious law against professional criminals , and those involved in the case are among the largest professional criminals in Africa and Sudan.

The crimes of those mentioned in the petition and those concerned with the aforementioned accusation, namely Dagalo, the Janjaweed and the leaders of the Janjaweed, varied as follows:

1- Demonstrators were killed in large numbers from 2020 until now in the streets of the city of Khartoum by indiscriminate shooting from Janjaweed rifles and pistols, on the orders of Dagalo.

2- More than 2,000 martyrs of various categories of demonstrators are buried in several cemeteries in the city of Khartoum periodically and under the full view and hearing of all, and the misleading of justice in the courts in all crimes attributed to Dagalo and the Janjaweed.

3- The rape of a large number of girls in the city of Omdurman on the orders of Dagalo and the leaders of the Janjaweed, and a large number of the raped women were buried in the cemeteries of the city of Khartoum.

4- Torture of demonstrators against the Janjaweed authority in the prisons of the city of Khartoum on the orders of Dagalo, killing a large number of demonstrators and burying them without real reason or accusation in the Cemeteries of the city of Khartoum.

5- Theft of state funds, estimated at billions, in repeated incidents, on the orders of Dagalo, by the Janjaweed forces in the city of Khartoum.

6- Inciting the periodic killing of protesters under the orders of Dagalo and Janjaweed leaders in the city of Khartoum.

7- The conflict with the leaders of the Sudanese army opposed to the authority and the

killing of a large number of them in the incidents of disappearance witnessed in the police records and the burial of a large number of army leaders in the cemeteries of the city of Khartoum.

8- Preventing elections in Sudan by orders of Dagalo and the leaders of the Janjaweed to elect the civil authority to which thought leaders, politicians and the general public aspire to in Sudan.

9- The alliance with the Justice and Equality Movement, which was founded by Khalil Ibrahim, and the intimidation of the general public from exercising their civil rights and the prevention of general elections in Sudan.

10- The alliance with the remnants of the former regime of President Bashir and the symbols of the Islamic Front regime and other terrorist movements in Sudan.

claim:

I call upon the United Nations human rights bodies and Higher Supreme Courts to remove the criminal Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo from his post As Vice-President of the Transitional Military Council and forcibly refer him to the judiciary and try him a fair trial in the military or independent and impartial civil judiciary and his ruling with the highest degree of punishment, which is the death penalty for the

crimes and misdeeds committed by the hands of the person concerned. Who is proven guilty of murder and other charges, and the execution of those found guilty and responsible for killing unarmed demonstrators in the streets and the role in the city of Khartoum.

I also demand that the families of the victims be compensated with the appropriate compensation approved by the law and that the perpetrators be punished severely, as the law allows.

I thank your esteemed organization for Listening well to the demands of the oppressed, and I also hope justice for all.

petitioner

General Solicitor