

Egyptian-Sudanese relations - Al-Zaim Azhari

Reading from within: Shifts in the strategic equation between Egypt and Sudan

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During this period, Egyptian-Sudanese relations are going through one of their most prosperous eras, compared to previous periods, in which there was ebb and flow between the two countries, due to many factors, which there is not enough space to mention in detail, but in this analysis we will only address some of the psychological aspects that have accumulated.

Over the past years, it has been continuously fed by different parties that do not want Egypt and Sudan to be hand in hand or one bloc. Sudan, along with Egypt, represents a regional power that can change the balance of power in the region as a whole.

Analysts agree that President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, who has demonstrated a great ability to provide an accurate reading of the ^{what} strategic scene in the region from 2001 until now, and to deal with the various opportunities and challenges created by the strategic environment surrounding Egypt, has been able to change the map of Egyptian-Sudanese relations in less than two years. During which he was able to jump over many of the walls of doubt and misconceptions that the rescue system had built and promoted over the past thirty years. Based on the above, the following question can be asked: What is the reality of Egyptian-Sudanese relations, and the most important features of the strategy followed between the two countries at the present time?

The rescue system and the formation of Sudanese awareness towards Egypt:

The huge impact on It was during the rule of the Salvation Front in Sudan, which lasted for nearly thirty years Reshaping and shaping the popular awareness of young people in Sudan towards the Egyptian state, as it overshadowed bilateral relations - despite their strength and despite the historical and geostrategic similarities.

During that extended period, despite Egypt's keenness to maintain friendly relations between the Egyptian and Sudanese peoples - what resembled a cloud of ideological difference, by Islamic rule, as that front and its media cultivation sought to

The Salvation Front's approach was one
Demonizing Cairo and describing it with all its imperfections, and raising the generations that were born and grew up during the past three decades to believe that Cairo sees in Sudan nothing but spoils, devouring, snatching, and seizing from it what it wants, starting with the waters of the Nile, and ending with the Sudanese decision, and the lands of the homeland, to the point that this ruling front has It deliberately excluded Cairo from any role in the process of ending the conflict between northern and southern Sudan, which ended with secession in 2011.

It also adopted the acceptance and promotion of the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam despite its serious risks, which may arise as a result of the lack of agreement on the management of the dam and mechanisms for resolving disputes that may arise from that management, with a binding agreement. All of this was to spite Cairo, which witnessed in that period a popular revolution supported by The armed forces to remove the Brotherhood from power in 2013, after their failure in all sectors of the Egyptian state was proven, in addition to their attempt to change the Egyptian identity in favor of the empowerment agenda and in favor of a larger project that was sponsored by regional countries and international powers. This disturbed the Salvation Front regime at that time, which hoped to complete and perhaps announce the Islamic project to the world.

Egypt and changing the equation of strategic relations with Sudan:

It is difficult to overcome in the Arab national security system in general And Sudan is a number
And Al-Masry in particular, and its importance to Cairo by virtue of its location as a gateway to the African depths, and an important partner in the water file, in addition to a partnership in the borders and the process of securing the Red Sea. Cairo had to confront that mistaken view that that front tried to root in the Sudanese popular psyche, and despite the difficulty of confronting that rooting. which lasted for more than thirty years, but Cairo was able to resolve that outlook into a positive one during

The past period - the most important features of the cooperation strategy between the two countries can be identified as follows:

(*) The Egyptian position on the Ethiopian encroachment on Sudanese lands: In the wake of the ruling Salvation Front in Sudan turning a blind eye to Ethiopia's occupation of the vast Sudanese triangle of Fashqa, and even killing the Sudanese, plundering their crops, and raping and killing their women in that region, by

The Ethiopian Shifta gangs, supported by the Ethiopian army, expanded their plundering of Sudanese lands, until they were on the outskirts of the Sudanese city of Gedaref. Following the killing of a group of Sudanese soldiers in an ambush set up by those Ethiopian militias while these soldiers from the Sudanese People's Defense Forces were trying to chase a group of killers. The Ethiopians Sudanese popular opinion was agitated as a result of this incident, which brought the issue of the looted borders to the surface of Ethiopian-Sudanese relations, which the ousted front and its mouthpieces tried to take as an honorable alternative. The electronic Brotherhood committees promoted as "On Cairo, so it appeared." slogans such of the border file "Ethiopia is stealing my sister's sister" to the Sudanese youth, and its insistence on stealing Sudan's lands whose Sudanese status was established by the 1902 treaty and the recognition of former Ethiopian leaders Ali Abiy Ahmed, made the Sudanese street discover the truth of that relationship that was in favor of Ethiopia, and what were the slogans of brotherhood and unity of color. Fate is merely a distraction for the Sudanese from what Ethiopia has stolen and is stealing in terms of lands and crops, which generate millions of dollars annually for the Ethiopian treasury at the expense of my sister country.

By supporting and supporting the Sudanese position for several factors, perhaps Cairo's position was clear and clear The most important of which is: emphasizing the validity of the 1902 Treaty, which has a clear position in support of the Sudanese-Egyptian position regarding the Nile water file, as well as the soundness of the Sudanese position and the factor of popular destiny away from politics and its fluctuations, which highlights the tag

(*)Development of military cooperation: Sudan views with admiration the Egyptian experience in the field of military industrialization, as Cairo has begun to produce many important military mechanisms, especially in ground warfare, that are appropriate to the geography of the region and the nature of the theaters of operations that the Sudanese Armed Forces are engaged in. These mechanisms include, for example Example:-

(&) The Fahd armored vehicle is equipped with 120 m mortar shells and a dual launcher carrying anti-armor missiles with a range of 5000 m and can be equipped with a 30 m artillery turret and its speed is 100 km/h. It is also equipped with a protection system against biological and chemical warfare and night vision devices. It is necessary for countries such as Sudan in its wars against armed militias.

(&) The Crocodile armored vehicle carries about 6 soldiers and is resistant to mines. It has a turret, a 7.5 m machine gun, and a 40 m grenade launcher. Egypt produces several copies of the Crocodile, Crocodile 2, and Crocodile 3.

(&) The armored vehicle Sinai 200, nicknamed the Egyptian Monster 100 ST, is a tank hunter. It is used in rapid intervention and carries powerful weapons such as anti-aircraft missiles, anti-tank missiles, a missile launcher, a mortar carrier, and surface-to-surface missiles, and its speed reaches 120 km/h.

(&) The 1A1M tank has the ability to destroy any moving targets at a distance of 5000 meters.

(&) The Patrick and Holobossal drone was produced by Cairo in cooperation with Belarus about a year ago and flies for a flight period of up to 6 to 12 continuous hours. It monitors, photographs, engages, and carries explosives and missiles as well as the Haram and Qaid drones. It is 100% Egyptian and is now operating on the Libyan border as well as deep in Sinai and Kan. It has a significant impact in defeating terrorism there.

Based on the above, Cairo can make a strong contribution to diversifying and modernizing the army's capabilities Sudanese and improving its capabilities to carry out military operations that may be assigned to it. Especially in light of the circumstances surrounding him currently.

The maneuvers of the Nile Eagles came November 1, 2020 to ensure that military relations between the two countries were rooted in accordance with this vision, and it also confirmed the readiness of the two armies to deal with the emerging threats to the interests of the two countries. Then these relations culminated in the signing of a military agreement between Cairo and Khartoum in March 2021 in Khartoum, which stipulated ensuring Cairo provides all types of military support that Khartoum may need when it needs it, in addition to the logistical support that has continued since the outbreak of the December Revolution in Sudan. The agreement also included that Cairo guarantee the achievement of national security for the two countries, and build armed forces that possess the experience, expertise, and ability to confront any attack, combat terrorism, and establish Military industries and ensuring the achievement of military balance in the region, as this agreement will achieve a rebalance in the balance of power in the Horn of Africa region, especially after the recent changes in relations between Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia.

(*)Cairo's support for the Sudanese government to make the transitional period successful: in order to gain the trust of the Sudanese people, by highlighting their capabilities to protect the national territory, rally around it, and strengthen cohesion.

Popularity among the spectrum of people, strengthening the state's position internally and externally, and the ability to confront Armed separatist movements, emphasizing the security arrangements that have been made, such as the Juba Peace Agreement, as well as filling the vacuum created by the withdrawal of the African Union and United Nations peace operations mission "UNAMID" in the Darfur region.

(*) Economic integration: After removing Sudan from the US terrorist list, Khartoum is striving to integrate into the global economy, in an attempt to address its strong economic problems and gain the trust and support of international donor institutions. Therefore, the chances of activating economic cooperation and integration agreements with Cairo will be strong, such as the freedoms agreement. The four agreements that would strengthen humanitarian ties between the two peoples, diversify the areas of intra-trade and conduct commercial barter as an integrated measure, as well as the electricity supply agreement to confront the electrical deficit in Sudan, which amounts to about 600 megawatts, which turns it from an Egyptian surplus that facilitates the integration process in this matter.

We affirm that Egypt and Sudan are moving steadily towards establishing strategic relations In conclusion
Strong during the coming period, according to one line drawn by the challenges for the common destiny between the peoples of the Nile Valley, the challenges of the Renaissance Dam, the challenges of the attack on Sudan's sovereignty, and the challenges of terrorism and armed groups, as drawn by many opportunities, including the future of development and economic cooperation between the two countries, and the future of military cooperation, And the future of integration between the two countries. Despite all this, the road will still contain some obstacles planted by the defunct Salvation regime, which require the leadership of the two countries to have a strong will to overcome and get rid of them, towards building a new phase of trust and cooperation. But in all cases, the Egyptian administration must keep under its eyes the process of Updating, directing and building a media strategy, using systematic scientific methods, with specialized researchers working on its platforms to address public opinion, especially inside Sudan, to build and strengthen strong fraternal ties between the two peoples, and to overcome all the psychological problems that some use to disrupt the train of strategic relations between Egypt and Sudan.

Sudan and the historical turning point in its political history (1-3)

Sudan is now going through a decisive stage in its history, characterized by the availability of a set of elements of success, amidst a safe and stable environment, resulting from the harmony between most of its influential forces, which provides it with the opportunity to completely escape from the swamp of crises, instability, and the scarcity of livelihood, and to move strongly development and stability towards the future of living. This stage represents a double-edged sword for the prospects for His salvation leads him to safety, or a calamity leads him to death. For Sudan, it will either be a collar It is a valuable opportunity that provides a promising start for Sudan if it is exploited with sincerity, impartiality, and responsibility. It is a poor opportunity if it is neglected through procrastination, lack of seriousness, taking into account one's own fortunes and scarcity, and giving priority to the private over the public and the partisan over the national. Then the country will enter, whether it likes it or not, into a stage of no return to life, just like the entry of a sick person. To the point of no longer returning to life Internal and external challenges and opportunities for the indicators at the internal and external levels, which herald the possibility of a quick and safe exit for Sudan from the box of despair and frustration to live a good, safe and stable life, and contribute to a degree of its potential at the regional and international levels. In this article, we will try to address these data at the internal and external levels, and read the indicators so that the work can be taken into account if they are aimed at success, or dismissed and avoided if they are aimed at stumbling and failure. We begin, in an unusual way, with data and changes at the external level that have repercussions on the inside, even if the inside is the reason for creating these opportunities and data on the external level: First: There is no doubt that the decision to lift sanctions

The American Economist's report on Sudan had many repercussions that speakers and writers researched

They spoke at length about its impact that will affect all aspects of life and the daily life of the Sudanese citizen in particular. Everything they said is true, but for my part, I see that the most important impact of the decision to lift sanctions on Sudan is the state of psychological relief that prevailed throughout the country.

If I said, which I do not think is exaggerated, that the state of psychological relief even overshadowed the general mood of the people and changed it 180 degrees, then this change would be reflected positively in the dealings between them.

Instead of a state of nervousness and reaction

Immediateness to provocation, no matter how small the reason for the provocation, before the decision is issued, the situation has now changed, to be replaced by a state of calm and self-control, acceptance of the other opinion, and lack of immediate response to provocative stimuli. Despite the great relief that accompanied the decision to lift sanctions, especially since it came in the last week of Obama's presidency, there is great anxiety that dominates

everyone. The source of this concern is that Sudan is under surveillance for a period of six months, after which it may be re-imposed

Sanctions again, and this apprehension was increased by President Trump's decisions to include Sudan among

The seven countries whose citizens are banned from traveling to the United States. But through follow-up

Monitoring and analysis show that the matter is moving in the direction of the final lifting of sanctions, for a number of reasons, including the following:

- There are a large number of Trump government ministers who are wealthy people, businessmen, and heads of cross-border companies, the most prominent of whom is Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Chairman of the Board of Directors of... (ExxonMobil) oil giant, which is considered the fifth largest American company by market value, which clearly expressed its objection to the policy of imposing sanctions on countries under the pretext that it is useless. With the eagerness of these companies to invest in Sudan's resources, which were deprived of them for a long time, the balance is tilted in favor of lifting the sanctions.
- Eric Reeves, the most prominent candidate for African affairs in the US State Department, is against sanctions on Sudan, and believes that the United States is in dire need of Sudan to achieve some of its interests.

In Africa and in the Arab world.

- One of the main goals of President Trump's foreign policy is to form an alliance that includes Egypt and Saudi Arabia to fight terrorism, and in order to achieve this, the UAE, Sudan, Israel, America, and Turkey. Each of these countries has a specific mission and duties. It appears that he chose Sudan to provide the fighters, and this certainly gives a strong indication

For Sudan, and removing its name from the list of states sponsoring terrorism. Economic sanctions permanently.

This American-Sudanese openness and rapprochement began with the United States and the Sudanese government exchanging military attachments in both Khartoum and Washington, although Sudan is listed on the US list of states sponsoring terrorism, which prohibits military interaction with it, except

The opening of military attachés and the assignment of military attaches indicates very clearly the intention of the two countries and their orientation towards cooperation in the military field, and this necessarily means paving the way for the military embargo imposed on him was lifted. removing Sudan's name from the list of states sponsoring terrorism, and then

- The issuance of a joint decision by the Troika (Britain-Norway-America) supporting the government's approach to dialogue with the opposition and the armed movements, and calling on the armed movements, especially the Abdel Wahid movement, the Northern Sector, and Minawi, to engage in the dialogue in a language that is not devoid of pressure and perhaps not a hidden threat.
- Expressing Ugandan President Museveni for the role of mediator in the release case rebellious and amnesty for those convicted of disobeying the government, Prisoners from the movements

The Ugandan president would not have done this had he not received the green light from the United States.

Uganda and Museveni began to improve in the wake of the United States. Although the visit he made to Sudan was organized by the righteous Sudanese girl Najwa, the establishment and continuation of this relationship clearly indicates American directives in this regard, which means that this is in the interest of Sudan.

- There is no doubt that Saudi Arabia and the UAE played a major and influential role in lifting sanctions on Sudan. What is striking here is that Saudi Arabia

It was able to play that major role despite the tense relations between it and the United States during the era of President Obama, who "sold" Saudi Arabia to Iran after the Iranian nuclear reactor deal. But now it seems that Trump's policy is moving in the opposite direction to Obama's policy, as

It started with tension with Iran, and followed up with action when it banned Iranians from traveling to Washington. Confirmed by the successful talks held by the Prince American On the other hand, we see a Saudi rapprochement

Mohammed bin Salman, Deputy Crown Prince, with President Trump. Saudi Arabia's success in helping Sudan is more successful after and influential It is in a state of tension with Washington, indicating that it will definitely be

The return of intimate relations between her and Washington. v The United States feels that it is politically and morally Towards the State of the South, and in light of the inability that required all countries and organizations, responsible concerned with providing solutions acceptable to the parties to the conflict in South Sudan, about putting an end to the conflict and returning stability to the nascent state. The United States has become fully convinced that Sudan is the most qualified country to contribute effectively to resolving the South Sudan crisis, and American thinking may go further than that, by creating... A relationship between Sudan and the state of South Sudan, which indicates that the United States is entering into a close relationship with Sudan. Needless to say

Saying that rapprochement with the United States, and the lifting of sanctions on its part, means the complete lifting of the European Union's endeavor to open a page for sanctions by other countries of the world, including a new one with Sudan. This endeavor reinforces the European Union's need for Sudan to help combat illegal immigration to Europe, especially after The breakdown of the security contract in Libya, which the United States entered into Activity of movements classified as terrorist For human trafficking gangs, along with Mali, It has become a market Niger and Nigeria, Sudan has become the country that can effectively contribute to ward off this danger from Europe. The indication of this was the arrival of about nineteen officials from...

The European Union visited Khartoum in mid-March, and Khartoum also received the European Union envoy for promoting freedom of religion. This March, Khartoum hosted the International Monetary Fund mission to Sudan, headed by Eric Muto, which approved the Sudanese economic plan, which clearly indicates the seriousness of work to integrate the Sudanese economy into the global economic system, in preparation for For a coming period of cooperation between Sudan and institutions

International countries subject to US directives. We cannot turn to the opportunities and data that exist at the internal level without examining the opportunities and data available to Sudan at the regional level, as follows: v At the African level, we find that Sudan's relations with all African countries. There is a close connection and almost complete understanding between South Africa, at its best, with Africa, the pivotal country in Africa, and Sudan in all fields, and it is enough for us here to just point out:

Because South Africa refused to arrest Al-Bashir when he visited it, despite the internal and external pressures exerted on it, and after this visit South Africa announced its withdrawal from the court.

international criminal. As for Uganda, which was in deep hostility with Sudan, and which provided and later became a haven of support and a safe haven for the Garang movement even after the secession of the south, for the rebel movements, it has now become the mediator between the government of Sudan and the rebel movements in the process of exchanging prisoners, convicts and convicts by the government. Sudanese. As for Ethiopia, perhaps

The current period is the most prosperous period for relations between Ethiopia and Sudan throughout the history of the relationship between them

Both countries. The same applies to Chad and to some extent Eritrea. As for the relationship at the level

He was with Saudi Arabia Al Arabiya: Khartoum has become the pivot in dealing with the Gulf states, together

Or the Emirates or Qatar, to the extent that this was reflected on the peoples in those countries by preferring them over other peoples of the region. Indeed, President Al-Bashir was celebrated. Yes For the Sudanese people

with Everything, whether on the part of Gulf citizens or their governments, is the distinguishing feature of the Sawa relationship

Citizens and rulers of those countries. There is no doubt that there are many reasons for this, which is too limited to mention here. Stay

With Sudan is Egypt, and although the only region affected by the ambiguity of the relationship is considered a passing matter, Egypt

has now become outside the circle of action and influence, and until...

Egypt resolves the crises that have exhausted it, and the situation changes to something different. The relationship will undoubtedly return to normal between Cairo and Khartoum. There is no doubt that these opportunities and data at the international level, which score the highest points in favor of the government, are, in return, an opponent for the opposition.

Egyptian-Sudanese rapprochement in the face of major challenges Asmaa

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sharing

Egyptian-Sudanese relations are witnessing a positive movement, and this was evident through the movements Egyptian Sudanese intensive on several levels. The visit of Maryam Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi, the Sudanese Foreign Minister, to Egypt came on March 2, 2021, during her meeting with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi and her meeting with Sameh Shukry, the Egyptian Foreign Minister. To emphasize the strengthening of relations between the two countries in a number of files and issues, as well as free There is m in continuing consultations and coordination to unify visions and political positions between the two countries. As T The same day, discussions took place between the Sudanese and Egyptian armies in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, which resulted in the signing of a military cooperation agreement between the two countries, including training, national security, and military cooperation in various fields.

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These interactions culminated in the visit of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi to Khartoum on the 6th what From March 2021, as his first visit to Sudan following the overthrow of the "Omar al-Bashir" regime in 2019, a visit that witnessed important meetings that brought him together with the President of the Transitional Sovereignty Council, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, his deputy, Lieutenant General Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo, and the Prime Minister of Sudan. "Abdullah Hamdok" to reflect the depth of Egyptian-Sudanese relations, and work to jointly strengthen them to ensure the security and stability of the two countries in the face of the challenges The capabilities

Accompanying the Egyptian-Sudanese rapprochement, This report attempts to examine the general context

In addition to the dimensions of cooperation between the two countries.

Contexts governing the Egyptian-Sudanese rapprochement

rapprochement is linked to a regional context and a growing number of issues in Egyptian relations The Sudanese

: subscriber. In this regard, we can point out the following The duality of interest

The Renaissance Dam file: This file witnessed a convergence in the Egyptian and Sudanese positions against the backdrop of:

Proceeding with the implementation of the filling for the second year Y The negotiating track, and Ethiopia's announcement, is detrimental to faltering
13.5 billion cubic meters of water next July without prior notification and without signing an agreement with Egypt and Sudan.

The unilateral Ethiopian actions prompted the two downstream countries (Egypt and Sudan) to coordinate their positions regarding
this file, as the two countries stress the importance of reaching a binding legal agreement regarding filling and operating the
Renaissance Dam in a way that achieves the interests of the three countries and preserves water rights.

For Egypt and Sudan. He also called on Ethiopia to show good faith and engage in an effective negotiating process

It is sponsored by the African Union through the formation of an international quartet led and facilitated by the Republic of the Congo

Democracy as the current chair of the African Union, and includes both the United Nations,

The European Union and the United States to mediate negotiations to reach a binding agreement.

Border tension between Sudan and Ethiopia: Interactions related to the border tension between Sudan and Ethiopia were
characterized by escalation. The Sudanese-Ethiopian border witnessed tensions, and clashes broke out between Ethiopian
and Sudanese forces late last year. On December 31, 2020, Khartoum announced the army's control over its entire territory in
the Al-Fashqa border region with Ethiopia, and Sudan confirms its adherence to its lands on the border where it redeployed
after the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry accused the army of

It was settled by Ethiopia for more than a quarter of a century. The
Sudanese also violated its borders. Despite the two countries' agreement to resolve the border crisis through technical
committees, we find that Sudan is accusing Ethiopia of procrastinating in implementing the recommendations of the High Border
Committee, and of Ethiopia mobilizing more of its soldiers on the border.

The current scene inside Sudan: The new Sudanese government that was formed in February 2021, against the backdrop of the
peace agreement signed between the Sudanese government and the Revolutionary Front in Juba in October 2020, faces a
number of challenges of a security and economic nature. Sudan suffers from deteriorating economic conditions, which requires
support from the state

This was confirmed by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi during his reception of Dr. Maryam Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi, Sudanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, in Cairo.

Dimensions of the Egyptian-Sudanese partnership

Military cooperation: There is cooperation between Egypt and Sudan in the military field, and this is evident through conducting joint military exercises. Joint air exercises "Nile Eagles-1" were conducted between the two countries in November 2020. This comes within the framework of strengthening joint military cooperation relations between the forces. Armed forces for both countries, cooperation between the two countries is also being intensified in the fields of rehabilitation, training, exchange of experiences, securing borders, combating terrorism, technical insurance, and military industries. On March 2, 2020, Egypt and Sudan concluded a military agreement in Khartoum, in the presence of the commanders of the two municipal armies, which reflects Egyptian keenness

Sudanese to face the challenges and risks. Shared

Maximizing development projects: The Egyptian-Sudanese rapprochement resulted in enhanced cooperation in commercial and investment transactions between the two countries, as well as in all areas of strategic cooperation between the two countries. We find that there is cooperation in the field of transportation, especially through the project Railway connectivity between the two countries, an electrical interconnection project between the two countries, as well as cooperation in the fields of air, land, river and sea transport.

Humanitarian aid: Humanitarian aid comes as an affirmation of the depth of ties and relations. Egypt sent a shipment of aid that is well-established in the history that brings Egypt and Sudan together. It sent a medical aid to Sudan in May 2019. The aid provided consisted of 25 tons of medicines.

And medical supplies to contribute to alleviating the burden on the Sudanese people. Aid shipments were prepared and prepared and transported via military aircraft to Khartoum Airport in Sudan. The Egyptian Armed Forces also equipped and sent a number of semi-automatic bread production lines to the field in October 2020, as three Egyptian military planes took off heading to Khartoum International Airport carrying bread production lines and technicians responsible for installing and operating the lines.

Confronting the threat of the spread of the "Corona" virus: An urgent shipment of medical supplies and medicines was sent to Sudan in May 2020. The General Command of the Armed Forces prepared and equipped four military aircraft loaded with a large amount of urgent medical supplies and medicines.

Confronting the floods: Within the framework of Egypt's solidarity with the people of Sudan affected by the floods that swept them in September 2020, large quantities of urgent aid were prepared and equipped for the brothers affected by the floods in the State of Sudan.

: Cooperation in the field of health

It was agreed to cooperate in the field of disease control, review the framework for sending specialized Egyptian medical convoys, support capacity building in Sudan, and enhance Sudan's benefit from President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi's initiative to treat one million Africans from Hepatitis C.

Providing 10 scholarships annually to Sudanese doctors within the Egyptian Fellowship Program.

Making Hepatitis C treatment protocols available to the Sudanese side to benefit from them.

Activating surveillance and control systems for epidemics between the two countries.

The bottom line is that the rapprochement between Egypt and Sudan serves the interests of both countries, and there is a degree of common ground, especially the file.

Coordination and common positions on a number of issues of concern

AlNahda dam. The meetings between Egyptian and Sudanese officials are considered a direct message to Ethiopia.

The Egyptian-Sudanese rapprochement will prevent Ethiopia from moving unilaterally towards the second filling of the dam without reaching an agreement with the two sides.

The future of Egyptian-Sudanese relations

Issue 44 of the Egyptian File Journal discusses "The Future of Egyptian-Sudanese Relations," in which Dr. Amani

Al-Taweel, an expert in African studies at the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, discusses the course of Egyptian-Sudanese relations, as she believes that talking about the future of Egyptian-Sudanese relations is fraught with dangers, as This relationship has remained tense throughout its history. The deterioration of these relations is due to the intersection of different interests and orientations in many political and economic files, most notably the water file related to the Renaissance Dam, the struggle for influence, the regional and international rivalry over the African continent, and the negative cultural, historical, and ideological perception of each party towards the other. Despite these complexities, mechanisms can be developed to overcome the intersection of interests, especially on the part of Egypt, to ensure the continuation of interactions even under the umbrella of crises.

Meanwhile, Imam Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi, leader of the Umma Party and former Sudanese Prime Minister, discusses the future of the relationship between Cairo and Khartoum. He believes that Egyptian-Sudanese relations stem from five starting points: geographical factors, historical factors, cultural factors, economic factors, and mixing factors. To talk about the future of the relationship between the two countries, there must first be a common vision, especially towards the Nile Basin. Egyptian-Sudanese relations should not be limited to a bilateral framework, but rather they must have regional and international dimensions. There is, with neighboring countries, especially Libya and Chad, because of the importance these countries represent. Secondly, there is an urgent need for relations between both countries. Third, there is an urgent need to review support for the Brotherhood regimes in Sudan, as these regimes have poisoned relations between Egypt and Sudan.

Dr. Ayman Abdel Wahab, an expert at Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, also discusses the water dimension as an input to formulating an inevitable strategy, as he believes that the water file reflects the nature of relations between Egypt and Sudan in terms of the nature of cooperation and consensus on the one hand, and contrast and conflict on the other hand. This is due to many reasons, the most prominent of which are accumulations related to the historical legacy, sensitivities between the two countries, and the primacy of political determinants over strategic interests. Although there is a legal framework that regulates water relations between Egypt and Sudan, especially the 1929 and 1959 agreements, there are a number of differences around them, as the political nature prevailed more than the technical, engineering and legal nature. On the other hand

Sudan's position on the Renaissance Dam is the most important element of water relations between the two countries, as it went through a number of stages, beginning with balance, then absolute and complete support for Ethiopia. Therefore, talking about the future of the Egyptian-Sudanese relationship requires a new formulation to build a comprehensive perspective on relations at the strategic level that takes into account the regional situation and the recent Egyptian movements towards the African continent.

Meanwhile, Professor Asmaa Al-Husseini, Deputy Editor-in-Chief of Al-Ahram newspaper, monitors the role of the media in Egyptian-Sudanese relations, as she confirms that for more than 50 years the media has played a negative role towards Egyptian-Sudanese relations. The role played by the media is divided into three stages. The first, from after Sudan's independence until the 1980s, the second extends from 1995 to January 2011, and the third extends from January 2011 until now. In addition to traditional media, social media platforms played the worst role in the relationship between the two countries. In this context, many poisons, lies and slander were planted, poisoning the atmosphere of relations between the two countries, in addition to preventing media professionals from each country from entering both countries in various forms. By contemplating and evaluating all of the above, it becomes clear that it is necessary to reconsider the performance, role, and goals of the media

In Egyptian-Sudanese relations.

Professor Saleh Khalil, a researcher at the Center for Historical and Social Studies in Al-Ahram, discusses the Four Freedoms Agreement and Egyptian-Sudanese relations, as he attributes the fluctuation of Egyptian-Sudanese relations to a number of issues taking place in the political arena. At the forefront is the issue of the Renaissance Dam, and the Haleb and Chaltin triangle. Although Egypt and Sudan are linked by political and ideological ties, in addition to the fact that they both represent an integral part of their national security, Sudan has opened up to blocs that do not promote Egyptian interests. The Four Freedoms Agreement, which was signed in 2004, stipulated freedom of movement, freedom of residence, freedom of work, and freedom of ownership between the two countries. Although more than fourteen years have passed since the signing of the agreement, it is still its implementation is subject to questions, due to the tensions that the two countries are witnessing during the period following the signing of the agreement. Therefore, both Cairo and Khartoum are in dire need of new frameworks that transcend past differences, with a future vision that places the relationship between them within the framework of regional action linked to the international and regional rivalry in the region.

While Professor Ramadan Qarni Muhammad analyzes the recent Egyptian-Sudanese summit, he believes that the summit established a stage of development in relations between the two countries, based on the summit's issues and contexts.

Regional and tensions that marred Egyptian-Sudanese relations. The summit was based on a number of rules, including calming the media between the two countries, strengthening political consensus on some files, and building and establishing a strategic phase for relations between the two countries based on a number of determinants, most notably emphasizing the centrality of the concept of a shared political will to resolve any differences, and indicating in a practical manner To the executive aspects of relations and joint projects concerned with electrical, land, and sea connectivity, and railway connectivity, and developing the frameworks of relations by reviewing the mechanisms that have been established in various fields, maximizing economic cooperation and achieving common interests in the fields of agriculture, animal production, transportation, and infrastructure, and emphasizing On the fraternal and eternal relations and common ties that unite the peoples of the Nile Valley.

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2004 AD – 2016 AD “ Egyptian-Sudanese relations case study: the period between

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hours

Egypt and Sudan

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the introduction

Egypt and Sudan are two countries located on the continent of Africa, but when we know the history of Egypt and Sudan, we find that Sudan is considered a natural extension of Egypt. The Egyptian-Sudanese relations are relations of a special nature, as some describe them as eternal and others as historical, as we find that such relations do not exist between any two countries. But it exists in the relations between Egypt and Sudan, which is why some call the Egyptian-Sudanese relations a special relationship. We find that there is more than one thing that made there a historical legacy in the relations between them. There are natural ties embodied by the Nile, intellectual ties supported by the unity of language and religion, and there are cultural, historical and social ties <1> Despite any differences that exist at the level of governments in Egypt and Sudan over different times and decades, the ties between Egypt and Sudan are special, connected, and characterized by continuity. >2<

Egyptian-Sudanese relations began in the nineteenth century, and with the passage of time and the differences between governments, this relationship passed through ebb and flow relations, that is, there was cooperation and harmony at some times and there was disagreement at other times. Therefore, it was called the ebb and flow relationship, and there is integration between Egypt and Sudan as a result of history, geography, and constants.

National security and the common interests of each. <3

The relationship between Egypt and Sudan is determined according to some of the determinants that control this relationship, whether internal or external. Therefore, we find that there are political and economic ties between them, just as there are regional relations in some issues and issues that concern the African region. We find that Egyptian-Sudanese relations during the Mubarak era differed. From time to time, it was characterized at times by a cooperative nature, and there were interactions between Egypt and Sudan in all political and economic fields, but due to some issues and differences of viewpoints, this led to the end of the stage:

1 - Osama Al-Ghazali Harb, "Editor", "Egyptian-Sudanese Relations: Past-Present-Future", Center for Research and Political Studies, Cairo, first edition, 1990 AD.

2 - Ghada Khader Hussein Zayed, "The Political Settlement of the Egyptian-Sudanese Conflict over the Halib Triangle," Master's Thesis, Cairo University, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, 2000 AD.

3 - Muhammad Ibrahim Youssef, "Egyptian-Sudanese Integration in Light of the Secession of South Sudan: A Study of Possibilities and Challenges," Master's thesis, Cairo University, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, 2014 AD.

The relationship turned to a cooperative nature, and there were some crises and regional issues that led to tension in relations between the two parties, such as the crisis of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Sudan's support for the Iraqi position and its stand against Egypt, and the crisis of the border dispute "Halib Triangle."

"Shalateen", over which the conflict is still ongoing, and there is also the issue of the Nile Valley and the

division of the water share between them. <1

With the advent of 2004 AD, Egyptian-Sudanese relations began to take a new path from the previous years during the Mubarak era, as it began by strengthening cooperation between them by signing some agreements, numbering 19

agreements, to strengthen cooperation between Egypt and Sudan. The relations also witnessed the signing of the

Four Freedoms Agreement, and then tension occurred in Relations are a result of Sudan's sense of its lack of independence through cooperation with Egypt <2>, and the relationship remained turbulent and fragile between them

until the revolution of January 25, 2011 AD, which represented a strategic shift in relations between Egypt and

Sudan, as the January Revolution and the fall of Mubarak's rule represented a breakthrough in Egyptian-

Sudanese relations that witnessed... Many times of bad and turmoil occurred, and a qualitative shift occurred in the

relationship, and it was characterized by frankness, transparency, and addressing the obstacles that plagued those

relations in the previous period. Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir was the first Arab president to visit Egypt after

the January Revolution to express his happiness at the success of the

Egyptian-Sudanese relations after the January Revolution and during the transitional period were characterized by

positive indicators, namely: the feeling of inadequacy or neglect of the Mubarak regime towards Sudan,

which caused a number of problems. Therefore, there was a visit by the Prime Minister of Egypt, "Issam

this visit resulted in the signing of a number of agreements. In the Sharaf," to President Al-Bashir, and

agricultural, industrial and other fields, there were visits by a delegation of young people to strengthen relations

between the two peoples, and there was party communication to discuss how to stabilize Sudan, and many

investment projects in Sudan and how to consolidate relations between Egypt and Sudan again were discussed. >

1 - Omar Siddiq Al-Bashir, "The Importance of Economic Cooperation between Sudan and Egypt after the January 25 Revolution," unpublished paper presented to the Eastern Nile Basin Conference, Institute of African

Research and Studies, Cairo University, publication date: July 21, 2012, available at:

http://www.sudanile.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=ar

ticle&id=42744:@-CbC2_&catid=257&Itemid=74

2 - Nanis Abdel Razzaq Fahmy, "Egypt's foreign policy after the January 25 Revolution and its impact on its African surroundings," African Horizons, State Information Service, Volume Ten, Issue 35, 2012 AD. -3 Reference previously mentioned.

When a crisis occurred in Sudan and the stability of the secession of South Sudan and giving them the right to self-determination and Egypt's recognition of the state of South Sudan, it sent a delegation headed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the celebrations of the nascent state in July 2011, and we find that the apparent appearance is that this peaceful separation does not affect the relationship between the two countries with Egypt. Unless the relationship between Egypt and the southern state increases at the expense of Sudan, hostile relations will arise here. Therefore, Egypt must create a tripartite body that includes "Egypt, Sudan, and South Sudan" and establish a strategy between the Nile Valley countries based on economics, security, and development. >1<

The Egyptian-Sudanese relations during the era of "Mohamed Morsi" witnessed ambiguous relations, and the Sudanese Foreign Ministry described it as not wanting things to proceed between the two countries in relations. Thus, bilateral relations witnessed a lot of tension, contrary to what some expected. Integration and cooperation in bilateral relations due to the intellectual rapprochement between them. The two regimes, and there was neglect by Egypt towards its relations with Sudan, and there was no official visit until the end of Morsi's era, and it was very short, as it indicates that there is no intention to plan cooperative relations or consolidate relations more than before, and there was an attempt by "Mohamed Morsi" to disavow From with the relationship with Sudan and that it is moving away from the Muslim Brotherhood, therefore, bilateral relations during this period were not in the best condition, as it was expected that they would witness strong bilateral relations under the first elected government after the success of the January Revolution. >2<

After many tensions occurred in the Egyptian regime, such as the fall of the first elected government and the outbreak of the June 30 Revolution, which was followed by the assumption of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the bilateral relations between Egypt and Sudan were not clear, as they were described as lukewarm and ambiguous, and Sudan was placed in the box of supporting the Brotherhood as a result of the similarity of the political system. With them, but Sudan distanced itself and considered this to be an internal situation for Egypt, and Sudan sent a representative to the president's inauguration ceremony.

with Al-Sisi, there were many questions that the president would follow in his relations with Sudan. Either they would be dealt with to favor Egyptian interests in the Nile waters and accept relations with them, or relations with them would be rejected because of the ideology of the political system in Sudan. We find that there are no disturbances even

1 - Mahmoud Abu Al-Enein, "editor, "Egyptian-Sudanese Integration in Light of Current Conditions and Challenges," Cairo, African Research Center, 2007, p. 15.

2 - Muhammad Zain Al-Abidin Othman, "The Future of Sudanese-Egyptian Relations After the January 25 Revolution," Publication date: June 27, 2012 AD, Accessed: February 10, 2016 AD, available at: <http://www.alrakoba.net>

Now in relations, with regard to the Haleeb triangle, Egypt deals with the method of appeasement and does not want to enter into special disputes with the political and economic instability that Egypt is going through, as well as the issue of the Nile waters and the recent Renaissance Dam crisis, so Egypt deals with Sudan with the belief that any harm to Egypt will result. It is harmful considering that this issue is common to them and to Sudan as well. Therefore, there is cooperation to resolve this crisis, and there are some issues that could constitute tensions in the relationship, such as Egypt's intervention in the Darfur crisis. Therefore, the Egyptian and Sudanese regimes must have a high degree of control and prohibition in bilateral relations. All the events that could affect the relations between Egypt and Sudan <1>, and we find that no matter the times witnessed or the differences in the regimes of government that Egypt and Sudan have passed through, Egypt and Sudan will remain a unique relationship between two countries, each of which represents a source of security for the other, and there are food security ties for that, no matter what happens. Historical and geographical, there is a national and strategic security dimension, and Egypt and Sudan will remain a safety shield for the other.

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Research problem

This study aims to examine bilateral relations between Egypt and Sudan. The study examines the internal, regional and international variables and their impact on Egyptian-Sudanese relations in the period between 2004 AD and 2016 AD, as we find that this period witnessed many internal transformations.

And regional, which in turn affected the bilateral relations between the two countries. The study also attempts to find some ways and means that would strengthen the political and economic relations between the two countries and reach a stage of future prospects and cooperation by studying the stages that the history of bilateral relations between Egypt and Sudan passed through, and how to pave the way for Joint work that guarantees national security for both Egypt and Sudan and strengthens joint work between them due to the availability of strategic, security and intellectual ties between them, and that Egypt has importance in Sudan as Sudan is considered a strategic extension of Egypt, and that relations between Egypt and Sudan on some issues must be coordinated so that tensions do not occur. In the relations between them, and through the study, the reaction to the difference in the ruling systems of Egypt and Sudan is revealed and how this affects the economic and political relations between them and the position of each of them due to some regional issues that bring together:

- 1 - Mahmoud Abu Al-Enein, "Editor", Egyptian-Sudanese Integration in Light of the Conditions and Challenges, previously mentioned reference, p. 35."current",

between them and its repercussions on ways of cooperation between them and how each of them behaves in and Sudan, with all these issues. Therefore, we find importance in studying the bilateral relations between Egypt the great historical legacy that brings them together, on the various internal and regional variables of each of them, and we study the problem through the main research question. and he :

What is the impact of internal, regional and international variables on bilateral relations between Egypt and Sudan?

The study is summarized in some sub-questions:

- 1 - Do internal and regional determinants play a role in influencing Egyptian-Sudanese relations?

- 2-Does the difference in regimes have an impact on Egyptian-Sudanese relations?

3-What type of bilateral relations brought together Egypt and Sudan? 4- Did the secession of South Sudan affect Egyptian-Sudanese relations? 5- Did the differences in the positions of Egypt and Sudan on some of the regional issues that brought them together affect Egyptian-Sudanese relations? 6 - What are the future scenarios to ensure the achievement of Egyptian-Sudanese integration in light of the importance of each to the other?

: the importance of studying

: First: Scientific importance

The theoretical importance of this study is due to knowing and understanding the relationship between Egypt and Sudan, which is characterized by extreme specificity due to their natural and geographical connection, and there is strategic and intellectual depth and the existence of links between the populations, as they are considered one people, and the importance of the regional dimension between Egypt and Sudan, and highlights the role that Egypt plays in relation to the African region, in Relationship Given the observation of the lack of Arab studies that are concerned with the strategic dimension in Egyptian-Sudanese relations and the special importance in these relations, therefore this study comes as an attempt to fill some of the gaps that exist in Arab studies and their lack of interest in an important topic that represents a special dimension in the relations between the two countries.

Practical importance:

The specificity of the Egyptian-Sudanese relations must be emphasized, as the unity of the Nile Valley is not a slogan, but rather a shared reality and vision for the history of bilateral relations between the two countries, and the existence of a historical reality full of connections between them, and even the simplest thing, the water connection and the presence of the Nile River between them, which was during the tensions and crises, water cooperation between them did not stop. We find that there is a strategic importance for both Egypt and Sudan, which each of them tries to preserve by preserving their national security, and thus they see that supporting the relations between them guarantees this, and that there is great importance in these relations for the African region, especially the Nile Basin countries, as when they see the existence of strong bilateral relations This will play a role between Egypt and Sudan as a unit of integration and cooperation

It is strong to ensure the protection of the rights of Egypt and Sudan in some issues in the region, such as the issue of the Renaissance Dam or the distribution of Nile water. We also find importance in studying Egyptian and Sudanese relations, as Egypt went through two revolutions in less than three years and internal developments occurred in Sudan, leading to the secession of part of Sudan. The establishment of an independent state called South Sudan and how Egypt controls its policy towards Sudan and South Sudan and deals with the two countries and continues with the two countries. With a ban on maintaining relationships without increasing the hostile atmosphere between them or losing Egypt to one of the two sides represents great importance for this study, and also the study of the ebb and flow relationship that formed the bilateral relations between Egypt Sudan will facilitate overcoming the obstacles that led to the occurrence of these tensions and strengthen common ideas between them to build a future that brings them together and strengthen political, economic and water relations between them and confront the internal and regional influences that could occur and affect these bilateral relations between Egypt and Sudan.

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Conceptual framework

1 - National interest: The concept of national or national interest is one of the pivotal concepts in the thought of the realist school and is one of the basic pillars on which foreign policy and its directions are based. To the extent of the difference in the national interest, foreign policy directions change. National interest is the needs that a country realizes in its relationship with other countries surrounding this country.

The types of national interests are: political interests, economic interests, strategic military interests, ideological interests, cultural and social interests, and finally the interest of the international system <.1>

The realist school views international relations and the international community as a continuous struggle towards increasing the state's power and working to exploit it in the manner dictated by its interests and strategy, that is, in a way that ultimately achieves the state's interests and goals. There are criticisms directed at this concept, including that foreign policy cannot be studied in isolation from the concept of national interest, as it is a major variable. However, it is difficult to give a practical meaning to this concept, given that every political leader gives it a different meaning, which confirms that the difference in national experiences contributes to I disagree with the concept of national interest. In confirmation of the same meaning, many critics believe that the national interest varies depending on the criteria used in this definition, which confirms

1 - The national interest is determined within the framework of goals that are the subject of broad agreement within the existing system in the state, and here the national interest has a specific content.

2 - The national interest may be determined within the framework of some preferences expressed by some sectors of public opinion within the state, such as interest groups, and then it has a content completely different from the previous content.

3- Also, the national interest may be determined within the framework of the readings taken by the official bodies responsible for determining certain values that bind society as a whole.

1 - Mona Dardir Muhammad Ahmed Abu Aliwa, "Russian foreign policy towards Iran during the period {2000 AD - 2011 AD}", Master's thesis, Cairo University, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, 2013 AD, p. 22.

In this context, Hoffman says that the concept of the national interest has significance in a period of stability, when there are parties struggling over specific goals and specific means. However, when the existence of the state itself becomes in danger, all goals become subordinate to this goal, which means that it is difficult to estimate. A specific meaning at a specific time for the concept of national interest <1>

2 - Political integration: The concept of integration is used to refer to a pattern of interactions that arise between a group of elements that have reasons for convergence that make them the nucleus of a single building or a joint entity. Integration in this sense has its optional character, which stems from the awareness of the concerned parties that their meeting will ensure better performance. For its functions. In internal interactions, as well as in relations between countries, integration does not mean the dissolution of the nucleus of units or the necessarily cancellation of all their particularities. Rather, it simply means giving priority to similarity over everything else. With this logic, it exceeds the limits to which influence goes, but it falls short of those shaded by assimilation. <2>

In defining the patterns and levels of integration, analysts went to various schools of thought. For example, "Lendecker" mentioned that integration has four aspects: cultural, meaning compatibility with prevailing cultural standards, moral, meaning compatibility between declared principles and followed behavior, communication, meaning the communications network encircling the existing system and permeating it with its vocabulary, and functional. Meaning mutual dependence

Third ring for pictures between units belonging to a specific system of division of labor. Speaking of integration, the national means the emergence of the state as an entity that attracts the loyalties of individuals and attracts them from groups it has transcended, and the regional means the penetration of state authority, some of which is limited to the borders of the state and some to its various parts, and between the elite and the masses in the sense of the former two parties reconciling on a set of desired goals as well as the means of achieving them. There are other attempts to standardize and classify integration, some of which reduce the aforementioned dimensions of integration to only two: national and values, while others add to them and elaborate on the distinction between national, regional, values, and behavioral, as Welles did.

1- Mai Hussein Abdel Monsef, "The Classical Realist Theory in International Relations," Al-Hiwar Al-

Mutamaddin, April 20, 2013, available.

Access date: 02/13/2016: <http://www.ahewar.org/debat/show>. on

Muqallad, "Encyclopedia of Political Sciences," Cairo University, Faculty of Economics - 2 Ismail Sabry and Political Sciences, Dar Al-Wataniya Press, 1993, p. 477.

Economic integration: The term integration in the general context means that a group of independent countries seek to establish strong relations among themselves, which leads to them acting as one or more countries in the face of human activity. Integration usually occurs between a specific geographical region and is therefore called regional integration.

Economic integration between a group of countries is the process of achieving mutual dependence between their economies to degrees that range from simple forms of economic cooperation to the maximum degrees of economic integration. >1<

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Theoretical framework

The theoretical framework of this study is based on the statements of the traditional realist theory <2>, which is considered the theory most connected to international reality and expressive of its conditions. The realist school appeared after World War II and dominated in the years of the Cold War because it provided simple and strong explanations for war, imperial alliances, and the obstacles that hinder international cooperation. Other international phenomena, and this school appeared as a reaction to the idealist trend, which is based on knowing how politicians should act, not on the basis of how they actually act, and that human nature is fundamentally good and capable of cooperation, and that there is harmony between national interests. This is why the realist school came to analyze what is actually exists in international relations, specifically the politics of power, war, and conflicts, and it did not aim, as idealism did, to present proposals and ideas about what international relations should be. Among the most prominent thinkers of this school of realism are Machiavellian and Thomas Hobbes, while the most prominent thinkers of realism in the twentieth century are Hans Morgan Thaw and are considered This school holds that the nation-state is the primary and only actor in Niebuhr relations. As for the actors below the states, it has given them secondary importance because the world is made up of a group of states and those states interact accordingly.

1 -Mohamed Ashour, "Regional Integration in Africa: Visions and Prospects," Proceedings of the International Conference for Young Researchers in African Affairs, Institute of African Research and Studies, Cairo University, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, 2005, p. 447.

Muqallad, "International Political Relations: A Study in Principles and Theories," 2 - Ismail Sabri, Kuwait University, Faculty of Commerce, Economics and Political Science, 1984 AD, p. 18.

States are the primary and only actor in international relations until the world turns into interactive societies and not interactive governments. These countries are rational and rational actors capable of making decisions that serve their interests, and there is no authority higher than the authority of the state.

This school also views the international system as a chaotic system in which nation-states depend on their capabilities. The world is a world of conflict and war, which is the basis of international relations. There is no authority that protects international security, and there is no global state that rules the entire world. As a result of the absence of institutions and procedures for resolving conflicts in international relations, every state depends on On herself and her strength

In order to maintain their security, countries may also resort to entering into alliances to support their capabilities. <1> The realists put their starting point in the concept of power and the efforts of states to gain power and authority, and do not give a major role to morality, international law, and diplomacy. They firmly emphasize military power, and power according to the realist school includes all forms of influence and control, and means the extent of the ability of states to influence others and this power. What is meant by realistic analyzes is not traditional military power, but rather national power in its comprehensive sense of its material and non-material elements and components. It is the final product of a large number of variables and interactions that take place between these elements, and it is what ultimately determines the strength of the state, including, for example, nature, resources, strategic location, and diplomacy. This is why power is a relative value. States are evaluated for their own power status compared to the situation in other countries. This is why international politics is nothing but a struggle for power. Whatever the material goals of any foreign policy, it always involves controlling others by influencing their minds. >3<

The realist school also focused on the concept of interest, and that each country seeks to achieve its own interests, and that there is a conflict of interests to the point that it leads to war. The continuation of countries' foreign policies despite the change in political leadership or the change in the dominant ideological pattern and prevailing values can be explained because of the presence of a set of basic interests for each country. It represents the highest interests of the state, and these interests are fixed, and the means may change to serve them:

1- Anwar Muhammad Faraj, "The Theory of Realism in International Relations: A Critical Comparative Study in Light of Contemporary Theories," Kurdistan Center for Strategic Studies, 2007, first edition, p. 226.

Muqallad, "Theories of International Politics: A Comparative Analytical Study," 2 - Ismail Sabry University, Cairo, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, 1982, p. 49.

The goal may be peaceful or military, but the goal itself does not change, and the highest interest of any state is to preserve national survival and national security. Military and security issues are of great importance to the realist school, and economic and strategic importance is important to the realist school as well.

Hence, it is clear that the traditional realist theory is considered the basis for this study. On the one hand, this theory focuses on the concept of national interest, which is indeed present in the relationship between Egypt and Sudan, as we find that there are national interests between Nasr and Sudan, whether economic or political, and we find this in this study through the chapter The second is "Bilateral Egyptian-Sudanese relations" through the first topic, which is "Egyptian-Sudanese political relations," and the second topic is also from the second chapter, which is "Egyptian-Sudanese economic relations." Therefore, we find that the realist school applies to this study, and the realist school is also concerned with the strategic ties between them, such as water The Nile River, which now constitutes an important issue, and both Egypt and Sudan have an opinion and move on it. There is an attempt to cooperate and reconcile the Egyptian and Sudanese positions, and we see that this is found in the study through the third chapter, which is "The positions of Egypt and Sudan towards some issues," and the first section, which is "The

issue of water and the Renaissance Dam." Also, the Haleeb and Shalateen issue, which represents a border dispute between Egypt and Sudan, which emphasizes the strategic depth and Sudan's extension to Egypt. We find this through the second section in the third chapter, which is "The Haleeb and Shalateen Triangle Case." Therefore,

this theory applies to this study that brings together Egypt and Sudan, and on the one hand Finally, we see that

the realist school includes the concept of power, which is a comprehensive concept that does not mean military power, but rather includes material and moral power through population, volume of production, and geographical location, and that there is a difference in the form of relations due to the change in the ideological pattern and the dominant prevailing values that affect the system and relations of the state, and we see the effect of this The factors on relations are that there are some influences, whether internal or external, that affect the

Egyptian and Sudanese relations and the form of bilateral relations between Egypt and Sudan, which are considered the primary control in the form of this relationship. We find this applies in the study to the first chapter, which is "Determinants of Egyptian and Sudanese Relations." Internal Determinants of Relations and Sudanese.

Which includes two sections, the first section talks about "the regional and international determinants of Egyptian-Sudanese relations," and the second section talks about "Egyptian-Sudanese relations." Therefore, through the

above, we see that the theory of the realist school is considered the most appropriate theory that can be applied to the study of

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Previous studies

Previous studies can be divided into three main axes, which are as follows:

The first axis: Studies related to the determinants of Egyptian and Sudanese relations:

1 - Hani Raslan, "Egyptian-Sudanese relations during the era of Mubarak" <1>: This study targeted Egyptian-Sudanese relations during the era of Mubarak. It dealt with the transformations that Egyptian-Sudanese relations witnessed during the era of Mubarak, as at times there were some tensions and crises witnessed by them. These relations, and at other times, there were cooperative relations and the signing of agreements between Egypt and Sudan to cement bilateral relations between them, and how Egypt dealt with the internal crises in Sudan and the problems of the south, and that with every period the form of the relationship changed due to Mubarak's policies and how his decisions affected Egyptian and Sudanese relations, and also this shows The study covers strategic measures to look towards a future that includes complementary relations between Egypt and Sudan and an attempt to control the internal and external influences that affect the form of bilateral relations

2 - Ahmed Youssef Atallah, "Egyptian-Sudanese relations between ebb and flow" <2>: This study presents a complete study of Egyptian and Sudanese relations in light of some of the situations that occur that make it appear that they are in a state of ebb and flow and that relations are either in a state of crisis or in a state of relief. And cooperation, and we see in the study some events that occur and affect relations, which led to tension in Egyptian and Sudanese relations. We see the situation of the Darfur crisis and Egypt's intervention between Egypt and Sudan, and also the problems that occur in South Sudan that affect this crisis and also Egyptian-Sudanese relations due to the sensitivity of Egypt's position in Dealing with: We see Egypt's position through the arrest of President Al-Bashir by the International Criminal Court. We see how Egyptian and Sudanese relations proceed in such events that are considered to influence these bilateral relations.

1 - Hani Raslan, "Egyptian-Sudanese Relations during the Mubarak Era," Al Jazeera Center for Studies, publication date: October 13, 2011, accession date: 12
<http://studies.aljazeera.net/files/2011/08/20118881144456400.htm> 2 - Ahmed Youssef Atallah, "Relations, February 2016, available at: Egyptian-Sudanese between ebb and flow," General Information Service: Political Relations, publication date: August 5, 2010 Accessed: February 9, 2016 Available at [http://www.sis.gov.eg/Ar/Templates/Articles/](http://www.sis.gov.eg/Ar/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?CatI)
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[tmpArticles.aspx?CatI](http://www.sis.gov.eg/Ar/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?CatI)

D=5165#.VryAFfkrKUI

3 - Abbas Abdel Rahman Khalifa, "Sudanese-Egyptian Relations After the Revolution" <1>: This study provides a complete study on the importance of Egyptian and Sudanese relations and how they are closely linked due to the strategic ties between them. This study deals with the determinants that bring Egypt and Sudan together, which are considered influential factors. On the relationship between them, and begins by talking about the relationships by dividing them between tension relationships and why? Between cooperation and integration relations and why? It highlights the results at each of these stages, and discusses some issues that concern Egyptian and Sudanese relations and consider national security for each of them, and ways of cooperation in maintaining this security.

The second axis: the axis of studies of bilateral relations between Egypt and Sudan:

1 - Omar Siddiq Al-Bashir, "The importance of economic cooperation between Sudan and Egypt after the January 2011 Revolution" <2>: This study presents bilateral economic relations between Egypt and Sudan after the January Revolution, as it discusses the importance of these relations and how to establish trade exchange operations. The importance of signing trade agreements It increases the volume of investments between Egypt and Sudan, facilitates economic integration between Egypt and Sudan and ensures gains, and also addresses agricultural cooperation between the two countries.

2 - Muhammad Abu Al-Enein, "The Future of Egyptian-Sudanese Integration in Light of the Current Conditions" <3>: This study deals with the conditions that Egypt and Sudan are going through through internal or regional activity in order for political and economic integration to take place, as this study deals with the components of political and economic integration. between the two countries, and means of strengthening this cooperation through agreements and decisions, and also addresses the economic and trade paths held between Egypt and Sudan. Therefore, we see achieving Egyptian and Sudanese integration as necessary because it affects them in the future.

1 - Abbas Abdel Rahman Khalifa, "The Future of Sudanese-Egyptian Relations After the Revolution," Al-Ahram Foundation, Issue No. 286, dated April 30, 2011 AD, available at eg.org.ahram: <http://eg.org.ahram>.

2 - Omar Siddiq Al-Bashir, "The Importance of Economic Cooperation between Sudan and Egypt after the January Revolution," 2011 research paper, Eastern Nile Basin Conference: Development Challenges and the Future of Egyptian Cooperation, Cairo University: Institute for African Research and Studies. "Previous reference"

3 - Muhammad Abu Al-Enein, "The Future of Egyptian-Sudanese Integration in Light of the Current Conditions," Institute of African Research and Studies, Cairo University, first edition, 2007 AD.

3 - Gamal Fadelallah, "The Four Freedoms Agreement between Egypt and Sudan" <1>: This study deals with the signing of the Four Freedoms Agreement between Egypt and Sudan, which was in 2004 AD. It stipulates freedom of movement and ownership between Egypt and Sudan, which supports trade exchange and economic integration, but it highlights This study examines the Egyptian authorities' slowness in implementing this agreement and its procrastination, which is considered unnecessary even though it helps economic integration between Egypt and Sudan.

The third axis: The positions of Egypt and Sudan regarding some important issues:

"The impact of the South Sudan crisis on Egyptian national security" <2>: 1- Othman Mirghani, as this study deals with the issue of South Sudan and the problems that exist between the South Sudan region and the state of Sudan and the attempt to separate from it and the Egyptian side's view of this issue and its intervention, but with a lot of prohibitions so as not to Neither party loses interest in their relations because both parties are important to Egypt in its relations.

"The political settlement of the Egyptian-Sudanese dispute regarding the Triangle 2 - Ghada Khidr Hussein Zayed, Halebi" <3>: This study deals with Egyptian and Sudanese relations by dealing with the issue of the Halebi Triangle, which represents one of the causes of conflictive relations between Egypt and Sudan, as this border dispute between them did not affect On relations, as there are legal procedures taking place between them to control this triangle, and each of them tries to assert his right to it, which leads to tension in relations between the two countries.

3 - Muhammad Ibrahim Youssef, "Egyptian-Sudanese integration in light of the secession of South Sudan" <4>:

This study presents Egyptian and Sudanese relations in light of the secession of South Sudan and its consideration as an independent state and the establishment of relations

1 - Gamal Fadlallah, "The Four Freedoms Agreement between Egypt and Sudan," Master's thesis, Sudan, Omdurman Islamic University, 2006 AD.

2 - Othman Mirghani, "The Impact of the South Sudan Crisis on Egyptian National Security," Khartoum, Azza Publishing House, first edition, 2004 AD.

3- Driving reference.

"Egyptian-Sudanese integration in light of the secession of South Sudan - 4 Muhammad Ibrahim Youssef, a study of possibilities and challenges," Master's thesis, Cairo University, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, 2014 AD.

Between Egypt and the State of Sudan and other relations between Egypt and the State of South Sudan, and the ban that Egypt is implementing in studying all its dealings with the two countries so as not to be a reason for increasing interests with both sides between them and to preserve its national

: Division of study

Chapter One: Determinants of Egyptian-Sudanese bilateral relations.

The first section: Internal determinants of Egyptian-Sudanese relations.

The second section: Regional and international determinants of Egyptian-Sudanese relations.

Chapter Two: Egyptian-Sudanese bilateral relations.

The first section: Egyptian-Sudanese political relations.

The second topic: Egyptian-Sudanese economic relations.

Chapter Three: The positions of Egypt and Sudan towards some issues.

The first topic: the issue of the secession of South Sudan.

The second topic: the water issue and the Renaissance Dam crisis.

The third topic: The issue of the Halib and Shaltin triangle.

Chapter One: Determinants of Egyptian-Sudanese bilateral relations

This chapter discusses the most important main determinants of relations between Egypt and Sudan that affect the external determinants of interactions between the two countries. These determinants are divided into internal determinants. The internal determinants include the geographical determinant, the political determinant, the military and security determinant, the economic determinant, and the cultural and ideological determinant. As for the external determinant, it includes the regional determinant. The first section includes the internal determinants between the two countries, while the second section includes the external determinants between Egypt and Sudan.

The first section: Internal determinants of Egyptian-Sudanese relations

The second topic: Regional and international determinants of Egyptian relations -

Sudanese

The first section:

Any country in the world has a number of tools that enable it to implement its policy and follow up its relations with other countries. These tools do not lie in political tools only, but there are a group of other tools that determine relations between countries, and there can be non-political determinants and other political determinants. It affects relations between countries, whether positively or negatively. Some consider internal determinants to be variables related to the subjective and structural formation of international unity.

They include a group of influences that emanate from the internal environment of the decision maker <1>. Therefore, internal determinants are considered very important in relations, especially between two countries like Egypt. Sudan is the result of several factors that we will discuss below:

1- Geographical location:

A-Egypt:

The complex of the continents of Eurasia and Africa, and at the junction of two seas, Egypt is distinguished by its geographical location, as it is located at two inlands, one of which extends to the Indian Ocean and its hot regions, and the other extends to the Atlantic Ocean. Therefore, Egypt is considered in the northeastern corner of the continent of Africa.

Therefore, it is a stone and its cold regions, the corner between the east, the west, and the Egyptian lands. Which is connected to the Mediterranean Sea and the presence of maritime connections between ports in Egypt is evidence of the importance of Egypt's geographical location <3>. Egypt is about one million square kilometers and represents 4% of its area suitable for agriculture. The area of agricultural activity is estimated at 35,000 square kilometers and 96% is desert.

Egypt: The Nile River, which is considered the longest river in the world, and also the Suez Canal, which is the most important canal in the world. The Suez Canal connects the Mediterranean and Red Seas, and hundreds of ships carrying

goods and commodities pass through it

1 - Hazem Saddam Muhammad Al-Sudani, "Egyptian-Turkish Relations Case Study: 2002 AD - 2011 AD," Master's Thesis, Cairo University, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, 2012 AD, p.

.30

2 - Previous reference, p. 31

3 - Egypt Information Portal, Council of Ministers "Center for Information and Decision

: Support", available at <http://www.eip.gov.eg/aboutegypt/GeoInfo>, following link

Egypt is located astronomically between latitudes 22 and 32 north of the equator and between longitudes 24 and 37 east of the Greenwich meridian <1>. Egypt is bordered in the northeast by Palestine and Israel with a length of 265 km. It is bordered to the west by Libya along a line with a length of 1115 km. It is also bordered in the south by Sudan. With a length of 1280 km, Egypt is characterized by its vital capacity, which consists of two elements: the territory and the population. We find that the region that Egypt is characterized by density represents only 4% to 6%. Rather, the low-density areas constitute a large part of its economic and strategic construction. We also find that the factor Population is considered an important factor in the geography of Egypt, as human capabilities represented a major factor in the continuation of this role. Egypt was the first civil society in the history of humanity, and a nation was formed in it, and a kind of understanding and harmony arose among its members <2>, and the size of the population connected all cadres and gave Egypt superiority among The rest of the countries, allowing them to supply their armed forces, the population in Egypt inside and outside the country to 94 million people. The population inside the country reached 86 million people and abroad about 8 million people. The percentage of males is 51.1%, while the percentage of females is 48.9%. This was in In 2015 AD, while in 2004 AD, the population was 68.6 million people <3> Therefore, we see a clear difference in this

increase, which affects the human and demographic region

Egypt's climate is affected by several factors, the most important of which are location, surface features, the general system of pressure, air depressions, and bodies of water, all of which helped divide Egypt into several distinct climatic regions, as Egypt is located in the dry tropical region, except for the northern outskirts, which enter the temperate-hothouse zone <4> Therefore, Egypt is characterized by a distinct climate that is consistent with its distinguished geographical location.

1 - Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, Egyptian Geographical Location,

: publication date: February 15, 2010 AD, accessed: February 27, 2016 AD, available at <http://www.petroleum.gov.eg/ar/AboutEgypt/Pages/LocationandClimate.aspx>

2 - Previous reference.

3 - General Information Service, Population, publication date March 21, 2016, accessed March 24, 2016,

: available at the following link: [http://](http://www.sis.gov.eg/Ar/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?CatID=19#.Vxkw5dQrJdg)

www.sis.gov.eg/Ar/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?CatID=19#.Vxkw5dQrJdg

D=19#.Vxkw5dQrJdg

4 - General Information Service, Climate, date: January 18, 2016 AD, accessed February 25, 2016

AD, available at the following link:

<http://www.sis.gov.eg/Ar/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?CatID=13#.Vxk0ZdQrJ>

D=13#.Vxk0ZdQrJ

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B- Sudan

The country of Sudan is the name given by Arab geographical historians to the region inhabited by blacks in Africa. Sudan was known in ancient times by several names, such as Tasiti, which means the land of bows. After that, most researchers agreed that the name Nubia was different from the land of Sudan <1>, and Sudan is located in the heart of the African continent. It is located in the northeastern part of the continent of Africa, between latitudes 8.45° N to 22.8° north of the equator and longitudes 21.49° to 38.34° east. It is bordered by nine countries: Egypt in the north, Libya in the northwest, Chad in the west, and Uganda in the south and Ethiopia in the east">2>. We find that the area of Sudan is about 2 million miles. This area has led to diversifications" "It was considered the largest Arab and African country before secession." Square in agriculture due to the distinction and diversity of the climate. Sudan is divided into two distinct geographical regions. The first is the north, where agriculture depends on the waters of the Nile and extends From the south of the city of Khartoum to the Egyptian-Sudanese border, and the other is in the south, where swamps and savannah grass cover most of the lands <3>. The geographical and strategic location of Sudan is considered important and has given it a prominent role at the international and regional levels. Therefore, the geographical location of the State of Sudan is very important and we see that it is There are conflictual relations in Sudan that have been in a state of conflict and war for many years until a solution was fo

It reached the division of Sudan, and Sudan was divided into the northern state, which is also called Sudan, and the southern state, which is called southern Sudan. In this study, we will focus on northern Sudan, which has been the state of Sudan since 2011 AD <4>, and we find that the Republic of Sudan is located in the north of the African continent and overlooks Its eastern border is on the Red Sea, and it is located between longitude 38 east and longitude 22 west and between two latitudes.

1 - Madani Muhammad Ahmed, Hamid Othman Ahmed, "eds.," "Sudan's Foreign Relations," Khartoum, Institute of African and Asian Studies, University of Khartoum, 1991, p. 141.

2- Issa Abdul Hamid Abdullah Saleh, "Sudanese foreign policy towards Egypt during the period 1989 AD to 2005 AD," Master's thesis, Cairo University, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, 2010, p. 17.

3- Madani Muhammad Ahmed, "Sudan's Foreign Relations," previously mentioned reference, p. 145

-Andrew s. Natsios and Michael Abramowitz, "Can south apart 4 Sudan's Secession Crisis from North Without War", Foreign Affairs , 1-2-2011.

22 north and 10 south latitude <1> It is bordered to the north by Egypt, to the east by Ethiopia and Eritrea, to the south by the state of South Sudan, and to the west by the state of Libya and the state of Chad. The area of the Republic of Sudan is estimated at about 1,863,890 million square kilometers, and there are a number of major rivers in it, such as the Nile and the Nile. The White and Blue Nile <2>, and the Republic of Sudan is located in the tropical region, so its climatic regions vary from desert climate to tropical climate, and also the passage of the "Tropic of Cancer" with a moderate continental climate in southern Egypt, and this affects the climatic nature in the northern Republic of Sudan, so we see that Sudan's distinguished location and the presence of the Nile River passing through its territory and its extension over 1,700 km from south to north contributed to strengthening the link between the countries of the basin, especially Sudan and Egypt, due to its passage through their lands. >3<

The Republic of Sudan is distinguished by being one of the vast countries rich in natural resources, whether mineral wealth or petroleum, and also rich in livestock and fish wealth, forests and agricultural lands.

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2-The political determinant

A- Egypt:

Egypt is considered one of the most important countries in the Arab or African world, and we find that Egypt went through many stages, especially in political life, where we find that it went through a monarchy that lasted for many years. Then came the July 1952 revolution, and with it came the republican system, and presidents took over it with various policies that were implemented. Until Mubarak's rule came, and political life in Egypt was based on the President of the Republic being the primary driver of executive authority, with the presence of a partisan movement, but with restrictions on it, but there was a stumble in the transformation process.

1 - Muhammad Ibrahim Youssef, "Egyptian-Sudanese integration in light of the secession of South Sudan and a study of the possibilities and challenges," previously mentioned reference, p. 65.

2-A previously mentioned reference.

3 - Hussein Khalaf Musa, "Egypt and Sudan," research paper, Arab Democratic Center for Strategic, Economic and Political Studies, publication date: April 25, 2016, access date: March 5, <https://democraticac.de/?p=814> 2014

Available on:

Democracy and an imbalance between powers. Power became uniquely in the hands of the President of the Republic only, and the principle of peaceful transfer of power was absent. A stagnation occurred for the ruling elite and it became

There is a weakness in political participation <1>, and party life in Egypt before the January Revolution consisted of the presence of a large, dominant party, the National Party, affiliated with the government and the president, and its presence was like an extra role in the republic, while the other parties were fragile in the political game. It is also noted that there is an organizational weakness. For political parties, and also some parties were unable to have organizational cadres so that they could compete for power <2> Also, there were many restrictions on freedoms, whether on individuals or on the press, which contributed to the failure of political life in Egypt and the high levels of anger and discontent among members of society. Therefore Due to several reasons that can be summarized in corruption, whether administrative, security, or political, the revolution of January 25, 2011 occurred, which is considered a turning point in political life in Egypt and the beginning of a new page of freedoms and political life, as it brought down a regime that had lasted for 30 years, which was said to have never fallen.

Everyone sees that what fell was the fall of the July 1952 regime and the 1956 Constitution, on top of which were the features of the monopoly of the military on the position of President of the Republic and the accumulation of features and indicators of a structural crisis in the political system. Therefore, it was the beginning of the aspiration to build a new political life based on certain foundations and rules, and the era of one dominant party ended. In life, there began to be several parties, including Islamic, liberal, leftist, political and centrist parties, and this would be the beginning of a new life in the Egyptian political system, where there were several parties, the beginning of a new parliamentary life, and the presence of more freedoms, but due to the dominance of conflicts, confusion in the steps adopted, and the rise of Salafist and religious movements, the steps of the stage were delayed. <3> The transitional period took place, legislative and presidential elections were held, and the Third Republic was elected under the leadership of Mohamed Morsi, but his rule did not last long as a result of his of the Muslim Brotherhood more than serving Egypt. He committed many tendency to serve the purposes violations and entered into disputes because he wanted to

-1Hussain Tawfiq Ibrahim, "The Crisis of the Egyptian Political System: The Balance Between Powers and the Legislative Dilemma," Al Jazeera Center for Studies, publication date: February 15.

NET.STUDIESALJAZEERA://HTTP 2011, accessed: April 15, 2016, available at:

2 - Doaa Hussein Alam, "Opposition Parties and Fulfilling the Role in Time of Entitlements," Democracy Magazine, Cairo, Issue 21, Sixth Year, January 2006, p. 142.

3 - Ali Al-Din Hilal - May Mujib - Mazen Hassan, "The Struggle for a New Political System: Egypt After the Revolution," Cairo, Egyptian Lebanese House, 2013, p. 511.

Interference in the authorities of the armed forces. Therefore, crowds of thousands of Egyptians took to the streets again and demanded the overthrow of the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood. Therefore, the armed forces went to stand by the will of the people. A road map was drawn up with the participation of political and religious forces, and President Adly Mansour was appointed interim president of the country. This was considered back again, the top scorer, the January 25 Revolution <1>, but the challenges were greater than the challenges after the January Revolution, where the Muslim Brotherhood did not accept the decision and began military operations and confrontations with the armed forces and the Egyptian police and began a campaign of assassinations and bombings in all of Egypt, but the road map continued. This is due to the power of deterring the armed forces and their power to control and confront these challenges and try to control the reins <2>. Steps began to implement the road map and a constitution was drawn up for Egypt in 2014 and was approved. Presidential elections were held and President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi won for the presidency of Egypt in June 2014 AD, after his landslide victory, and Egypt began to stabilize politically and rebuild state institutions again. <3>

B- Sudan:

Sudan represents the most important points of contact between the Arab region and sub-Saharan African countries, as it connects the Arab countries in northeastern Africa with the countries of Central Africa. We see that the political system of Sudan is a federal system based on serving and ruling the states, each according to its priorities and demands <4>. However, we find that Sudan fought two civil wars between the central authority and the south (from 1955 to 1972 and from 1983 to 2005), which left several million dead, displaced and refugees. The peace process began in 2001 under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and with the support of some international forces, including the United States of America, Norway and the United Kingdom. Negotiations that took place beginning in September 2003 in Kenya between Vice President Ali Osman Taha and John Garang led to the signing of the "Comprehensive Peace Agreement" in Nairobi on January 9, 2005, which specified

1 - Muhammad Musaad Al-Arabi, "Dimensions of Political Changes in Egypt after June 30," Al-Ahram Political Foundation, publication date April 15, 2014, access date: 1: Ali Mamawah, April 2016, <http://www.siyassa.org.eg/NewsQ/3169.aspx>

2 - Iman Rajab, "The Return of the State: The Development of the Political System in Egypt after June 30," Democracy Library, Issue: 59, Publication Date: July 12, 2015, Date: <http://democracy.ahram.org.eg/News/1686/Subscriptions.aspx> Accessed: April 3, 2016, available at:

3 - Previous reference.

4 - Trethart Gerard Mc Hague, Tariq Hilal and Albert, "Governance in Sudan: Options for Political Accord in the Republic of Sudan," Conflict-CDI/documents/org.cdint://http://February, International Dynamic Governance_in_the_Sudan_full_report_Arabic.pdf 2014 AD, available on

Conditions for sharing power and wealth between the North and the South during a transitional period extending until July 2011 AD <1>. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement stipulated the formation of a national union government and the South obtaining self-rule and the right to self-determination in 2011 AD. Political life in Sudan continued on this matter with the presence of a mission The international community verified the implementation of the peace agreement until the year 2010 AD, and presidential elections were held. "Omar al-Bashir" was re-elected again for the Republic of Sudan, while "Salvana Kiir" was elected again to head the autonomy of South Sudan, and on January 10, the process of self-determination began and the work The referendum is considered the most important stage in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and the official results confirmed the presence of massive support for the independence process. Independence was declared on July 9, 2011, and Juba became the new capital of the state of South Sudan <2>. We find that matters deteriorated between the north and the south, as the Republic of Sudan includes many Contradictions as it consists of organized ethnic tribes while there is a weak political system and lacks effective political structures and the absence of sound democratic practices in Sudan, which made the political system after with secession get worse under Bashir's rule because it was found that there are new secessionist movements forming in the north

The south in order to divide the northern region. The biggest example is the Darfur region crisis. Therefore, problems have returned again between the north and the south. We also see that President Al-Bashir, in order to tighten his grip on the country and not allow any further secession from the northern region of Sudan, is imposing some policies such as restricting freedoms on the press and media, and there are violations. In the context of human rights, we find that a number of political opponents who called for a boycott of the elections were flogged <3>, and some political analysts in Sudan saw the failure of the federal system, as all states were taken care of, and that President Al-Bashir is a weak man, and his policy is that he rules and does not rule, despite his background. Military and thus led to the failure of political Islam in Sudan, which leads to instability of the situation in Sudan, which has a negative economic Security and leads to an increase ^{And} impact.

1 - Sudan: Presentation of the Republic of Sudan, French Diplomacy, Publication date: April 11, 2014 AD, Access date: April 10, 2016 AD, available at:

<http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/ar/afrique-du-nord-et-moyen-orient/soudan/presentation-de-la-republique-du>

2 - Previous reference.

3 - Abdel Hafeez Al-Abdali, "There is no future for the Bashir regime with the continuation of the iron fist," publication date: August 2, 2015, accessed: March 29, available, <http://www.swissinfo.ch/ara/8A%D8%A9-/41566420> 2016

on me:

Tensions in the north and instability in light of these disputes, whether internal or external.

>1<

3-The economic determinant:

Egypt: A-

Egypt plays a distinguished regional role as a result of its civilizational history and geostrategic positions. Egypt possesses many economic resources, its military potential, and its economic resources, some of which are exploited and others are not exploited or have been exploited in a wrong way <2>, and if we look at Egypt's economic role as a regional power, we will find that its role is weak and that This is due to several reasons, as Egypt relies heavily on aid, especially in the presence of conditions for obtaining this aid, which led to directing or facilitating some economic policies and political participation in it in Egypt. The Egyptian economy is based on rentier sources of income from the sectors of agriculture, industry, tourism, and services in almost equal proportions. They are similar, but the Egyptian economy is based mainly on income from the Suez Canal, agriculture, tourism, and taxes. Therefore, the Egyptian economy is considered one of the most diversified economies among the countries of the Middle East region <3>, and we find that one of the resources of the Egyptian economy is cash transfers from workers abroad, and the petroleum sector achieves some achievements as well Gas production in some years, such as in 2008, Egypt ranked highly in its region in the inflow of direct foreign investment <4>. It received domestic direct foreign investment, but it declined after that, preceded by Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. Egyptian economic policy failed to mobilize savings or attract foreign direct investment, especially after the establishment of The revolution of January 25, 2011 AD, when Egypt went through very bad economic conditions, which led to huge losses in

The withdrawal of many foreign investors and incurring losses

And

1 - Abdul Hafeez Al-Abdali, "There is no future for Al-Bashir's regime with the continuation of the iron fist," previously mentioned reference.

2 - General Information Service <Economy>, publication date: May 19, 2012 AD, accessed: April 11, 2016 AD,

available at:

<http://www.sis.gov.eg/Ar/story.aspx?sid=124z>

-3 Previous reference.

4 - Sudan: Presentation of the Republic of Sudan, French diplomacy, previously mentioned reference.

The Egyptian Stock Exchange also led to an increase in food prices and thus an increase in support, as the production wheel stopped in many sectors and this contributed to an increase in the number of unemployment and a decline in national income, in addition to the sharp increase in the cases of sit-ins, sectarian claims, and the succession of demonstrations and protests resulting from the instability of policies and their desired achievement.

<1> And also the major flaw in Morsi's government's treatment of the exchange rate of the pound, which led to its loss of about 18% of its value against foreign currencies. This had a negative impact on the value of the deficit in the state's general budget, as well as the deficit in procuring currencies to pay Egypt's commodity imports and creating a parallel market for the exchange rate. The official exchange rate, and these factors directly contributed to the deterioration of Egypt's credit rating and the subsequent rise in interest rates on loans concluded by Egypt, whether internally or externally, <2> which led to the general budget deficit increasing to double, which led to borrowing from the International Monetary Fund, which It is a testimony of international confidence in the economy's ability to recover and recover. However, this solution declined significantly and was replaced by another rescue, represented by aid and loans from sister Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait, which supported the economy in the wake of the June 30, 2013 revolution.

Egypt is going through difficult security conditions, and when President Adly Mansour came to the presidency, things were unstable. Therefore, the most important thing was to strengthen the country by restoring stability again.

As an indicator of this improvement and the beginning of the recovery of the Egyptian economy, a report by the Ministry of Planning showed that total investments were achieved during the fiscal year 2013-2014. A growth rate of 12.9% compared to 3.7% during the previous year, with a total value of 280.6 billion pounds, achieving a growth rate of 2.2%, attributing the reason to the improvement in the investment climate <3>. She added that the growth was linked to the development of the political and security situation in the country, so it rose from 1.4% during the quarter. The second to 2.5% in the third quarter of the same fiscal year - 2013 2014. He pointed out the continued improvement during the fourth quarter to record 7.3%, which shows the beginning of the wheel of economic activity turning, after achieving political stability and moving forward towards security stability in the country, and when it takes a new path from the President Al-Sisi started the situation in Egypt

1- State Information Service, Egyptian Economy, "The Egyptian Economy after the January 25 and June 30 Revolutions," publication date November 2, 2014, date

[http://www.sis.gov.eg/Ar/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?CatId](http://www.sis.gov.eg/Ar/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?CatId=c97VyDBLv11660#.)

c97VyDBLv11660#. =D, accessed: 1 April 2016, available at:

2 - Previous reference.

3 - Sultan Abu Ali, "The Egyptian Economy After the January 25 Revolution: A Point of View," Center for Information and Decision Support, Research Papers Series, Issue 2,

Publication Date: June 2011, Access Date: March 25, 2016.

The economy, where Al-Sisi intensified foreign visits to countries to strengthen cooperative relations, whether in politics or the economy, and called on financiers and investors to return investment activity again to Egypt in order to see the radical changes that Egypt has achieved in order to once again restore productive capabilities. Al-Sisi seeks to raise the growth structure in Egypt in order to attract More investments, and the economic recovery that Egypt is experiencing is due to the return of confidence as a result of the country's return to the right track again <1>, and also the presence of some national projects that helped revive the Egyptian economy, the most important of which is popular participation in financing the new Suez Canal project with more than 64 billion pounds during Only 8 working days, including 27 billion pounds of new money pumped into the Egyptian economy, which gave great international confidence in the beginning of the improvement of the Egyptian economy <2>, and also the state's pursuit of legislative reforms represented in laws such as the Mining and Quarry Exploitation Law, the Small and Medium Enterprises Law, And the law of unified companies and new investments, in addition to providing land for investors and exploring ways to solve the problems of serious investors and strengthening economic conferences. Egypt is moving towards maintaining social solidarity. Therefore, we see that despite the fact that strengthening the free economy with Egypt went through two revolutions in less than 4 years, it did not collapse, but rather returned again. To build itself again and revive its economy ag

B- Sudan:

Sudan's geographical location has made it a strategic bridge for the global and regional economic system, as it is considered a corridor for economic movement across the Red Sea basin to the inland countries in the middle.

The African continent and the Nile Basin countries. Sudan is considered one of the vast countries rich in natural resources, represented by fertile agricultural lands, livestock and mineral wealth, forests, fish resources and abundant water. Sudan relies mainly on agriculture, which represents 80% of the population's activity, in addition to industry, especially industries that depend on Agriculture is as follows

1 - State Information Service, Egyptian Economy, "The Egyptian Economy After the Revolutions of January 25 and June 30," previously mentioned reference.

2 - Reference previously mentioned.

3 - Magdy Sobhi, "Economic Challenges in Egypt after June 30: Perceptions and Scenarios," Arab Institute for Studies, publication date: October 20:

14 Access date: <http://studies.alarabiya.net/future-scenarios2014>

April 2016, available on:

We see that the total volume of Sudanese export revenues in 2010 amounted to about \$10.29 billion, and the gross domestic product, according to estimates in 2011, measured at the exchange rate in dollars, amounted to about \$63.3 million <1>, but despite all of that, Sudan is considered among the eleven poorest countries in The world, despite its enjoyment of natural resources and livestock, is due to mismanagement of the economy, weak planning, and imbalance in the structure of exports. This is due to the continuation of civil wars and conflicts between the North and the South, and the secession of South Sudan from the Republic of Sudan has posed a threat to the North, as it has led to foreign investors fearing for their money in light of this. Unstable conditions and also the secession of the Juba region in 2013 AD, which led to Sudan losing about 75% of its oil production, and the inflation rate reached 15.8%. The unemployment rate also reached 18.7% of the labor force, which numbered 9.3 million workers. Poverty also includes about 46% of the total population. Their number is estimated at 37.2 million people <2>, and the external public debt represents about 41.4 billion dollars, which is equivalent to 70.4% of the total gross domestic product. Not only that, but the deficit in the balance and must be dealt with realistically in accordance with trade confirms this result, as it reached approximately 4.9 billion dollars. ,

Because of the emergency direction in which the north is heading, which will lose 90% of the revenues that support the state's overall economy, this requires measures represented in reducing spending and removing subsidies on many goods, in addition to reducing tax exemptions, limiting spending on constitutional officials, and investing revenues towards real needs, and despite We find that the economic resources of the State of Sudan are diverse, including agricultural, animal and fishery resources, which it can exploit with neighboring countries such as Egypt and South Sudan in order to achieve economic integration between them and the possibility of establishing different food industries among them. We see that the large area of Sudan and the cheap human labor available are two main factors that play with it. Sudan to pump huge cash investments into it, attract companies and international economic bodies, and establish huge, high-tech or labor-intensive factories <3>. Therefore, we find that the Sudanese economy is oscillating and unstable as a result of the circumstances that Sudan is going through and also as a result of the political situation that Sudan is experiencing, as economics and politics are two sides of the coin. In order for one branch of them to be rebuilt, the other branch must be taken care of at the same time. <4>

1 "The Economy of Sudan after Secession," Al Jazeera Center for Studies, publication date: April 24, 2011,

accessed: April 11, 2016, available at:

<http://www.aljazeera.net/news/ebusiness>

2 - Abdel Hafez Al-Sawy, "Sudan's Economic Crisis and the Absence of Aid," Al Jazeera Center for Studies,

Publication date: October 9, 2013, Access date: 12

Ali Mamwath, March 2016: <http://www.aljazeera.net/news/ebusines>

3 - Previous reference.

4 - Sudan's economy after secession, previously mentioned reference.

4-Military designator:

A- Egypt:

Since the elimination of colonialism, Egypt has been considered the largest and most powerful army in the world. The world believes that Egypt is Arab, as the independent Egyptian state has relied throughout its history on the army to protect regional interests in its decades-long conflict with Israel and again in disputes with Libya and Sudan on its western and southern borders <1> Despite the disappearance of these threats in recent years, the phenomenon of terrorism appeared and it was necessary to develop the army at the highest level. We find that the Egyptian army is armed with the latest weapons and military equipment and has reached the 13th place among the most powerful armies in the world and the first place in the Arab world and Africa, where it ranks sixth in the world. In terms of the number of tanks, it has 4,767 tanks, and it is third in the world in terms of possession of armor, as it has approximately 19,000 armored vehicles. As for the ground forces, the Egyptian army has approximately 470,000 soldiers in addition to more than 800,000 reserve soldiers. Egypt also has an artillery and fire force. It is large, as it is the third in terms of possessing launchers, with 1,469 launchers, in addition to more than three thousand artillery of various types. The Egyptian Air Force is considered eighth in the world with 1,100 aircraft, including 358 attack aircraft, 343 interceptor aircraft, 390 training aircraft, and 249 transport aircraft, and the rest includes several types. Of helicopters, Egypt also has the seventh largest naval force with 237 pieces, including submarines, battleships, and defense vessels <2>. Egypt's military spending budget is estimated at about \$4.4 billion, so Egypt com

We find that Egypt during the Mubarak era was dependent on the United States of America in its arms deals, and there was aid provided by the United States of about \$70 billion to support the Egyptian military forces, including annual aid amounting to \$1.3 billion since the signing of the Camp Agreement to maintain Israel's qualitative superiority <3>, Therefore, David was with Israel in 1973 AD, with the United States finding it a means to put pressure on Egypt in some political directions, but when the January 25 Revolution occurred, the United States began to reduce this aid until a way was found.

1 - "American Intelligence: The Egyptian Army is the largest and strongest military force in the Arab world,"

Al-Diyar newspaper, date of publication, May 1, 2015, accessed: May 5, 2016, available at:

<http://www.addiyar.com/article/1016317>

"In numbers...the Egyptian army is the 13th in the world and the first in the Arab world and Africa,"

2

publication date: February 16, 2015, accessed: April 24, 2016: Available.

. Previous Reference-3: Ali <https://arabic.rt.com/news/774231>

To put pressure to achieve its interests, and when the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood came, America welcomed cooperation with it and that it was a new step in the Middle East and dealing with an Islamic with group that rules Egypt, but when the June 30 revolution occurred, the United States refused because its interests were the Brotherhood and it used arms deals as a means of putting pressure on Egypt. In order to reverse the removal of Morsi and prevent arms shipments from reaching Egypt, Egypt turned to Russia and China in arms deals, as they separate politics from weapons and are committed to all contracts and agreements, regardless of the circumstances. Therefore, Egypt is trying to find its interests with any party in order to build a strong army that it has. All the capabilities and weapons that make it maintain its global and Arab rank. >1<

B- Sudan:

Rather, to his belief The Sudanese army is considered a strong army, and its strength may not be due to technological superiority With its unique combat and rare experience, the army has remained in combat mode since World War II until recently, and although war is an unpleasant thing, its continuation creates a very high cumulative experience, and this is not available to other armies that are better armed than Sudan, and the army The Sudanese fought battles for more than 50 years in the civil war in South Sudan from August 1955 until 2005 AD, which ended with the signing of the Naivasha Peace Agreement <2>. The infrastructure of the Sudanese army consists of a huge military force represented by factories for armored vehicles, heavy machinery, and factories for weapons and ammunition. Sudan is considered a self-sufficient force in the arms industry and has the best trained personnel. This is evidenced by the spread of Sudanese army officers in various Arab armies in advisory and training positions and enjoys a strict military system. President Al-Bashir, the Supreme Chief of the Armed Forces, considers that the Sudanese army possesses a large and advanced deterrent force. It enables it to protect the country from internal and external dangers. We find that the Sudanese army in the African ranking is number 11 in Africa. The Sudanese army consists of 109,500 soldiers and the number of reserve soldiers is 102,500 soldiers. We find that the armed forces consist of several branches, which represent the number of forces

1- "US Intelligence: The Egyptian Army is the largest and strongest military force in the Arab world," previously mentioned reference.

2 "The balance of military power between Egypt and Sudan in the event of a war over Halib," Arab Liberal Network, publication date: April 10, 2013, access date:

Available on 15 April 2016, <https://liberals.org/vb/showthread.php?t=36712>

There are 85,000 ground forces and about 20,000 compulsory conscription. The Sudanese army contains 360 tanks of various types, 400 armored combat vehicles, 20 mobile cannons, 780 towed heavy weapons, and 20 missile launch systems. The air force is composed of helicopters and aircraft. The Sudanese multi-engine force consists of 3,000 personnel, attack aircraft, training aircraft, and troop transport. It consists of 168 aircraft, with approximately 38 offensive and defensive combat aircraft, 57 multi-engine aircraft, 48 troop transport aircraft, 6 training aircraft, 68 helicopters, and 36 attack helicopters. The force consists of The navy consists of 18 forces and contains one sea port and 74 operating airports. The Sudanese army contains 1,500 multiple heavy fighters and contains 241 infantry carriers on tracks and 353 wheeled vehicles. The army has about 635 missile launchers and 44 anti-missiles, and there is a base A large missile system consisting of 54 missiles from the converter on the shoulders. The naval forces are stationed in Khartoum, Flamingo Bay, on the Blue Nile and the Red Sea <1>. We find that the Sudanese forces possess a lot of equipment and weapons, and one of the most important factors that prove their strength is their steadfastness in the face of conflicts and civil wars. The situation that Sudan was experiencing until the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was agreed upon and implemented in 2011 AD <2>, and the military importance of northern Sudan became represented in maintaining the protection of the region and not allowing the division of any other part of it and preventing conflicts from igniting again, and we find that the breadth and geographical depth The Republic of Sudan enables it to establish military bases and deploy forces and train them for combat operations in all types of lands, along the coast and in the forests. The Republic of Sudan is provided with a network of land transportation lines, whether roads or railways.

Sea transportation and air transportation, which helps to freely maneuver forces from one strategic direction to another strategic direction within the African theaters of operations to the Arabian Gulf and the Indian Ocean <3>. Therefore, we find that Sudan is trying to reach a large military force in order to maintain its internal conditions and conflicts.

1 - Ghanem Suleiman Ghanem, "The most powerful armies in the world: ranking of global and African armies and a comparison between the strength of the Sudanese army and the army of South Sudan," Sudanis website.

board/com.sudaneseonline://http, publication date: January 25, 2015 AD, accessed April 21, 2016 AD, available at:

-2 Previous reference.

"The balance of military power between Egypt and Sudan in the event of a war over Halib," a previously ³ mentioned reference.

With South Sudan and at the same time also maintaining its presence in front of Egypt so that it can reach a solution in the Halib and Shaltin issue.

5-Social and cultural determinant

A- Egypt:

Due to Egypt's distinction in all fields, Egypt has a long population history that is unique from others with its special geography, which confined the population presence from the time of the Pharaohs to this narrow strip of the Nile Valley and the Delta until the present day. The inhabited area represents about 5.3% of the total area of Egypt <1> All reports issued in the twentieth century indicate that the population of Egypt is constantly increasing, and Egypt is considered the second largest country in the world.

Africa is the largest country in population in the Middle East. In 2004, the population of Egypt reached 70.548 million people, with about 68.648 million people inside Egypt and 1.9 million outside Egypt. This percentage is divided between one million males, at a rate of 51.1%, and about 33.542 million males. Females represent 48.9% of the total population. >2<

In 2015 AD, the population of Egypt reached 94 million people, an increase of one million people, as the number of Egyptians at home reached 86 million, while the number of expatriates abroad, according to statistics from the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reached eight million, with a ratio of 51.1% males and 48.9% females <3>,

The population of Egypt is divided into several parts, divided between the valley, the delta, and the deserts. About 99.3% of the population is concentrated in the valley and the delta. Despite this large percentage, it constitutes only Egypt, and this leads to a high population density in this region, 7.8% of the area, and also leads to pressure on services. And public facilities and affects

1 - General Information Service, Population, previously mentioned reference.

-2 Previous reference.

3 - Hazem Saddam Muhammad Al-Sudani, "Egyptian-Turkish relations, a case study: 2002 AD - 2011 AD," previously mentioned reference, p. 35.

It depends on the movement of development and growth in society because this drains Egypt's national economy <1>, while the Egyptian deserts, which constitute most of the Egyptian land area at a rate approaching 95% of the total land area, contain only 0.7% of the total population, and the population distribution is considered In Egypt, it is variable and does not follow a single pattern in all governorates. We find that there are some governorates that are densely populated due to the concentration of citizens in Greater Cairo, such as the governorates of Cairo, Alexandria, and Qalyubia. There are other governorates that contain low rates of population density, such as South Sinai and the Red Sea governorate.

The New Valley and the difference in population distribution are due to the factors of attraction and migration that encourage citizens to move to one governorate and stay away from others <2>

In our modern history, despite some sectarian events that occurred against the backdrop of lack of awareness and intolerance, the leaders of the Egyptian state and Al-Azhar Al-Sharif always emphasize equality.

And unity of ranks and cohesion among the fabric of one nation. We find that the population of Egypt consists of 80.5 million Muslims, representing 95% of the total population, and the number of Christians is about 6 million Christians, representing 5% of the total population <3>, but despite all of that there is freedom in expressing opinion, both of them deal as one national fabric.

There are several limited ethnicities in Egypt, such as: the Nubians in southern Egypt, a minority of Berbers in the Siwa Oasis, the Bedouin Arab tribes in Sinai and the Eastern Desert, and the Beja and Doum tribes in the Eastern Desert. >4<

Colloquial Arabic, English and French have recently begun to spread and are widespread in Egypt, especially in education. The Nubian language is found in southern Egypt, especially Aswan.

1 - Reference previously mentioned.

2 - Nahla Kamal, "The Population Situation in Egypt," Dar Al-Mandumah, Volume: A, Issue: 79, Publication date: January 2010, Access date: April 22, 2016, available at:

<http://search.mandumah.com/Record/155410>

3 - General Information Service, Society, Religious-Christian Bodies in Egypt, Publication date: May 27, 2013 AD, Accessed: May 10, 2016 AD, available at:

<http://www.sis.gov.eg/Ar/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?ArtID>

=69992#.VzIORNlrJdh

4 - Previous reference.

B- Sudan:

The population of the Republic of Sudan is about 34,926,546 million people. The population distribution varies, but it is concentrated in Khartoum and on the main branches of the Nile River and its tributaries, while it decreases in other areas, especially in desert lands and mountainous areas <1>, and 69% of the population works in agriculture in March The rest are various other activities, and the Republic of Sudan is characterized by a diverse ethnic population, as there are about 200 ethnic groups that speak more than 900 languages and dialects, but some linguistic groups dissolved through adaptation or conflict and the influence of Arab culture, and now includes a group of Negroes and a group of Arabs, so the Ibi tribes are divided into Some groups, such as the Chat, Rang, Madi, and southern Nuba tribes, are divided into ethnic groups according to language, such as the Kawalib group, the Namanig group, and the Taqali group, and the tribal tendency prevails in the relations between the population with the countries

geographically neighboring South Sudan. >2<

The relationship between Islam and Christianity in the history of the modern state in Sudan and before that is almost invisible in the nature of religious fanaticism. The map of religions in Sudan continued to live in a state of religious peace, and Muslims in the State of Sudan represent 33 million Muslims, at a rate of 97%, but after the separation, the number of Muslims in the Republic of Sudan increased The percentage is 73%, while Christians represent 8% of the population, and the rest of the other religions and beliefs represent about 19% <.3>

As for languages, Arabic is the official language, and there are dominant local languages such as Nubian and others, in addition to the English language in some schools affiliated with the church, but in general everyone tries to preserve the Arabic language in order to preserve the Arab identity. >4<

1 -Hussein Khalaf Musa, "Egypt and Sudan," previously mentioned reference.

2 - Samir Muhammad Ali, "Cultural overlap in the contact areas between northern and southern Sudan and the possibilities of geographical integration between them: a case study of southern White Nile State," Journal of Political Studies, Khartoum, issue: October 17, 2011, p. 188.

3 - Issam Siraj El-Din, "Sudan: Muslims and Christians," Believers Without Borders Center for Studies and Research, publication date: June 26, 2013, access date:

Ali Mamwath, April 2016, <http://www.mominoun.com/articles/327> -4 Ibid.

We find that with the separation of South Sudan from the North, it was expected that good relations would prevail between the population as a result of achieving what these movements wanted, but because the North lost a fifth of its area and a third of its population, these conflicts and tensions between the two peoples increased, and the North treated them as the political elite as a transition to Total integration into Arab identity.

We find that after studying the internal determinants of the relations between Egypt and Sudan, whether geographical, political, economic, military, cultural or social, we find that the most important thing that distinguishes the relationship between Egypt and Sudan and confirms the importance of the strategic depth between them is the geographical proximity, as this facilitated the existence of common relations and ties between them, and also It helped to conclude agreements and treaties and stimulate trade exchange between the two countries due to their proximity and the lack of difficulty of movement between them, and it led to each of them being influenced by the other, as protecting Sudanese national security is at the same time protecting Egyptian national security from the south, which is considered a gateway to Egypt, and the Nile River is considered one of the The most important links between the two countries is that it passes through the lands of Sudan to reach Egypt, which is considered its lifeline. Therefore, there are economic links and relations as a result of the availability of natural and economic resources and the availability of fertile soil for agriculture and the necessary ingredients. We find that through the succession of governments in both Egypt and Sudan, there were cooperative relations. There were significant differences between the two countries at times, but at the same time, as a result of the change in these governments, some conflict relations and lack of cooperation prevailed, according to the nature of e

importance of the relationship with Sudan, and it is left to him to A politician and his personal convictions about the determine the level and size of the relationship between the two countries, whether on the political or economic level, and we find that no matter how different the relations are and whether they have gone through ups and downs, the relationship between the two peoples remains eternal relations, as there are many common customs and traditions between them, and there is also the Arabic language. Which strengthens this relationship and facilitates interactions between them, and that despite some cases that the two countries went through of non-cooperative relations or incompatibility, especially the issue of the border dispute that exists over Haleeb and Shalatin, the relationship between the two peoples was not affected and the relations between them remained and they do not preoccupy themselves with the political matter and enter into conflicts and abandon the matter.

Political aside, we find that all the determinants confirm the strength of the ties and relations between the two countries.

We will later see the political and economic relations between Egypt and Sudan in detail and the extent to which each of them was

affected by the political situation in each period of the stu

The second topic:

After studying the internal determinants and the extent of their impact on the relations between the two countries, we will address the study of the external determinants and the study of external interventions that would achieve their interests and goals through interference in the relations between Egypt and Sudan, and the external determinants, whether regional or international, that we see as affecting the relations between Egypt and Egypt. And Sudan, we find

that it has a significant impact through the following:

A- Regional determinants:

1-Israel:

We find that Israel has worked hard to consolidate its foothold on the African continent in order to have Egypt is Egypt's real enemy, and the reason is a major matter and a regional power that can compete with the main one to eliminate Israel's dream of controlling the Arab world through the 1973 war. Therefore, Israel adopted the support of developing countries and emerging countries in Africa in order to achieve its goals through them, and South Sudan is considered the most prominent country. Which Israel began to exploit as a weapon against Egypt and Sudan <1>, where Israel had previously supported the secession of all

It supported them to have a role in determining its fate and its right to the rebellious movements in the south, and saw the independence of South Sudan as a golden opportunity to advance its interests and be an independent security and economic state in the region. Therefore, when the south separated, Israel was the first to support it and recognized it the next day. From raising the southern flag <2>, we find that the main reason behind Israel's support for the rebellion movements and the secession of the south is that Sudan is considered one of the largest Arab countries geographically and possesses many important natural and economic resources that, if exploited, would become a major regional power similar to Egypt and Saudi Arabia, so it supported Israel. This separation does not even appear

1 - Hamdi Abdel Rahman, "The Role of Foreign Interventions in the South Sudan Crisis," International Politics Journal, Al-Ahram Center, Issue: 183, January 2011 AD, Cairo, p. 165.

2 - Mervat Auf, "The Zionist Dream is Approaching the Nile: The Reality of Israeli Influence in South Sudan," Sasa Post website, publication date: June 7, 2015,

Access date: May 10, 2016, <http://www.sasapost.com/juba-and-israel>, available at:

A new regional power that affects it and its interests <1>, and despite achieving what Israel aims for and the independence of South Sudan, it even seeks to fuel conflicts and tensions in the State of Sudan, whether in the areas of the Blue Nile and the Darfur region, in order to dismantle Sudan and turn it into an image of Somalia, in completion of its well-known strategy. In the name of tightening limbs and then amputating them <2>, Israel began to make huge investments in South Sudan and began building infrastructure projects and military aid, as it seeks to build an Israeli military force in South Sudan <3>, and the State of Israel seeks to achieve the strategic goals of the national security theory by Work to encircle the Arab countries, deprive them of their influence on the continent, and keep them with the upper hand in Africa.

Israel has exploited the water issue and considered it a weapon to fight Egypt, as the Nile waters are of great importance to both Egypt and Sudan, where more than 30 million people live on its banks.

Sudanese and about 90 million Egyptians. The Nile River provides Egypt with 95% of drinking water, irrigation and energy, and also supplies Sudan with 80% of its water needs <4>. Therefore, Israel is trying to impose pressure and is trying to be the main actor in the water issue and to control it for the sake of pressure. It provoked Egypt and Sudan, so it signed a cooperation agreement for water infrastructure and technological development with Israel and built an agricultural village with Israeli technology in southern Sudan <5>. We find that Egypt refused in the past to allow part of the Nile water, even if it was simple, to Israel, so Israel is now working to obtain this. Egypt's share of water and Sudan's share of water, and several Nile waters were provided, thus affecting the share of projects such as the Peace Canal Project in order to obtain about 800 million cubic meters from Egypt, considering that Egypt does not benefit from the Nile water, and this means benefiting from about 10% of the share of water. Water

previously 1 - Hamdi Abdel Rahman, "The Role of Foreign Interventions in the South Sudan Crisis," mentioned reference, p. 168.

2 - Ibrahim Al-Minshawy, "A Permanent Strategic Alliance: The Implications of Israeli Relations with South Sudan on Egyptian National Security," Arab Center for Research and Studies/<http://2625org.acrseg.www/2625org.acrseg.www>. Publication date: March 15, 2016. Access date: May 10, 2016. Available. on me:

3 - Abdul Hamid Al-Musawi, "The strategic relationship between Israel and the state of South Sudan and its impact on Egypt and Sudan," Al-Mustansiriya Journal of Arab and International Studies, Volume: A, Issue: 44, Iraq, 2013, p. 6.

-4 Previous reference.

5 - Ibrahim Al-Minshawy, "A Permanent Strategic Alliance: The Implications of Israeli Relations with South Sudan on Egyptian National Security," previously mentioned reference.

And that there will be a surplus of irrigation needs, and it will be important for it if it is able to benefit from this water that Egypt does not benefit from <1>, and it also supported the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, as it reserves the Egyptian share in the river's water and seeks to sell the water to Israel, and thus it tries To play the role

Similar to what Türkiye does, and this trend is also confirmed by it

It is the main and active player in the water issue because it believes that this pressure will confuse Egypt, and also with other Nile Basin countries such as Ethiopia. It visits and tries to establish official relations with Africa and agrees on economic investment projects in order to increase the pressure on Egypt and Sudan. Therefore, the current regime must Restoring the Egyptian role in Africa once again and raising the level of diplomatic representation and interest in the African department, as Egypt returns to its leadership role in Africa, cooperates with the State of Sudan, establishes complementary relations with the State of South Sudan, and attempts to win it over again after it allied itself with Israel, due to its apparent lack of political experience. Egypt and Sudan must take action so that Israel It has the belief that its alliance with Israel will make it a strong state, so does not pose a great danger to them.

2-Ethiopia:

Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia are considered countries in the African regional neighborhood and at the same time countries of the Nile Basin. We find that Egypt throughout the ages had leadership in the African regional role and had control, and no country could take any action that would harm Egypt due to Egypt's political strength. Mubarak's era, then the January Revolution, and and militarily, but due to the decline of its regional role in... Economically And the political and security instability that Egypt went through. The African role declined again, and also as a result of Sudan's preoccupation with conflicts and civil wars with South Sudan, then the measures by which the South would become independent and hand over power. Ethiopia took advantage of this situation and announced the construction of the Renaissance Dam >2 <, and saw that its interests were more important than considering Egypt's interests

1 - Amani Al-Taweel, "Israel's Objectives from the Nile Water Transfer Agreement with South Sudan," Public Authority for

Fisheries Resources Development, Publication date: August 6, 2012.

2 - Sawsan Hamdan, "The Impact of the Renaissance Dam on the Future of Water Resources in Egypt and Sudan," Al-Mustansiriya Journal of Arab and International Studies, Volume: A, Issue: 51, Iraq, 2015, p. 280.

Sudan's interest in the dam was to generate electrical energy for itself, and it saw that it was a legitimate right for it and its people to enjoy the development that would come from the dam. Egypt and Sudan saw that this dam was considered a scourge that could destroy them, as the dam had negative effects, whether in the event of its construction or collapse, and would threaten disasters that would harm them. The national security of Egypt and Sudan <1>, and the two countries believe that even if Ethiopia controls 86% of the total revenues of the Nile, this does not give it the right to announce the construction of the dam without negotiating with Egypt and Sudan, and if armed wars are entered into, this will harm national security. Africa and there is no benefit from it. Therefore, after the announcement of the construction of the dam, a tripartite committee was formed that included experts from Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, and international experts to discuss the effects of the dam if it were constructed. A final report was made, which made it clear that there are harmful effects on the social and economic levels and that it will affect the share of both... Egypt and Sudan and the harmful effects that the dam cannot bear if it is built as a result of the engineering errors that exist in it, but Ethiopia did not care about this report result of the lack of political experience in governing and continued to do so <2>, and the matter became more complicated>2 as a Morsi and the radio of the parties' dialogue with President Morsi regarding discussing the crisis live on air with Ethiopia, which represented a disaster for the Nile water crisis and for Egypt's position, and led to tension in relations. It considered what took place in this meeting a threat to it, and with it it gained the support of some countries and supported its position, including South Sudan. <3>

Both Egypt and Sudan saw that they would be drawn into political tension with Ethiopia, which would lead Egypt, after the June 30 revolution, to enter into armed conflicts. In order to avoid that matter, it took the negotiated option in dealing with the dam project because this is considered a first-class diplomatic process because it affects the country. Egyptian national security. President Sisi's visit to Equatorial Guinea to attend the African Summit in Malabo constituted a new stage that opened negotiations again on the crisis. On the sidelines of the African Summit, Sisi met with Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam, and their discussions touched on the crisis, as both sides stressed the centrality of the River Nile. The Nile is an essential resource for the lives of the Egyptian people, and they decided to return again to resume the work of the Tripartite Committee and try to reach it

1 - Sawsan Hamdan, "The Impact of the Renaissance Dam on the Future of Water Resources in Egypt and Sudan,"

previously mentioned reference, p. 180.

2 - Ibrahim Al-Minshawy, "The Negotiating Option: The Issue of the Renaissance Dam and Egyptian Water Security,"

Arab Center for Research and Studies, publication date: October 12, 2014 / <http://13288org.acrseg.www>, accessed: May 9, 2016, available at:

-3 Previous reference.

A compromise solution that satisfies all parties, and the Ethiopian side pledged to avoid any harm that could come to Egypt and Sudan from the construction of the <1> dam. Hence, the fourth round of negotiations took place in Khartoum in August 2014 after eight months of interruption, during which a mechanism was agreed upon to implement the recommendations of the expert committee. The International Conference on the Renaissance Dam, and the two sides signed the final statement under Sudanese sponsorship <2>. Therefore, Egypt must move in all areas to resolve this crisis within the framework of restoring the Egyptian role in Africa, raising the level of diplomatic representation, paying attention to the African department, and intensifying cooperation with Sudan, because standing on its side gives economic strength. With the basin countries, Egypt has the right to do so, and also begins investment projects and the Nile to return Egypt's role again to Africa.

B- International determinants:

1-United States of America:

The United States of America, as an international actor, controls the balance of power in the world and has an important and effective role in influencing relations between Egypt and Sudan. We find that the United States of America during the Mubarak era was exerting great pressure on him in order to achieve what it wanted in Sudan, as America was following a policy of carrots and sticks. It was dealing with the stick during the era of the stick and what characterized Bush, and when Obama came to power, the carrot took space, balanced with it

His policies of resorting to dialogue <3>, and America intervened in order to keep Egypt or Arab public opinion in general from making a decision when signing the Naivasha Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the North and the South. Therefore, the American administration worked to exert all the pressure at its disposal to push the Sudanese government to agree with its policy, and after Obama came to power and came to visit Cairo and delivered a speech at Cairo University. The situation appeared balanced, and there became a policy of push and pull in dealing with the Sudan file. "Scott Gerbash" was appointed as an American envoy to Sudan. He is characterized by moderation and is considered America's hand in implementing what it wants in Sudan, so it was happening. Lots of consultations with all parties and it works

1 - Sawsan Hamdan, "The Impact of the Renaissance Dam on the Future of Water Resources in Egypt and Sudan," previously mentioned reference.

2 - Muhammad Abdel Hadi Alam, "The Khartoum Agreement and the Crowning of Understanding and Cooperation in the Eastern Nile Basin," Arab Center for Research and Studies, publication date: 24

<http://36786org.acraseg.www/> March 2015, accessed: May 10, 2016, available at:

3 - Rakha Ahmed Hassan, "Sudan and the Internal and External Challenges," Dar Al-Mandumah, Issue: 142, Cairo, 2010 AD, p. 116.

He must unite the rebel movements in Darfur to facilitate the negotiation process and try to prevent any tensions between the north and south and continue the negotiation until the agreement is implemented and not reversed, as he considers that the goal that the United States seeks is to dismantle Sudan and break it up into small states that will be subject to it in the region, and this entails These situations are countries threatening Egypt, strategically besieging it, and suggesting that Egypt is not Arab countries neighboring Sudan, in particular, are far from such a fate if they try to directly confront American pressures or fail to comply directly with American goals in the region, which would affect security.

The United States of America has shown great interest and provided assistance in preparing for the recent Sudanese elections, which were held to choose the government of South Sudan. We find that everything America is doing is because it does not want Sudan to be a haven for terrorists and extremists, and that it is better for Sudan not to return to conflicts and civil wars and for them to continue always. Likewise, such as Somalia, because it will influence neighboring countries such as Libya and Chad in order to protect their interests from oil in them. <2<

We find that the policy of the United States of America regarding the Sudanese issue is summed up by getting rid of the Islamic ruling system in Sudan and thwarting a unified Sudanese-Arab-Islamic concept that is also opposed to preserving the petroleum interests that exist between American and Western values, and the north and south, but the largest part is in the south, and working to prevent allowing the presence of a large regional force in Africa in general and Sudan in particular, so it is trying to impose its control. The United States also aims to separate South Sudan to make it a base for American and European interests in Central Africa, and work to reduce the Arab and Egyptian role in particular in Sudan after pressuring Egypt to reduce its African role. And its distance from the role it played in the past as a major force and weight in Africa. This distance from the continent, especially its abandonment of countries that impose Western and American policy on the neighborhood, allows the United States the opportunity to intervene in all its goals from the continent. <3<

To be implemented through which it can impose its conditions

1 - Ihab Abu Aish, "Renewed Fears: The Secession of South Sudan and Egyptian National Security," Arab Center for Research and Studies, publication date: September 30, 2014 /

11279org.acrseg.wwwhttp://AD, access date: May 10, 2016, available at: Sudanese-American: 1989 - 2011, Sudan

-2 Khaled Hussein, "Relationships

Center

for Research and Strategic Studies, Khartoum, 2011, p. 120.

-3 Previous reference.

2-The International Criminal Court:

International interventions do not stop at the level of countries, but sometimes some international organizations move to intervene in the affairs of a country. We see that as a result of Western and American pressure, the International Criminal Court intervened in the Darfur crisis, which is the annual or periodic crises of congestion associated with the dry season and the entry of tribes with Arab origins, which led to conflict with tribes of African origin, and several political movements emerged demanding the sharing of power and wealth with the government, which led to an increase in regional and international intervention in the crisis. With the international position and America's strictness towards the government, they have a large space in the issue, especially Sudan, and the rise of opinions demanding the division of Sudan <1>, and the crisis escalated and became more complicated as a result of the increase in displaced people to Darfur despite the difficult living conditions and the movement of some tribes to Chad, which led to an increase in the complexity of the matter. We find that some attribute the crisis to the rebellion operations against the regimes in Chad and Sudan, and both of them accuse them of To the other, it supports the rebels with money, equipment, and weapons against the other. Chad submitted a complaint against the African Union and the Sudanese Conference Organization to the Security Council, and Egypt, Libya, and the Islamic Bank intervened to achieve a breakthrough in the tension between the two countries. After things worsened between the two countries, the conflict returned again with an attack from the state of Chad, which This led to Egypt, Libya and the League of Arab States rejecting this position <2>, and the international community also condemned this matter, but because the international community is working to exaggerate everything in order to benefit from this in its interests, the UN Security Council issued 26 resolutions on Darfur and turned it into an international crisis. In July 2008, the Criminal Court announced an indictment against President Al-Bashir accusing him of several crimes he committed in Darfur, including war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide against some tribes <3>. An order was issued to arrest President Al-Bashir and arrest him if he did not respond to the request to appear before the court. We find that transferring the case from the Security Council to the International Criminal Court is subjective and inconsistent with political considerations, because the Da

1 - Abdel Salem Ibrahim, "Contemporary Sudan: Foreign Policy and International Relations," Dar Al-Manhaj for Publishing, Amman, 2005, p. 115.

2 - Previous reference.

3 - Labib Rizk, "Darfur and Egypt's Historical Responsibility," Al-Ahram Egyptian Newspaper, Issue: August 15, 2004 AD.

However, there are many questions about the decision of the International Criminal Court and how major powers can interfere in the core of its judicial work and influence it to undermine the legitimacy of Sudanese rule, but the Arab countries were not tempted, the first of which was Egypt and Africa, and they rejected this decision and stood against its implementation <1>, and After the south gains its independence, international and regional powers, especially America and Israel, help the Darfur region to gain its independence and have the right to self-determination. Therefore, they work to strengthen the conflicts in northern especially Egypt and other neighboring countries, must unite and Sudan. Therefore, the neighboring countries, with stand by Sudan in order to emerge from This crisis ended without any other divisions occurring.

We find that after studying the regional and international determinants, we find that the major powers are working in their interests, regardless of what they will do, how they will affect the state and its people, and what they can do in order to achieve their goals. Thus, Israel, which works through legitimate and illegitimate methods, began to be a major actor on the continent and influence the interests of Egypt and Sudan through its relations with South Sudan, then supporting Ethiopia and constructing the Renaissance Dam and trying to support it with money, pumping investments into the African continent, and establishing huge economic and technological projects in exchange for achieving its interests. Then we talked about Ethiopia and how it deceived Egypt and Sudan and its lack of respect for neighboring countries by constructing the dam without their knowledge and knowing the extent of the mistakes. Then continue to establish it and put pressure on Egypt and Sudan to achieve its goals, and in view of the international powers that consider that to achieve their interests they can eliminate countries and undermine their authorities, and how international organizations operate in order to work in their favor, such as the Security Council and the International Criminal Court, and therefore we see that after studying the internal determinants and determinants We found a significant impact on the relations between Egypt and Sudan and the existence of cooperation between them in some situations and unity together to confront some matters.

1 - Mahmoud Abu Al-Enein, Hassan Makki <editor>, "The American Role in the Darfur Crisis: The Origins, the Endowment, and the Scenarios of Solution and Penetration," Institute for African Research and Studies, Cairo, 2005, p. 455.

Egypt and Sudan, due to their regional neighbourhood, whether Arab or African, are sister countries, and if we look at the history of the two countries, we will see that there are many bilateral relations, whether political or economic, that brought them together at various times, and these bilateral relations were whether they were cooperative relations or Conflict is the result of the circumstances of the two countries, whether internal or external circumstances that affected these bilateral relations. In this chapter, we will address the bilateral political and economic relations between Egypt and Sudan across various systems and all fields.

The first section: Egyptian-Sudanese political relations

The second topic: Egyptian-Sudanese economic relations

The first section: Egyptian-Sudanese political relations

We find that since the independence of Sudan in 1956 AD, Egyptian-Sudanese relations have been going through states of ebb and flow or cycles of ups and downs, and this was the result of the difference between the regimes of government between the military regimes. As a result of the rapprochement, Egypt preferred to deal with Egypt and Sudan where the viewpoints were <1>, so it deteriorated. Egyptian-Sudanese relations deteriorated significantly in the 1990s, which formed a generation of Sudanese who saw Egypt as an external enemy, and each country began to blame the other. Egypt accused Sudan of having camps that sponsor terrorism and religious extremism, but they are sponsors of terrorism and justified it. Sudan stated that these camps are for the Sudanese People's Defense Forces <2>. Then came the major issue that led to things getting very bad, which was the attempt to assassinate President Mubarak in Addis Ababa in 1995 AD, in which Sudanese elements were accused, which led to a worsening of relations between the two countries and their near cessation. However, Egyptian-Sudanese relations began to improve since the decade of the new millennium, as a result of the split that occurred within the ranks of the Ingaz regime and the departure of Hassan al-Turabi from power, who was considered the extremist wing of the government. Therefore, President al-Bashir turned against him because he had dual leadership, which led to an improvement in relations between the two countries. <3>, Egypt's standing by Sudan, refusing to impose economic sanctions on Sudan in the incident of the president's assassination, which demonstrates the extent to which decision-makers in Egypt are aware of the importance of relations between the importance of keeping the higher interests between them away from any regional disputes or tensions between the two countries.

as Internationally, diplomatic visits began from the Sudanese side in order to overcome obstacles and serve confirmation from the Sudanese side and its keenness to thaw the ice that has occurred between the two countries and improve relations between Egypt and Sudan, considering that they are important strategic relations

<4>, and Cairo is considered the first capital that President Al-Bashir will visit. On his foreign visits Lidl

1 - Ihab Ibrahim Al-Sayed, "The Implications of the Secession of South Sudan on Egyptian National Security," Master's thesis, Cairo University, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo, 2014, p. 80.

2-Ibid., p. 82

3 - Issa Abdul Hamid Abdullah, "Sudanese foreign policy towards Egypt during the period from 1989 AD to 2005 AD," Master's thesis, Cairo University, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo, 2011 AD, p. 91.

4 - Ihab Ibrahim Al-Sayyid, previously mentioned reference, p. 85

On the importance of relations between the two countries and how to restore them again to what they were before disturbing the peace between the two countries <1>, the two presidents began consultations on how to restore relations again. President Mubarak visited Sudan in May 2003 after a period of interruption that lasted 13 years. This represented The visit is the culmination of the slow path of improvement in relations between the two countries and indicates that both countries decided to give priority to their strategic interests and open a new page in relations <2>, and consultations began on how to achieve integration between the two countries, especially after Sudan signed the Machakos Agreement, which was the agreement that was signed in Kenya. As a culmination of the negotiations between the Government of the Republic of Sudan, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and the Sudan People's Liberation Army, under international auspices, it was agreed to divide power and wealth between the North and the South, and to set the year 2011 AD as the year of the right to self-determination for the people of the South through a popular referendum to determine their desires and the South, and a ceasefire and bloodshed. To And that lasted 20 years <3>, and this agreement was announced eliminate the civil war between the North and the war without Egypt's knowledge and in the midst of a great surprise, as the right to self-determination means the possibility of Sudan disintegrating into small states, which affects Egyptian national security, so there was a reservation From the Egyptian side, how

In view of the regional and international protection of this agreement and the acceleration of its implementation, Egypt had to change and stand by Sudan so as not to leave it alone, weak, and divided more than it was.

Therefore, the 2004 consultations were very important, whether in terms of economic or political decisions, but here we will address the political integration strategy. .

It has been agreed between Egypt and Sudan to prepare a joint ten-year strategy so that the goals of the two countries are achieved through the new concept of integration, and experts and scholars were assigned to prepare this. The Sudanese side also presented a draft of the project and presented it to the highest decision-making bodies, and a proposal was put forward for discussion <4>, and one of the most important steps of integration is he

1 - Sayed Muhammad Ahmed, "The Egyptian-Sudanese Complement," Suez Information Website, publication date: September 2010, accessed: May 5, 2016, available at:

<http://www.swissinfo.ch/ara/%D8>

reference 2 - Sudanese foreign policy towards Egypt during the period from 1989 AD - 2005 AD, previously mentioned, p. 95.

previously mentioned reference 3 - The repercussions of the secession of South Sudan on Egyptian national security,"

p.84

previously mentioned reference: 4-Sayyid Muhammad Ahmad,

Activating institutional integration devices in a way that enables the transition from bilateral exchange to partnership. Agreement in this aspect on some foundations, including the periodicity of summit conferences between the producers and the presidents of Egypt and Sudan, and secondly, establishing a supreme committee headed by the Egyptian Prime Minister and the Sudanese Vice President, whose function is that it is authorized by the summit and accountable to it. A ministerial committee is formed and consists of ministers supervising the sectors within which the projects are carried out

There is a joint integration fund that undertakes feasibility studies for projects, raises funds for their implementation, and does the necessary propaganda for them. <1> A joint Egyptian and Sudanese parliamentary committee is formed consisting of 7 members from each parliament, headed by the Speaker of Parliament. It was actually held for the first time in Cairo in January 2004, and then after A meeting was held again in Khartoum <2>, and also in May 2003, the popular dimension was activated in the relations between the two countries, and common interests were created far from official levels, such as agreements to exchange experiences between popular action organizations, such as the formation of the Egyptian-Sudanese Civil Forum, with the participation of about 56 associations. Civil society under the auspices of the League of Arab States and four agreements were signed between Egyptian and Sudanese associations in the fields of science and technology <3>, but we find that there were some events that led to the integration strategy not being implemented as agreed upon as a result of the events that led to the internal threats that Sudan is going through From the aggravation of the Darfur had intervened crisis, which was exacerbated by international intervention, and there was a security, tragic, and humanitarian situation, such that Egypt asked from day one that the issue in Darfur must be in this crisis, and Egypt's position was political, economic, developmental, social, and humanitarian solutions to address the situation <4>, and there must be The crisis should not be classified as a war between Arab tribes and African tribes because in the end all the tribes are Sudanese, and the Egyptian policy towards the Darfur crisis took more than one path with the aim of helping to reach internal solutions and preventing the escalation of military action and the internationalization of the is

1 - Muhammad Hussein, "Egyptian-Sudanese relations... between Egypt and Egypt," Suez website, History

Publication: August 5, 2010 AD, Accessed: May 2, 2016 AD,

Reference mentioned previously, available at <http://www.swissinfo.ch/ara/%D8%A>.

2 - Previous reference.

3 - Amani Al-Taweel, "Egyptian-Sudanese Relations Towards a New Rapprochement," International Political Journal,

Cairo, Issue: 153, July 2003, p. 273.

4 - General Information Service, Political Relations between Egypt and Sudan, publication date: May 15, 2009,

accessed: May 4, 2016, available at:

<http://www.sis.gov.eg/Ar/Templates/Articles>

Egypt efforts External interventions and keeping the crisis within its regional framework <1>. The Arab League and the African Union supported the solution of the issue on the one hand and cooperated with the Sudanese government to resolve it on the other hand in order to reach a solution that could end the crisis <2>. The Egyptian position was not limited to political and diplomatic action, but rather It extended to the field of humanitarian and medical aid, as the official and popular medical and humanitarian convoys did not stop, and there was a resident medical delegation for medical aid, and the Egyptian Armed Forces participated in the peacekeeping forces in the region in partnership with the United Nations and the African Union. Therefore, we see that Egypt has a major role in reaching a solution to the crisis in the Darfur region, which It affected the integration strategy between the two countries <3>, which as a result of the international intervention in Sudan and the sanctions that it would have been exposed to as a result of the tragic situation in the Darfur region, led to damage to the political and economic interests of Sudan and also affected the integration between Egypt and Sudan

Both Egypt and Sudan tried to continue to support bilateral relations and strengthen the integration path to build a strategic partnership, but the integration strategy did not succeed as a result of the political obstacles, which are considered the most important and dangerous obstacles in the field of integration, as they are the dominant factor more than any other economic or social factor <4>, and we find that the obstacles Political is represented in: preferring political and security goals, which was a strong reason for freezing the integration project in order to preserve the national security of each country, as when the Darfur crisis emerged, it led to Egypt moving away, also fearing the civil war between North and South Sudan on its national security from these threats, and it led to many From the tension in relations and the incompleteness of the integration strategy, both the Mubarak government and the Bashir government were limited to the official nature and not to the popular participation that had been agreed upon before. Strategic affairs, joint defense, and activity remained as well. The absence of political will for diplomatic integration outside the framework of popular knowledge, and

1 - Muhammad Al-Tabei, "Egyptian-Sudanese Relations in General," Egyptian Journal of International

Law, Volume: Volume, Issue: 42, Cairo, 2000 AD, p. 150.

2 - Ahmed Atef Abdel Rahman, "The Lost Relationship between Egypt and Sudan," Money and Trade

Magazine, Volume: A, Issue: 458, Cairo, 2007, p. 2.

3 - Previous reference, p. 3

4 - Fatima Ibrahim Muhammad, "The Future of Sudanese-Egyptian Integration after the Revolution of January 25, 2011

AD," Dar Al-Manzumah, Issue: January 40, 2014 AD, Cairo, p. 12.

It was an important reason for obstructing the integration project, as Mubarak's political will was to achieve a strategy for integration with Western countries, led by the United States of America. What was most important to him was ensuring that Egypt would emerge from the circle of developing countries and the role that America was playing in distancing Egypt from its African role and its intervention. In the secession of South Sudan and encouraging it to be in its interest, it put pressure on Egypt to stay away from the issue and not interfere in Sudanese affairs, and due to the lack of political pluralism in government, Egyptian-Sudanese relations have deteriorated to the greatest extent without President Mubarak paying attention to Egypt's strategic interests in Sudan is in the Nile Basin and the waters that pass through its territory <1>. Sudan also began from time to time to use the weapons of Haleeb and Shaltin in order to put pressure on Egypt due to the severing of relations between them and its lack of regional containment. This was a direct reason for the weakness of Egypt's role regionally and its distance from Africa.

The January 25 Revolution took place in Egypt, and with it began an attempt to restore Egypt's regional and pioneering role in Africa, and an attempt to break out of American subordination, the policy pursued by Mubarak, which led to a cooling of relations between Egypt and Africa in general and between Egypt and Sudan in particular <2>, and an attempt to restore Egyptian sovereignty once again. After the success of the January 2011 revolution, a strategy was developed to restore Egyptian-Sudanese relations to cooperation and integration relations as a result of the common issues of the water issue, which represents the national security of both of them, and cooperation in the fields of economy, agriculture, and education, as Sudan is one of Egypt's large markets <3>, and we also find a response The actions of the Sudanese side played a major role in restoring relations, as there was great welcome for the overthrow of the Mubarak regime, and President Al-Bashir was the first to congratulate the overthrow of the regime and the success of the revolution <4>, as hope was renewed for Sudan for Egypt to return once again to its integration with Sudan and to try to save it from its weakness in particular. After the secession of the South and the economic losses that c

Reference previously mentioned, p. 14 1-Fatima Ibrahim Muhammad,

2 - Khaled Hussein Muhammad, "Determinants of Egyptian-Sudanese relations after the January 25 Revolution," Sudanese

Center for Press Services, publication date: March 10, 2016, access date:

May 4, 2013 <http://www.sudaress.com/smc/332>

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Available on

3 - Previous reference.

4 - Khaled Hussein Muhammad, "Determinants of Egyptian-Sudanese Relations After the January 25 Revolution," previously

mentioned reference.

Also, the new situation in Sudan after the secession of South Sudan and the new political situation after the secession.

Therefore, both countries must develop a new strategy in line with the new strategic situation for each of them. In principle, countries and work to relations with North Sudan must be consolidated in order to achieve integration between the two propose the unity of the Nile Valley. As a strategic choice, a balance must be established between Egypt and the two countries of Sudan in order to preserve the strategic depth for Egypt and Egypt's national security <1>. We find that the Sudanese side held discussions with the head of the Egyptian Armed Forces, and regional and international positions were coordinated and the issue of water and the issue of food security were discussed. It occupied a large number of discussions, and the Prime Minister of Egypt, Essam Sharaf, visited Sudan after being appointed as the first country after taking office. The visit came with the support of both sides to discuss joint projects between the two countries and how to benefit from integration strategies between them. Some agreements were signed in all fields, and this visit was An affirmation of Egypt's restoration of its natural orientation to cooperate in a new way with the African continent, the Nile Basin countries and Sudan in direct and strong expression of the desire to open a new page for cooperation between the particular. The visit was a two countries. >2<

Morsi had a special strategy. Then the presidential elections took place and former President Mohamed won through the Renaissance Project, but Sudan did not have a large part of Morsi's strategy. Perhaps

To the concerns and problems that Egypt went through, the inherited legacy of corruption and instability, and the political system's preoccupation with reconciling its internal conditions while formulating foreign policies in a way that serves His interests And his strategy <3>, and also the Egyptian regime depends on establishing balances with one country with any of the two countries, and we find that the President of the South, thus trying to prevent a disturbance in relations, Al-Bashir took the initiative to visit Egypt after Morsi took over, and this behavior is considered an appreciation from the Sudanese leadership for the new leadership in Egypt. As a prelude to the establishment of strategic relations between the two countries <4>, President Morsi also visited Sudan, but the visit did not come

mentioned 1 - Khaled Hussein Muhammad, "Determinants of Egyptian-Sudanese relations after the January 25 Revolution," previously reference.

previously mentioned reference.²-Fatima Muhammad,

3 - Mustafa Al-Feki, "Sudanese-Egyptian Relations from a Neutral Perspective," Al-Hayat Center, publication date: November 17, 2015

AD, accessed: May 3 Reference - 4: Ali Mamwath, AD <http://www.alhayat.com/Opinion/>

Writers 2016

the previous.

Contrary to what Murad had raised, the issue of the border dispute was raised, and one of the president's aides had promised to give Sudan two milk bags and two shawls, which prompted Al-Bashir to declare that Morsi had stirred up Egyptian public opinion, and the Egyptian presidency denied that, but that was the wick of the flame for the June Revolution, which came some long way. Of fear and anxiety for Egypt and the June 30 announcement of the dismissal of President Morsi and the formation of a transitional government until another presidential election <1>, and we find that during the period of President Adly Mansour there were no innovations in the issue of relations between Egypt and Sudan, but when President Sisi came, there were fears when... The Sudanese, where President Sisi's background goes back to the military, and in Sudan there is an Islamic background, and there was a fear of severing relations between Egypt and Sudan due to political Islam and the return of relations again to what they were during the Mubarak era, given that he was also of a military background <2>, but foreign policy The plan adopted by President Sisi calls for and supports dealing with the two states of Sudan, and that he wants to establish strategic relations for integration between the three countries because each of them represents the other's national security and strategic depth, and it will

This integration becomes a great regional force that other countries can benefit from and join them. Egypt, for its pioneering role in the Egyptian foreign policy, was to work to restore the region, whether in its African, Mediterranean, or Arab surroundings, and to restore it to its position at all levels, confirming its Arab affiliation, its African roots, and its Islamic identity <3>, And it counts

There are strategic relations with Sudan that affect Egyptian national security in light of the ties

Relationships

The history that brings together the two peoples and common interests in all fields, which was reflected in the following interactions supervised by the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including following up on the visit of the President of the Republic, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, to Khartoum on his first foreign tour, as well as the visit of Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir to Egypt on October 18, 2014, which It helped strengthen bilateral relations, during which it was agreed to raise the level of the Supreme Committee between the two countries to be at the level of the presidents of the two countries <4>, and arranged the successful visit of Thabo Mbeki, former President of the Republic of South Africa and Head of the African Union High-Level Mechanism.

1 - Mustafa Al-Feki, "Sudanese-Egyptian Relations from a Neutral Perspective," previously mentioned reference.

2 - Egypt News, "Ambitious Priorities for Egyptian Diplomacy Regionally and Internationally," Publication date:

April 12, 2015, Access date: May 2, 2016, available at:

<http://www.egynews.net>

3 - Previous reference.

4 - Nada Kiwan, "Restoring the African Role: The Future of Egypt's Relations with the Nile Basin Countries,"

Institute for African Research and Studies, Cairo, publication date: May 31.

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2011 AD, accessed: May 5, 2016 AD, available at [http://](http://www.siyassa.org.eg/News)

www.siyassa.org.eg/News

regarding Sudan to Egypt on the first of November 2014 and his meeting with the President of the Republic Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also seeks during the coming period to

Continuing to develop cooperation and bilateral relations with Sudan by focusing on the following axes: By emphasizing the Egyptian role in particular and the Arab role in also contributing to mediation between North and South Sudan in general on Sudanese issues, and coordinating with the Higher Committee of the African Union, the League of Arab States and the parties Regional and international, as well as completing visits at all levels and meetings for coordination and political consultation, Egypt's support for Sudan in the files of Darfur and eastern Sudan, and communication with the university for humanitarian aid. >1<

Arab League in its efforts to support Sudan and provide m

We find that the political relations between Egypt and Sudan have gone through states of ups and downs, between cooperation and conflict, and have not proceeded at the same pace, due to the difference in presidents, as well as the difference in each of them's vision of the other and their convictions about the importance of each country to the other. We will see in the next section whether the economic relations between the two countries were proceeding as they did. One style or not?

1 - Egypt News, "Ambitious Priorities for Egyptian Diplomacy Regionally and Internationally," previously mentioned

reference.

The second topic: Egyptian-Sudanese economic relations

We find that geographical neighbourhood, good relations and ties, and the abundance of natural, human and economic resources are considered a reason for successful economic integration. We find that Egypt and Sudan had economic integration as explained in the previous section, but they agreed on a political integration strategy and economic integration was affected by political integration. At the time There were times of upswing in the relationship between the two countries, and integration between them increased. However, during times of decline or tension and crises, they were considered obstacles to the conduct of the integration process, as is its subject. We find that the discussions that took place between Egypt and Sudan to strengthen integration between the two countries were agreed upon on integration as a sustainable or strategic partnership. A productive initiative aimed at developing human and natural capabilities, achieving common interests, and removing restrictions and barriers to strengthen the bond between the two countries <1>. The Four Freedoms Agreement was signed, namely <movement - work - residence - ownership> and the approach of annual meetings between the two countries and business and investment men was adopted <2> We find that this agreement represents a qualitative leap in the Egyptian and Sudanese integration experience, as it is the cornerstone of the existing integration process between the two countries. These freedoms include very important choices for the residents of the two countries, which if implemented in a serious manner

It will lay a real foundation that will benefit every citizen of the two countries <3>. We find that this agreement carried within it a political agreement, such that these freedoms that the agreement came with are only granted to citizens of ^{And} one state, and this is what distinguishes this agreement from previous agreements and pacts. We find that President Mubarak and President Al-Bashir took several decisions at the summit held in Khartoum in 2005 AD, and these decisions represent a turning point in relations between the two countries, such as strengthening the integration fund between the two countries at the economic level and food security projects, and the Supreme Joint Committee assuming the functions of the Supreme Council for Integration, and establishing committees. To study investment projects and strengthen the role of the private sector between the two countries and several other decisions to support the integration strategy between the two countries <.4>

- Haskinn David,"Sudan and its neighbors", the African 1
securityAnalyses programme, vol:10, march 2003, no:10.

2 - Helmy Shaarawi, "Notes on the Integration Experiences between Egypt and Sudan," International Politics
Journal, Issue No. 154: Cairo, October 2004, p. 104.

3 - Previous reference, p. 106

4 - Issa Abdel Hamid, "Sudanese Foreign Policy Towards Egypt," previously mentioned reference, p

.84

The duration of the Four Freedoms Agreement was five years, and was automatically renewed for the same period unless the other two parties notified the other of their desire to terminate it three months before its entry into force <1>. We find that the success of the experiment in its objective form will eliminate the contradiction between official dealings and popular dealings and will achieve a qualitative leap in dealing for the sake of public interests. And we find that in order to benefit more, the right to work must be developed, the transfer of capital must be developed, individuals must enjoy the benefits of investment, there must be freedom of trade and marketing of products on a wide scale, and laws must be unified <2>, and we find that the Egyptian-Sudanese economic integration during its journey in some cases While some are active and effective, while others are suspended or almost frozen, we find that in the year 2000, the COMESA Free Trade Organization was announced, through which intra-trade would be liberalize

All customs and non-customs restrictions and the formation of a customs union and then a monetary union among the member states at a later stage. The implementation of this agreement resulted in reaching another agreement regulating customs exemptions so that 43 Egyptian goods are excluded from customs exemption in Sudan and 10 other goods enjoy a 30% customs reduction. While 5 Sudanese goods are subject to customs duties when imported to Egypt <3>, an investment encouragement agreement was also signed between the two countries to support the relations of cooperation and friendship and the desire of each of them to create suitable conditions for investment in order to strengthen the economy in both countries.

If we look at the Four Freedoms Agreement, it includes the movement of citizens between the two countries and residence for a permanent or temporary period with complete freedom, as if they had the nationality of the two countries, and this is done through official air, land and sea ports, as well as the right to ownership and use of real estate and land, and also the practice of obtaining anything that is a right. To a citizen of the two countries, the professions and crafts without prejudice to the international and Arab agreements concluded between the two countries <4>, and the right to invest and establish all projects with all facilities for both sides and all of this through a law and agreement

1 - Muhammad Mahmoud Al-Imam, "Regional Economic Integration between Theory and Practice," Institute of Research and Arab Studies, Cairo, 2003, p. 65.

mentioned 2 - Helmy Shaarawi, "Notes on the Integration Experiences between Egypt and Sudan," previously reference, p. 110.

3 - Previous reference.

development," Institute of Arab 4 - Muhammad Mahmoud, "Joint Arab economic action, its dimensions and Research and Studies, Cairo, 2005, p. 455.

concluded between the two parties. Also included in the agreement was the handover of prisoners from both parties to the state to which the prisoner belongs so that he can serve his sentence in his country. The obstacles that prevent the full implementation of the agreement must be removed by both the Egyptian and Sudanese parties. <1>

We find that in 2004, 5 memorandums of understanding and an executive program were signed in the fields of electricity, infrastructure, industrial cooperation, and trade exchange between the two countries, which deepens economic relations and helps achieve the integration strategy between them <2>, and in 2003, an agreement was signed to manage camel trade between the two sides for the benefit of Egypt. of meat imported from Sudan, and we find that all of these agreements were not up to the required level as a result of political will and tense relations between Egypt and Sudan as a result of President Mubarak's hostile policies towards Sudan since the attempt to assassinate him, and even if there were some positions in solidarity or similar views, the Tension and crisis in relations, which led to the failure of the integration experience and its failure to be implemented in a correct and serious manner, as there are some decisions in the agreement that have not been implemented, such as freedom of movement and ownership with complete freedom in Egypt until now. <3>

And

Until the January 25 revolution occurred and the political leadership changed, there was also a shift in strategy, the secession of South Sudan, and Egypt became towards Sudan and the entire continent of Africa, and two countries, not one country. We find that there was some official visits between the two countries, so we find first the visit of the Prime Minister of Egypt to Sudan. To strengthen cooperation relations between the two countries and enhance economic relations, as cooperation between the two countries were nine agreements, memorandums of understanding, and executive programs for signed in the fields of food security, investment, environmental protection, and biofuels <4>, but there was no tangible progress in the Four Freedoms Agreement or renewed discussions to implement it seriously, President Al-Bashir also rose

1 - Reference previously mentioned, "Sudanese foreign policy towards Egypt," p. 100

2-Fatima Ibrahim, previously mentioned reference.

3 - Muhammad Ibrahim Youssef, "Egyptian-Sudanese Integration in Light of the Secession of South Sudan,"

previously mentioned reference, p. 68.

4 - Ibid., p. 70

He visited Egypt in 2012, after the first presidential elections, and it was agreed to quickly activate major projects, most notably the Egyptian farm in the northern states in Sudan and the animal production farm, in addition to increasing the import of meat <1>. It was agreed to develop a strategic partnership program to be implemented in three years and to strengthen the industry. By opening training centers for Sudanese youth to benefit from Egyptian experience and to support and increase trade exchange <2>, then the Prime Minister and a delegation of ministers visited Sudan again in September 2012, and it was agreed to open a branch of the National Bank of Egypt in Khartoum on September 20, 2012, with a capital of 50 million. Dollars and an agreement to accelerate the electrical connection project <3>, and to establish an industrial city for leather tanning in Khartoum followed by a technological institute for training workers, and to provide the appropriate environment for investment and to sign a memorandum of understanding to encourage investments. The executive protocol for the land transport project for passengers and goods was signed in February 2013 <4> Then came the visit of former President Morsi to Sudan in April 2013, and it was agreed to establish joint projects, especially in the field of agriculture to meet Egypt's needs for grains and wheat, as well as in the field of livestock to meet its needs for meat and ensure food security for the two countries. It was agreed to expedite the The executive steps for establishing a joint industrial zone in Khartoum, and agreeing on the speedy opening of the land road east of the Nile, the western road, and the coastal road to stimulate trade <5>. Then came the visit of the Sudanese president to Egypt in June 2014 AD after President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi assumed the presidency, and came to confirm the commitment to cooperate with Egypt in all fields, and ways to activate the Four Freedoms Agreement between the two countries were discussed, and the representation of the joint committee between the two countries was raised to the presidential level to meet once in Cairo and once in Khartoum <6>.

1 - Muhammad Ibrahim Youssef, "Egyptian-Sudanese Integration in Light of the Secession of South Sudan,"

previously mentioned reference, p. 75.

2- Amani Al-Taweel, "Assessing Integration within the Framework of the Political and Economic Action Platform," African Research Center, Cairo, 2007, p. 95.

3 - Previous reference, p. 99

4 - State Information Service, Economic Relations between Egypt and Sudan, publication date: June 2, 2015, accessed: May 2, 2016, available at

<http://www.sis.gov.eg/Ar/Templates>

5 - Previous reference.

6 - Omar Siddiq Al-Bashir, "The Importance of Economic Cooperation between Egypt and Sudan," previously mentioned reference.

The most recent joint project launched between the two countries is the Qastal-Ashkit land port project. The port is considered the most important Egyptian gateway overlooking Africa, as it will contribute to creating a shift and investment between Egypt on the one hand and Sudan and the African continent, which is significant in the trade movement through developing the movement of exports and imports of goods. And wealth, on the other hand, and livestock, and stimulating passenger traffic. Therefore, official visits between the two sides have yielded many positives and benefits that serve the economy of both countries <.1>

If we look at the volume of trade exchange between the two countries, we find that in 2001 it was about 97.5 million dollars and it gradually increased until it reached 254.8 million dollars in 2006, then it declined again in 2007 by 15.3% to reach 215.8 million dollars, and then there was a noticeable increase. In 2008, it reached \$579.6 million <2>, and it also continued to rise. In 2009, it reached \$604.1 million, as part of the customs reduction within the framework of the COMESA agreement, but it declined slightly in 2010.

It reached 600.7 million dollars <3>, and we find that in 2011 AD as a result of the January Revolution and the secession of the south, the volume of trade exchange between the two countries declined, reaching 563.7 million dollars in 2011 AD, and it declined in 2012 AD and reached 475.3 million dollars, but this was a result of official visits that There was an effort between the two countries to increase the volume of trade exchange, and it also increased. Its volume increased in 2013 and reached 607.7 million dollars, then returned in 2014, especially after the opening of the port of Qastal-Ashkit. It is expected that the volume of trade exchange will increase to 80% or 90%. >4<

We find that the elements of economic integration between Egypt and Sudan have been available since the beginning of the study period in 2004 AD, that is, during the Mubarak rule, as the population of the two countries constitutes a large human capacity, which creates a market of size in

Reference previously mentioned. 1-The General Information Service,

2 - Ahmed Muhammad Hussein, "The role of the agricultural sector in supporting trade exchange between Egypt and Sudan in light of the secession of the south," Master's thesis, Cairo University, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo, 2014, p. 119.

3 - Previous reference, p. 135

4 - Muhammad Al-Hassan, "The Future of Sudanese-Egyptian Relations After the January 25 Revolution," Al-Rasid Journal for Research and Science, Issue: 36, Sudan, 2013, p. 60.

Accommodating the goods and services provided, which encourages trade exchange between the two countries, as well as the historical social relations and geographical proximity between the two countries were the basic structure in developing this integration. The infrastructure, including roads and means of transportation, had to be developed to facilitate the movement of trade and commerce, and the participation of Egypt and Sudan in COMESA and the Free Trade Organization. The Greater Arab Region paved the way for the integration project, and each country's move towards economic openness to the global economy and the adoption of economic reform programs that facilitate the participation of the private sector

Which depends on the activation of integration projects, and there must be coordination between the two countries to determine the controls of the private sector and investment <1>. The availability of 200 million acres suitable for agriculture in Sudan, and double that in Egypt, which does not exceed 8 million acres, has created a kind of integration, as Egypt is distinguished by experience and agricultural hands. Skilled people and advanced scientific expertise, the availability of meat production in Sudan and Egypt's need for it and for food commodities help to increase investments <2>, and there was popular acceptance from both countries of the idea of integration, especially in light of a sense of unity and neighborliness in light of external interventions trying to control, which leads to encouragement for Economic integration.

However, there were some obstacles to the economic integration project between Egypt and Sudan. We find that Egypt's membership in the World Trade Organization and the development classification of Sudan as a least developed country make the economic integration project limited to the Free Trade Organization because it is difficult to reach the customs union <3>, and the economic climate is also characterized by... Both Egypt and Sudan are affected by the low level of per capita income, in addition to the spread of unemployment, which has weakened the economic weight of Egypt and Sudan, and the presence of obstacles that limit the ability of the two countries to develop. There is a severe deficiency in the infrastructure, and developing it requires a very high budget and machinery due to the weak level of development of the two countries, and the most important reason for the failure of integration. The economic approach is the routine treatment of problems through financing and not daring to make appropriate decisions for non-traditional projects <4>, and by taking a look at the economic integration project between:

1 - Muhammad Ibrahim Yusuf, previously mentioned reference, p. 120

2-Ahmed Muhammad Hussein, previously mentioned reference, 137

3-Fatima Ibrahim, previously mentioned reference.

4 - Amani Al-Taweel, previously mentioned reference.

Egypt and Sudan: We find that the failure of this experiment is due to the political side giving priority to the economic side and the attempt to limit the integration project to agriculture only and not paying attention to other areas such as trade, industry, customs union, etc.

Then this idea changed after the January Revolution. On the contrary, the Egyptian side began to offer to establish economic projects with Sudan and work to increase the volume of trade exchange and try to activate the Four Freedoms Agreement and increase investments between the two countries. We find from here that it was the political will with Sudan that helped in this. It is clear after the January Revolution to establish cooperative relations, unlike the period of former President Mubarak's rule, and also the availability of the desire on both sides to overcome the obstacles and differences of the past. Therefore, economic cooperation between Egypt and Sudan in the future has all the factors that make it basic and necessary for developing relations between the two countries on the path to integration. Comprehensive, and we must work on the necessity of establishing a free trade zone on the border between Egypt and Sudan, establishing free trade agreements between the two countries, and supporting popular and cultural cooperation.

We find at the end of the chapter that the political and economic relations between Egypt and Sudan, if at times they are not well and at other times good and fruitful relations, this is due to the policies of the political leadership of the two countries, and also due to the dominance of the political factor over the other. Agreements can be made if the relations are exploited well and With economic and economic rules in all fields and seriousness, Egypt and Sudan will become a major regional power on the continent of Africa.

Chapter Three: The positions of Egypt and Sudan towards some issues

Given Egypt's important regional role, its geographical proximity to the State of Sudan, and their presence in the neighborhood on the African continent, which has given each of them a position on some of the important common issues they face, such as the issue of the secession of South Sudan, the issue of the Renaissance Dam, and the issue of Haleeb and Shalateen, we find that both Egypt and Sudan have each other. From them, I take a position on each of these issues, and this is what we will address in this chapter as follows:

The first topic: the issue of the secession of South Sudan

The second topic: the water issue and the Renaissance Dam crisis

The third topic: The issue of the Halib and Shaltin triangle

The first topic: the issue of the secession of South Sudan

The referendum held on the ninth of January 2011 resulted in the secession of South Sudan under the name of the state "South Sudan," becoming the 54th state in Africa and the 193rd in the world <1>. We find that this result was not reached between noon and the evening, but it continued for many years. Years passed between conflicts and civil wars in order to reach this result, and we find that after the passage and tension between the North and the South and violent rebellion movements arose against them for many years, there was a tightening of the Northern government and the Salvation Government tried to allow some countries to present initiatives to reach a settlement of conflicts with the Popular Movement, such as the initiative The Libyan President, the Egyptian initiative, and the initiative of the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, but it was accepted with complete rejection <2>, and international powers intervened to open the door for negotiation between the Salvation Government and the Popular Movement. These negotiations continued for nearly two and a half years until they reached the year 2005 AD and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was reached. "Naivasha" because it took place in Machakos and Naivasha in the Republic of Kenya, which began in 2002 AD. The signing of the agreement was attended by some presidents, including Kenya and Uganda, the Commissioner-General of the African Union, the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, and US Secretary of State Colin Powell, in addition to representatives of many Countries such as Egypt, Italy, and the Netherlands <3>, and this agreement revolves around the rights and duties of both the northern and southern sides and includes a number of protocols and agreements, including firstly an agreement defining a transitional period for six and a half years and granting the residents of South Sudan the right to self-determination at the end of the transitional period and also It stipulated the sharing of power and wealth between the North and the South, an agreement on peace implementation mechanisms, and a conflict resolution protocol in the states of "South Kordofan and Blue Nile." All of this is subject to the provisions of international law. The agreement also dealt with the status of the national capital and the rights of non-Muslims, and the National Interim Constitution for the South and North was also issued. A new Sudanese currency, and the National Unity Government was formed by 52% of the National Congress, 28% of the Popular Movement, 14% of the Northern Opposition, and 6%. Despite the positive aspects

1 - Noura Osama, "The Accounts of the Nascent States: South Sudan's Foreign Relations," Journal of International Politics, Volume: 46, Issue: 185, Cairo, July 2011.

2 - Muhammad Ahmed Al-Sheikh, "The Security Situation after the South Sudan Referendum," research paper, Sudanese Association for Political Science, Khartoum, November 2010, p. 6.

3 - Editorial Board, "The Secession of South Sudan: Is it the Title of a New Phase?", African Readings, Volume: A, Issue: 8, Saudi Arabia, June 2011, p. 31.

There are many things that were included in the peace agreement, but giving the people of South Sudan the right to self-determination is the biggest negative part of the agreement, as the unity of Sudan remains threatened by division in this case until the time for self-determination comes. Thus, the SPLM army refused to join the unified

Sudanese army and insisted on There must remain an independent army for South Sudan so that it does not affect the opinion of the residents of the South when deciding their fate due to the presence of a unified army <1>, and that in the event of the secession of the South, the division will take place according to the borders of

1/1/1956 AD, but in this case there are some administrative problems around the area Ibi and some prominent border areas. Therefore, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague was resorted to in 2008 AD to resolve

the dispute between them, and thus new borders were established for the disputed areas <2>. We find that there was violent opposition to the peace agreement from the northern side, as some believe that in that north it is necessary For my people to participate opens the door to divisions as a result of disagreements and conflicts, and they see that Sudan is the North in the referendum as well, and it is their right to participate in this important step,

considering that the North will lose a fifth of its area in the event of secession, but others agree with this agreement and see it as a good opportunity to protect the North. Sudanese protection from wars and the protection of the rest of

the wealth that was not destroyed due to conflicts and conflicts <3>, so holding a peaceful referendum acceptable

to both parties acquires great importance not only as a guarantee of what was decided in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, but also because it paves the way for a peaceful transfer of power and regional stability in the long term > <4>, We find that in the period preceding the referendum there was a feeling of mistrust and widespread anxiety

between the two parties, and there was a strong adherence by the southerners to the date of the referendum and not changing it for fear of losing the opportunity to decide their fate. Also, there were many preparations for this. The referendum was preceded by a group of discussions and negotiations about... The future of the relationship after

separation, with the participation of a high-level African delegation, as well as an international delegation, and the vi

1 - Sally Hani, "The Final Peace Agreement in Sudan," African Horizons, Volume: Four, Issue: 16, 2005, p. 7.

2 - Zain Al-Abidin-Osama Ali, "The border dispute between North and South Sudan in the event of secession," Al-Rasid Magazine, Al-Rasid Center for Studies, Volume: S, 5, Issue: 9, Sudan, December 2010, p. 7.

3 - Hani Raslan, "Sudan: The separatist drive may also come from the north," Democracy Magazine, Al-Ahram Agency, Volume: Volume 3, Issue: 10, Cairo, 2003 AD, p. 217.

4 - Musab Abdel Qader, "Negotiating the Future of North and South Sudan," Al-Rasid Center for Studies, Issue: 10, Sixth Year, Sudan, June 2011, p. 85.

From America to confirm the desire of the United States of America to ensure the progress of negotiations between the North and the South after the referendum, to facilitate the process of peaceful separation, to ensure the future of cooperation between the two parties, and to protect the rights of the Sudanese in the North and South. There are many important issues that must be negotiated after the referendum, such as the security event of secession. issue, the oil issue, and the issue of Currency and some other important issues in the We find that the historic referendum was held under international sponsorship and the fate of South Sudan was decided, which chose to secede from Sudan by an overwhelming majority of 98% <1>. The North mourned this separation. In any case, they were one country with a population But that was the desire of the South, which was very happy to achieve a dream. Therefore, a new state emerged with a predominantly African character, no Arab character, and most likely not part of the League of Arab States <2>. After the secession of South Sudan, its area became approximately 600,000 square kilometers, and its population is estimated to be Its population is about seven million citizens, most of whom are of traditional African religions and animists. Traditional religions constitute about 60%, Christians constitute 23%, and Muslims constitute 17% of the population. South Sudan consists of the African Nilotic and Hamitic tribes, and it is believed that the largest ethnic group is the Dinka with a proportion of 40%, followed by the Nuer and then the Shilluk. <3>, English is considered the official language of education, government and business, and there is a language known as Juba Arabic, which is the o

We find that there is fragility in the political structure of the southern state, the absence of civil society institutions and weak party work. As a result of its lack of political experience, the southern state will begin to impose control and a strong dictatorial regime, and President Salva Kiir began to violate the constitution and became a threat to national unity and dominant over the popular movement. Therefore, conflicts occurred internally as a result of this domination and the presence of conflicts and shooting between the two parties. Therefore, international and regional efforts intervened to negotiate. Salva Kiir had arrested many, so Machar insisted on releasing them before signing the agreement to stop the violence and discussing negotiations and stopping the violence between the two parties, and with international efforts to establish the constitutional foundations. For the state and the organization of the ruling party, we find that South Sudan is at stake if these conflicts and wars are not ended, and that it is not united internally, but its hatred for the Khartoum government made it separate, not the strength of its unity.

1 - Abdel-Ghani Salama, "Southern Sudan...the New Born," Dar Al-Mandumah, Volume: A, Issue: 146, Cairo, 2011 AD, p. 202.

2 - Hani Raslan, "Sudan: The secessionist push may also come from the north," previously mentioned reference.

3 - Reference previously mentioned. p. 208

It is important to influence neighboring countries, and we find that after the establishment of the state of South Sudan, it has a direct and indirect role, and it will also be affected by its regional and international surroundings. We begin with the direct African neighboring countries and the repercussions of the establishment of the state of South Sudan on Egypt and Sudan:

First: Republic of Sudan:

It represents the northern border of the state of South Sudan, as it extends over a distance of about 2010 kilometers, which is the longest border on the African continent. We find that the future of relations between Sudan and South Sudan depends on the results of negotiations between them on a group of common fundamental issues. We find, first, that on the political level: causing separation and the establishment of A new state has been detrimental to northern Sudan, as it has become possible for any of the other regions to follow the example of self-determination in accordance with

South Sudan's approach, like the Darfur region, whose problem still exists despite the signing of some agreements between the government and a number of armed movements in Darfur, and also the encouragement and support of some of the armed movements of the People's Movement in the south, which leads to an increase in the differences between them ^{<1>}, and southern intervention in the Kordofan and Blue Nile file It ignites tensions between the North and the South, so the Republic of Sudan stands before a test regarding imposing control over the separatist tendencies that dared to emerge, and it was a reason for encouragement from the Popular Movement of the South, which achieved what it wanted from the secession of the South and obtaining the right to self-determination amid international and regional support ^{>2} ^{<And on the economic level: The economic aspect is one of the most prominent challenges facing the Republic of Sudan due to the loss of its share of oil revenues to the South, where it lost 80% of all oil revenues and the resulting significant decline in the hard currency reserves of the Republic of Sudan, as oil was considered the primary element. The main source of funding for the state's foreign exchange reserves, in addition to the fact that it constituted about 36% of the general budget, put Khartoum in a difficult economic situation ^{<4>}, and the tripartite committee "Troika" urged Sudan and South Sudan}

1 - Reference previously mentioned.

2 - Muhammad Gharib, "Post-separation Sudan...a reading of the internal and external challenges," African Horizons, Volume: Ten, Issue: 36, Khartoum, 2012, p. 134.

3 - Sami Sabry Abdel-Qawi, "The Northern Crisis: Challenges after the Secession of the South in Sudan," International Politics Journal, Al-Ahram Foundation, Cairo, December, 2012, p. 35 - 4. Ibid., p. 38.

To negotiate together in order to reach an agreement through which disputes in the oil sector and important financial issues outstanding between them would be settled, and the Troika said that a quick solution to these issues and prosperity for the citizens of the two countries, and after the separation, the government of the relationship will improve the security of the north in the face of economic challenges that require searching for alternatives. Another way to avoid the risks of economic crises and the high level of poverty due to the loss of southern oil. We see that the most prominent alternatives available are to move the industrial sector, which benefits from the revenues of agriculture and animal production, and can bring them back to the forefront ^{<1>}, and also to pay attention to agricultural production due to

Due to the availability of all the ingredients that help provide food and agricultural production that can be invested in industry and export, and the availability of some minerals is considered one of the most important alternatives available to northern Sudan, such as gold, it must be searched and prospected for in the north and the process of extracting it should begin. This is the paper that northern Sudan uses in all media outlets that they will once again make a lot of money and get back the hard currency that was lost due to the loss of oil in the south through gold. >2<

We find that the most important thing that Sudan lost after secession was the advantage of the single entity that was supposed to make Sudan the strongest and richest in the region, and its loss was that it had with greater regional and international weight. It also marginalized the state of Sudan from its African depth, which led to the severing of ties with the Nile Basin countries because South Sudan now had the direct relationship with them <3>, and the Republic of Sudan fears that the State of South Sudan will renounce the legal agreements related to the Nile Basin, especially in light of the direct American and Israeli pressure on it, as there have become strong relations that unite them <4>, and the State of South Sudan has become the gateway to strategic depth. African Union and Israel and its interference in the problems of the Nile Basin.

Therefore, the Republic of Sudan lives in great anxiety until it emerges from its neck

1 - Hani Raslan, "Developments in the situation in South Sudan," Middle East Papers Magazine, National Center for Middle Eastern Studies, issue 58, January 2013, p. 172.

2 - Previous reference.

3 - Muhammad Gharib, "Post-separation Sudan...a reading of the internal and external challenges," previously mentioned reference, p. 138.

4 - Ayman Shabana, "South Sudan is a Risky Future," Political Horizons, Arab Center for Research and Studies, second issue, February 2014, p. 102.

The bottle, where the deteriorating conditions on the political and economic levels, and the rise and intensity of popular tension as a result of austerity policies and the resort to violent means in dealing with opponents, and with the encouragement of popular opposition movements in the south and moved to the north, Sudan is living in a crisis situation that must be taken care of in order to get out of it without losses that will cost Sudan. A lot >.1<

Second: Egypt:

The secession of the south has created a new state with many problems and challenges that deserve to be focused on, especially in light of the importance of the state of the south to Egypt. We find that Egypt has reserved its right to self-determination to resolve the Sudanese crisis. This was to preserve the unity of Sudan, and Egypt refused to participate in the negotiations that Regarding this, Sudan's signing of Egypt at the official level and the latest resemblance to the Machakos Protocol of 2002 led to a reservation of shock to public opinion. Egypt's objection was that the report included only two options: unity or secession, and that this had no legal basis in accordance with international law, which specifies granting minorities the right to decide. fate in certain cases and that there are several other methods, such as the confederal or federal situation, not resorting directly to secession <2>, but after that Egypt remained calm and found that there was no benefit in staying away Egypt from the situation and leaving Sudan alone in this situation, so it announced that it would support Sudanese efforts to In order to achieve unity and bring viewpoints closer, and when the referendum took place and the secession of South Sudan, Egypt developed several fears about the impact of the existence of this nascent state on Egyptian national security. We find that it will affect national security politically, as the internal conflicts that Sudan suffers from will have an impact on national security. The percentage of water that Egypt receives is 28%, and it is now in the hands of South Sudan. Also, a number of projects between Egypt and Sudan have been stopped <3>, and the water issue is considered to preoccupy Egyptian strategic thought for fear that

1 - Akram Hossam, "Developments in the situation in the states of Sudan and South Sudan," Middle East Papers Magazine, National Center for Middle East Studies, Issue: 60, 2013, p. 223.

3 - Diaa al-Din al-Qusi, "Where do the Nile waters come from?", International Politics Journal, Al-Ahram Foundation, Volume: 45, Issue: 181, Cairo, July 2010, p. 42.

Egypt is vulnerable to Western blackmail that pushes it to obtain a portion of these waters for Israel. We find that after the separation, it led to the escalation of counter-movements in the Republic of Sudan, which affects Egypt, as it led to an increase in immigration to Egypt across the border and the resulting negative effects on the economy. Also, Egyptians residing in Sudan are exposed to some harassment and it affects their security <1>, and we find that after the January Revolution there are some problems facing Egypt on all its borders, but the greatest danger has become through the southern border, which has become a source of concern for Egypt as a result of what my country is going through. Sudan is plagued by conflicts, civil wars, and migrations. The secession of South Sudan harms Egypt's strategic interests in Sudan and Africa, as in the event of a clash between the North and the South, Arab countries will intervene to support the North and African countries will intervene to support the South, which leads to the deterioration of Arab-African relations and also strains relations between Egypt. And the Nile Basin countries <2>, and also the separation led to a negative impact on Egyptian national security, as there are threats coming from the strategic proximity between Israel and South Sudan and terrorism attacking the entire region, and there is a fear that South Sudan will turn into an advanced base for foreign presence in the region and what this represents A direct threat to Egyptian national security on the southern strategic direction <3>. One of the most prominent problems is Egypt's location in the far north of the continent, so South Sudan has become the gateway and natural corridor for Egyptian and African relations. Therefore, the instability of bilateral relations between Egypt and South Sudan will lead to Egypt's isolation from Africa. Therefore Egypt is considered the biggest loser from the secession process because of its danger to Egyptian and Arab national security, and the fragmentation of Sudan into small states will give an opportunity for foreign intervention and threaten the security and stability of Egypt <4>, and if we look at the water issue, which is considered the biggest impasse in the relationship between Egypt and the secession of South Sudan, as it represents The threats to Egypt in the announcement of some countries that they do not abide by the concluded Nile agreements and the existence of ambitions of some countries to

1 - Akram Hossam, "Developments in the situation in the states of Sudan and South Sudan," previously

mentioned reference, p. 230.

2 - Ayman Shabana, "South Sudan is a Risky Future," previously mentioned reference, p. 115.

3 - Mona Hussein Obaid, "The Repercussions of the Secession of the South on the Neighboring Arab-African Countries," Arab Journal of Political Science, No. 33, Cairo, 2012, p. 81.

-4 Previous reference, p. 85

Benefiting from the waters of others, such as Israel, the desire of upstream countries to price the Nile waters, and the influential Israeli presence in South Sudan, which has become the controller of South Sudan's decisions and its strategic partner, which leads to pressure on Egypt <1>, and we find the support of the United States of America for the secession of the south in order to put pressure on security. The Egyptian Water Authority and an attempt to reduce Egypt's share of water, as a result of the limited water resources in Egypt due to the scarcity of rain and the lack of other sources of Nile water. At the same time, South Sudan became Egypt's share of water as a result of the plain topographic characteristics <2>, thus controlling Egypt's share. Develop a complete strategy in dealing with the state of South Sudan in order to avoid the negative effects it is exposed to from this with separation, but it must be emphasized that strengthening relations with northern Sudan, but working with South Sudan must not be at the expense of relations within the framework of bilateral and tripartite cooperation based on achieving the interest of all. Parties and we find this through:

Establishing strong relations with the official and popular bodies in northern Sudan. Therefore, both Egypt and southern Sudan must build integration between the three countries in the fields of politics, economics, water, agriculture, livestock, health, education, and also the military field. Therefore, multilateral relations must be developed between Egypt, Sudan, and the rest of the Nile Basin countries. With the aim of creating areas of Egypt with cooperation that increase ties and common interests, the relationship between the South and

The two states, and replacing the culture of competition with the approach that former Egyptian Prime Minister Essam Sharaf brought to Juba in 2011 AD, and the opening of a number of Egyptian health and educational projects in some cities in the south and in the capital, is a new approach in Egyptian politics based on a clear plan <3>, and a Minister of State for African Affairs must be appointed to follow The Prime Minister, not the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, heads the Supreme Council

For African Affairs, which is composed of academic and professional experts interested in African affairs in various fields, its mission is to activate

1 - Ayman Shabana, "South Sudan is a Risky Future," previously mentioned reference, p. 99.

2 - Aziza Muhammad Badr, "Cooperation Relations in the Nile Basin Countries in the Social Field," Center for Strategic Studies, Cairo, 2010, p. 94.

3 - Previous reference, p. 105

Egyptian relations with the countries of the continent in general and countries of strategic importance such as South Sudan in particular, and the necessity of deepening and balancing political ties and relations with the major active countries (China - the United States - the European Union) and international donor institutions so that there is no clash or misunderstanding of Egypt's interests with those of Egypt. These forces should rather be invested in the interests of Egypt <1>, and the Egyptian presence must be activated within the framework of African regional organizations by raising the level of Egyptian representation therein to the presidential level whenever possible. Cooperation must not be limited to the official level only, but rather extend to popular cooperation as well and maximize the role of The private sector in strengthening relations <2>. As for the economic and social field, Egypt must accelerate the development of infrastructure in South Sudan through railway lines and river navigation lines in order to strengthen relations between Egypt and the two states of Sudan, and the serious call for a comprehensive common market between North and South Sudan <3>, and that Egypt grant the privileges that northerners get in education, and Egypt and that it also grants to southerners equally, and that it also grants the right to the four freedoms to the south like the north, and that Egypt presents projects to exploit the lost water of the Upper Nile in the sea and mountain regions. Egypt And Bahr el-Ghazal in South Sudan <4>, thus preserving its historical and acquired rights from the Nile River and the possibility of establishing advanced projects. Therefore, Egypt must develop its cooperative policy and build strategic relations with the state of South Sudan because of the strategic depth it represents for it with regard to the issue of water and food security. And the economy and not surrendering to the negative effects and pressures on it from the establishment of the tenth countries in the Nile Basin, but transforming this into great importance for them and achieving tripartite integration that achieves development for all.

1 - Ihab Ibrahim Al-Sayyed, "The Implications of the Secession of South Sudan on Egyptian National Security,"

previously mentioned reference, p. 135.

2 - Ahmed Al-Sayyid Al-Najjar, "Sudan between Unity and Division: Egyptian Water Policy Options,"

Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo, Issue: 142, August 2004, p. 30.

-3 Previous reference, p. 35

4 - Nihal Sarhan and others, "Egypt and the Nile Basin Countries... Extended Relations,"

Information Report Series, Issue 25, Center for Information and Decision Support, Cairo, January 2009,

p.14

We also find that international and regional powers have strategic importance in the state of South Sudan, as each of them is keen to achieve their interests through a nascent state that can represent strategic depth to the African continent. We find that the United States of America has several goals from the state of the south, as it uses it to rebel against the north. The Sudanese people who follow political Islam and the desire of the United States of America to build a military base for it in the face of Chinese penetration with America as a result of aid in Africa, and South Sudan's acceptance of the existence of friendly financial relations that reach them annually and are estimated at one billion dollars <1>, the State of South Sudan has been keen with The European Union, which is known for supporting new countries, has allocated about 200 million euros in establishing relations with the state of South Sudan to develop the state of South Sudan with the aim of helping it achieve development and improve its economy <2>. As for the largest supporters of the state of South Sudan, we find Israel, which has supported it from Before the separation and then after the separation, they had a friendship, and Israel became the controller of the decisions of the state of South Sudan as a result of its lack of political experience. Israel began to exploit South Sudan as a pressure card on Egypt through the issue of the water issue until it obtained what it wanted, such as a portion of the Nile water to achieve its plan or build... A military base in the south so that in the event of any threat, Israel does not need to transfer equipment, so it preoccupies South Sudan with investments and projects that develop its economy, while at the same time preventing any country from intervening to negotiate with South Sudan in order to preserve its interests with African countries, and Israel takes advantage of the weakness in which it exists. continer

Africa and tempts countries that suffer from weakness and poverty to intervene and become an important player in the Nile Basin countries.

As for Ethiopia, it encouraged the southern state, as Ethiopia considered it a partner in confronting Egypt and Sudan in the water issue, especially in light of the connection between Ethiopia and South Sudan, because the SPLA has spent three decades training in Ethiopia and the presence of the leaders of the SPLM in Addis Ababa, which they took as a starting point for their rebellion against The government of the north, therefore, there is a strong welcome from Ethiopia towards the establishment of the state of South Sudan. >3<

1 - Ajal Raafat, "The impact of the establishment of the state of South Sudan on the situation in Sudan and on neighboring countries," Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, History

Publishing: <http://www.dohainstitute.org/release/9e5689a7-dde3-> –

February 10, 2011 AD, accessed: May 10, 2016 AD, available at:

-2 Previous reference.

3 - Reference previously mentioned.

The second topic: The water issue and the Renaissance Dam crisis

The water issue is more than just a political dispute or just employing a negotiation crisis between Egypt and the majority of the basin countries, but rather it has strategic dimensions. We find in international law that the countries bordering the river, which have agreements to run the river with appropriate shares, must adhere to these rules. When a country comes from The downstream countries build a dam. In this case, there is no harm to the rest of the countries overlooking the river because they are the last countries. However, if a country comes from the upstream countries and decides to build a dam, in this case it will harm the rest of the countries to which the water reaches. In this case, we find the Renaissance Dam or a dam. The Millennium is a good example <1>, and Egypt shares the Nile River "Sudan - Ethiopia - Uganda - Kenya - Tanzania - Rwanda - Burundi, nine times, which is

"Congo." These countries vary in terms of their dependence on the waters of the Nile River, with Egypt being the most dependent on its waters. We find that it is an exploitation of Egypt's distance from Africa, the outbreak of the January 2011 revolution, and political and security instability. Ethiopia announced the construction of the Renaissance Dam without prior warning from Egypt, Sudan, or Sudan. We find that this issue was not a surprise and had been raised before, as in 2010 AD the Entebbe Agreement was signed, where the Nile Basin countries saw it as not dividing or re-dividing without adhering to the legal framework for regulating the river's water. Water must be fair and the water must be divided according to the area of the Nile Basin in the country and the size of the river. The total revenue from water is <2>, but the timing in which the construction of the dam appeared has confused Egypt and Sudan, and Ethiopia has used the method of evasion and lying, as is clear from Ethiopian practices and statements, the timing of construction or its capabilities, and its funding entities, so whether the false information about the name of the dam was changed, the name of the dam was changed from Project

1 - Muhammad Shawqi Abdel-Al, "Legal and Political Options for Dealing with the Renaissance Dam Crisis," Political Horizons, Arab Center for Research and Studies, Issue: Fifth, May 2014, p. 94.

2 - Ayman Shabana, "Parallel Paths: How is Egypt Managing the Renaissance Dam Crisis with Ethiopia?", Regional Center for Strategic Studies, Issue: 24, Cairo, February 2014, p. 17.

3 - Previous reference, p. 20

There was confusion between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Irrigation, the Council of Ministers, unofficial institutions, and specialized councils, which led to conflicting and unbalanced statements <1>, but for the success of the negotiations to be successful requires not viewing the issue as a purely technical issue and dealing with it as an issue of fate, in addition to the availability of a real political will that moves at a strategic level and not Through while raising the level of negotiation to become at the level of heads temporary tactics or through reactions of state and government and not at the level of irrigation ministers as a result of the importance, we find that the Renaissance Dam and the Renaissance Dam is a major project that Ethiopia seeks to establish on the Blue Nile with the aim of generating electrical energy with a capacity of 5,250 megawatts. The project is located in the Benishangul, Garmuz area, 20-40 km from the Sudanese border and at an altitude of about 500-600 meters above the surface.

The sea <2>, and Ethiopia justified the establishment of the dam because Ethiopia is one of the lowest countries in the world in terms of electrical coverage rate, as the total amount of electricity it produces is less than 2000 megawatts, which makes 80% of Ethiopians live without electrical coverage <2>. As for In light of the Renaissance Dam, the production of electrical energy will increase by three times the energy currently used. Therefore, Ethiopia found a strong reason and motivation for constructing the dam without obtaining the approval of both Egypt and Sudan. We find that there are some fallacies and ambiguities about the dam, as it was announced that the financing of the dam is \$4.8 billion. Ethiopia confirmed that the dam is self-financing through popular subscription to bonds offered by the government and that there are no foreign parties financing it, but this cannot be accepted given the modest Ethiopian economic capabilities <3>, and at the same time the company responsible for constructing the dam is the Salini Company and this company is very weak. It does not have any experience in building dams, so it is not suitable and could lead to something disastrous. We find that negotiations have begun between Egypt and Ethiopia, sponsored by Sudan, regarding the Renaissance Dam during 3 rounds, November and December 2013 AD and January 2014 AD, and a tripartite committee was formed of experts from the three Countries and international experts and its implications for both countries <4>, to attend the discussions to discuss the technical matters of the dam

.. Repercussions and Prospects," Afaq 1 - Ayman Al-Sayyid Abdel-Wahab, "The Renaissance Dam and the Failure of Political Talks," Arab Center for Research and Studies, Issue: Second, Cairo, February 2014,

p. 46.

2-Ibid., p. 50

3 - Muhammad Abdel Hadi Alem, "The Khartoum Agreement and the Crowning of Understanding and Cooperation in the Eastern Nile Basin," Arab Center for Studies and Research, publication date: March 24, 2015,

/36786org.acrseg.www://http Accessed: May 11, 2016 AD, available at: -4 Ibid.

But Ethiopia stipulated that the committee's decisions be not binding on it and that the final report does not force it to do anything. The committee's final report confirmed that there are 4 reservations related to the safety of the dam and the social and economic impacts on the poor groups in the areas where the dam is constructed, as well as

Reservations regarding its impact on the water resources of the two downstream countries and the lack of water flow to them, and these matters require more detailed studies on the part of the Ethiopian government to prevent the negative effects of the dam. Technical studies have confirmed that a project of this size must be preceded by Egypt's studies, considering the dam state an imminent danger to everyone. Especially extensive, so that the lower estuary does not become <1>. The huge storage area of the dam, which amounts to 74 billion m³, will definitely affect Egypt's share of water, as this means depleting the area of agricultural land, estimated at at least one million acres, displacing many citizens, and reducing Egypt's stopped, as well as state income generating %, many industries Electrical energy by 20% gas-powered electricity depends on cooling from the Nile water and the deterioration of water quality in canals share of water by 9 to 12 billion cubic meters per and drains. It will also lead to a decrease in Egypt's year. However, if Ethiopia decides to build the entire dam package, this will lead to a shortage. What will 50 billion it cost annually? One billion cubic meters of water annually <2>, and that Egypt is less than 15, about pounds for desalinating sea water to compensate for the shortfall that the Renaissance Dam in Ethiopia will cause in Egypt's share of the Nile water at a cost of 12% of Egypt's budget, and there are other concerns for both Egypt and Egypt. And Sudan, where the dam collapsed as a result of its assignment to an obscure company, the nature of the basalt soil on which the project is being built, and the construction of the dam of cement, which leads to the risk of its collapse during the period of filling the dam, and will lead to Sudan being left under flowing water that is likely to reach it after only four days, at a height of ten and a half metres. It is also possible that the water will reach Aswan in Egypt after approximately eighteen days, and with the large volume of flowing water, the High Dam and other irrigation projects, such as barrages, locks and others, may collapse <3>, and we find that during the three discussions there was a desire on the part of the Ethiopian side to prolong the negotiations, which highlights In front of international public opinion, with the approval of Egypt and Sudan, and an attempt to bring viewpoints closer in light of the failure to stop work on the dam and the continuation of its construction, and Ethiopia's rejection of most of the proposals and its requirement that international experts not be present in the final report on the dam and to rely on local experts only. It also refused to acknowledge responsibility in the event of any negative effects. In the event that Egypt and Sudan were harmed by the dam <3>, Egypt followed in these negotiations a long-term policy that later turn

1 - Diaa al-Din al-Qusi, "An Elusive Equation: Ethiopia's Motives for Building Dams on the Nile River," International Politics Journal, Volume: 48, Issue: 191, Cairo, p. 66.

2 - Previous reference.

3 - Reference previously mentioned.

It is a pressure card on it due to the continuation of construction, and we find that Ethiopia is adhering to its right to complete the dam, but not only to its economic and development rights for its people, but there are parties seeking to change the rules of water cooperation at the expense of Egypt's historical water rights, through the encouragement of regional and international powers that want to threaten the security of Egypt through the waters of the Nile, which represents a national security issue for it, as the percentage of water reaches 55 billion km³ and is therefore an important strategic issue for Egypt <1>, and the most prominent of these powers is Israel as a result of its dream in the Nile Basin and its extension to the Euphrates and its ambitions in water as a result of scarcity. The water shortage it suffers from and the lack of many water resources for it, which leads to its intervention in the African continent and its attempt to influence countries and pump investments into the Nile Basin <2>, and uses the strategy of establishing huge important economic projects in these countries, and also establishing direct relations with Ethiopia and some countries that it has a conflicting path with Egypt, and the United States of America also has clear influence in the Nile Basin countries, whether through bilateral relations with countries such as Uganda and Ethiopia or by putting forward initiatives regarding the establishment of blocs that may result in weakening cooperation between Egypt and the Nile Basin countries <3>, and seeks The United States sought to besiege and encircle the Egyptian political system in its regional surroundings in a way that would serve to consolidate American influence politically and strategically and thus pave the way for an active Israeli force and pressure on Egypt to accept some of the things it rejects. <4>

There were several paths for Egypt to deal with the crisis in light of Ethiopia's adherence to its position and Sudan's weakness and failure to take any position. Therefore, Egypt had to determine paths to deal with the crisis, including:

The political track: Essentially, the Egyptian forces must unite with the Sudanese forces, and this puts direct pressure on Ethiopia to withdraw from the construction of the dam, and secondly, address regional and international countries and powers such as the European Union and

1 - Muhammad Salman Taye, "The International Conflict over Water and the Environment of the Nile Basin," Center for Research and Political Studies, Cairo University, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, 2007, p. 105.

2 - Hani Raslan, "Overlapping Factors: Dimensions of the Worsening Water Crisis in the Nile Basin," International Politics Journal, Issue: 191, Cairo, January 2013, p. 56.

-3 Previous reference, p. 58

4 - Muhammad Salman Taya, "The Impact of External Interventions on Water Relations in the Nile Basin," Middle East Papers Journal, National Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Cairo, Issue 46, Publication Date: October 2009, p. 60.

France, which has a role in this matter to influence Ethiopia and request assistance from African regional organizations such as the African Union to intervene and preserve the situation and the safety of Egyptian national security from this with threat, using the pressure cards available to it in the relationship with Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia and putting pressure on the parties that provide financial and technical support to the other side. The Ethiopian by reducing the size of diplomatic representation with them, and deepening political relations with Ethiopia. Here the Coptic Church can invest and correct the political perceptions that have historically been linked between the two peoples while opening a continuous front for societal and popular dialogue with Ethiopia, and exploiting the political opposition in Ethiopia that stands before the government and its refusal to build the dam. >1<

Negotiating path: Negotiations must continue with Ethiopia in order to convince it of the necessity of abandoning the policy of imposing construction of the dam. The dam's storage capacity of 14 billion cubic meters must be adhered to and not increased. The water-for-energy initiative can be put forward and the possibility of cooperation with Ethiopia in the field of solar energy can be studied. As for Egypt's entry into a war Directing a military strike would be considered wind production and a losing war for Egypt, whatever its outcome. The international community did not allow this and might be imposed. Also, the upstream countries would ally against Egypt and did not accept to cooperate with it in sanctioning future Egypt, especially in water losses projects, which would lead to Egypt's water suffocation. >2<

The economic track: Relations between Egypt and Ethiopia must be developed in the areas of bilateral trade, economic aid, grants, loans, and joint investments, especially in the field of energy and infrastructure, to create a true economic partnership. The importance of coordination with China, which supports the dam.

Financially with Italy, the company that is building it, and putting pressure on Qatar to stop its political and economic support for the dam project. >3<

Legal option: It is possible to resort to international judiciary, which means either resorting to the International Court of Justice or resorting to international arbitration, given that Egypt's legal position is stronger than that of Ethiopia and that resorting to them is optional and appropriate.

1 - Essam Abdel Shafi, "Managing the Nile Water Crisis, Determinants and Scenarios," Documentary Vision, Publication

date: March 3, 2011 AD, Access date: May 10: Ali Mamshafy, M <http://>

essamashafy.blogspot.com.eg 2016

-2 Previous reference.

3 - Reference previously mentioned.

In the event that the case is presented to the Criminal Court or arbitration, this requires the approval of Ethiopia with jurisdiction in order for it to accept the ruling. It can be pressured to accept appearing before the International Court, and it is possible to resort to the UN Security Council and submit a complaint to the Council against the Ethiopian measures regarding the construction of the dam and the resulting damage to Egypt along with Emphasizing that the situation represents a threat to international peace and security in the Nile Basin region.>1>

We find that despite the previous scenarios and strategic paths to deal with the crisis, the political leadership's dealings with the crisis differed at its various levels. We see that during the era of the Brotherhood, Egyptian and Ethiopian relations worsened as a result of the tension in relations due to what was issued by the Egyptian leadership and the broadcast of the To discuss dialogue in which the political parties interviewed the former president. Morsi addressed the issue of the Renaissance Dam and reached a solution. The dialogue was broadcast and transmitted live without the knowledge of any of the attendees, which led to the deterioration of relations, as the opinions and proposals that were discussed indicated an unconscious and irresponsible political leadership <2>, and putting forward the idea of military intervention in Ethiopia was

"if The decrease in the waters of the Nile is an unacceptable situation that indicates the lack of political experience and Morsi's statement

"Our blood is the alternative." All of this led to the deterioration of Egyptian-Ethiopian relations, which considered this meeting a direct threat to them in the event of not reversing the construction of the dam <3>. Ethiopia gained the support of some Nile Basin countries that saw this as a threat, so the Secretary-General of the Popular Movement announced in South Sudan expressed his country's intention to join the framework agreement to divide the Nile waters, "Entebbe Agreement," stressing his country's support for Ethiopia, which strengthened the Ethiopian position on the dam issue <4>, and Ethiopia began to promote its project at the world level and its urgent need for it, as citizens relied on primitive methods of saving energy, such as Due to its severe lack of energy, trees are cut down and burned, so Ethiopia succeeds in gaining regional and international support for its project, but

1 - Essam Abdel Shafi, "Managing the Nile Water Crisis, Determinants and Scenarios," previously mentioned reference.

2-A previously mentioned reference.

3-Saqa Shaker Ibrahim Ahmed, "The Water Conflict between Egypt and the Nile Basin Countries: A Study of Foreign Interventions," Regional Water Center, publication date:

se.watersexpert.wwwhttp://September 2010 AD, accessed: May 9, 2016 AD, available at:

4 - Rehab Al-Zayadi, "The Southern Border... A Coming Danger," Al-Hiwar Magazine, Volume: Two, Issue: Five, Cairo, January 2015, p. 66.

After the June Revolution and the victory of President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, he resorted to opening the door to negotiations once again, as it was the only solution to preserve Egyptian national security again with the Ethiopian side, which he saw, and which opened the door to negotiations, and it was considered an important step on the path to negotiations, which is the visit of President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi to Equatorial Guinea. To attend the African Summit in Malabo, where Sisi met on the sidelines of the African Summit with Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam, and motives and their discussions touched on the crisis, where both sides stressed their respect for each other's goals

The other is on the water issue and that there will be discussions that guarantee the achievement of reconciliation and justice between the two parties

<1>, then President Sisi's meeting with the Ethiopian president in Egypt at the conference indicates that it is regaining its global economic role, which demonstrated to the whole world that Egypt is a strong country and once again the regional and international and Negotiations must begin with it <2>, so the negotiations resumed once again, and another committee must be formed for another discussion after an interruption of eight months, and it was agreed that the technical studies of the dam and reaching a solution that satisfies all parties were completed, and some principles were signed regarding the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and it was signed at the Egyptian summit - The Ethiopian-Sudanese agreement that was held in Khartoum was the way forward for greater understandings in the future in order to preserve the historical rights to the waters of the Nile River <3>, and the real value of this agreement is the completion of the understanding until the completion of the course of technical studies for the Renaissance Dam project, which guarantees the absence of any effects. Negative effects on Egypt or Sudan, which thus increases the level of understanding between the Nile Basin countries to achieve what is in the interest of all. The agreement gains its importance from its reliance on the principles of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Use of International Watercourses for Non-Navigational Purposes, which codifies the rules of international law for uses for non-navigational purposes. There are questions raised about the reasons for not stipulating Egypt's water rights (55.5 billion cubic meters annually) in the agreement, and the answer to that issue can be summed up in several points, which are that the agreement relates to principles and their relationship to historical rights and agreements related to operating and filling the dam with water, and the agreement is an indicative framework. Followed by detailed executive agreements for the document, and that the agreement is not related to distribution

mentioned reference.

1-Saqa Shaker Ibrahim Ahmed, previously

2-A previously mentioned reference.

3-Rehab Al-Zayadi, previously mentioned reference, p. 66

Water quotas between the three countries, and these quotas are not fundamentally in doubt, as Egypt and Ethiopia are bound by them (the 1993 Agreement, the Framework Cooperation Agreement), and there is another agreement with the State of Uganda signed in 1991 (the Cooperation Framework Agreement).>1>

His preoccupation with handing over power to the southerners, and we find that the Sudanese position, although initially due to the instability of the situation in the north, which led to its weakness at this time, but all this did not prevent the north from standing by Egypt and uniting with it in its decisions and the ways in which it believes it can be negotiated because Egypt It is considered to have a strong regional partner, and although for some time its position remained unclear and frank on that issue, in the end it later played the role of mediator in bridging the distances between Egypt and Ethiopia and the agreement was signed between them thanks to Sudanese mediation. >2<

We find that after the negotiations and signing of the principles on which the Renaissance Dam project will be implemented while ensuring that no damages or losses occur to any of the three countries, President Sisi is received with great warmth in the Ethiopian capital, and President Sisi stands before Parliament, addressing the Ethiopian nation about coexistence, one destiny, and the value of understanding. Among the peoples who are linked by geography to a single lifeline, stressing the depth of the historical relations between the two peoples and the Ethiopians' right to development, and his confidence in Ethiopia's keenness on Egypt's right to the waters of the Nile, and this indicates the successful leadership in managing negotiations related to the state's strategic issues. >3<

1 - Reference previously mentioned.

2 - Hani Raslan, "Egypt and the Responsibility for the Secession of South Sudan," Al-Ahram Strategic File, Cairo, Issue: 201, January 2011, p. 56.

3 - Previous reference, p. 58

The third topic: The issue of the Halib and Shaltin triangle:

We find that the Haleeb and Shalateen triangle is considered the thing that disturbs the relationship between Egypt and Sudan and is considered the main reason for the ebb and flow of relations between the two countries. Before we address the problem of the border dispute between Egypt and Sudan, we must first get to know the Haleeb and Shalateen triangle from the ground up:

The Haleeb Triangle is located on the African side of the Red Sea. Its area is about 20.5 km² at a latitude of 22 degrees Celsius. It consists of 3 large cities: "Haleeb, Abu Ramad, and Shaltin" <1>. It contains Mount Elba, which is one of the largest natural reserves in Egypt. Southeast of the Haleeb Triangle. The reserve includes many natural and human resources and is endowed with wildlife and medicinal plants. It is also characterized by the availability of fish wealth in light of the presence of fertile soil that depends on groundwater and rainwater, which leads to agricultural activity <2>. The Haleeb Triangle includes many Geological and mineral resources and many water resources, including freshwater wells and springs, in addition to the availability of marine resources such as coral reefs, seaweed, and rare marine organisms, in addition to a number of islands belonging to the Red Sea. Mount Elba also contains marine turtles and many types of mangrove trees of environmental and economic value. The Haleeb Triangle is considered to be of great economic importance, as it contains a large amount of minerals of great economic importance, such as high-quality manganese, which is found in large reserves. There are also many studies proving the possibility of producing inorganic magnesium chemicals, such as magnesium sulfate and chloride, which are used in the textile industry. And fertilizers, and it can also be used to produce magnesium instead of importing it. There are also gold, granite, phosphate, copper, silver, chromium, and iron <3>. There are also some echoes that confirm that the Haleeb and Shalateen triangle contains high oil reserves, but it has not yet been proven, and the Haleeb and Shalateen triangle now falls under the ruling. It is under Egyptian administration, and most of its residents belong to a number of tribes, such as the "Bishariyin, Al-Hamd, Awab, and Al-Abaida," but it is controlled by the "Beja" ethnicity, which is located

H₁ - Moaz Muhammad Ahmed, "The Sudanese-Egyptian Border Dispute between History and International Law," Journal Strategic Studies, Issue 10, Cairo, 1997, p. 5

2 - Previous reference, p. 6

3 - Saleh Muhammad Ibrahim, "About the Halib Triangle," Al-Sudani newspaper, Khartoum, publication date: March 4, 2008, p. 6.

The population of this triangle is 27,000 people belonging to the Basharib tribes, from the north to the port of Port Sudan and to the borders of the Atbara River in the south. The most common activity among the population is grazing as a result of the availability of environmental factors that help, and the population promises this. Part of them who reside there belongs to the Sudanese part and the other part that

The other is Egyptian, and from here the conflict begins.

We find that the border dispute between both countries over the Haleb and Shaltin triangle goes back to historical repercussions. It begins with the bilateral rule agreement between Egypt and Britain in 1899 AD, in which the north of Egypt was demarcated. Therefore, the The border between Egypt and Sudan included areas from a latitude of 22, the Haleeb Triangle and Shalatin, within the Egyptian political borders <2>. Then, three years later in 1902 AD, the British occupation came, which ruled both Egypt and Sudan, and made the Haleeb Triangle affiliated with the State of Sudan as a result of its geographical proximity and because of The Sudanese tribes were stationed there. They reached this decision after forming a technical committee headed by the director of Aswan and three inspectors, one of them from the Egyptian Interior Ministry, one representing the government of Sudan, and a third representing the Egyptian Coast Guard. Their mission was to determine the land of the Bisharian tribes and they submitted a report confirming that the Halib and Shaltin triangle is land inhabited by Sudanese tribes. In light of this report, it belongs to Sudan <2>, but the conflict intensified upon Sudan's independence in 1956 AD, when the dispute began over whether the Haleeb and Shalateen triangle was Egyptian, or whether it belonged to Sudan. In 1958 AD, when the referendum was held on the presidency of the republic, Egypt sent a memorandum to Sudan informing it that the Haleeb triangle Shalateen was informed that it would participate in the referendum and at the same time register it within the geographical circle of Egypt. Sudan had included the region in the Sudanese geographical circle, so the Egyptian side objected in accordance with the 1899 agreement to demarcate the borders <3>, so President Gamal Abdel Nasser sent some forces to the border strip, and Sudan objected and advanced. A complaint was submitted to the United Nations against Egypt regarding the withdrawal of military forces from the border strip, considering that the Haleeb and Shaltyn triangle is Sudanese, in accordance with Resolution 1902 AD, and with the agreement of the Security Council with Egypt, these forces were withdrawn after a short period, until the end of the Sudanese elections

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1 - Reference previously mentioned, Hani Raslan, p. 10

2 - Reference previously mentioned, Moaz Muhammad Ahmed, "The Sudanese-Egyptian Border Dispute between History

And international law, p. 10

3 - Omar Muhammad Al-Tayeb, "National Security of the Nile Valley and its Implications in the Military Field,"

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printing and publishing Cairo, Al-Nahar 1998, p.

4 - Previous reference, p. 30

Sovereignty over the Haleeb and Shalateen triangle remained a dual policy, and there was no tension in relations except from time to time
decree Egypt issued a presidential Mor when a crisis occurred. In 1990, its borders were clarified, confirming the annexation
of Haleeb to the Egyptian borders. Then in 1992, Egyptian forces penetrated into Haleeb, despite Sudan's complaint to the Security
Council, but Egypt relies on the border demarcation agreement and that the administrative powers and facilities granted to Sudan are
merely administrative powers that do not mean Egypt's approval of Sudan's right to Halib and Shalateen. >1<

We find that since President Al-Bashir assumed the reins of power, the issue of Haleeb and Shalatin has become in great ambiguity,
but it appears at a time of political or economic crises between Egypt and Sudan in order to be used as a pressure card for both parties.

The dispute appeared again in 1992 AD when Egypt objected to giving the Sudanese government the rights to explore Petroleum
in the waters opposite the Halib Triangle was issued to a Canadian company, so the company withdrew until the issue of sovereignty over
Area <2> was decided. In July 1994, Sudan sent a memorandum to the United Nations, the Security Council, the African Union, and
the League of Arab States, complaining to the Egyptian government of thirty-nine raids launched by Egyptian forces on the border.

Sudanese, and we find that after an assassination attempt revealed that the one who carried it out was affiliated with the Sudanese
state, President Mubarak's relations in Addis Ababa became strained and relations between the two countries became hot <3>, so

Mubarak refused the Egyptian government's participation in the negotiations of the foreign ministers of the Organization of the
African Union in Addis Ababa to resolve the border dispute. Then, in 2000 AD, the Egyptian forces expelled the Sudanese forces from the
region. Egyptian political and security control was completely imposed on it. In 2004 AD, the Sudanese government announced that it had

And not abandoned the administration of Haleeb and Shaltin, nor abandoned it or handed it over to the Egyptians, and confirmed the

submission of a memorandum to the United Nations to withdraw the Egyptian forces. Then the crisis renewed again in 2010 AD when

Mr. Taher Asay, head of the Haleb Council, who belongs to the Bisharin tribe, was arrested for his opposition to the Egyptian
presence in the Haleb and Shaltin region.

1 - Omar Muhammad Al-Tayeb, "National Security of the Nile Valley and its Implications in the Military Field," p

25 previously mentioned references.

Th Haleeb and Wadi protrusion 2 - Moaz Muhammad Ahmed Tanqo, "The border dispute between Sudan and Egypt: an example
An alliance in the light of international law", Khartoum, Khartoum University Publishing House, 2005, p. 35.

3 - Hani Raslan, "Egyptian-Sudanese Relations during the Mubarak Era," Al Jazeera Studies website, publication date: October 13,
2011 AD, accession date: May 10

: <http://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/files/> Ali Mamawah, 2016

He was arrested for two years, which led to tension in relations between the two countries <1>. Haleeb was also approved as a
Sudanese electoral district affiliated with the Red Sea State, and the Sudanese National Elections Commission approved the right
to vote in the Sudanese elections for the people of Haleeb as Sudanese citizens. Then, after the outbreak of the January
2011 revolution, elections were held. The Egyptian parliamentary district lists were prepared and included Haleeb and Shalatin as
an electoral district. Elections were held there and the votes were transported by military plane to Hurghada for vote counting <2>,
which led to the outbreak of the crisis again between the two countries and as a result of the weakness of the diplomatic solution
that he left behind, Mubarak's policy and his distance from Africa, and we find that after former President Morsi took over the
crisis again when the president visited Sudan in 2013 to strengthen relations between the two countries and try to restore ties of
harmony again, but the visit did not bear fruit as the assistant to Sudanese President Al-Bashir announced that Morsi had
promised Sudan to give them milk and two shawls because they belong to Sudan. Due to the 1902 Agreement, which led to arousing
decision or statement, which led to exile from the Egyptian presidency to calm Egyptian public opinion and its rejection of this
Egyptian public opinion <3>, the Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces visited Sudan and sent a message to the Sudanese
authorities confirming that Haleeb and Shaltin It belongs to Egypt, and there is no intention to neglect it. We find that in 2014, the
Sudanese statements were renewed regarding its right to Haleeb and Shalateen, and this came after the failure of Egypt's failure to
implement at that time the full implementation of the four freedoms and the discussions on the Renaissance Dam, and there is a
tendency on the Sudanese side to resort to arbitration. International or conducting a referendum

solution due to its The population expressed their opinion on joining the two countries, but Egypt rejects this conviction of its right and the history of the agreements that give it the region <4>. In 2015, the government of Sudan announced the filing of a complaint in the Security Council against Egypt as a result of holding the parliamentary elections and including the Haleeb region as an electoral district, and we find During the Sisi era, the continuation of the promotion of diplomacy is the first to be discussed, and his policy, which is to resort to a negotiated solution announcement to give Saudi and try to reach a solution, but the crisis has worsened as a result of Egypt's Arabia an island to redraw the borders of Tiran, Sanafir and

1 - Hani Raslan, "Egyptian-Sudanese Relations during the Mubarak Era," previously mentioned reference.

2 - Previous reference.

3 - Dina Abdel Khaleq, "Halib and Shaltin...a nightmare that disturbs Egyptian-Sudanese relations," Al-Watan newspaper, publication date: May 6, 2014, access date: 9

: [http://www.elwatannews.com/news Ali Mamwath](http://www.elwatannews.com/news/Ali-Mamwath), May 2016

4 - Previous reference.

The naval agreement that was held during the Ottoman rule, and this sparked the crisis again and led to its return. As for its return, Egypt must demand that Sudan has the right to Haleeb and Shalatin as a result of the 1902 agreement, as has opened well as the islands of Tiran and Sanafir. As for resorting to international arbitration, Egypt therefore considers itself to be the door to a crisis that cannot be resolved. It was resolved, and thus the Egyptian authorities requested the opening of dialogue with the Sudanese authorities, but this time the negotiations will be in order to reach a solution that satisfies all parties. <1>

When we look at the issue from a neutral point of view, we find that each party has a reliable basis that confirms its right to Haleeb and two shawls. We find that the Sudanese side relies on the bilateral agreement that

It was held in 1902 AD and continued until 1958 AD without any objection from the Egyptian side. Sudan also and also the recognition of relies on the principle of prescription in its right to the region and its rule over it before, some regional and African organizations in light of, without any objection from Egypt, and Sudan falling under colonialism, that It had this region, and the presence of Sudanese tribes that prove that they are 100% Sudanese, and therefore these tribes have the right to be subject to the rule of Sudan, and also based on the year 1964 AD when the High Halfa and not to Compo in Aswan, that Dam was built, Egypt displaced the residents of the Surra Triangle to New is, if it considered them to be. Egyptian citizens were sent to Aswan, like the residents of Nubia.

>2<

Egypt also has its own convictions regarding the dependency of Haleeb and Shallatin: it is based on the 1899 ^{As for} AD, which specified the 22nd parallel as a dividing line for Egypt's southern borders, and it responds to the lack of any reaction or action since 1902 AD to 1958 AD, considering that it is a state that is not fully independent and has not become a state that enjoys sovereignty. It is completely regional, so it did not speak until Sudan became independent.

Egypt also considers the 1902 agreement to indicate the granting of complete sovereignty over its land, and that it exercises administrative sovereignty, not Sudanese sovereignty. The administrative borders of Haleeb and Shalatin and the political, also the inclusion of Haleeb and Shalateen in the geographic circles. The 1958 elections give Egypt evidence that it was recognized as the first to have rights in the region. Egypt relies on the refusal of the tribes in Halib and Shalatin to be included in the electoral rolls of the Sudanese Commission and that they insisted that they belong to Egypt and were therefore not included in the population lists.

1 - Saleh Muhammad Ibrahim, "About the Halib Triangle," Al-Sudani newspaper, previously mentioned reference.

2 - Dina Abdel Khaleq, "Halib and Shaltin...a nightmare that disturbs Egyptian-Sudanese relations," previously mentioned reference.

For the State of Sudan <1>, Egypt also sees that Sudan uses the issue of Haleeb and Shalateen only in times of crises or when it has the purpose of putting pressure on Egypt, but in times other than crises, the issue of Haleeb and Shalateen is not raised.

We find that in order for the crisis to be resolved, the door must be opened for negotiations, but each country must have the sincere intention that it will be satisfied with reaching a compromise solution, even if it will give up part of the Haleeb and Shaltin region in order regional power. For the other, maintaining to maintain relations with a country, each of which represents strategic depth and the existence of political and economic relations between the two countries guarantees each of them regional strength and a level ^{And} of development by exploiting this region and the presence of a national sense of development for the two countries instead of entering into crises and border disputes that could lead to stubbornness leading to an armed conflict between two sister countries.

1 - Hani Raslan, "Egyptian-Sudanese Relations during the Mubarak Era," previously mentioned reference.

Conclusion:

After presenting the internal and regional determinants of both Egypt and Sudan, looking at the political and economic relations between the two countries, and following each other's position on some issues, we find that Egypt and Sudan are a special historical relationship with long-standing and deep ties that have continued over time, and this relationship has gone through some imbalances in some cases. The times are a result of the Egyptian failure under a certain political rule and its neglect of the important strategic depth that Sudan represents for Egypt, and the regional and international interventions that seek to sever and worsen relations between the two countries by sowing discord between them and provoking problems, the nature of the water file and its importance to Egypt and the sensitivity it represents to Egypt. Relationships tense at times, and as a result of some problems with Sudan and the secession of South Sudan after the report of political events such as the outbreak of the January 25 revolution in Egypt and its fate also in 2011 AD, which led to a difference in politics in relations from before, so Egypt began to pursue new policies towards the state of Sudan in particular After the secession of the South, as this was a direct threat to Egyptian national security, and Egypt had to be careful not to lose any of the two parties, whether the North or the South, and it found that in order to guarantee the achievement of national security and maintain its strategic position, integration must be established with the two states of Sudan. Economic relations with the Republic of Sudan after the stagnation that Egypt began to establish political relations that existed during the era of Mubarak, and both parties began to arbitrate each other's interests and began consolidating official visits and working to activate relations between Egypt and the Republic of Sudan, and Egypt and Sudan began to overcome the issue of the border dispute over The Haleb and Shaltin triangle, where after the disputes that surrounded this issue, after the change in the political circumstances of the two countries, reason and strategic interest must be arbitrated and a negotiation must be resorted to that guarantees the rights of each party.

Even when the issue of the Renaissance Dam arose, Egypt and Sudan tried to stand by each other because the damage would come to both parties. They started on the political and negotiating side after several proposals that could have drawn Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia into armed wars that would ultimately harm all parties. Therefore, we find that Egypt must Sudan has developed an integration plan that works to and human ^{And} and try to benefit from the economic potential, natural and mineral resources, consolidate relations between the two countries power of each of them so that they become a regional power in the region and ensure that their security is not compromised. Therefore, we see

This is done through:

- 1 - Maintaining the strength and vitality of bilateral relations between the two countries. The two peoples must be involved in the integration and political forces in the two countries must participate in this strategy. strategy and all organizations
- 2 - Paying attention to increasing joint investments between the two countries to be the driving force for political relations and the beginning of the path to Arab-African integration.
- 3 - Paying attention to economic cooperation between Egypt, Sudan and the Nile Basin countries in order to secure the common interests of the Nile Basin countries and build a regional economic bloc similar to the European Common Market to face the challenges of economic globalization.
- 4 - The Four Freedoms Agreement must be immediately implemented and there must be coordination between the two countries to fully address any effects that may result from its implementation.
- 5 - Working on a strategy for agricultural cooperation and developing a plan to attract investments to finance industrial and agricultural projects between the two countries.
- 6 - Working to coordinate the foreign policies and positions of both Egypt and Sudan, both at the regional and international levels, by activating the role of coordination between official and popular institutions between Egypt and Sudan.
- 7 - Coordination must be achieved between Egypt and Sudan with the state of South Sudan on achieving cooperation between them in light of external interference in order to ensure supporting cooperation and not allowing any disputes to occur and leaving them in the hands of the national security of the two countries.

8 - Paying attention to environmental integration, supporting educational cooperation projects, paying attention to infrastructure, cultural and social integration, developing the scientific and research aspect, and developing the role of civil society organizations and civil society between the two countries.

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"Egyptian-African economic relations... Reality, challenges, and proposed policies" View issue (47) - of the "Badael" periodical - August 2021

Egyptian-African relations go back decades, strengthened by close cultural, historical and geographical ties that made Africa a part of Egyptian history and one of the most important political circles.

Active on all continents

Foreign Egypt; Since 2014, Egypt has recorded a presence

The levels through which Egypt regained its leadership role in Africa, just as Egypt did in its relations

The quality of African countries in all fields, especially with regard to their countries' need to enhance economic capabilities, develop trade partnership mechanisms, and achieve the desired development. Economic and development cooperation files have occupied a large part of Egyptian-African relations.

Through it, Cairo was able to regain its position on the continent after an almost complete absence over three decades.

In this context and under the title "Egypt and Africa...towards greater effectiveness and influence," Professor Safinaz Mohamed, editor-in-chief of the "Badael" periodical, explained in the editorial of the issue that since 2015, Egyptian interest in strengthening cooperation with the African continent has crystallized, especially through the economic portal. In light of the advantages enjoyed by the African market that give Egyptian products the advantage of "ease of access" compared to other markets; This is done by strengthening trade partnerships with a number of African countries, such as Tunisia, Sudan, South Africa, and the Nile Basin countries, in addition to Egyptian involvement in regional economic blocs spread throughout the continent, such as Egypt, which are serious and effective steps to strengthen COMESA and SADC. Despite what Egyptian-African cooperation has taken in various fields, such as establishing a fund to support investment risks in Africa, and establishing the African Counter-Terrorism Center for the Sahel-Saharan group of countries, the multi-dimensional transformations and changes taking place on the African scene indicate that there are

^{what} With the countries of the continent, it is consistent with the need to formulate a new Egyptian strategy to manage relations that are witnessing transformations, and advance the wheel of Egyptian-African cooperation.

Under the title "Egyptian-African Economic Relations: Reality, Challenges, and Proposed Policies," Dr. Sally Mohamed Farid, Assistant Professor of Economics at the Graduate School of African Studies, discussed in the issue's study the status of intra-African trade with regard to the sectors of intra-African exports and imports and the volume of growth on the continent during the period from 2019-2019. 2021, and the extent of trade intensity in regional economic blocs, during which I concluded that there are opportunities

It is wasted in intra-African trade in many products, especially agricultural and food. Also, despite what the study indicated that the volume of trade exchange between Egypt and the countries of the continent has recorded an increasing increase in recent years, according to

The intensity of Egyptian-African trade. Trade relations between Egypt and African countries are unlike their counterparts with the outside world. Arabic is weak, in comparison

classified Egypt is The volume of Egyptian investment in the continent during the past years, and As a result, he rose to become the largest investor in Africa, in light of Egypt's efforts to strengthen the investment mechanism with the countries of the continent, such as launching many investment projects with developmental goals, in partnership with the private sector, such as projects to build dams and stations to generate electricity and solar energy, which a number of people are currently implementing. From Egyptian companies. There are still many Egyptian investment opportunities in light of the continent's enormous resources in various fields, such as energy, agricultural resources, and fisheries.

In this context, strongly activating Egyptian investment opportunities in African countries would enhance Egypt's ability to overcome the many obstacles and challenges facing Egyptian-African economic relations. Among them is the lack of regular maritime and air navigation lines between Egypt and the countries of the continent, and the limited number of commercial representation offices. The study presents a set of recommendations in order to address them: Such as stimulating investment in African infrastructure, which contributes to reducing restrictions imposed on Egyptian-African trade, and developing production networks to improve the ability to access the most attractive investment opportunities in Africa. Competitiveness and quality standards, through a mechanism to enhance cooperation and coordination between Egyptian ministries and companies.

At this stage, the Egyptian rapprochement with Africa has become the focus of the Egyptian foreign political movement. The continent in general, and the Nile Basin and East Africa regions in particular, have occupied an almost central weight in the priorities of the Egyptian state, especially after the June 2013 revolution. President Sisi's current tour represents a quarter African countries are a new example of this Egyptian trend.

The factors for this convergence are multiple. Some of them are related to the nature of the current security threats to the Egyptian state, and others are linked to international and regional agendas in the Middle East and Red Sea regions, which by their nature affect Egyptian national security. Some of them are linked to the Egyptian water needs and the repercussions resulting from the construction of the Renaissance Dam, in terms of the possibility of maintaining the Egyptian water share at the appropriate time. The Egyptian citizen's share of water reached below the water poverty line according to global indicators.

The water factor may have been the main driver of the June State in accelerating the movement towards Africa, in the context of the renewal of Egyptian-African ties in accordance with the perspective of Abdel Nasser's state, who said, "How can the existence of the African continent be ignored?... Destiny has willed for Egypt to have a share in it... and it affects Egypt whether it wants it or not." [1] Based on this vision, that The conflict over it put the African continent in the circle of strategic attention. It also developed the appropriate tools for its era in interacting with the continent, and was able to build regional influence that enabled it to achieve its strategic goals of national liberation from traditional Western colonialism, and storing water within the Egyptian borders behind the High Dam. In a strategic coup against British water policies, and then in concluding a water agreement with Sudan to divide the waters of the Nile, Egypt was assigned a water share that it is currently arguing against whoever wants to approach it as a stable historical right that has support in international law.

On the other hand, what is lacking in Egypt at the present time is an awareness of the successive changes in the African scene, in terms of the increasing weight of individual African countries due to their primary resources on the one hand, and the presence of new elites who are more aware of their country's national interests, especially in light of their connection to the Western model by virtue of the continued Colonial countries have been linking these elites with them since the era of former President Anwar Sadat. Perhaps the education mechanism that Egypt abandoned, Cairo, may also need at this important stage to update some of the tools in interaction with Africa

These are still inactive and ineffective, in addition to employing more support to the instruments that have made reasonable progress for Egypt in Africa since June 2013.

1-Challenges related to Egyptian instruments in Africa

The long Egyptian absence from interaction with the African ruling elites created a gap in perception and understanding between the two parties. While Egypt lives on the legacy of its support for Africa and African issues during the national liberation phase, Africans still maintain this role as part of history, but it no longer has a significant impact in the current or future phase. In this context, we can explain the failure of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni to market the Egyptian approach to get out of the Entebbe Agreement impasse. It can be said that the summit of the Nile Basin countries in June 2017 failed for two main reasons - in my estimation. The first is Egypt's absolute reliance on Museveni to mobilize support for the Egyptian approach. The second is the Egyptian bet that stopping international support for water projects in the Nile Basin countries will push these countries to welcome the Egyptian approach, as the Israeli incitement was absent from this assessment. In this context, Egypt was absent from direct interaction with other key countries in the Nile Basin and East Africa, which explains President Sisi's choice of Tanzania and Rwanda to be important stations in the current round. Tanzania enjoys great weight and influence in interactions in East Africa, and Arusha - one of its most important cities - hosted many activities related to defusing many of the region's crises during the 1990s, starting with the genocide crisis between Tutsis and Hutus in the mid-1990s, to the current Burundi crisis, Going through the crises of Sudan, north and south. The irony here is that Tanzania has not been visited by an Egyptian president since 1968. As for Rwanda, which has such important regional weight, its president, Paul Kagame, has, on a personal level, a charisma that influences decision-making circles in the Nile Basin countries and East Africa. He enjoys great respect on the continent, due to his ability to build peace in his country, inaugurate a phase of coexistence between the conflicting Tutsi and Hutu parties, and even achieve a reasonable level of economic development, in which he certainly relied on direct Western support.

The lack of appropriate Egyptian tools in interacting with Africa is one of the main challenges that Egypt faces in the many stages of privatization at this stage, as it lost huge companies that were playing basic and diverse roles on the continent, such as Al-Nasr Company and Reinforced Cement Company, as these companies underwent Completely for planning the Egyptian state in

Africa, and worked within the state's tools in implementing its foreign policies on the continent, especially in light of the Egyptian government's ability at the time to directly finance these companies, and its actions contributed in one way or another to this financing.

In an important step to create a new mechanism to support the Egyptian role in Africa, the "Egyptian Agency for Partnership with Africa for Development" was established as a mechanism for working on the continent, which began its work on July 1, 2014, pursuant to Cabinet Resolution No. 959 of 2013, where all From the Egyptian Fund for Technical Cooperation with Africa, and the Egyptian Fund for Cooperation with Commonwealth Countries in one entity. Despite the importance of the step of establishing this agency, activating its role remains subject to confronting a number of complexities facing its work. The first of these complications relates to its budget, which the agency compensates through international grants, which is likely to be influenced in most cases by the international agenda regarding Africa and not by the purely Egyptian vision. The second of these complications relates to the almost complete absence of the agency in Africa, with the exception of a limited number of technical experts, and the agency was sometimes unable to fulfill their salaries, which made it innovate important initiatives based on cooperation with Egyptian civil society. The Magdi Yacoub Heart Center played important roles in various medical missions, especially In Ethiopia. The agency also cooperates with the Egyptian Liver Association to carry out similar roles, given the spread of hepatitis viruses in Africa.

Perhaps we suggest here that the budgets of the African activities of the relevant ministries be included in the agency. In this case, the interaction should be on the part of the ministries under the agency's umbrella, which means central planning capable of building Egyptian regional influence in Africa, and networking and coordination between the various ministries under the agency's umbrella, ensuring the achievement of Egyptian strategic goals instead of a state of bureaucratic rivalry between ministries on the African scene. . This is because the main goal is the presence of Egyptian hands on the African scene and not a limited African presence in Cairo within the framework of training and capacity support operations carried out by the "Cairo Regional Center for Training in Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa," for example, where the volume of training was recorded during the year About 600 trainees in 2014, an increase of 120 trainees over the year 2013. [2] The Radio and Television Union also conducts similar training in the media field. But the dilemma remains that there is no entity that maintains communication relationships with these African trainees, which means that there is no impact over time, even though these trainees are often in the upper levels of the executive bodies in their countries.

In the same context, the Ministry of Higher Education plays a role in providing educational scholarships to Africans, and some universities also carry out these tasks, but these scholarships are very limited and we need to expand them [3]. At a time when the official Egyptian banks have financial surpluses that they can invest in direct investment in African countries, especially in the agricultural field, which is one of the major goals of the African Union's development plans known as "2063-13", and considering that the agricultural sector in Africa is one of the sectors with high returns. However, Egyptian banks are still failing to play this important role despite the presence of the African Investment Guarantee Bank in the Egyptian capital. The same conclusions apply to the role of businessmen, whose efforts remain invisible and do not have a positive impact on Egyptian strategic interests. With the exception of the Qalaa and El Sewedy companies, we do not see any influential roles in the Egyptian business field in Africa.

In general, we can say that despite the well-known presidential efforts towards Africa, state institutions seem to be still far from realizing the importance of the African continent to Egypt, and are focusing only on the Nile Basin countries. Perhaps this explains Egypt's absence from the significant efforts currently being made by African countries to catch up with the plans Sustainable development declared by the United Nations since 2015. The African Union has developed a plan for this goal, "13-2063" plan, with which most African countries interact, as Nigeria, for example but not limited to, allocates an office for coordination among its government ministers to study this comprehensive plan and research Available opportunities that can support the Nigerian economy, according to six pillars: especially since there are international partners currently interacting with this plan, structural economic transformation and inclusive growth, science technology and innovation, people-centred development, environmental sustainability, natural resources and disaster management, peace and security, finance and partnerships. On the other hand, the Egyptian Council of Ministers formed a committee from a number of ministries regarding Africa during the government of Engineer Ibrahim Mehleb, but it lacked a vision, and did not specify the goal or its tools, so we do not hear any news about it and do not know of its meetings at the present time.

With regard to the Egyptian Parliament, with the exception of attending the sessions of the African Parliament of with his African the African Union held annually, no Egyptian parliamentarian has for decades had relations counterpart on a bilateral level. The Egyptian Parliament is also absent from interaction with its African counterparts in bilateral frameworks, matters that had a major negative impact on Egypt during the stage of interactions related to the African countries' ratifications of the Entebbe Agreement on the one hand, and on the development of

African parliamentary positions of some Nile Basin countries are hostile to Egypt. Hence, it has become necessary for the Egyptian Parliament to have initiatives to activate its role at the African level, whether at the bilateral or regional level, all the way to the collective level.

2-Challenges related to regional and international actors

Africa plays a role that cannot be overlooked in threatening Egyptian national security, both in terms of... Water security, the security of the Suez Canal, or the security of the western borders, which made the continent a theater for the work of many regional and international actors.

Before referring to the roles of regional and international actors on the African continent, some of which aim to influence Egyptian national security and Egyptian interests in the continent, it is worth noting here the importance of the Red Sea region to Egyptian national security and regional security, as the strategic importance of the Red Sea lies in a group of overlapping geopolitical factors. , security, and economic; It is the shortest transportation route between North and South, and plays an influential role on the economies of Southeast Asian and European countries, in addition to its role as a carrier of Gulf oil and an outlet for trade exchange for the countries bordering it, some of which have no other linking them to the world, and its influential role on overall Arab-African relations as a major shipping corridor in operations. Cooperation between the two parties. The Red Sea is also of utmost importance to Egypt due to considerations related to the Suez Canal, one of the most important sources of national income.

Hence, the security of the Red Sea constitutes an Arab and African strategic importance. The closing of Bab al-Mandab at the southern entrance to the Red Sea in 1973 was one of the influential factors in making the October victory, and it is a lesson that the Israelis have not forgotten, as they seek and are still seeking to maximize their capabilities in influencing the determinants governing the security of the Red Sea now and in the future. The collapse of the state institution in Somalia and the presence of military bases for France, the United States of America, China and others in Djibouti increase the sources of threat to Arab and African interests, in general, and the countries bordering it in particular (Egypt, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Eritrea, Yemen, Somalia ([4].

Egypt announced the inauguration of the southern naval fleet, and it also has forces in this context. It announced military forces at the entrances to Bab al-Mandab, in addition to an Egyptian military presence in Eritrea.

A- The Israeli role in the Nile Basin

The Zionist project is linked to both the Nile and Euphrates rivers. The Torah says: "So he made a covenant with Abraham to give to his descendants this land from the River Egypt to the great river, the River Euphrates" [5]. Perhaps this religious fact is what explains the existence of Israeli projects linked to the Nile River, coinciding with the Hertz project itself at the beginning of the twentieth century, which was based on transporting Nile water from siphons under the Suez Canal to Sinai and from there to Israel. Accordingly, Herzl submitted to the Egyptian government a project to obtain a settlement concession in the Sinai Peninsula for a period of 99 years, demanding in the context of this project a portion of the excess Nile water in the winter that goes to the Mediterranean Sea [6]. However, this project faced British-Egyptian rejection based on the fact that the British project linked the paths and trends of Egyptian agriculture to the requirements of British industry in the North African country, and these requirements made cotton cultivation a priority in both Egypt and Sudan on the one hand. In addition to the salinity that silts under the Suez Canal may cause to lands in Sinai, which causes the collapse of any agricultural projects there, on the other hand[7].

The second step for Israeli projects related to water was in 1974, when the most important Israeli projects looking to obtain water from the Nile River were presented, which was the project of "Elisha Kali," the Israeli water engineer who issued his project by saying: "The data of our region

Environmental and political conditions require that every peace agreement have a water clause" [8]. The basic idea of the "Kali" project is based on the fact that Israel's obtaining a small amount of Nile water (0.8 billion cubic meters annually) through Egypt will not affect the Egyptian water balance. As for The technical basis of the project depends on expanding the Al-Salam Canal in the city of Ismailia, to transport between 100 and 500 million cubic meters of water annually, provided that this water is transported through silos under the Suez Canal to reach Israel, and in this case the water is transformed into a commodity that Israel By purchasing it.[9]

It seems to us that this project is central to Israel, as it has been presented periodically and on every occasion to Egypt, starting in 1974. It was presented during the years 1986 and 1989, and it was also presented within the framework of

Madrid negotiations in 1991. An Egyptian position rejecting this project crystallized based on technical and strategic considerations, as the technical aspect is based on the possibility of raising the salinity of agricultural land in Sinai, as well as inaugurating the principle of pricing and selling water, a principle that will be very expensive for Egypt, which is deprived of any water sources except the Nile River. , especially if you think about using it in the Nile Basin headwaters countries. The arrival of the Nile waters to Israel, in addition to being in violation of the rules of international law related to the shared river basins, adds to the basin countries a new state in a precedent that is the first of its kind.

From a strategic standpoint, obtaining this amount of water will be tantamount to a new birth for Israel, because it gives it 20 times the currently cultivated area and enables it to increase the cultivated areas in the Negev Desert by an amount equal to 500 thousand acres. In addition, it supports the Israeli capabilities to attract more settlers. Certainly, both the technical and strategic aspects represent huge losses for Egypt at the level of its national security.

An increase in the level of threats to Arab national security in general[10].

In this context, Israel played a pivotal role - and continues to play - in the issue of building the Renaissance Dam, and it also plays a fundamental role in supporting and building Ethiopian negotiating strategies towards Egypt. African countries that need to generate energy based on water resources linked to the Nile River, which puts additional pressure on Egypt. In addition to the Ethiopian case, there is the case of Rwanda, with which Israel is actively interacting with the aim of generating energy from water, while Egyptian projects to generate energy from its new sources such as sun and wind are still just ideas that have not entered the stage of widespread production. Indeed, the new energy generation project of one of the Egyptian businessmen exists in... West Africa[11].

B- The Sudanese role

At the current stage, the Sudanese regime is playing hostile roles towards Egypt, and is using all its cards in an attempt to weaken the elements of the comprehensive power of the Egyptian state. This included support for the Muslim Brotherhood militias in Libya, despite Sudanese promises to Egypt to stop this support, but the closure of the Sudanese consulate in Kufra, southern Libya, and the statements of the Libyan military

spokesman, Colonel Al-Mismari, that he had evidence of this clearly indicate the continuation of this support[12]

In addition to concluding strategic partnership agreements with Ethiopia within the framework of supporting the construction of the Renaissance Dam on its current terms, Sudan also played the Qatar card against Egypt. In most cases, Sudanese support for the Libyan Brotherhood is based on Sudanese-Qatari understandings. On the economic level, Sudan is playing the card of blocking Egyptian goods from flowing to Sudan and from there to East Africa, as Sudan has banned these goods more than once under the pretext of quality and suitability conditions. Despite the calculated rapprochement that took place after the recent visit of Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry to Sudan, Egyptian-Sudanese relations appear to be going through a crisis against the backdrop of Sudanese practices and policies towards Egyptian interests in the African continent.

C- The French role

It appears that the terrorist incidents that France faced during 2015 represented a major impetus for fundamental shifts in French foreign policies. It adopted interventionist policies on a military basis in Africa, given that a significant portion of terrorist organizations operate in Africa. Starting from ISIS in Libya, and Boko Haram in Nigeria, to Salafist jihadism in Mali, as well as Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, and Islamic militias in Central Africa, with military roles for the Justice and Equality Movement in Libya. In sum, 70% of the volume of French military interaction with abroad was with Africa.

^{against} The military alliance between France and five African countries, and the formation of a rapid intervention force against terrorist organizations and organized crime gangs, appears to be the most recent development in this context, as the recent summit between France and Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, Chad and Mauritania came as a natural development for the Barkhane process that began in 2017. 2014 with the same alliance. This summit decided to form a rapid reaction force consisting of five thousand members as a first stage.

This alliance disrupted Egyptian visions that had been crystallized at a conference of defense ministers of 27 African countries held in Sharm El-Sheikh in 2015 regarding the fight against terrorism, where a collective vision was crystallized regarding the formation of African rapid reaction forces and the establishment of a center to combat terrorism, with influential roles from both Egypt and Morocco. In any case, Egypt is currently seeking an influential role

With regard to the Libyan file, considering that it is the country currently the base for security threats to the western borders, which witnessed a number of successful operations by armed bases to thwart cases of border crossings with armed four-wheel drive vehicles.

In general, African threats to Egyptian national security seem to require more diligent work, especially in the government sector, despite the great efforts of the Egyptian state in this field.

[1] See: "Egyptian-African relations after June 30," State Information Service, Cairo. See the following link:

<http://www.sis.gov.eg/section/125/10073?lang=ar>

[2] Same source.

[3] Al-Youm Al-Sabea, 1/8/2017

[4]D. Amani Al-Taweel, "Red Sea Security: Reality and Challenges," International Center for Future Studies, Cairo, 2009, unpublished paper.

[5] The Torah: Genesis 15-18

[6]D. Muhammad Salman Taye, The International Conflict over Water in the Nile Basin Environment, Institute for African Research and Studies, Cairo, 2007, p. 40.

[7]D. Amani Al-Taweel, Egyptian-Sudanese relations, the roots of problems and challenges to interests, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2012, p. 219.

[8] Elisha Kalle, "Water and Peace: An Israeli Perspective," translated by Randa Haidar, Institute for Palestine Studies, 1991, p. 1.

[9] Elisha Kali, previous source, p. 85

[10]D. Amani Al-Taweel, Israeli Strategies to Fragment Sudan, co-author, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, unpublished paper.

[11] Direct information from the head of the Federation of Egyptian Industries to the researcher.

Libyan military spokesman, Colonel Ahmed Al-Mismari, Al-Ahram newspaper, Saturday [12] seminar with 8/5/2017.

Hamdok and what is left unsaid in Egyptian-Sudanese relations

Sudanese Prime Minister Dr. Abdullah Hamdok's speech in his meeting with the leaders of Al-Ahram Foundation and Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies included many positive points that can be built upon to push Egyptian-Sudanese relations forward, especially with regard to creating a positive atmosphere for healthy and productive dealings for the benefit of the two countries, and rationalizing the perspective. How these relationships are addressed. Despite this, we find that inside Sudan, Dr. Hamdok's comprehensive talk did not receive any attention, except for what he spoke about what he called "the unspoken matter" in the relations between the two countries, which came via a telegraphic method that did not take more than a minute and a half, in which Hamdok pointed out three items that must be Seeking to find a solution to it, in order to consolidate the relationship between the two countries. These items included "mutual stereotypes," "view of history," and "Halib issu

In this silence, the "social media" and the Sudanese media only paid attention to half of the line that was reported about Haleb, in continuation of the approach of incitement and placing the matter within a conflictual framework, while the man's talk and its general context were within the framework of a positive approach and striving to maintain the continuity, stability and constancy of relations. .

It is no secret to anyone that there is a negative image in Sudan towards Egypt, which has been established over an extended period of time, and which has intensified over the last three decades. Complex factors have contributed to this, some of which are historical, some of which are cultural, and some of which are political, and a significant part of which is related to... added to it In Sudan, whether regional or cultural. Then a The data of internal conflicts Also, in the last decade, there have been interventions from external parties with media arms directed inward to serve the strategies and interests of these Sudanese countries, and seek to create a gap between Sudan and Egypt, external parties and not to serve Sudan.

The context of this article does not allow for details, and it is not the appropriate space for a dialogue to address this phenomenon, its dimensions, and how it develops and emerges from it. However, the basic observation is that much of what is circulated about Egypt inside Sudan, and constitutes material for repeated campaigns of hatred and attacks that go beyond any traditions or customs, is essentially based on false information that is repeated and treated as if it were facts and axioms. Unfortunately, there is a sector of the elite

Sudanese contributes to this in various ways, instead of rationalizing the dialogue or at least correcting the wrong information on which perceptions and concepts are built, which have become an actual obstacle, and are even on the verge of becoming a threat to the relationship between the two countries, as if it is left in this way - and through modern means of communication - it will create counter-reactions, creating a conflicting dialectic that will not be long until it is reflected in behaviors that undermine the common conscience that still exists.

At the present time, we find that official relations have received a strong boost and a clear momentum that is now reflected in most fields, due to structural factors and objective facts that cannot be overlooked due to the threats to the national security of both countries, which has proven that the sources of the threat to the two countries are the same, and that their interests and destiny are the same. subscriber. However, this momentum needs to be supported by a positive incubator and great work on both sides to overcome the impurities that have stuck to the relations, many of which are artificial and artificial.

There is no doubt that the proposal presented by Dr. Hamdok in addressing the "unspoken" has many positive aspects that cannot be overlooked. There is a prevailing feature in Egyptian-Sudanese relations, resulting from a political characteristic that seeks all the time to overcome stages of apathy, and searches and focuses on aspects of cooperation. For this reason, it tends to remain silent about any conversation that addresses reservations here or there, and considers that talking about that is something that disturbs the atmosphere, and that we must leave that behind us, as long as we are in a moment of agreement, and as long as we seek to pave a positive or cooperative path towards the future. Accordingly, there is frequent talk about connections and complementarity in interests and a common destiny, and many agreements are signed, the implementation of which is limited or temporary, while some undisclosed reservations remain hidden, or some unfulfilled demands here or there, in order to reappear at another time. As the existing gap in mutual awareness widens over time, due to many overlapping factors.

Here is Dr. Hamdok's speech opening the door to a new and different approach, filling the gaps and going beyond the usual diplomatic niceties, historical conversations, and the depth of the relationship. They are completely correct, but they are no longer sufficient at the present time. The challenges facing us now require a positive, supportive environment that provides support and popular support for the success of the many projects that have been agreed upon, some of which have already entered into implementation. They also go beyond the idea of successive cycles between stagnation and improvement that prevailed throughout the period that followed the independence of the State of Sudan.

It is known that these issues are addressed through extended dialogues between elites, researchers and academics on both sides, through frank discussion, transparency and objectivity, by correcting false information and examining the facts, clarifying this thick dust that confuses many, and producing new literature that frames the relationship and puts it on the right path. This matter, by its nature, requires quite a bit of time, and then it requires another time to bear fruit and reach the public conscience. But what is important is to start and break this vicious circle that reproduces problems and crises, which in the recent cycle of apathy and tension ended up exposing the security of the two countries to risks that would not have been able to knock on doors like this, if the doors of dialogue and consultation were wide and open.

Therefore, the urgent demand put forward now is to begin finding or creating structures and frameworks for communication and dialogue on a regular basis between the two countries, or to provide appropriate care for some existing institutions and entrust them with this task, which is no longer a luxury or an excess of work, but rather has become a duty point for the interaction of the media of this new page in A wide range of cultural, artistic and as a beginning and starting sporting aspects, consistent with relations characterized by unprecedented coordination and solidarity over more than three decades

The future of Egyptian-Ethiopian relations

Within the framework of its keenness to support the pillars of Egyptian national security and preserve its strategic interests, Egypt has sought during the past four years to restore its pivotal role regionally and internationally. This is done by correcting the path of its relations with other countries, especially those
Its relations with it witnessed some tension regarding some issues, such as Ethiopia, so that relations are based on the principles of joint cooperation and mutual benefit, with a commitment not to harm the other party, in order to support mutual trust and overcome any challenges. In this context, it is allocated

Issue No. (51) of the Egyptian File Journal (November 2018) to discuss the future of Egyptian-Ethiopian relations, especially after the arrival of the new Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed, to power.

Governance, and the opportunities and challenges this brings for Egypt, especially with regard to the issue of the

Renaissance Dam.

Dr. Amani Al-Taweel, Assistant Director of Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, began the issue by discussing the determinants governing Egyptian-Ethiopian relations, and the challenges they face. In this context, she focused on a number of determinants, the first of which was specific, considering that more than 85% of the water flows of the Nile River, which plays a decisive role, come from Ethiopia. It also referred to a number of determinants, such as political determinants, cultural determinants, religious determinants, economic determinants, and regional determinants. At the end of its analysis, it recommended the necessity of working to activate Egyptian-Ethiopian relations within the framework of these determinants, in order to support stability and regional balance on the African continent.

Due to the importance of the Renaissance Dam as a fundamental factor in Egyptian-Ethiopian relations, Dr. Ayman Abdel Wahab, the center's African affairs expert, addressed the various aspects of the Renaissance Dam crisis, where he pointed out that the paths of the crisis passed through many stages and stations, mainly linked to the nature of the environment incubating this crisis. Then he described the current situation of the crisis as a temporary freeze, and attributed this to reasons related to the quality of technical studies on the one hand, and Abiy Ahmed's reform project and power relations within Ethiopian society on the other hand. Dr. Ayman also discussed the foundations of the Egyptian movement, through three tracks: The first is presidential diplomacy, the second is the political track, and the third is the technical track. In conclusion, he recommended the need to support the negotiating mechanism, and considered it the Egyptian starting point

Dependent on the transformation of the Egyptian vision for water security. In addition to supporting policy directions

The Egyptian Foreign Ministry towards Africa, especially based on supporting development issues as a way to

achieve human and food security.

Regarding Ethiopian internal interactions, which are the governing framework for its foreign policy, Dr. Khaled Hanafi, an expert in African affairs, presented in the third article an analytical vision regarding attempts to redefine Ethiopian politics, and revealing the limits of its influence on Egypt, where with the rise of Abiy Ahmed to the position

of prime minister, it moved Ethiopian policy changed from what he saw as a repressive role to a reformist role accommodating the crises of pluralism, by taking many reform measures for the federal model, which are primarily aimed at calming nationalities angry at the hegemony of Tigray. In order to prove good intentions, Abiy Ahmed released prisoners of conscience, and removed some Movements from terrorist lists. In addition to developing an economic reform plan to confront the foreign exchange shortage crisis and the increase in foreign debt, by abandoning new national projects and confining ourselves to completing the currently implemented projects. Externally, Ethiopia has transformed from a regional power that intervened militarily or besieged its neighbors to

A regional peacemaker in the Horn of Africa, through several directions, including restoring regional leadership in a peaceful perspective by transforming bilateral cooperation into a regional one that provides the ability to influence and

adapt to regional competition arrangements. The second trend is building new partnerships with regional powers for two reasons: The first is by securing support for his reforms, and the second is by expanding his investment options. As for the impact of redefining the regional role on Egypt, Khalid said that the limits of influence are linked to the extent of Cairo's ability to build realistic policies to deal with it. For this purpose, three tracks of relations were monitored, the first of which is bilateral cooperation, the second is strengthening the Egyptian assimilation policy towards Sudan, and the third track relates to the extent of the possibility of Egypt presenting a new initiative for regional cooperation.

Regarding the repercussions of internal interactions on redefining Ethiopia's foreign policy, Dr. Rania Hussein Khafaja, political science teacher at the Institute of African Studies, discussed in the fourth article, Ethiopian foreign policy towards the Horn of Africa, where she saw that this policy was not isolated from Abiy Ahmed's reform vision, and was evident. This is through fundamental transformations. The most prominent of which was the historical rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and the two countries' signing of a friendship and cooperation treaty. Ethiopian policy was not limited to Eritrea only, as Ethiopia signed an agreement with the government of Djibouti to buy a share in the port of Djibouti in May 2018. As for Ethiopian-Sudanese relations, Ethiopia succeeded in neutralizing the Sudanese position in the dam negotiations.

Renaissance. Thus, Dr. Rania believes that Ethiopia not only sought to develop its bilateral relationship with the countries of the Horn of Africa region, but also sought to confirm its position as a regional power. Perhaps Ethiopia's attempt at playing the role of mediator in the internal conflict in Sudan is a clear example of its regional strength. Dr. Rania then monitored a number of factors and determinants of the Ethiopian movement in the region. She concluded her analysis by monitoring a number of challenges facing Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa region, including obstacles to full normalization between Ethiopia and Eritrea, in addition to the border dispute, such as the two countries' support for opposition movements and rebel groups that target other countries, in addition to the challenges of the internal position in Ethiopia, regarding its foreign policy, especially towards Eritrea.

The issue was concluded by Dr. Ayman Shabana, Deputy Director of the Nile Basin Center at the Institute for African Research and Studies, by discussing the latest developments in Ethiopian regional and international relations, where he stressed that Ethiopian foreign relations revolve across several circles; The most important of them is the Horn of Africa, while the other circles are the Nile Basin, the Great Lakes, the African regional groupings, the Middle East, and the World Circle. Dr. Ayman explained that Ethiopia was keen to diversify its foreign relations and build balanced strategic partnerships that would help it achieve its national interests, the most important of which were preserving its unity, securing direct access to the Red Sea, and benefiting from the water resources available to it. He also stressed the existence of a number of principles governing this policy, the most important of which are economic outside world on the basis of development, following the peaceful approach, and establishing relations with the common interests.

Dr. discussed He identified the factors affecting Ethiopian foreign relations, and classified them into internal and regional and international countries. external factors. Finally, he reviewed Ethiopian relations with a number of He believed that Ethiopia has achieved many gains from its foreign relations, the most important of which is maintaining its regional cohesion and strengthening it as a regional power in the Horn of Africa, in addition to providing political cover to complete the Renaissance Dam project.

Sudanese-Egyptian relations after the revolution

Egyptian-Sudanese relations continued to be closely linked and have a deep dimension. in spite of

It was and still is in a state of ebb and flow; This is because the successive governments in the two countries did not face anything that would hinder their continuation of the comprehensive solution, and they took the method of calming and alleviating the outstanding problems between the two countries. Because of its awareness of the importance of this relationship for the two countries, and the necessity of its continuity and confirmation, and to start or reach It has reached advanced stages; For fear of confrontation that might lead to their complete separation It reaches the dead end stage.

The relationship between Egypt and Sudan is characterized by the connection, geographical neighborhood, and thus common interests, common history, ethnic mixing, common Arabic language and culture,

Countries tend to search for commonalities In light of the recent growth in international relations With others to strengthen cooperation among themselves to serve their common interests; Whether these components are sought are political, cultural, or economic. From this standpoint, we all moved towards...

Egypt and Sudan seek to link together through integration relations at some point in order to achieve the best use of common resources in the fields of politics, economics, and society.

To achieve the well-being of the peoples of the Nile Valley, and to secure them against internal threats And security, all the way However, the indicator of tension in relations between them continued to rise as usual, until the activity of the Their mutual defense agreement was cancelled. Now, in light of the fifth revolution (Integration) program stopped, and On the 20th of January, which raised the slogans of patriotism, the fight against corruption, and political, administrative and economic reform, Egypt may find that it is on its way back to a leadership position in the Arab and Islamic world, and that this road passes through the gate of Sudan, which will need its security support as it is the strategic depth of Egypt, and its economic support to solve the security problem. Food and political support in regional and international organizations.

Egypt:

Egypt is the land of civilizations and cultures, and it has remained active throughout history, influencing and being affected by As imposed by its geographical location and its distinguished role regional and international policies, both negatively and positively. In political reality.

Egypt is located in the northeastern corner of Africa, and part of its territory (7% of the area) enters the continent of Asia, between latitudes 22.35-32 north and longitudes 25-35,909 km, and the shore of the Red Sea, overlooking the Mediterranean Sea with a coastline of Length From the from Libya past to the west th Mediterranean. With a coast length of up to 1,370 km, an area of 1,001,450 square km, the Sea. The Red Sea and occupied Palestine, and north From the south, Sudan, and to the east Average.

Studies indicate that the population size exceeds 70 million people now.

Through which the Far East trade, d The Suez Canal is one of the most important waterways; When it was completed y Come The Arabian Gulf and East Africa are on their way to Europe via the Mediterranean, a meeting point for East and West.

Raha in Sudan is greater; It is strategic depth y Egypt is greatly influenced by neighboring countries, but it is affected For Egypt, as it appeared in all its wars, and all the campaigns that invaded Sudan, were strategic interventions at the political level. Egypt Road. Sudan, by virtue of its location, represents a neighbourhood Economic and military, Sudan represents the largest basin of the Nile Basin, and it is the second basin country with its waters after Egypt. The Nile is beneficial

strategically on global trade lines, Egypt in the eighteenth century location I was occupied As a result of the industrial revolution in Europe; It made it an essential stop for Westerners on their way to India, and The ambitions of the European empires competing for Asia and Africa, after they lost a target Its American colonies in the second half of the eighteenth century. The importance of Egypt's geographical location increased after the establishment of the Suez Canal, which shortened the commercial navigation route and facilitated the colonization of Africa and the Middle East. Egypt played an important role in the twentieth century, through... Eliminate Its contribution to the liberation of colonized areas in the Arab world and Africa, and then

In front of the Zionist project in

The French and English empires formed an impenetrable dam

Establishment of the Greater State of Israel.

Egypt in preparing Arab and Islamic elites and leaders through Al-Azhar Al-Sharif, Egyptian universities, I contributed
and through its educational centers and educational missions in the Arab world, and played the role of the pole of attraction for the
Arab and Islamic world.

At the end of the twentieth century, Egypt's star began to fade after the signing of the Camp David Agreement with Israel. This
agreement led to the decline of Egypt's influence on the countries of the region to a position that was not commensurate with
the size of its interests and its leadership of the countries of the region for a long time. This agreement continued to govern
Egyptian politics and influence The Foreign Ministry negatively affected its role in the region in general and Sudan in particular.
The reality also says: The decline of the Egyptian role in the region's foreign policy has not been compensated for.

None of the region's capitals to this day, individually or together

a

What role it has in the environment The Arab Republic of Egypt is gaining great importance in the region. For
It has political, economic, media, social, cultural and security weight Regional and international, and
Who is Arab and Islamic? What influence it has in the world He is a military man to be reckoned with

Studies related to the ethnic composition of the world indicate that the inhabitants of ancient Egypt and the inhabitants of
northern Sudan belong to the Hamitic race, which entered this region long ago, and it is believed that
He came from the south of the Arabian Peninsula, and with the southward movement, the Hamitic Nile tribes appeared in
South Sudan.

Religion remained a linking factor between the north and south of the valley. Egyptian paganism came to Sudan, then Christianity,
and Islam entered Africa after the Islamic conquest of Egypt in the seventh century AD. It became a center for the spread of the
call to the west and south, and from there Islam entered Sudan in the year
651 AD, after which the Arab tribes flocked to Sudan, carrying with them their culture and civilization, which over time
became the culture and civilization of the majority of the population in Sudan.

Relations between the two countries: And Fly

After Muhammad Ali Pasha took control of Egypt and established the foundations of his authority there, he began working hard to... And achieving his aspirations to the east in the Hejaz lands, to the west in Libya, and to the south Expanding the area of ml In Sudan, which enables him to recruit his men into his army to repel the ambitions of France and England in his rule, and to support his country economically through the gold mines for which Sudan is famous, and it has a strategic goal. as a source Totally dependent The last thing that opened up Sudan was securing the sources of the Nile, which Egypt depends on The only irrigation resource for agricultural lands, then exploiting Sudan's resources other than gold, marketing them in global markets, and opening new markets for Egypt's exports in Sudan. Muhammad Ali was aware of the fact Sudan represents the strategic depth of Egypt, and the necessity of securing it The coasts of the Red Sea to ensure the protection and safety of navigation for his fleets. After taking control of the Hijaz, Muhammad can be exploited as a defensive depth if a Ali Pasha realized that Sudan represented the depth to Egypt and Finally, it European country attacks it. Despite the Turkish effort to highlight the features of the map of modern Sudan in the period from (1863-1869 AD), introducing Arab and Islamic culture, and activating investment activity in the field of mining, cotton cultivation, and ginning, the Turkish policy of oppression The treatment of the Sudanese led to their complaints, and marked the beginning of rebellion against them and the activation of the revolution Nationalism, and the emergence of the Mahdist revolution in Sudan until the liberation of Khartoum from the grip of the Turks on January 26, 1885 AD. Then Britain decided to restore Sudan, and this was done after the Battle of Karari on February 9, 1898 AD, which was the beginning of what is known as dual rule, which in turn fueled Sudanese anger against the fact that it was ruling nominally, and it was That Egypt is Egypt for its cooperation with the British in confronting Sudan; Note the true sovereignty of the English. When the winds of Egyptian national renaissance blew, its leaders demanded the restoration of sovereignty over Sudan in favor of Egypt, and they did not correct the existing situation and call for the independence of Sudan, while the concept that was associated with the minds of Sudanese nationalists after the 1924 revolution and in the years 1945-1956 AD was demanding the removal of colonialism from Egypt and Sudan, and in this The writer says the land of peace has been open to Egypt since time immemorial Egyptian Omar Toson: Sudan is empty, and it must remain that way. Because it is necessary for the soul to be attached to the body, and to this end must be directed all the efforts of those benefit it. who have the fortune of Egypt in their hand, and in whose hearts they intend to And interest.

The White Banner Society was formed in Sudan in 1924 AD under the leadership of Ali Abdul Latif and Obaid Haj Al-Amin, and coordination was adopted between the military and civilians in opposing British rule in With movement The face of the association is unitary; That is, the union with Egypt, and Sudan coordinated this. And it was T Represented by the Egyptian National Society for the Defense of Sudan, which raised patriotism in Egypt

The slogan (Nile Valley Unity); however, the concept of the slogan, as Professor Abu al-Qasim Haj Hamad pointed out in his book (Sudan's Dilemma, History and Future Prospects), meant to the Sudanese the Arab-Islamic right as a framework containing the two countries' culture, history, and national bond, but on the Egyptian side it

To them, what he meant was Egypt's rights in Sudan and Sudan's interests in Egypt, which, as he pointed out, was the feudal ownership that had prevailed for a long time in Egypt. So I did

The The writer and the spirit

between them agree, and there is no strategy or unified move. It has been characterized The slogan achieves real, popular integration

Egypt was negative towards the White Brigade movement, the Sudanese street, and the vanguard of its intellectuals, and restricted the movement of Egyptian military units in Sudan to support the armed military movement in Sudan. Then, after the killing of Sir Lee Estack in Cairo, it accepted the humiliating ultimatum, as described by the English historian Arnold Toynbee, and it was the utmost What Saad Zaghloul did then was to resign from the presidency of the government, so that someone else could implement the terms of the ultimatum, including Egypt's final abandonment of its existence.

In Sudan under the British threat, and the threat of the Nile Waters Agreement concluded in 1929 AD, which the Sudanese saw as unfair to them in favor of Egypt; This added another factor in weakening the trust in Egypt among the Sudanese, and the result was that the shift in Sudanese political awareness began from abstract idealism to realism and to proving Sudanese self-rights and independence from Egypt.

Despite the troubles he sometimes experiences, and despite what

The friendship between the peoples of the Nile Valley remained constant

Disagreement occurs between the regimes of the two countries and tension and hostility in their relationship due to conflicting interests and differences of views on political issues, which indicates their mutual affection for each other, so the effort continued.

... The specificity of this relationship between Egypt and Sudan, and confirms the need of each country to remove the rift and seek to legalize and frame the relationship. However, all efforts have not yielded results.

Its fruits are as I want them to be.

Relations between the years (1956 - 2007 AD):

In the period from 1956 to 2007 AD, the course of relations between Egypt and Sudan was characterized by anticipation and caution. It eased at times and became more complex at other times, and the stage had the vitality it imposed

Conditions of political development in both countries.

In Egypt, the Egyptian leadership decided on its political vision of establishing states based on an alliance of people's working forces, within a philosophical framework based on Arab thought or nationalism, and with the death of Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1970 with the vision of Sadat in the state of knowledge, faith, and village traditions, and after the assassination of Sadat, he was followed by Hosni Mubarak, who summarized his path in that he is not Muhammad Anwar Sadat and that he is not Gamal Abdel Nasser. As for Sudan, the experience went through a closed-circle path of liberal rule and military coups, and over the extent of the disagreement in the concept of the state, the system of government, and the content of authority in the two countries, the specificity of the relationship, despite its ambiguity and ambiguity, continued to provide a soothing and palliative for any attempt. Tension or disturbance of relations.

During the period of the first military rule in Sudan, led by Lieutenant General Abboud, an agreement was reached on the waters of the Nile and the construction of the High Dam, after he stated in his first statement that his government would seek to remove the artificial rift between the Egyptian and Sudanese peoples, which he saw as the creation of politicians. Whereas the border problem (Haleb region) had previously arisen during the era of Prime Minister Abdullah Khalil, it was not raised again during the era of the Abboud government.

- It is what was known as the second democracy between the Events occurred after President Abboud's term Ath
Show the October Revolution years 1964 - 1969 AD - on the relations of Egypt and Sudan; Egypt that did not die
With false information that led to street excitement He did it in the media Sudanese no interest, it came
The Sudanese and his protest against the Egyptian media and the insult to the Egyptian flag. This is considered a confrontation, but the Egyptian leadership considered this a natural public reaction
The world of relationships is supportive
And I got over it.

on a strategy with clear The June 1967 war broke out, and Sudan proved once again that its relations with Egypt were built goals, and it stood by Egypt. President Ismail Al-Azhari, head of the Sovereignty Council, even declared that Sudan was a state of confrontation with Israel, and that its potential had been maximized.

Blocked To serve the battle, and he worked in complete harmony with the leader of the opposition, Mr. Mohamed Ahmed. The nation was dispersed after the setback. The Khartoum Summit (the summit of the Prime Minister's League and we were able to bring together the Arab countries) was famous for its three allegiances. The nation regained its unity and met its goals, where the Saudi King Faisal met with the leader Nasser. The dispute over Yemen ended, and the bleeding of Arab blood in that part of the country stopped. The Arab countries undertook to support the war effort in the confrontation countries (Egypt, Syria, and Jordan).

President Nimeiry's rule extended for sixteen years and witnessed stability and development in...

Relations between Egypt and Sudan, despite some periods of coldness or tension; As happened when Sudan restored its diplomatic relations with the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany without returning to Egypt. This reflects the lack of familiarity of the brothers in Egypt with the Sudanese independence mood, but the waters returned to their normal course and relations continued at their normal pace, and the strength of the personality of leader Abdel Nasser and his dedication to serving the nation's issues had a significant impact on this relationship.

Sadat succeeded Abdel Nasser in ruling Egypt and had his own personal mood in relations with Sudan. The strategy of protecting Egypt's back had an impact on its foreign political relationship with Sudan, out of fear from shifting the (Addis Ababa-Aden) axis and circumventing it from behind with Soviet support, they became place. Because of his fear of the Aden Pact, the 19th coup took Libya (confirmed). And Dan - with (Als). The opposite is the solution. July 1971 AD, carried out by the communists in Sudan, was expected to succeed in encircling Egypt and Sadat's rule from the south, which called on Sadat to move and declare his protection for Sudan and the protection of the regional system as a whole and not to allow interference in Sudan's internal affairs. As a result of this incident and the events of 1976 AD, which was led by the Sudanese opposition with the support of From Libya, the two countries signed the Defense Pact Joint on July 15, 1976 AD.

With the assassination of President Sadat in October 1981 AD and President Mubarak assuming power in Egypt, a new era of Egyptian-Sudanese relations began, and at its beginning they continued in the previous pattern of maintaining friendly relations through which Egypt achieved the Egyptian depth strategy in Sudan and security was condemned.

To upgrade the integrated work platform (which was in 1974 AD) for water development, and sought to develop the economic, social, political and intellectual capabilities of the two countries, within the framework of joint integration, and

1982 AD with the aim of codifying the relationship and This was done by signing the integration charter in October. Wow subjecting it to governmental supervision of both countries.

Many political and technical institutions and bodies were established to supervise and achieve goals. The principles included in the Charter, which included the Supreme Council for Integration headed by the two heads of state, the Nile Valley Parliament, the General Secretariat for Integration, the joint technical committees, and the Integration Fund, agreed to implement three axes to achieve the objectives of the Charter, which are: And other subcommittees. Watt

- Developing common interests between the two countries in the social, economic, cultural and military fields.

- Removing restrictions and barriers, especially in the field of trade and commodity exchange between the two countries.

- Working to eliminate differences and disparities between the two peoples to confirm historical unity and common destiny.

The implementation reality of the Charter demonstrated many positives and negatives, the most important of which was sharp criticism It has it in both Egypt and Sudan. That it was imposed from above and ignored the element of popular interaction with her. Then relations witnessed a clear cooling at the end of President Numeiri's era, and work on the project stopped As a result of the rebel activity in South Sudan and the deterioration of the security situation, the John Guli channel was not activated

- Common defense to preserve it agreement

With the outbreak of the popular uprising in Sudan and the revolution against Numeiri's rule, the relationship between the two countries became tense at the beginning of this era, and was characterized by declared confrontation and the rejection of both countries' policies. the other; Sudan accused Egypt of being responsible for supporting Numeiri's rule and protecting its continuation. The Sudanese government requested the extradition of President Nimeiri, who remained in Egypt after the uprising, as a political refugee. In return, the Sudanese government demanded Popular power, and Egypt refused to cancel all agreements and pacts with Egypt, open the border file (Haleb issue), and review the Nile Water Agreement.

Egypt supported the Salvation Revolution in 1989 AD at the beginning of its reign as a result of false intelligence with the Nasserist line and called for Egypt's information that saw the leaders of the revolution as those who stood relations to be the first to recognize and support the new regime and provide it to others with Egypt, and presented discovered its support; The Egyptian intelligence services reneged on what happened And when Egypt Rather, it confronted the regime with hostility and took advantage of Sudan's preoccupation with the situation in the south, the security aspect, and confronting the economic problems inherited by the Salvation Revolution, and it occupied (the Haleb Triangle), an issue that had been kept silent about throughout previous eras since the era of Abdel Nasser, and Sudan was considered a blatant attack by the Egyptian government that falls within the American vision. Which she saw to be narrow

That's an exception

Sudan must impose economic restrictions, embargoes and boycotts, and its neighbors must fight it. That

The plan, which was sponsored by Madeleine Albright, the Secretary of State at that time, brought together six...

Almighty did not distract most of them from the invasion of their May God bless you Sudan's neighboring countries, but God
, what countries, or from the confrontations that took place between those countries with each other. Sudan due to internal
problems, except for Uganda, which participated in Operation Heavy Rains with its forces to invade South Sudan, but Sudan,
due to its internal circumstances, dealt with He wisely dealt with the Halib issue and did not resort to military escalation
through the international community, which Egypt rejects. The issue remained across and preferred to resolve the issue peacefully

Relations between the two countries, then came And the borders with Egypt are among the thorny issues that hinder development

The repercussions of the Second Gulf War cast a shadow on Egyptian-Sudanese relations, as a result of
the event, benefiting from American support, keeping up with the American policy of exploiting Egypt,
and Sudan's insistence on the agreed-upon Arab solution, which was conspired against one night during the
Arab Summit Conference in Cairo, and Sudan appeared as if it supported Iraq's occupation of Kuwait in 1990
AD. This is the opposite of the truth, and Egypt saw this as a departure from obedience, and pressure was applied

Western and American pressure on the countries of the region to escalate with Sudan, and in 1995 AD relations reached
a crossroads after the incident of the attempted assassination of President Mubarak in Addis Ababa, where tension escalated
and the situation worsened, and the common interests between the two countries were affected. However, the intensity of
tension decreased and the two countries were satisfied with what they could. To fall within the scope of the Cold War, or between
push and pull, cooperation and coordination in international forums sometimes to the point of agreement on the four freedoms between

The two countries.

Relations and their impact on the security of the Nile Basin:

The Nile Basin: It is the area that the Nile crosses from its sources to its mouth, and the basin consists of:
Egypt, Sudan (before the secession of its south), Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Zaire, Tanzania, Rwanda, and
Burundi. The area of the basin is 2.9 million km², and the length of the course from source to mouth is 4,190
miles or 6,695 kilometers, and it is the longest international river in the world.

of the colonial conflict across different eras; The basin has political importance, which is what made it a location

It passes through nine countries, and connects the Arab peoples in the north with the African peoples in
the south and east, and it is the belt connecting the Arab-Islamic culture and weight with the African culture and
weight in the south. Which made Western countries and Israel seek to exploit it and incite a threat to
the Egyptian and Sudanese national security (these two countries overlooking the

The Red Sea), and their importance comes from being maritime outlets for some of the landlocked countries of the basin, with an essential basis. Considering the importance of the Nile waters and exploiting them against Egypt and Sudan, the Nile waters remained coveted

In the Zionist expansionist plan within the framework of Greater Israel from the Nile to the Euphrates to irrigate the Negev Desert.

With the exception of Egypt, all the countries of the basin are located in the Horn of Africa, and are characterized by political instability, which is a hotbed of conflicts on the African continent and an area of permanent conflict. Which is easy Foreign intervention or the need for it for the purpose of support, then the Nile Waters Agreement itself is a subject Permanent conflict between the basin countries; It is exploited by foreign incitement to maintain tension in the region Between the basin countries on one side, and Sudan and Egypt on the other side.

The economic importance of the Nile Basin:

The Nile Basin has many economic resources that have not yet been exploited. Where it is available Water is used to irrigate arable land and the fertility rate increases, and joint projects can be established in the fields of food and industrial security and electrical energy, which does not satisfy the powers that be.

Foreign affairs and their interests.

1959 AD, with 1 year ago agreement Relations between the Nile Basin countries continued to be relatively stable until each of them regulating their benefit from the Nile waters. However, differences emerge from Egypt and Sudan which n Other parties between the Basin countries; Especially those that the agreement did not grant any share of the water, and Egypt and Sudan had the largest share, or as a result of the agricultural and industrial development policies pursued by the basin countries from time to time; This is what greatly worries Egypt about its share of...

Water.

to the other; Nile Valley (Egypt). strategically Both countries (Egypt and Sudan) represent depth Sudan is the heart of the Arab world, and Africa's gateway to the continents of Asia and Europe. It is their natural extension to the heart of the African continent and its east. It has components and capabilities that reflect the necessity of integration, as it represents the optimal awakening to achieve common interests. Thus, Sudan and Egypt become a single threat unit to the ambitions of the great powers.

The security of the Nile Valley necessitates the establishment of joint security between Egypt and Sudan, to protect their interests in the face of the League of Nations. The Western and Israeli threat, in light of the absence of Arab national awareness that it represents Arabic language, which was completely absent from the Egyptian strategic vision during the course of problems South Sudan, which ended with a referendum on separating its south from its north, which exposes it to Zionist polarization and threatens Egypt's water security and its national security as well. Israel may exploit this situation to have a military and economic presence in South Sudan or the new state, and all agreements related to the Nile waters will collapse due to the existence of this state.

The interests between them are disputed. We have reviewed the progress of Sudanese-Egyptian relations, and it has become clear that they are strong. It leads to fluctuation and tension in their relations, and the tension in relations is most often the result of interventions by global powers, or was built on a temporary or tactical interest that did not care about the strategic dimension.

- The times
- The personal outlook of leaders throughout the world
- And even sometimes for relationships, a

However, the strategic dimension of these relations confirms that both countries possess capabilities and capabilities that reflect... The necessity of integration to achieve the common interests of the national security of Egypt and Sudan, and achieve creation A force to be reckoned with in the region; This tempts the rest of the neighboring countries to join it, follow its path, or avoid attacking it and harming its interests. The components of the common foundations for this integration are present, represented by their sharing of a social and cultural background based on their belonging to common goals and achieving an awareness of **lord** common to the Arab-Islamic civilization, which is what is valid T, and the connection between national security for both of them is a fact that is due to **McCarthy** and hence close together. The reality of geography, history and circumstances, which calls for the necessity of coordination in all areas of economic, political, military and social forces.

Egyptian-Sudanese relations after (January 25):

In light of the goals and principles advocated by the (January 25 Revolution) in Egypt in the field of foreign policy to restore Egypt's pioneering role in the region, and to emerge from the control of the American-Zionist policy, which weakened that role and harmed Egyptian-Arab and African relations on Sudanese security in particular; Which is what happened And with sucking relationship. As a result of that policy in general, Egyptian nationalism and Sudanese national security, and Sudan was greatly harmed

It occurred that the previous years, and will affect Egypt more in the future due to its neglect of the strategic outlook

And being satisfied with temporary and immediate solutions, and raising the slogan of restoring Egyptian sovereignty Egyptian-Sudanese relations return to a situation that serves both countries in all fields. In order to achieve national security for both of them, there are many common goals and interests that impose the inevitability of rapprochement and unity around them, and to overcome the conflicts and disagreements of the past. These objectives include the following:

- Joint cooperation regarding the Nile water agreements: This is to secure the two countries' share of the water, in light of the basin countries' threat to reconsider the agreements.

•D Sudan is one of the markets y Cooperation in the economic, agricultural and educational fields: where the Egyptian products and agricultural lands available to it are considered the effective solution to the problems of Increasing Egyptian food security, under the threat of population explosion and American control over Egypt using the pressure card represented by American wheat.

Cooperation in the military security field; Sudan, which is neighboring seven countries after the separation of the South from them, and with the American policy that fights and intervenes in the Sudanese countries, and whose interests intersect by proxy, expects the continued threat from all directions, and the Zionist presence in the south of the Egyptian interests and the Nile Basin countries may force Egypt and Sudan to intersect. To confront y a decisive factor in it; The defense agreement may be settled D. The relations between Sudan and y military; Which comes Egypt, which share a conflict before it begins, as an effective deterrent factor.

The importance of these goals requires Egypt and Sudan to overcome problems, contain differences between them, and work to develop their relations. Not only politically, but in every field Cooperation: economically, politically, militarily, socially, etc. This will raise a lot of concerns With Western and Zionist interests, and exploiting the situation what happened That's Problems in Egypt; The internal conflict under a liberal government to create a state of instability in Egypt by provoking partisan differences, religious disparity, or Islamic-Christian discord, or even by military threats on the border with Israel.

Therefore, Egypt needs, above all, to define a foreign policy strategy, which must begin gradually so as not to be surprised by the opening of many fronts and facing more challenges in light of a situation that was not established with a solid internal agreement basis, and with realistic plans to confront those challenges, and this may require...

the social contract between RF, Egyptian National Security, considering To bring people together around Citizen and power; In terms of essential services and human rights considerations, remember that

The people who revolted against the regime of oppression and tyranny and to restore rights will not live in any future A system that violates these rights, even if it comes through election, provided that this understanding and approach applies to the base as well (i.e. the general public), as is required at the top of the pyramid.

This requires a lot of effort and effort to enlighten and educate citizens

Considering the national and patriotic interest, the red lines in matters of national security and not compromising them, and giving priority to the public interest over the private interest, which is one of the requirements of religion as well as one of the necessities of the world. In this way, the country can be protected and fortified against the state of (Somalia) or fragmentation word. Then, when choosing And collect with the capabilities of its people, its geniuses, and its devotees, and by uniting the good officials, it is necessary to activate the rule of (the strong and trustworthy) and remove those for whom the national agenda is weak, and those who are strengthened by the hostile elements in dismantling and dispersing unity and opinion. .

It is also necessary to strive to come up with a system and constitution that reduces differences and conflicts Opinion in which the opposition takes care of the national interest before the government, and the goal is the interests and aspirations of the people and the nation.

Economists say that the economic crisis in Egypt increased due to the increase in the political influence of the business class and their participation in the government, and the implementation of unjust economic decisions against the country and its people. This led to an increase in inflation, unemployment and debt. Reforming the economic situation requires leaving this circle and entrusting the matter to the specialists.

It is certain that Egypt after the January 25 revolution will not return to Egypt before that, restoring its position on the previous map of the Arab world at least. The way to do so, if Egypt wants to do so, is to adopt a policy that achieves its national sovereignty first and to work to serve the nation's issues. Especially

Its pivotal issue is (Palestine). It is expected that Egyptian foreign policy will change gradually in light of the given internal reality, the regional and international situation, and national security considerations, and it is not wise to open the Camp David files with and relations with the United States in a hurry out of anger.

Slogans of the revolution. Rather, it may take a period to consolidate and establish the system, and to gain the support of the countries of the region, the Islamic nation, and the non-aligned countries, if they exist.

What was stated regarding Egypt's right in foreign and internal policy is needed by Sudan in the coming period on a regional level in cooperation with Egypt - it To create a stable, developed and growing situation; can achieve Also - serves the interests of both countries, and Sudan expects the new era in Egypt to solve the problem of the eternal, silent borders, end the military occupation of Halib and stop the policy of Egyptianization pursued by Hosni Mubarak's regime, and for the two parties to adopt the method of dialogue or arbitration to solve the dilemma once and for all. He went to serve both countries, but in the light of the truth This may be within the framework of an integration area, as is desired Sudan needs shade Address other disputes as well. Sudan's legal and military mandate in Halib, including the requirements of national security, its internal circumstances, and its regional and international environment, is to develop its relations with Egypt in a way that does not cause irritation in the local, regional, and international environment.

Sudan happened to be a means to tear up the pressure card In light of joint economic cooperation The results of economic and agricultural projects in particular can be of great benefit to my people.

Nile Valley.

The issue of the Nile waters requires the crystallization of a Sudanese-Egyptian vision that serves their interests while taking into account the interests of the other basin countries. Rather, it is more beneficial to win over the other basin countries to The course of international law; It is known serve this vision instead of boycotting it, or imposing an opinion on them, even if it is... Egypt mechanisms are all subject to Western interests, and will not serve the Currently, international law enforcement interests of Sudan at that time.

Sudan's internal issues after Naivasha and their expected consequences need Egyptian support, especially since they are influential and affected by the goals of international politics, such as the Darfur issue, and what will result from the Naivasha agreement in the areas of Abyei, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile.

There is no doubt that the areas of cooperation between Sudan and Egypt are many and endless, and we only mention the . I hate it issues: education, human resources development, and media, in addition to the above.

It is in the security and interest of both, and therefore integration between the two countries may achieve the interests and goals

example built on real common of all other countries of the region, within the framework of a unity that is a living

Contrary to what is interests, with effectiveness and a tangible impact on the peoples and countries of the region.

happening in existing institutions that have no impact on the members of the organization and its countries.

Above all, Egypt must look at Sudan as an equal and a neighboring country with common interests, and get rid of the view of
condescension that prevailed throughout the past era, and then it will find in it a cooperative and friendly country that will come

God bless you.

together when needed. And

Egyptian-Sudanese relations in the period "2011-2015"

Photo of the Arab Democratic Center Arab Democratic Center. July 28, 2016 011,065 1 hours

Egypt and Sudan

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Egyptian-Sudanese relations (2011-2015)

introduction:

Human societies have known relationships since ancient times and established relationships among themselves a long time ago, and their methods for doing so were settled on foundations that became principles upon which they followed, thus strengthening the bonds of relationship and caring for mutual interests. Thus, the national interest was the axis on which the policies of countries and their foreign relations were based in light of the differences in interests and values. Most of them focus on preserving the state's sovereignty and preserving its national security.[1]

Looking at the Egyptian-Sudanese relations, we find that they are characterized by privacy, due to the neighbourliness, the intertwining of interests, and the ethnic, historical, and geographical overlap, which achieves a model for the relations between the two countries with a unique strategic character. It is a twin relationship, just like the Syrian-Lebanese relations, the Saudi-Yemeni relations, and the Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations, which are rooted in history. It cannot be dismantled or eliminated, as the Sudanese issue has long been linked in Egyptian political thought to the concept of national security, which sees any threat to Sudan's unity as a threat to Egypt's security.[2]

The relations between the two countries have always been based on solid and real ground that is deeply rooted.

History: A common history links the two countries, and a human and cultural interpenetration strengthened by the waters of the Nile, and even if relations between them oscillate between push and pull, on the one hand, the Sudanese governments tend to follow policies that are more independent and different from their Egyptian counterparts, and on the other hand, the Egyptian governments are keen to secure their political interests. Strategic, economic, and water resources in Sudan. All of these links made Sudan Egypt's gateway to Africa and a bridge of communication with deep Africa.[3]

Throughout the ages, Egyptian-Sudanese relations have been determined by two main determinants: the Nile River being the responsible source that supplies both with water, and the second factor is Egypt's desire to play an active and effective role in the region, which helped human and natural factors in its growth. The issue of securing access to the Nile resources after Essential in the Egyptian political agenda, starting with the first kings, passing through Muhammad Ali to the nationalist elite that ruled after the occupation, all the way to Muhammad Naguib and Gamal Abdel Nasser[4]

Independence and the unity of the Nile have crystallized at the top of Egypt's foreign policy priorities. In this regard, the closeness between the Sudanese case and the Egyptian case stands out. Both were subject to similar conditions of occupation that led them to adopt the idea of the unity of the Nile Valley as a form of resistance to achieving independence. However, the British occupation was a major obstacle in developing relations between the two countries. In both countries, Britain continued to interfere in the internal affairs of Egypt, even after the end of the 1936 treaty, and did not evacuate its forces until after World War II. On the other hand, Sudan remained an obstacle in understanding Egyptian-British relations, as the Egyptian desire to retain it and make it subject to it [5]

Despite the strong ties of this relationship, it went through long periods of tension, oscillating between tension and attraction. This may be due to many factors, including the period of the Egyptian-British conflict over sovereignty over Sudan during the first half of the twentieth century, and the reduction and confinement of relations within the security framework and the political interests of successive Sudanese elites. Polarizations within these elites and the rise of political Islam to power in Sudan, in addition to its decline

The Egyptian role during the period of former President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak and the failure of the Sudanese elites to support the south and its secession, not to mention building their stable national state and entering into extended wars, conflicts in Darfur and armed groups. On the other hand, Egypt is also exhausted by its internal problems and deteriorating economic conditions after the revolution [6]

The integration experiences in the 1960s and 1970s demonstrated the predominance of political and security goals over the goals, so they became limited to protecting the political system of each of the two countries. Many problems occurred in the nature of relations between the two countries. As soon as a regime arrived with different orientations and policies from the other regime, accusations erupted between the two parties and controversial issues were reopened. Especially the border issues, namely the Haleeb Triangle and the Nile Water Agreements, in which Sudan sees an injustice to its rights, especially with the arrival of the Salvation Government and its adoption of the fundamentalist opposition to the regime in their country and its attempt to adopt an Islamic civilized project that it conveys as a model for other countries in an atmosphere of the lack of capabilities that qualify it for this role

In the decade of the nineties of the last century, Egyptian-Sudanese relations deteriorated in an unprecedented way, reaching the level of a true cold war, which did not stop at the point of discord between the regimes, but rather extended into Sudan to a greater extent through continuous media attacks and mobilization against what was portraying Egypt as... It is an external opponent, which has created a generation in Sudan that looks at Egypt with suspicion and apprehension. However, despite the misfortunes of that period, it can be considered as a lesson learned or a lesson that emphasizes the importance of the privacy of that relationship, no matter how many ways they parted, and then returning to a situation of cooperation and coordination again. [8]

However, relations witnessed development in the late 1990s as a result of a number of regional and international variables that urged a reconsideration of relations and the resumption of integration, but developments remained limited as a result of it being designed in a superficial manner, lack of clarity of goals, weak human resources, lack of training, inability to keep pace with changes in the labor market, and weak financing. The absence of political stability, especially in Sudan, in addition to bureaucracy [9]

Therefore, the study seeks to try to overcome these bad experiences, address them, and establish a new page based on equality, brotherhood, equality, mutual respect, and partnership in all fields.

Getting out of the crucible of the security perspective and mutual accusations, striving towards resolving the outstanding succession issues from a neutral perspective, with an emphasis on commitment to all diplomatic methods and means, staying away from mechanisms of violence and coercion, and analyzing relations from all angles and within the framework of regional and international changes, especially with the outbreak of the spring revolutions, which heralds a new era. Of freedom and democracy, an era whose lines are drawn and governed by the peoples of both countries, not just their governments, and then there is an emphasis on supporting the popular side with the official side side by side, and paying attention to the common interests between the two countries, such as national security and the waters of the Nile, and emphasizing the importance of Egypt's role returning to its pioneering status as it was on the Arab and African scene. Which is in the interest and service of both parties and achieving common goals and interests

Research problem:

The problem of the study lies in understanding the nature of the common interests between the two countries, how to reach future relations based on reality and the future vision of these interests, and providing factors that help develop them, while shedding light on the obstacles and problems that stand in the way of developing them, and presenting solutions and proposals to solve them, as many opportunities and challenges have emerged in the recent period. The outbreak of the Arab Spring revolutions opened horizons - or expectations at least - towards democratic transformation and thinking about restoring the Egyptian role in the Arab and African arena, not to mention some of the challenges represented in the Renaissance Dam file, the Haleeb problem, and the difference in the two positions on some regional issues.

Research questions:

What are the determinants of the relationship and the foundations on which the relationship is built?

What is the Egyptian and Sudanese position towards the Haleb-Shaltin triangle?

Why does Sudan stand alongside Ethiopia in the Renaissance Dam issue and what are the mechanisms of the Egyptian position?

What is Sudan's position on regime change in Egypt during the two revolutions?

What is the Egyptian and Sudanese position towards

2015 _ Libya? Timeframe: from 2011

Reasons for choosing that period:

2011: The revolution of January 25, 2011 and the principles and goals it calls for in the field of foreign policy to restore Egypt's pioneering role in the region and emerge from the sway of the American-Zionist policy, which contributed to weakening this role and harmed Egyptian-Arab and African relations in general and Egyptian-Sudanese relations in particular, which affected security. Egyptian and Sudanese nationalism, and Sudan was greatly harmed by this policy in previous years. Therefore, it is expected that Egyptian-Sudanese relations will return to a situation that serves the interests of both countries in all fields.

2015: The security situation became almost systematic against the Sudanese community in Egypt, also Sudan's embrace of Brotherhood elements hostile to President Sisi's regime, and the mutual accusations between the two parties: Sudan's accusation of Egypt of supporting the revolutionaries in Darfur and Egypt's accusation of Sudan of supporting terrorists with weapons, and the Renaissance Dam, not to mention the new regional situations. Which were previously mentioned, which are the Libyan file, the Yemeni file, and the difference in the positions of each of the two countries.

Location: Egypt and Sudan

Scope: The study is subject to the field of international relations

Theoretical importance:

Emphasizing the specificity of Egyptian-Sudanese relations, the single historical location, and the geographical fact represented by the Nile River, which helped maintain relations even in the darkest times.

Understanding and analyzing the controversial issues and trying to reach solutions that satisfy and serve both parties.

Knowing the factors that help develop Egyptian-Sudanese relations and then highlighting the positives and negatives that prevent the development of relations to reach a future vision.

Practical importance:

Revealing the obstacles that stand in the way of political and economic integration between the two countries so that they can be avoided in the future. Providing an objective and impartial approach that ensures the decision-maker does not infringe on the rights of the other party, thus avoiding escalation and causing tension, while at the same time achieving benefit for his country.

Choosing the study period from 2011 to 2016 involves the two most important events for the Egyptian side, which are the revolutions of January 25 and June 30 and the instability they caused. Therefore, it was necessary to reconsider Egyptian national security, in which Sudan represents a large share, as the depth failed to prevent the secession of South Sudan, let alone the strategic The water issue, especially since Egypt is concerned about the continued Israeli penetration into Sudan, especially its south, with which it has had relations since its birth.

Conceptual framework:

Economic integration: According to Hermann Linz: "It is more like a continuous, evolving process towards maturity and perfection from a lower stage to a higher stage. In all stages, integration means an assembly of parts in a new form, and it does not mean merely assembling separate things without changing the development of these parts." Therefore, it is a process of achieving homogeneity and harmony. Within the political and social body, abandoning narrow loyalties, and creating a common sense of solidarity and unified identity[10].

Political integration: "It is the process that includes the shift of political loyalties and activities in multiple and different countries towards a new center, whose institutions have powers that go beyond the existing nation-states[11]."

Security integration: means that the state parties agree on collective security arrangements, regardless of the differences in their power resources, and that decisions related to their common security are taken in a manner of implementation, planning, and joint leadership [12].

The elite: According to Pareto: They are those who excel in their fields of work in the game of life, which enables them to exercise political or social functions that create from them a ruling class that does not need public support and approval because it is limited in its rule to the internal characteristics that it possesses, and this is what qualifies it to monopolize the positions [13].]

National security: "According to Dr. Ali al-Din Hilal: securing the entity of the state and society against the dangers that threaten it internally and externally, securing its interests, and creating appropriate conditions economically and socially to achieve goals and objectives that express general satisfaction in society." That is, this insurance is achieved through social stability, development, and political participation. [14]

The right to self-determination: Political science defines it as the right of every society that has a distinct collective identity, such as a people or an ethnic group, through which it determines its political, economic, social, and security goals and chooses the political system that suits it in order to achieve its well-being and requirements and manage its life without any foreign interference [15].]

Water security: means preserving available water resources, using them in the best way, avoiding pollution, rationalizing their use in irrigation, industry, and drinking, and striving by all means to search for new water sources, develop them, and raise their exploitation capabilities [16].

Theoretical framework: The realist school will be used:

It can be said that the realist trend in the study of international relations goes back to what the First World War and then the policies of Nazi Germany represented as a challenge to the basics of the ideal approach to international relations.

This was supported by the risks resulting from the capabilities of nuclear weapons in the late 1940s until the late 1950s, and the basic statement was that only policies based on force could achieve a degree of global security[17].

Despite the multiplicity of works related to the realist movement, the theory of Hansje Morganthau is considered representative of this school, as he presented in his book *Politics Among Nations* a comprehensive theory of international relations, stating that different statements about international politics can become coherent if viewed within the framework of the power politics model, as politics Internationalism is a struggle for power, and whatever the ultimate goals of the state are, power is the immediate goal, as three alternatives are placed before the state in order to obtain power, the first of which is the struggle to maintain power by strengthening the status quo, and the second is: increasing power by expanding its power, that is, Imperialism, and the third is to show power in order to gain influence that it can use to achieve its goals[18].

This school considers the nation-state to be the primary and only actor in international relations. As for the actors below the states, it has given them secondary importance because the world is made up of a group of states and those states interact and therefore it is the primary and only actor in international relations until the world turns into interacting societies and not interacting governments, and this is States are rational and rational actors and are able to make decisions that serve their interests, and there is no authority higher than the authority of the state

[19]

This school also views the international system as a chaotic system in which nation-states depend on their capabilities.

The world is a world of conflict and war, which is the basis of international relations. There is no supreme authority that protects international security, and there is no global state that governs conflict. As a result of the absence of institutions and procedures for resolving disputes in international relations, every state It relies on its ability and self-strength to maintain its security. It may also resort to entering into alliances to support its capabilities[20].

Hence, the realists placed their starting point in the concept of force and the efforts of states to gain power and authority, and not giving a major role to the Creator, international law, and diplomacy, and emphasizing the use of military force as a tool for maintaining peace, and that force is not traditional military force, but rather national force in its comprehensive concept of its elements and components, both material and non-material. It is the product

The final conclusion of a large number of variables, such as population, natural resources, strategic location, level of technological development, propaganda, public opinion, political influence, diplomacy, and the productive system, is that foreign policy is nothing but a struggle for power, and that whatever a state's external goals are, it always involves controlling others by influencing their minds [21].]

Therefore, the school focused on the concept of the national interest, and that each state seeks to achieve its own interests, and that there is a conflict of interests to the point of leading to war, and thus foreign policies continue despite the change and change of the regime, its ideological orientation, and the prevailing values, due to the existence of higher interests for the state, and these interests are fixed, and the means may change to serve this goal. It may be peaceful or warlike, but the goal does not change, and the highest interest of any state is to preserve national survival and national security. Military issues occupy great importance for the realist school, more than economic issues, as military, security, and strategic issues represent high politics, while other economic and military issues represent low politics.[22]]

In order to achieve their interests, states may use any means, whether moral or immoral. There is no room for values and ethics in politics. Moral or ethical principles are difficult to apply to business and political behavior. The issue here is related to how the state achieves its foreign policy goals without exposing the state to danger. Here, Morgenthau refuses to adopt The state has purely moral considerations that limit its pursuit of gaining power and achieving interests. Rather, it is argued that foreign policy decision makers should not give consideration to abstract moral motives. Moral values are the national interest itself, as morals are not islands isolated from national interests[23].

Curriculum:

Statements and assumptions: [24]

This study is based on the National Interest approach. This approach belongs to the realist school of international relations that has dominated the analysis and study of international relations since the end of World War II and is based on three basic concepts: power.

The balance of power, and the national interest, thus refuting the idealistic trend in the study of international relations that dominated in the wake of World War I and the establishment of the League of Nations, which some considered to be harbingers of the global government that the thinkers of the idealist movement had always called for. According to this school, states have sovereign national interests that do not deviate from them. It is driven by interaction with others, and states cannot defend the national interest without conflict among themselves, and conflict in turn requires force

Politicians and decision-makers in various countries often move according to the interests of the state, not its morals, and impose conditions according to its power, not according to its right. Therefore, power and interest are still seen as forming the essence of policies, regardless of the different forms of their practice, and in line with their being exploited in propaganda or by realists who point out that moral principles are based on It has value only if it is compatible with the state's power and does not constitute a burden or burden on it in the way of its interests

Both Nicolas Machiavelli and Karl Marx expressed this essence, as the first said, "A person keeps his word only if it is in his interest." The second says, "Material or moral interests, not ideas, directly control and control people's actions, and interests are of a flexible nature that does not... It is characterized by limitation or stability, as well as constant change in circumstances

different

These interests are rarely the result of calculations based on pure rationality, as their formulation necessarily includes value judgments that are an expression of the prevailing ideology in a given country and at a certain stage, which ultimately brings us back to psychological factors more than material explanation factors.

The theoretical foundation of the concept and its determinants[25]

The concept of national interest goes back to the writings of Machiavelli, especially his book *The Prince*, about the relationship between the Italian states in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Italy and then in Britain, where the interests of "the will of the king" and the interests of the ruling family, which had been prevalent, began to gradually decline, to be replaced by the term interest. Nationalism. Following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the concept of national interest was widely used among European countries to justify their policies.

Foreign Affairs and its behavior at the international level. The term has also been used widely by the leaders of the United States since its announcement

The concept began to be proposed in the 1930s, as Charles Beard was considered one of the first to employ the concept of national interest in the study of foreign policy and international relations, in his book "The Interest National of Idea, although his talk was mainly focused on American foreign policy, then Hans Morgenthau, the most prominent thinker of the realist school in the modern era, touched on the concept of national interest in his 1952 article on the national interest of the United States of America.

Although the term is widely circulated politically, there are few contributions in the field of theoretical consolidation of the concept, perhaps the most prominent of which is Joseph Frankl's book in 1970, which bore the title "The National Interest and dealt in detail with the various dimensions of the concept, as Professor Dr. Ahmed Youssef pointed out in his book "Introduction to International Relations" Approaching the national interest as one of the approaches of the realist trend in researching and studying international relations

What helped in the return of the realist school was blatantly in its ugliest form, represented by the United States' invasion of Afghanistan and then its occupation of Iraq. The international system moved towards a tyrannical unipolarity, which strengthened the realist school and strongly re-introduced it in understanding and analyzing international relations and the foreign policy of major countries in particular. Among the approaches that were reused in this context is the national interest approach, especially by American writers and thinkers, as Stephen Walt, for example, considered that "power is the basis of the international influence of the United States and the ultimate guarantee of its security, and that the ability of the United States to achieve its national interests, which include limiting the spread of Weapons of mass destruction, support for human rights and democracy, and defense of its allies depend primarily and fundamentally

Morgenthau defined it as the national interest as power, while Joseph Nye defined it as the group of interests that represents a common denominator for the citizens of the state in its relations with the rest of the world, while Joseph Frankl defined it in three groups of interests: a military and political strategy that includes preserving the political doctrine, national identity, and economic It is represented by the well-being of the state, and the arrangement of these interests varies from one state to another and from the last era

Third: Determinants of the national interest and its priorities

The senior political leadership in the state: It plays a pivotal role in precisely defining its national interests and the priorities among them. The national interest is usually determined at the level of the top of authority, which is considered not only primarily responsible for defining it, but also for implementing it.

The structure of decision-making and the extent of influence of the political elite:

Democratic systems differ from dictatorships. In the first, the movement of the ruler is governed by institutions such as parliament, not to mention the role of interest groups and public opinion. In the second, the rulers enjoy wide movement, not to mention the origins and social backgrounds of the elites. There are religious elites such as Iran, there are sectarian elites such as, and there are military elites.

The state's position and capabilities available to it:

It is considered a basic determinant of the national interest and the arrangement of its priorities. Large countries usually have a wide geographical and objective range of interests and interests, while medium and small countries with limited capabilities usually reduce their interests to a limited number of priorities that directly affect their vital space, their regional surroundings, and their national security in its broad sense.

Fourth: Redefining interest and its boundaries:

This comes as a result of a change in two factors. The first is a change in political leadership, whether in a peaceful way, namely loss in elections, or in a violent way, such as revolutions and coups, and thus the difference in orientations, ideologies, and vision of the world in terms of interests and threats. The second factor is the emergence of internal developments, such as economic faltering, an economic boom, revolutions, or regional developments. Such as wars in the region or international issues related to international issues such as terrorism and the actual structure of the international system

For example, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice saw that national interests are not fixed but rather variable, and that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US administration redefined its national interests and defined them by increasing American military capabilities and power and affirming the American role as leader of rogue regimes.

To the world and deal decisively with

Applying the approach to the case study:

The study paid attention to the need for the common interests between the two countries to be the focus and basic pillar upon which relations are based in all economic, political and social fields, perfecting the path of integration between the two countries, especially in light of the circumstances and regional changes witnessed by the Arab and African arena and the challenges it is witnessing, such as terrorism, as well as the circumstances that it is witnessing. With both of them, Egypt is suffering from economic deterioration and faltering on the path to democratic transformation, and Sudan is suffering from political instability as a result of the prolonged wars it has entered into, in addition to the threat of armed groups to its lands and civil conflicts to overcome the bad experiences that have accumulated in the past centuries due to the period of the Turkish era and the policies of the British occupation. And his keenness to blow up the relationship and spread hatred between the two peoples, which was due to the change in the ruling elites in the two regimes, which as soon as a regime of government arrived in one state that was different from the other state, tensions erupted and mutual accusations were exchanged, thus highlighting the importance of prioritizing interest over ideological orientations, not to mention the importance of security and strategic coordination in Sudan. It is the strategic depth of Egypt from the south, and it is its gateway to Africa. It also aims to achieve mutual economic benefit by helping Sudan with what it needs in terms of human resources and relatively advanced technology, in exchange for Sudan helping Egypt with its abundant natural resources, especially Egypt since Egypt is suffering from the problem of population explosion and the decline of its agricultural area, and with a focus on These axes present many opportunities to end the outstanding controversial issues between the two countries on the basis of mutual benefit and the interest of both of them.

Previous literature:

The first trend: Egyptian-Sudanese relations in their general framework:

A study entitled "Egyptian-Sudanese relations between the past, present and future" [26]: It emphasized the specificity of Egyptian-Sudanese relations with inevitable geographical foundations and deep historical roots, and work to reconsider them and push them forward for the benefit of the two countries, despite all the challenges facing both, as Sudan was preoccupied with wars. For an extended period, it was preoccupied with its worsening internal problems in the midst of the necessities of defense and its civil conflicts, and Egypt and the national security of each of them. This study covered the historical experience of both countries and the mutual awareness between them, in addition to common issues such as the Nile and border security, and shed light on the problems and differences related to those issues, in addition to setting a future vision for relations. Economic and political relations between the two countries

Many recommendations were put forward to reformulate Egyptian-Sudanese relations, including the following:

- The necessity of seeing relations in their historical context within the framework of regional and international relations and the circumstances of British colonialism.
- _The necessity of correcting wrong views in the relations between the two countries, going beyond traditional statements, and focusing on the bright, artistic, economic, and social aspects.
- Emphasizing that the solution to all controversial problems will only come through development for both countries as a common supreme interest and preserving their national security while respecting the sovereignty and independence of each of them on the basis of equality and brotherhood and within the framework of changing regional and international circumstances.
- _Emphasizing on dealing by peaceful means in bringing peace to the South Nile as a gateway to strengthening the relationship between the two countries.
- _Developing the infrastructure for each and providing the opportunity for the public and private sectors to partner in the field of trade exchange

A study entitled "Egyptian-Sudanese relations, the roots of problems and challenges of interests" [27]: which worked to reread the internal Sudanese interactions and provide an understanding of the political developments in Sudan within the framework of bilateral relations and the nature of the influences surrounding them at the level of the Sudanese national movement, with reference to the factors that stood as an obstacle. In developing relations between the two countries, including historical factors, namely the period of the British-Egyptian conflict, in addition to relations and their sizing within the security framework, in addition to historical factors such as the reduction in the size of the period of the British-Egyptian conflict over sovereignty over Sudan, the political interests of successive Sudanese elites and the polarizations within these elites, the rise of political Islam to Governance in Sudan, with reference to the Egyptian role, which declined during the period of former President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak, not to mention Sudan's inability, until the present moment, to build their stable national state and establish its strategic principles internally and externally.

Hence, the study considered that the course of Egyptian-Sudanese relations suffered from a major imbalance and instability, which contributed to political, economic, and social losses on both the Egyptian and Sudanese sides in the past half century. It attributed this imbalance to the following factors:

_Egypt maintained sovereignty over Sudan during the royal era and British policy worked to spread hostility and undermine relations between the two countries.

_The expected goals of each Sudanese regime or elite change and change by successive Sudanese elites towards Egypt.

- The difference in ideology of the political systems. At a time when Egypt was Nasserist socialism, the state owned the means of production and controlled the economy, that is, of a centralized nature. The Sudanese reality was of a pluralistic nature due to the diverse ethnic and racial nature of the people.
- The threats facing Egyptian national security played a major role, such as the involvement of parties from the Umma Party with ties to Israel, the entry of American companies into southern Sudan, and allegations of establishing military bases in Halib.

_The water file, where accusations and doubts are raised about the nature of Egyptian goals in Sudan, in addition to Sudanese citizens' neglect of other water sources.

A study entitled Sudanese-Egyptian relations (1956-1985) [28]: This study indicated that Egyptian-Sudanese relations were not established on solid and established foundations, including political instability, especially in Sudan, Egypt's preoccupation with the Arab issue, and its adoption of the Arab-Israeli conflict during the fifties and sixties, in addition to the aspirations of The Sudanese people towards their independence, ending dependency, and establishing relations on the basis of equality, brotherhood, respect, sovereignty, and independence of each other, and prioritizing common interests over ideological orientations.

The study pointed out the factors that prevented the development of Egyptian-Sudanese relations and prevented the completion of integration between the two countries imposed by the specificity of the relationship between the two countries, including:

-The arrival of the Umma Party, which has an ideology that rejects any form of unity with Egypt after independence.

_The 1959 agreement, which many Sudanese view as unjust, the construction of the High Dam, and the displacement of the people of Halfa, which led to a massive wave of anger and protest.

- The signing of the 2005 peace agreement, which stipulated determining the fate of South Sudan. The result of the referendum was the acquisition of South Sudan, which caused a problem with the new state's right and share of water, as two scenarios emerged. The first was deducting the share from Sudan only, that is, the north, and the second was dividing part of Egypt and northern Sudan both.

_The problem of Halib, which has not yet been resolved, despite Egypt's recognition of Sudan as a sovereign state without any reservations about anything regarding its borders or territories.

A study entitled: "Egyptian _Sudanese relations [29]." The study started from the unity of the Nile Valley and pre-dynastic history, where there was a single Pharaonic culture and the Arab-Islamic invasion of Sudan in the nineteenth century, which it described as the Egyptian occupation of Sudan, although considerations of the unity of the components of the Nile Valley were used as a pretext for the occupation of Sudan. He denounced that the independence of Egypt of Sudan was no more than a formality after a period of Egyptian-British conflict over sovereignty over Sudan. From the perspective of that study, it was no more than a product of the British agenda. It also pointed to the necessity of cooperation between the Sudanese economy and the Egyptian economy as a complement to it and not a follower or competitor.

The importance of the study is evident in that it provided a comprehensive historical introduction that worked on a critical analysis of the Egyptian political system, its trends and priorities, in addition to that it presented the topic from more than one angle, as comparisons were made between the writer's assumptions and sayings and the assumptions of Sudanese writers based on British documents - mostly - as an attempt to reach a balanced formula that governs relations. Between the two countries

The study concluded that the two peoples are not identical, but they share language, religion, history, and culture. However, these factors are not distinct factors that make it an exceptional or unique relationship. These links also exist with the Arab countries and West African countries, but it emphasized the geographical or geopolitical dimension and gave it priority and considered it It is the axis or basic pillar through which relations between the two countries can be developed, but it saw the improbability of establishing political unity between the two countries.

A study entitled "A New Reading in Egyptian-Sudanese Relations [30]": It presented a vision from a neutral perspective of Egyptian-Sudanese relations in a new, neutral way, based on an analysis of the events and ties that connect the two countries, such as religion, geography, history, and culture, leading to Sudan gaining independence and referring to the idea of unity and solidarity against colonialism. Emphasizing the need to improve relations that were subject to several points of tension, such as the Turkish expansion and the British policy that aimed to undermine Egyptian-Sudanese relations, in addition to the Haleeb problem, and it was based on several constants, including the following:

_The independence of each state by unilaterally making its political decision within or outside its territory

Emphasizing the depth of this relationship, which is rooted in history, working on cultural, social and economic cooperation and the necessity of coordination to protect the national security of both countries.

_Working to overcome points of tension, abandoning the strategy of reactions, and adopting advance planning so that tensions do not reach the peak of escalation for all controversial issues, as well as working in the arenas of the international and regional community.

The study also indicated that the determinants of the relationship require cooperation between the two countries as threats such as the strategic depth and the waters of the Nile, in addition to threats to external security and mental structure as a cause of religious, ethnic and tribal bombing. It also touched on the role played by historical experience, which was characterized by enthusiasm and emotion without systematic employment, which appeared in Several studies have been conducted, such as the idea of the unity of the Nile Valley, the tripartite aggression of 1956, and the war of 1967, pointing to the effects of the Turkish expansion, represented in the expansionist policies of Muhammad Ali and the policies of his sons, which led to real revolutions that transcended ethnic and tribal frameworks, which was embodied in the Mahdist revolution, which witnessed tension in relations between the two countries, and touched on Also to the British policy that was working only to achieve its imperial goals and interests and provide consumer markets to sell its products.

The study emphasized the necessity of cooperation between the two countries in an atmosphere of independence in their decision-making without denying common interests, and working to exploit all opportunities for cooperation and cordoning off all points of tension and conflict through balanced solutions that guarantee each of them achieving their goals and interests.

[31]: This study stems from an emphasis on Egypt's role, a study entitled "Northern Winds" in Sudan from a positive perspective, where the relationship between the two countries is likened to an organic, dialectical relationship in life, thought, and blood, and the reference to the bonds of kinship, the connection of kinship, the unity of religion and language, not to mention the constant aspiration. By the Sudanese people to Egypt, these are relations that cannot be denied, despite all the attempts of the Government of Sudan - according to the study's description - which is exerting and redoubling its energies in order to repel those ties coming from Egypt, that is, the north, and confirms that it has never succeeded in repelling those winds.

It also touched on Egypt's role in the scientific renaissance in Sudan, which was embodied in the building of many example, while schools and universities, perhaps the University of Khartoum being the most prominent revealing the roots of this role, which dates back to pre-Christian times, where the Alexandria School and bringing the Egyptians to Meroë, in addition to Egypt's role in spreading The Christian religion came through Egypt and not Abyssinia. The study also touched on Egypt's role in spreading the Islamic religion and teaching its sciences through Al-Azhar and the Sudanese going to Egypt to teach there, as it remained at the forefront in all educational institutes. Therefore, it was natural for Sudan to be influenced by the educational system prevailing in Al-Azhar and it became consolidated.

With the establishment of the Islamic Volj state, that relationship ended

She also referred to the period of Muhammad Ali, which she considered to be a period of spending generously to educate and develop the Sudanese people and encourage them to join civilization, and the role of the Egyptians in training the Egyptians to teach the Sudanese to govern themselves, in addition to credit for discovering South Sudan.

It also referred to the period of dual rule, which considered that Egypt was not the one with sovereignty over Sudan, but Britain. It referred to Britain's policy, which sought to remind the Sudanese of the Egyptian-Turkish rule, and that it was a rule that witnessed the imposition of many taxes and royalties, and that this was exploited to undermine relations. The study concluded that whoever believes in the disappearance of those relations Or dismantling it is more important!!

The second trend: issues and problems of Egyptian-Sudanese relations

A study entitled The Political Settlement of the Egyptian-Sudanese Conflict Regarding the Halib Triangle[32]

The study touched on the specificity of the relationship between the two countries, in addition to shedding light on the historical factors and their role in the tension in relations. The research problem revolves around how the disturbance and tension in the Egyptian-Sudanese relations affect the provocation and outbreak of the border dispute between them, while presenting the internal, regional and international determinants, in contrast to the legal aspect of the research problem. It is about determining the legal basis establishing the border between the two countries

The study concluded that "returning to applying the concepts of political borders and administrative borders" or establishing an integration zone in the Haleeb Triangle are the solutions most likely to be implemented due to their flexibility and possibility of implementation.

A study entitled The level of Egyptian-Sudanese relations in the field of communications and information technology[33]

The study began by emphasizing that Sudan is the southern strategic depth of Egypt, and then highlighting the importance of maintaining the security and stability of Sudan, and thus the necessity of coordination and cooperation in all political and cultural fields, issues of investment in information technology, and development issues such as health, education, and other issues.

The study reached a number of results, including:

Egypt is in the hearts of the people of the African continent, until there are opportunities for the Egyptian role to restore its status to what it was by strengthening Egyptian relations with the African continent and then eliminating all attempts to undermine relations between the two countries and thwarting conspiracies aimed at diminishing the Egyptian role.

For the African arena, and then emphasis and interest in developing research bases - the importance of the return of Egypt's role and international cooperation in the field of science, innovation and creativity to serve the various sectors to create an advanced information society

_Working to develop Egypt's infrastructure in the field of communications technology and working to provide workers trained in various languages and a basic and advanced technological infrastructure characterized by low cost and high technical level.

_Emphasizing that the field of information technology and knowledge is the gateway to strengthening relations between the two countries due to its close connection to the economy and development, especially after it has become the economic tool

It is the basic determinant of the state's relations with other countries and in light of the partnerships and dependence between countries to provide the needs of their people.

- Emphasizing the West's monopoly in the field of media and technology to ensure control over Third World countries, expanding the circle of alienation and dependency, and widening the gap between rich countries and poor countries.

A study entitled "Egyptian-Sudanese relations in light of the bilateral agreement ([34]: 1899_1924)"

This study pointed to the British policy that worked to widen the gap between the two peoples for the sake of its colonial interests behind the conclusion of the bilateral agreement, as it instigated the annexation of the two peoples to it and the formal maintenance of its dependence on Egypt, as represented by the continued raising of the Egyptian flag on government houses next to the British flag and the continued appointment of the Governor-General by decree. Egyptian royalty and the continued circulation of the Egyptian currency in Sudan. The study also clarified the British role in promoting incitement and hostility between northern and southern Sudan, leaving the south in a primitive, marginalized state, as a phase of economic exploitation of Sudan began for the benefit of Britain through the launch of investment projects and the building of English companies.

A kind of comparison was made between the British situation, which worked to deepen ethnic problems, exploit it economically, and marginalize its south, and the Egyptian role, which it considered to be a bright role, in contrast to other studies that see the Egyptian role in Sudan as a form of occupation or colonialism without awareness of the difference between colonialism and expansion. The Regional Council indicated that Egypt willingly provided Sudan with many financial aids saved it from the suffering Sudan was suffering and which helped it establish the necessary vital and development loans, which facilities such as telephone lines, telegraphs, and railways, in addition to

Egypt was provided with skilled workers in constructing government buildings and many projects, in addition to assisting Supply it with forces from its army who helped establish security in the country.

The study concluded that British policy failed to blow up the relationship between the two peoples, widen the gap, and sow the seeds of hatred. This was demonstrated by the national uprising in Sudan in 1924.

A study entitled "The secession of South Sudan and its effects on Egyptian national security [35]: The research problem lies in studying the repercussions of the secession of South Sudan on Egyptian national security in its various dimensions, and investigated the fears that the nascent state would turn into a cat's paw used by regional powers hostile to Egypt to threaten and destabilize its national security. Thus, creating what is known as the policy of tightening the parties. The study concluded that the secession of South Sudan represented a strategic earthquake at the regional level in general and for the Egyptian national security system in particular in its vital field and direct strategic depth, as it carries many threats to Egyptian national security, most notably water security, and also puts it in front of Critical balances. As for the south, Egypt has interests in securing the flow of water. In the north, there are relationships that cannot be broken and alliances are required with the ruling center for all internal interactions, the collapse of which means the fragmentation of the state, and its loss to the south means the loss of the main ally in confronting the upstream countries, most notably Ethiopia, which makes the Egyptian state face strategic costs. It is expensive in this vital circle, necessitating a comprehensive, multi-dimensional Egyptian move to confront these strategic dangers.

Chapter One: Determinants and development of Egyptian-Sudanese relations

The first section: Determinants of the Egyptian-Sudanese relationship

The second section: The development of Egyptian-Sudan relations

Determinants of the Egyptian-Sudanese relationship

East Africa, which Egyptian-Sudanese relations have developed in particular since Egypt established an empire in led to the establishment of the state of Sudan until Sudan gained its independence in 1956. Since that date, Sudan has represented the strategic depth for Egypt, and the water issue has represented a fundamental axis in Egyptian relations. Sudanese relations for more than a hundred years, not to mention the social, cultural, and commercial ties, Islam, and the problem of border disputes. These axes have represented the highest priorities on the Egyptian foreign policy agenda since 1956[36].

Political, strategic and security determinants:

Strategic depth:

This aspect was formed before the establishment of the state of Sudan, which was evident in Muhammad Ali's decision to annex Sudan in 1820 due to his fear of the Mamluks who fled to the regions of Sudan to form a military force with which they would threaten Egypt. This aspect continued in all the subsequent stages of the establishment of the state of Sudan, which appeared during the Mahdist revolution and appeared. It was clearly stated in the evacuation decision, even though the authority was not Egyptian, as it was a colonial authority that always worked to get closer to Sudan to threaten the Egyptian strategic depth. It emerged again in 1941 when the Axis forces led by Rommel penetrated and then reached the outskirts of Alexandria, which threatened the defeat of those forces. [37]

After Sudan gained its independence, the importance of Sudan's strategic depth to Egypt became clear through two Authority, represented by Gamal Abdel Nasser, to hold the positions. The first was the keenness of the National Arab Summit Conference in Khartoum. The second and most prominent event was the transfer of some Egyptian forces to Sudan, especially the Air College, so that it would be within reach of Sudan. The Israeli Air Force, in preparation for the next round of conflict with Israel[38]

National Security: Several issues are linked to this dimension:

_Securing Egypt's southern front, as it is one of the vital interests, and the importance of this issue is increasing in light of the scarcity of natural obstacles that can be relied upon to secure the common border between the two countries and work to ensure the security, stability, and territorial integrity of Sudan [39]

- The issue of Red Sea security, as the Red Sea represents for Egypt the left arm of its national security (while water security represents the right arm), in addition to Sudan's ownership of part of the Red Sea coast, which contributes to securing the Egyptian commercial fleet and in the same gateway for Egypt to communicate with the countries of the Horn of Africa and then Work must be done to dissolve the negative aspects of inter-relations

The dispute between the two countries as a result of the Sudanese-Iranian rapprochement and also taking measures to prevent the presence of any military force of a regional state or another state in the Red Sea, especially in light of the repeated Israeli attacks on Sudan[40]

_This dimension appears clearly in the issue of the secession of South Sudan. Egypt has always sought to solve this problem between northern and southern Sudan through a political settlement, but it failed to prevent the secession. Hence, Egypt adopted a strategy that works to reduce the chances of a strong effective presence, whether in the north or the south, which it works to threaten Egyptian security and prevent ethnic, racial, or religious conflicts. Consequently, the separation had some negative repercussions on Egypt's national security from the Nile, which is the Egyptian lifeline, including the emergence of a new state that affects Hessa, in addition to placing Egypt in the face of strategic bargaining from the north and south, making it inevitable. A multi-dimensional strategy to achieve its interests, not to mention the possibility of escalating migrations, which will bring economic and financial burdens, as well as the possibility of Egypt falling into Sudan into Egypt, a circle of Western blackmail that will make it accept the fulfillment of the Israeli ambition to have a share of the Nile waters, given the Israeli and American relations with which the nascent state is linked and its relationship. With Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia, to ultimately produce an outcome that reverses the direction of the Arab nationalist trend, which affects Egyptian national security[41].

Water security issue:

This issue is considered a priority for Egyptian national security, and therefore national security interests must be determined, which are as follows[42]:

HaySurvival: Here we mean the survival of the state, and the Nile River is considered the source of Egypt's survival, and a fundamental source ¹ Oh, its existence and its survival. Where most of the riparian countries in the basin have their water needs; Sudan and president and Egypt - due to the large number of fresh lakes and rivers, and the large amount of rain they receive, while Sudan (by 77%) and Egypt (by 97%) depend on the waters of the Nile River.

. Development: The Nile River is one of the most important sources of economic development in Egypt. ²

3. Stability: The Nile River is considered the basis of stability in Egypt.

From the above, it is clear that one of the requirements of national security is to maintain water security, represented by the Nile River, and Egypt's share of the Nile River's waters. This is done through:

Maintaining the security of the sources of the Nile River and the continuation of the natural flow of the Nile waters; Considering that water is an important strategic resource for Egypt, it affects economic development in Egypt.

Ensuring the security and stability of Sudan; Considering that the threat from Sudan constitutes a threat to Egypt.

Securing energy sources on the course of the Nile (High Dam), to secure agricultural and industrial development, as it secures Egypt's national economy.

Coordination with the Nile Basin countries regarding the projects they are implementing, which may affect the flow of water to Egypt, or affect Egypt's share of water.

With the Nile Basin countries. Resisting Israeli penetration into Africa, and developing relations, and therefore this issue is considered one of the constants of Egyptian national security, no matter how the policies of the Egyptian authority change in nature or methods. This has clearly appeared since Muhammad Ali built modern irrigation systems in the first half of the nineteenth century, where any development of this The device entails more Nile interests, which became clear in the projects to expand cotton cultivation in Egypt and the imposition of Egyptian authority on the regions of southern Sudan and the construction of the Equatoria Directorate. It was more evident during the British occupation of Egypt and Egypt's keenness to regain Sudan in 1898 as a result of Sudan's fears of the threat to the Nile waters. Following the French advance towards Fashoda[43]

Hence, there was an effort to codify this issue through many treaties and agreements, such as the Nile Water Agreements in 1929 and 1959. The first aimed to exploit flood waters to irrigate the Gezira Cotton Cultivation Project, which worked to establish the principle of Egypt's acquired rights in all revenues from the Nile River at 48 billion, and Sudan's share. With 4 billion cubic metres, while the 1959 agreement established the most comprehensive legal framework to regulate relations between the two countries with regard to the water issue, from which Sudan obtained two-thirds of the water provided by the High Dam (14.5) billion cubic metres.

Egypt agreed to pay 7.5 pounds of compensation to the government of Sudan as a result of the damages that occurred to its property due to storage at the High Dam, which was estimated at about 15 million pounds. Egypt's share of the Nile was 55.5 billion cubic meters, while Sudan's was 18.5 million. However, it stipulated that cubic meters, which caused objections from large sectors of Sudan. Since its signing on the grounds that it is unfair to the Sudanese side[44]

This proposal is linked to the fact that the water issue is a constant of national security. The rescue elite used it to put pressure on the Egyptian government during tense relations between the two countries as a way to achieve independence from Egypt and tried to use it to put pressure on the Haleeb and Shalateen file. To do so, it took a number of measures, including freezing irrigation equipment. And preventing it from performing its work and tasks, freezing Egyptian-Sudanese cooperation in the permanent technical authority for the Nile waters, raising the Roseires reservoir, in addition to digging the two Kenana canals, and proposing many dams and reservoirs.

[45]

This issue constitutes an urgent need to reconsider Egypt's national security priorities and pursue an active policy on the African arena, diplomatically, politically, and economically, in light of the current conditions of Israeli penetration attempts, Iranian-African rapprochements, the secession of South Sudan, the Egyptian economic deterioration, and the Entebbe Agreement, especially the Renaissance Dam file, which has a negative impact. This will affect Egyptian national security, as it will lead to a number of negative impacts on Egypt and Sudan, including the loss of large areas of agricultural land, a decrease in electricity for the High Dam, the Aswan reservoir, and Nag Hammadi, and the cessation of many drinking water stations, with the possibility of a link between Aswan and Giza in the event of the displacement of millions in Khartoum and vast areas of Egypt. The collapse of the Renaissance Dam, not to mention the decrease in the share of both Egypt and Sudan, which forces Egypt to desalinate water, which costs it an estimated 50 billion annually, not to mention the crisis that the Egyptian economy is going through, which ultimately leads to tensions and conflicts between Egypt that contribute to the region igniting wars. and armed conflicts[46] Sudan and Ethiopia, which may

Hence, it must be emphasized that the Nile Basin countries must respect the agreements concluded between them, enhance cooperation, and establish many regional development projects that serve all parties without causing harm to others and unfairness to their share of the water, and respecting the principles of international law.

The border issue (Haleeb and Shalateen file)

It is the ongoing dispute between Egypt and Sudan, where the north-eastern border of Sudan meets the south-eastern border of Egypt. This dispute began in 1958 after the national government took over after independence, when Egypt sent a memorandum to Sudan requesting its right to the region and their submission to Egyptian sovereignty. However, controversy did not arise over it. That triangle in the period from 1958-1991) following the improvement of relations between the two countries following the signing of the 1959 agreement to regulate the use of the Nile water. However, the conflict was renewed in 1991 when Sudan announced an auction for oil exploration in the region and contracted with a Canadian company, but Egypt strongly opposed this. It sent a warning to 100 international companies, which led to Sudan withdrawing the license granted to the Canadian company, not to mention sending Egyptian forces to the region to confront threats from Islamic groups settling in Sudan, and even imposing a siege on the region. Sudan filed a complaint before the Security Council, considering that Egypt is imposing a fait accompli and it is possible that Opening this case while it is proven that there are oil fields or mineral resources there, and then this case is considered a barometer or a satisfactory symptom of Egyptian-Sudanese relations that appears once relations become tense and disappears when they improve [47]

Economic determinants [48]: mainly related to the distance and shares of the two countries:

_ Securing vital targets, facilities and water projects in a way that ensures the continued flow of Nile water, increasing storage capacity, reducing losses, developing water resources and generating electrical power, securing Egyptian targets, airports, ports and transportation routes necessary to secure the Nile water sources.

The Sudanese side, in accordance with these Egyptian goals, must coordinate with Egypt and complete its flowing projects. Supporting Egypt to provide the necessary measures for it and convincing international parties to do so

_ Joint cooperation between the two countries to solve the problems that Sudan suffers from, especially the conflicts and armed conflicts that consumed Sudan and its resources during decades of prolonged wars, especially since the separation had many negative repercussions on Egyptian national security. Therefore, work must be done on the joint projects planned in the Upper Nile, which were disrupted due to...

The civil war in the south, which will develop Egypt's water resources in the future and thus increase the area of the agricultural area, especially in light of the trend aimed at developing southern Egypt.

Egypt has declared its historical rights to the waters of the Nile in accordance with what was stipulated in the agreements, with Sudan and the rest of the Nile Basin countries continuing to adhere to it. On the Sudanese side, it declared its respect for the agreements signed in 1959 and announced a strategy between the countries of the Blue Nile Basin. It was issued in Khartoum by Egypt, Sudan and Athens and was signed in 2000. It includes rules and principles. The three countries discuss water work, ways to propose joint projects, and cooperation mechanisms in irrigation, drainage, power generation projects, and the unified electrical interconnection network. Thus, the Nile water agreements are integrated to foundation for include the countries of the White Nile Basin and the countries of the Blue Nile Basin, to lay the cooperation between these countries.

- Working to create any of the forms of interconnection between Egypt and Sudan to form a strong and homogeneous entity in the face of the upstream countries, Ethiopia and Uganda in particular, and to strengthen their negotiating position, not to mention that such an entity may represent a shield to resist conflicts and disputes.

Armed

_Working to increase the volume of commercial exchange and border trade, implementing major strategic projects that achieve food security for both parties, and working to find a common market, especially given the deteriorating economic conditions that Egypt suffers from, conflicts and armed conflicts in Sudan, as well as the secession of its south.

Looking at the areas proposed by Egypt in Sudan, several areas appear: [49]

The field of agriculture: Agricultural investment occupies the first priority in the areas of Egyptian investment in Sudan, as it is one of the main tools for achieving Egyptian food security. There are many projects such as the Arqeen Project and the Agricultural Redemption Project.

The field of animal production: It is considered an urgent necessity in light of the Egyptian market witnessing an increasing deficit in providing the necessary red meat for local consumption on its own. There is

Many projects in this regard, including the strategic meat project and the Wadi Al-Khoei animal production project

Fish wealth: It is possible to benefit from the special features of the northern state, which are free from epidemics and diseases, not to mention the possibility of Nile fish wealth from the river and Lake Nasser, which stimulates the presence of other industries such as the manufacture of boats, nets, and fishing equipment.

Other issues arise, such as spinning and weaving, to rehabilitate existing textile factories, and electricity to support the Arqin area and establish other projects there, which serve the interests of both parties.

Cultural and social determinants:

Egypt was linked to Sudan with subservient relations based on ties of kinship, blood, one history, one language and one religion. The Sudanese people have always looked to Egypt and always have since the era of the Pharaohs (the Alexandria School) until it came to receive scientific missions from Egypt and spread it in Sudan through Christianity. It spread in Egypt, and after that it sent the Nubian bishops, and churches and monasteries spread on the banks of the Nile, on the island of Meroe, and on both sides of the Blue Nile. After that, Islam entered Sudan via Egypt, also via Nubia. This was followed by the reception of Egyptian teachers to Sudan and the Sudanese going to receive education, which led to Sudan being affected. With the educational system in Al-Azhar, not to mention Egypt's credit in informing the Sudanese press about the trade routes that brought the two countries together until those relations crystallized with the annexation of Muhammad Ali to Sudan and the Egyptians training the Sudanese and qualifying them to govern themselves, linking the north with the south, establishing new cities such as Khartoum, and building arsenals and factories contributing to the establishment of the state of Sudan and education. The Sudanese and helping them to keep up with the journey of civilization[50]

These social and cultural components can be presented in the following [51]:

Geographical foundations: Egypt was linked to Sudan through geographical ties that achieved actual ties of actual, emotional, and popular ties, in addition to the surface and climatic conditions, which helped the integration of its population. This was represented in the presence of many roads linking the two countries, such as the caravan road that connects central and northern Sudan with Egypt, and the Arbaeen Trail between Assiut and western Sudan

Arab-Islamic foundations: The culture of the Nile Valley was formed from a group of Arab and Islamic elements that came from the Arabian Peninsula and were represented by the tribes of Bani Judham, Kinana, Quraysh, Juhayna, Rabi'a, Bani Tabai and others.

Tribal extensions: It includes Nubia, which contains five human groups divided into two parts: Egyptian Nubia and Sudanese Nubia, which includes three human groups, not to mention the Red Sea tribes.

Language: The Egyptians share the Arabic language, as well as the Hamitic and Semitic groups represented by the ancient Egyptians, Beja, and Nubians, and the Sudanese groups represented by the Dinka, Nuer, and Shislu languages in southern Sudan.

Religion: It linked them from the time of the Pharaohs, where the idea of monotheism was called for by Akhenaten, through the spread of Christianity, where he embraced the Jacobite doctrine, and continued to enter Islam through Egyptian merchants, which led to the Arab-Islamic character.

Ethnic foundations: belonging to the Caucasian dynasty is a mixture of races and blood and is culturally divided into the Semites (camel herders and Shukria), which is linked to the Hamites and which played a role in shaping the ancient Egyptian civilization.

Education: It supported the cultural ties between the two brothers. On the official side, there were many agreements, such as the Cultural Agreement and the Media Cultural Agreement of 1969, the exchange of scholarships, and the loan of university professors. On the unofficial level, it represented the presence of Sudanese in Egypt and vice versa.

After Sudan gained its independence, these relations crystallized, and popular support was provided by Sudan to support Egypt in its wars against colonialism, the Zionist occupation, and the tripartite aggression. Egypt agreed to the withdrawal of British forces from Sudan to obtain its independence, and also worked towards integration attempts (the Tripoli Charter, the Platform for Political Action, the Charter Integration (in the seventies and eighties) to constitute a reflection of similar social components and foundations, despite the oscillation of relations between push and pull

Given the situation after the secession of Sudan, where there are about three million Sudanese in Egypt, diverse in their class and social formations and origins, there are Nubians who always aspire to Egypt, in addition to the rich Sudanese who live in Cairo and have many assets there, especially in light of the wave of instability, not to mention the people of the South. Sudanese people who fled to all neighboring countries, but they live in poverty and sometimes complain about the persecution of the Egyptian authorities, not to mention the teachers and Egyptian officials who have families since the period of Egyptian sovereignty over Sudan, some of whom were linked to the Sudanese elites. Going back to the 1960s, no Sudanese president or Sudanese political figure had anyone like him. What happened to President Gamal Abdel Nasser, and on the artistic and cultural level, no artist was as lucky as Umm Kulthum. As for the south, Egypt played a role in the south through university scholarships, providing support for schools, hospitals, and water projects, and intensified its diplomatic efforts aimed at non-separation and the unity of the Sudanese people, given the cultural components. The Egyptian Sudanese Islamic elite in the 1990s had a reference for the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt, and therefore it can be said that the cultural and social components constitute a strong dimension in Egyptian-Sudanese relations[52]

Development of Egyptian-Sudanese relations before 2011

Egyptian relations date back to the Stone Age, through the Pharaonic era, the transmission of Christianity and Copticism through ancient Nubia, the spread of Christian kingdoms, and then after that the spread of Islam and the establishment of Islamic kingdoms in Sudan, such as the Kingdom of Sennar, the Zarqa Sultanate, and the Kingdom of the Volj, which used to send its students to Al-Azhar Al-Sharif in Egypt. As we described before, they are relations. Humiliation[53]

Let modern history come and Muhammad Ali set off towards Sudan, where he looked at it from three angles: Sudan of gold, Sudan of army men, and Sudan of the Nile. Then after that, the period of dual rule, where the two periods shared the Egyptian presence. The first was the Egyptian-Turkish presence, and the second was the Egyptian-British presence under dual rule. Since 1898, however, these two periods had a major impact in not establishing a solid foundation for relations between the two countries, especially with the British colonialist's keenness to blow up that relationship, not to mention the inherited sensitivities, or in other words, the mental structure on the Sudanese side, that Egypt treats Sudan from the perspective of the older brother and deals from The perspective of superiority, not equality, in addition to the border problem and the Nile waters[54]

However, despite the misfortunes during Turkish rule, such as corruption, bribery, and heavy tax collection, the Turkish rule worked to achieve prosperity in the country and contributed to the establishment of the state of Sudan and its preservation of unity, strengthening national and natural ties, language, religion, and blood, and providing services that were not present under a modern system. Like education, even in its bad aspect, it led to the convergence of Egyptian and Sudanese thought, exemplified by the Urabi Revolution in Egypt and the Mahdist Revolution in Egypt in the face of tyrannical Turkish rule[55].

as a result of its orientations and goals for the establishment of an Islamic empire. It worked to get rid of Egyptian-Turkish rule and almost achieved it, imposing its control over all Sudanese regions except Khartoum. To do so, it attacked the Egyptian forces at Mount Ghadir, defeating them, and trying to invade Egypt. The Egyptian-British forces thwarted those attacks on Sudan and directed a number of strikes at the Egyptian army until its departure in 1885. This movement was focused on refuting and aborting the claim of Egypt's historical and legal rights. However, the Mahdist revolution strained relations with Egypt

Consequently, the Mahdist revolution turned to war on various fronts, especially with Egypt and Abyssinia, which distracted its efforts from establishing a strong central rule as an alternative to Egyptian-Turkish rule. It ended with the defeat of the armies of the Mahdist revolution and the reopening of Sudan again under Egyptian rule, but in partnership with Britain (dual rule). [56]

During this period in which Sudan was subject to dual Egyptian rule, Britain worked to blow up the relationship between the two countries, which led to tension in relations and the generation of three trends. The first trend: Egyptian calling for Egypt's right to full sovereignty over Sudan, the second trend: Egyptian-Sudanese calling for the unity of the Nile Valley, and the third trend is Sudanese. It calls for the right to self-determination and independence, and the latter movement prevailed[57]. In 1924, there was an incident in which the Governor-General of Sudan, Sirlie Stack, was killed. Britain reduced the Egyptian army. In 1936, a treaty of friendship was signed between Egypt and Britain, and the British embargo imposed on these relations was lifted, as Britain allowed. With a symbolic and military return to the Swan, represented by the deployment of Egyptian army units, irrigation units, and the educational mission, and Britain accepted the return of the means of communication between the two peoples, which contributed to the ^{For those} rapprochement of the national movements in the two countries to call for the unity of the Nile Valley. The reasons for this treaty represented a turning point in Egyptian-Sudanese relations[58].

The July 1952 revolution came to represent an important turning point in the relationship between the two countries, which can be described as a crossroads, as it adopted a new policy that was completely different from Egypt's traditional policy towards Sudan, especially the classic royal adherence to Sudan, as the Revolutionary Command Council determined in a session in mid-August 1952 the following: [59]

_Recognizing Sudan's right to self-determination and stopping the policy of begging Britain for matters
Egypt in Sudan stuck

_The disappearance of English civil and military rule from Sudan is a basic condition for the Sudanese to exercise the
right to self-determination

_Working to amend the draft constitution submitted by the Governor-General to guarantee the greatest possible amount of powers to the Sudanese during the transitional period of self-determination, in accordance with the Egyptian-British negotiations, where it was agreed to grant Sudan 3 years in which it would enjoy self-rule and the withdrawal of both Egyptian and British forces from Sudan to allow a neutral climate for self-determination. Destiny

The Egyptian government was betting that Sudan would choose unity, but it chose the right to self-determination and independence. Indeed, Sudan gained its independence and the British forces were evacuated from Sudan.

Before its departure from Egypt, the Water Agreement was signed in 1959, which facilitated the construction of the High Dam and established the Permanent Committee for the Nile Waters. Even after independence, Sudan remained influenced by Egypt, and this was evident in the revolution of May 25, 1969, which is considered a true extension of revolutionary thought in the north (Egypt), although it was the result of internal circumstances, but it was not far from the effects of the July 1952 Revolution, whether on the theoretical, intellectual, or organizational level. This was reflected in the policies and practices adopted by the state in the political and economic fields and its relationship with other countries[60].

The period from 1965 to 1985 witnessed several attempts at Egyptian-Sudanese rapprochement and integration, including:

1_ The Tripoli Pact concluded between Egypt, Libya and Sudan in December 1969

One of the most important points was the rapprochement between Egypt and Sudan in light of an atmosphere of ideological compatibility between the Libyan and Sudanese regimes, and the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser remained within the framework of a revolutionary alliance between the three countries to serve their goals and revolutionary orientations against colonialism and Zionism, as it was based on the idea of marrying Libyan oil interests, Sudanese natural resources, and the surplus Egyptian labor to push the wheel of economic development in the three countries. Although Gaddafi called for immediate unity, the other two parties had reservations, and Jaafari Al-Numeiri's opinion was that the issue of Arab unity must be integrated and not conflict with the distinctive characteristics within any Arab entity, and that it should be subsequent and not prior to the completion of national unity. He sufficed. At the level of coordination and integration only[61]

However, it quickly disintegrated due to the dispute between the three countries. The biggest dispute was between Nimeiry and Sadat and between him and Gaddafi, which was due to the Tanzanian-Ugandan dispute. At the time when Sadat and Gaddafi considered Idi Amin a champion of Arabism against the backdrop of his expulsion of the Israelis from Uganda, Nimeiry favored a balanced African policy that did not take sides. Without the other, disagreements also emerged due to the Egyptian side's dissatisfaction with Sudan's handling of the South Sudan problem in the Addis Ababa Agreement, in addition to Sudan's foreign policy, which was moving toward normalizing relations with the United States, and on the Libyan-Sudanese side, which was represented by forcing Libyan planes heading to Uganda, which was on the verge of war in Tanzania in Khartoum, in addition to weak financial resources and the lack of political organizations on the Sudanese and Libyan sides[62]

2_Platform for political action and economic integration:

The Integration Charter was signed in 1974 according to a government program of political action and economic integration in light of the harmony of the two countries' views towards the integration approach, as it represented an advanced step on the unitary level, whether Arab or African, and it led to many political, cultural and social achievements, including the following: [63]

- As for the political aspect, that line culminated in the signing of the Joint Defense Agreement of 1976, whereby Egypt committed to taking a firm stance towards what threatens the sources of the Nile or Sudan's national security, as well as considering any attack on Sudan as an attack on Egypt, and each of the two countries respecting the other's sovereignty over its lands and borders and over its internal policy. The Foreign Ministry also established a joint defense council and a joint staff, not to mention the support provided by Sadat to defeat an air bridge linking Cairo and Khartoum to transport the National Front coup by providing soldiers with medical aid and food supplies.

On the economic side, integration was more complicated due to the lack of equality between the two parties, which represented a major obstacle in implementing the projects that were planned (Jongli Canal, the Joint Company in the Transportation Sector, the Joint Company for Mining).

In the cultural and social field, the importance of training and qualification was emphasized, which represents one of Egypt's training and qualification of important pillars, especially for Sudan. To this end, Sudanese worked in Egyptian universities and institutes.

3_Egyptian-Sudanese Integration Charter, October: 1982

As a continuation of this path and based on the unity of the components on which the social, political and economic structure of Egypt and Sudan was based, a new charter for integration was signed during the era of Mohamed Hosni Mubarak, based on strategic foundations to be implemented according to a timetable within ten years.

Plan Years to ensure the planning and implementation of a joint plan for economic and social development that integrates the two countries, and procedures to ensure coordination of economic, commercial, and financial policies in preparation for their unification, and a common policy in the field of agriculture, irrigation, mineral revolution, energy, transportation, and communications, and paving the way for the abolition of all restrictions, including customs duties, freedom of trade, freedom of residence and ownership, and coordination of joint work. in

The field of international relations, diplomatic and consular representation, organizing the Joint Defense Command, working according to a unified strategy for education, and unifying systems and legislation for health and pharmaceutical services[64].

In an attempt to benefit from studying the obstacles that hindered previous integration, the most important of which was financing, the Integration Fund was established as a financing and investment body that enjoyed financial and administrative independence. Its primary goal was to achieve economic unity between the two countries by contributing to increasing trade between financial and technical financing for huge projects in the region. Every country of the two[65]

However, the situation remained as it was and there were no tangible achievements, especially due to the outbreak of events inside Sudan and the outbreak of the popular uprising in April 1985 and its adoption of armed struggle and the Numeiri government's adoption, at the end of its rule, of implementing Islamic law, in addition to the conflicts in the south and the economic crisis. On the Egyptian side, he began to question the circumstances of the situation. Forming the regime, presenting criticism of the practices of the Sudanese regime, and opposing integration on the basis that the relationship should be based on the free will of the people and within its democratic framework, and thus this alliance was dissolved with a coup in 1985 by Abd al-Rahman Muhammad Hassan Siwar al-Dahab, which not only abolished the Numeiri regime but also abolished the friendly relations with Egypt[66].

4_ The Charter of Fraternity during the period (1987-1989)

During the Egyptian-Sudanese political stagnation and the popular uprising, there was a reconsideration of the previous agreements. It was a completely different form and within the framework of an expanded organizational work with a popular base and through the approval of the Umma Party and the Federal Party. Therefore, it was a formality that did not express a political orientation.

Or a strategy in relations due to the tensions and mistrust that those eras carried, which led many to consider it a step backwards on the path towards Egyptian-Sudanese integration, unlike the previous stages, despite the shortcomings witnessed in implementation[67].

Until the coup of Omar al-Bashir came, which was a turning point in internal and foreign policies, especially since country to Egypt belonged to Sudan, where he initially maintained friendly relations with Egypt. It was the first to recognize his regime, and in order to obtain Egypt's support for the opposition in South Sudan, the National Egyptian Democratic Alliance movement, and on the Egyptian side. It retained its traditional interests, such as security and increasing the flow of Nile water, especially after expectations of the secession of the south, and therefore it always sought to solve the problem through a political settlement.[68]

Despite that positive aspect, things soon turned dramatically as relations worsened, especially on the Egyptian side, where fears prevailed from the Islamic leadership, especially Hassan al-Turabi, who was trying to export the Islamic model to neighboring countries, not to mention the Sudanese-Iranian rapprochement, which culminated in Al-Bashir's visit to Tehran and Iranian President Khatami, which had an impact not only on Iran but on its relations with the Gulf states and the United States of America as well[69]

Egypt stated in its media that Sudan provides refuge and shelter, and in the summer of 1990 it claimed for the Islamic Egyptians and provided them with military training and protection for fugitives wanted by the Egyptian authorities. This crisis was further exacerbated by the dispute over the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. On the Egyptian side, Egypt opposed the invasion and supported and participated in the international coalition to oust Iraq, while Sudan allowed Iraqi forces to pass through its territory

In December 1991, an agreement was signed by the Sudanese side to exploit Halib oil, which led to Egypt's opposition on the grounds that it was subject to Egyptian sovereignty. This was met with Sudan's statements demanding the disclosure of historical documents proving its ownership, in addition to Egypt sending forces to the region and Sudan subsequently establishing primary and secondary schools and managing Cairo University, Khartoum Branch, renaming it to Al-Nilein University, and Sudan's complaint to Egypt before the Security Council, considering that Egypt is imposing a fait accompli policy in Halib[70]

Another stage of the clash came, which was the result of former President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak being subjected to an assassination attempt in Addis Ababa in 1995, accusing the Sudanese government of participating in this incident, and Ethiopia filing a complaint before the Security Council, which led to the imposition of sanctions on Sudan and its inclusion by the United States of Sudan in a list Countries encouraging terrorism, in addition to Mubarak's explicit statement. Consequently, Egypt escalated its hostility to the rescue elite in regional and international organizations and declared its legitimacy in the right to self-defense against Sudan and against the security services that supervised the crime. The parties worked to condemn the attempt and considered that getting rid of the Turabi state was in the interest of the Sudanese people. First, then the peoples of the region second[71]

These problems were not resolved except by Al-Bashir removing the political and ideological obstacles and Egypt revealing with the Mubarak regime its willingness to end these problems. As for Sudan, reconciliation was achieved.

5_ The fifth attempt comes in the Four Freedoms Agreement (residence, movement, work, and ownership):

The preamble indicated that the agreement is based on the directives of the senior political leadership in the two countries to consolidate the concept of an effective and sustainable integrated strategic partnership, as Sudan took a proactive step by fully implementing the freedoms of movement and residence, but it was focused on the Egyptian interest and limited returns for the Sudanese side and in a slow and gradual manner.

With regard to ownership and work, Differences in laws prevented their implementation in Egypt and Sudan[72]

However, from the beginning of this agreement, it sparked a dispute between Egypt and Sudan, in addition to its failure to implement it. The most important differences emerge in the following: [73]

According to Issam Awad, Director of the Egyptian Department at the Sudanese Foreign Ministry, Egypt is reluctant to implement The agreement is the result of Egypt's demand to amend the initial draft of the agreement, so that the right of ownership is for Egyptians in Sudan without restrictions, while ownership of lands is for Sudanese in Egypt according to the monopoly law, which means that the period of Sudanese's use of Egyptian lands does not exceed 10 years until they achieve the right to ownership, and that So that Egypt ensures that its lands are invested first before they are owned.

In return, Egyptians have the right to benefit from Sudanese lands through direct ownership, according to the agreement

For the signed agreement. As for the issue of movement between citizens of the two countries, Egypt wishes to
Amending the agreement to prevent the entry of Sudanese into Egyptian territory for those aged
between 18 to 49 years

The Sudanese authorities allow Egyptians of all ages to enter Sudan without a visa.

Regarding the item that sparked a major dispute, it is the dispute over the international borders between Egypt
And Sudan. Within the framework of the Four Freedoms Agreement, international borders had to be demarcated
Egypt included so that individuals and goods could be transported through border crossings on both sides. However,
the disputed Halib and Shaltin region between the two countries within its international borders, which raised
objection from Sudan. The dispute over this item - in addition to the fact that the region is a subject of dispute - affects
the sovereignty of the state until it is decided upon or a solution is agreed upon.

We conclude from this that the freedoms agreement was an ambitious, unplanned step, like the rest of the previous
attempts at integration. It was not carefully studied, and the implementation of the freedoms of movement and
residence was not carried out gradually. The Egyptian side has reservations about these two freedoms for fear that
there will be a wide movement of movement due to political instability. In Sudan and focuses on Sudan to solve the
unemployment problem in Egypt[74]

Then the conflict came again in 2010, when Haleeb was approved as a Sudanese electoral
district affiliated with the Red Sea State, and the Sudanese National Elections Commission
approved the right to vote in the Sudanese elections as Sudanese citizens, but all of this was to
no avail and relations became tense in 2011 once again due to the adoption of parliamentary elections
by Egypt, the same region, to confirm that Halib and Shaltin are pure Egyptian land[75].

With the secession of the south and Egypt striving to rise, relations develop again after 2011, especially sluggish relations
between the north and the south in order to preserve their established interests. The January revolution comes to
open horizons for change and reconsider the Egyptian national security priorities and attempt to restore the
Egyptian role that was marginalized on the African and Arab scene and emerge from the crucible. American
dependency, which led to the deterioration of this role, in addition to Ethiopia's construction of the Renaissance Dam
and its threat to Egyptian national security.

Chapter Two: Issues of Egyptian-Sudanese relations

The first topic: The border issue (Halib and Shaltin) The second topic:

The water issue (the Renaissance Dam)

The third topic: Sudan's position on change in Egypt (the revolutions of January 25 and June 30). The fourth topic: Sudan's

position on regional issues (Libya)

The case of Halib and two shawls

Egyptian-Sudanese relations have deteriorated significantly since the overthrow of Jaafar al-Nimeiry's rule. Since then, Sudan unilaterally terminated the economic integration pact and the joint defense agreement concluded in 1974 through the government of Sadiq al-Mahdi. However, Omar al-Bashir came to power, and Egypt was the first country to recognize his regime, hoping to Relations would improve during his reign after periods of instability, but those expectations were dashed, and the Bashir regime represented the greatest deterioration of Egyptian-Sudanese relations since Sudan's independence. It was based on two things: radicalism and raising the issue of the border dispute related to the Halib and Shalatin issue, which added a conflict dimension to the relations, not to mention other issues. [76]

Historical background:

The agreement of January 19, 1899, between Egypt and Britain was an important turning point in the issue of the Egyptian-Sudanese border, as it was for the first time in the history of the two countries that a dividing line was set between them, which was the 22nd parallel north of the equator, to the north of which lay the Egyptian border and to the south of which was the Sudanese border.

The first article stipulated that the word Sudan, in this agreement, is entitled to all lands located south of the 22nd degree of latitude, which are: [77]

_Lands that Egyptian soldiers have never entered since 1882

_The lands that were under the control of the Egyptian government before the recent Sudan revolution, and were lost temporarily, then were granted to them by the government of Her Majesty the Queen and the Egyptian government in the union.

_The lands that may be opened by the union between the two governments from now on

Then amendments were made in order to facilitate the administration of the territories in the Nile Valley region and facilitate the passage of tribes, including the following[78]:

The first amendment was made on March 26, 1899, according to which the borders in the Nile Valley region were amended to reach 25 km north of the city of Halfa, including 1,014 agricultural acres and 10 villages, the most important of which are Sars Sharq, Sars West, Fars, Arqiya, Dabira, Raghim, and Derousha.

The Second Amendment: It took place on July 25, 1902 regarding the border tribes in three regions: the Jebel Elba sector in the southeastern corner of Egypt, from the south of Hali to Bir Shaltin, and the Mount Parthazoga region, which is inhabited by groups of Ababda Bedouins who live in Egypt and included the Egyptian administration and the Korskur region, which It was initially modified administratively to belong to Sudan on the basis of its agricultural richness, and when its poverty was proven, it was returned to the Egyptian administration in 1907.

This came for the first time after the independence of Sudan in 1958, after the national government took power. The border dispute over Chalib, as it announced the division of the Sudanese electoral districts, included the Halib and Shalatin triangle area in the south-eastern region of Egypt, and the San Halfa area on the Nile River, which coincided with Egypt holding a referendum. The Republic and the declaration of unity with Syria, which included the same two regions, which led to the Egyptian government sending a memorandum to its Sudanese counterpart indicating Sudan's violation of the 1899 Convention and the cancellation of administrative decisions and Egypt's right to sovereignty over it. However, it was met with Sudanese disregard at first, but then escalated by launching a propaganda campaign against Egypt and presenting A complaint was filed against Egypt in the Security Council in 1997, but President Gamal Abdel Nasser remedied that situation by postponing it until after the Sudanese elections, but there was a solution[79]

During the period of Numeiri and Sadat's rule, the related disputes between the Egyptian and Sudanese sides broke down on the rock of the personal relationship between the two presidents, on the one hand, and on the hypothetical integration project that was not implemented on the ground, on the other hand. The idea of integration was a comfortable idea for both parties, as it... The status of sovereignty over the region remained unresolved[80].

Then came the 1992 crisis, which resulted from Sudan signing a memorandum of understanding with a Canadian oil company regarding exploration in the Halib Triangle, in addition to allowing a Japanese mission to work in the Halib region, which led to Egypt raising an official protest to the company and requesting it to withdraw equipment and machinery from the region and sending explanations to 101 companies. Petroleum Corporation confirmed that Haleeb was Egyptian territory until the 1995 crisis erupted with the severity of the two positions in asserting its right to the Haleeb region, which led to the deterioration of Egyptian-Sudanese relations. It reached its peak with the Sudanese regime being accused of participating in the attempt to assassinate President Mubarak. Clashes occurred between the Egyptian border guard forces and their Sudanese counterparts. 81]

Modern stations:

In 2010, Haleeb was approved as a Sudanese electoral district affiliated with the Red Sea State, and the Sudanese National Elections Commission approved the right to vote in the Sudanese elections as Sudanese citizens. However, all of this was in vain, and relations became tense in 2011 once again due to the adoption of parliamentary elections in the same region to confirm that Haleeb Two shales are pure Egyptian land[82]

In 2012, the arrival of the Muslim Brotherhood's rule represented a new development indicating the desire to end the problem with... A huge media campaign and the spread of modified political maps led to its inclusion He included some academic curricula, which was met by the Sudanese side with the arrival of the Nasr Brotherhood to the Sudanese leadership, but the reality of the matter did not allow for the abandonment of Egyptian sovereignty over that region.

On September 22, 2014, the Sudanese Parliament announced its rejection of the Egyptian escalation of the two countries' dispute over the region, and warned that the government's handling of the Haleeb border triangle by appointing an Egyptian president.

The file does not mean silence and does not mean its acceptance of the current situation. The Sudanese escalation is wise with

The Egyptian government's decision to appoint a head of a local council for the region is unacceptable, and the assertion that Haleb is Sudanese came against the backdrop of the appointment of a head of a local council for Haleb after the decision to transform it from a village into a city[83].

In addition to this is Omar al-Bashir's statement regarding the Sudanese state of Halib and Shaltin, and that Sudan will not fight Egypt in order to regain it because there is more than enough overlap between the two countries and the two brotherly peoples, and that in the event of complete impotence, there will be no means other than resorting to the United Nations and international arbitration, which Cairo rejects[84]

Current position:

This is evident in the Sudanese government's request for Halib and Shalatin against the backdrop of Egypt demarcating the borders between it and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on the islands of Tiran and Sanafir and ceding them to Saudi Arabia. The Sudanese ambassador claimed, in a press statement: "The two regions of Halib and Shalatin are located on the African side of the Red Sea and are subject to Egyptian administration." , belonging to Sudan, according to For history, law, population and geography," and the Egyptian side refused Egyptian Foreign Ministry spokesman, Ahmed Abu Zeid, commented on the Sudanese ambassador's words and stressed that there is no development in the case of Haleeb and Shalateen, saying: "The situation is as it is. allegations of the existence "There is nothing new regarding this issue at the present time." The problem increases with of mineral or petroleum resources in the region.[85]

This problem may arise and escalate to its peak due to the decision to transfer the dependency of Halib and Shaltin to Aswan, which was announced by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Dr. Ali Abdel-Aal, on May 9, 2016[86].

Egyptian chains of narration:[87]

The agreement of January 19, 1899 between the government of Egypt and Sudan specified that the term "Sudan" applies to all lands located south of the 22nd degree of latitude, and none of the provisions of this agreement was amended until July 10, which is the complementary agreement regarding the status of the port of Suakin.

The administrative amendments that took place on the common border between it and Sudan were officially made for humanitarian purposes, which is to facilitate the tribes living on both sides of the border line. They are nothing more than ordinary administrative decisions, issued in response to the desires of local officials in the disputed areas, and their impact was limited to this. The role only confirms the temporary administrative nature of these arrangements. Therefore, these decisions cannot confirm the subordination of these areas to Sudan, and this results in their inability to transfer ownership from another country without the waiver being final and in an official document that explicitly states that what is intended is the waiver of the territory.

- When determining the right to self-determination for Sudan in preparation for its independence, there was no need to re-determine the borders because they were predetermined in accordance with the 1899 Convention. Also, according to the provisions of the theory of international inheritance, Sudan must adhere to its borders after its independence determined in the aforementioned agreement.

- Holding Sudanese elections in the disputed areas does not mean evidence of Sudan undertaking this for several reasons, namely that these elections were of an administrative nature due to sovereignty over them and not political, and the participation of the population in them is a kind of participation of the people in the growth of the local administration and not in the political system, not to mention Egypt's refusal to include them. For Sudanese departments

- The presence of Egyptian sovereignty since 1899, represented by the Egyptian presence in its various forms, including security, military and executive administration, represented by the post offices, locust control, and mining activity since 1945, in addition to the fact that many residents carry Egyptian personal and ration cards.

_The Egyptian government recently included Haleeb and Shalatin among the electoral districts in Egyptian Parliament elections in the current year 2016

Sudanese chains[88]:

_Sudan has actually been able to take possession of these areas, as it has been administering them for a long time

Administrative amendments to the border line since January 19, 1899 AD, in accordance with the Egyptian government's decision
in June 1902 AD

_Egypt accepted this situation for many years and did not object to it during the period preceding AD. This position, in accordance
with the independence of Sudan on January 1, 1956, represents the rules of international law.

A strong support for Sudan to adhere to the aforementioned areas based on the idea of statute of limitations, which is based on the principle
Actual and uninterrupted possession on the one hand, and the absence of opposition to this possession on the other hand

The sanctity of the borders inherited from colonialism, as the principle of preserving the borders inherited from the colonial era is another
reason adopted by Sudan to prove its right to the region.

_Egypt's recognition of Sudan as an independent, sovereign state in 1956 did not include any reservations regarding the borders.

_Sudan has actually been able to possess these areas; He has been managing it since the amendments were made

The administrative decision was made on the border line established by the agreement of January 19, 1899 AD, in accordance with the

decision of the Egyptian Interior Minister in June 1902 AD. This administrative decision was reached after the formation of a technical

committee headed by the Director of Aswan (Egyptian) and three inspectors, one of them from the Egyptian Interior Ministry and one

representing The government of Sudan and a third representing the Egyptian Coast Guard confirmed that the Haleeb and Shalateen

triangle is land

Their mission was to determine the land of the Bisharin tribes, and they submitted a report

It is inhabited by Sudanese tribes, and in light of this report, the Egyptian Interior Minister issued the aforementioned decision[89]

Alternatives (solutions proposed to solve the problem) [90]

The first alternative: Sudan's acceptance of Egyptian sovereignty and the Sudanese explicit recognition that the 22 degree latitude
is the international political border line between Egypt and Sudan. However, this is

It is difficult to achieve, especially if we return to the historical record in dealing with the crisis on the Sudanese side

The second alternative: a return to applying the concepts of political borders and administrative borders, but it initially depends on the extent of Sudan's agreement to consider the 22nd parallel north as a political border. Therefore, new administrative arrangements can then be put in place to challenge the legitimacy of the international political borders between them.

The third alternative: establishing an integration zone in the Halib Triangle in order to achieve the strengthening of popular relations between the two countries, which was proposed by Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Othman Ismail.

The fourth alternative: It is barter, meaning that Sudan takes what it desires in the area of Halib and Jabal Elba and compensates Egypt along its southern borders on both banks of the Nile River up to the third cataract from Meroe and Karima, which is what was proposed by Professor Dr. Abdel Malik Odeh.

Therefore, it seems that the second and third alternatives are the closest to implementation because of their flexibility, which affects Egyptian rights and sovereignty over the lands north of the 22nd parallel as an international political limit.

Given the current situation and the escalation of the wave of infiltration and terrorist operations between the Egyptian-Sudanese border, which represents a threat to Egyptian national security, such a situation requires a practical strategy to confront these risks and challenges through actual executive measures that can be summarized as follows[91]:

_ Reviving the agreements signed between the two countries regarding borders, which is the Joint Defense Agreement in 1976

_ Using modern systems to monitor and protect borders

Expanding the areas of joint work between the security and intelligence services with the aim of securing the borders

between them

- That Egypt should have an active role in resolving its internal crises and military problems without interfering in its internal affairs, given its extended influence on Egyptian national security.

_Expansion of the establishment of border crossings, such as the Akshet Qastal crossing, which will deepen trade and investment exchange between the two countries, in addition to the Arqin land port, which is planned to open this year.

Related in this regard are the embryonic prerequisites for developing the common border between Egypt, Libya and Sudan, or what is known as the Golden Triangle, since mid-2013, which requires the resumption of meetings of the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of International Cooperation, Oil and Electricity, and the Desert Research Center to complete and implement tripartite cooperation opportunities in the fields of agriculture, industry, energy, roads, and infrastructure.]

92]

In conclusion, it can be said that the problem of Haleeb and Shalateen has always remained a contrived problem. It is more like a pathological symptom or a barometer of Egyptian-Sudanese relations, the effects of which end with the mere causes of disagreement in other issues, such as the Sudanese regime's attempts to undermine the Egyptian regime during the Mubarak era, not to mention the training of the Egyptian Islamic opposition groups in Sudan and the Iranian-Sudanese alliance in The aftermath of the invasion of Iraq, which led to a sharp deterioration in relations, led to the use of Haleeb as a pressure card on Egypt regarding the issue of its water share. Therefore, it is nothing but an embodiment of the weakness of the political position of the rulers of those two countries, and therefore it escalates unless there are disagreements between two regimes on specific issues or even The difference in intellectual and ideological structure of the two systems[93]

AlNahda dam

The Renaissance Dam project dates back to the 1950s, which was a reflection of the improvement and strengthening of Ethiopian-American relations and its strategic partner, Israel, which negatively affected the High Dam, which fueled Egyptian-Ethiopian relations. They reached the peak of their deterioration with the construction of Egypt. The feeling in Ethiopia of the necessity of achieving its dreams to compete for Egyptian leadership in the region

The Nile Basin, where it was decided to build 34 dams on the Blue Nile and announce the construction of the 40 km from _ Renaissance Dam in 2011 with the help of Israel and without the approval of both Egypt and Sudan, 20 meters away from the Sudanese-Ethiopian border[94]

Then, reference will be made to the legal position on which Egypt and Sudan are based[95]

- Commitment to the agreements that were signed from the 1890s until 1959. On the other hand, Ethiopia refuses to recognize these agreements, not on the pretext that it was under colonialism, as the rest of the upstream countries use as an excuse, but on the pretext of refusing British recognition of the Italian occupation of Ethiopia.

_The dispute between Egypt and Sudan on the one hand and Ethiopia on the other hand regarding the Entebbe Framework Agreement over a number of articles, especially Article 14, in which Ethiopia believed that development in one of the Nile Basin countries should take place on the condition that the water security of any of its countries is not affected, while Egypt and Sudan proposed the necessity of adding rights and uses. The current agreement for any country in the Nile Basin until the dispute increased when six upstream countries signed that agreement.

_Recognizing the right of any Nile Basin country to equitably and reasonably benefit from the Nile waters, provided that no significant harm is caused to the water security of the rest of the countries.

However, Ethiopia was able to impose a fait accompli policy of building the dam and later used it as a strategy to buy time through negotiations, and the circumstances were favorable for it on both the Egyptian and Sudanese sides.

On the Egyptian side:[96]

The January 25, 2011 revolution broke out, leading to conditions of political instability in the country and inward isolation, which led to many repercussions, some of which are similar to the previous phase, which was Mubarak's phase:

_Egypt's absence from African summits and from African collective action in general, which led to the deterioration of relations between the Nile Basin countries

_Egypt's agreement to enter negotiations and sign the framework agreement did not stipulate that it would not prejudice existing and valid agreements (1929, 1959)

_Egyptian relations with the Nile Basin countries were focused on technical matters only, and Egypt formed individual relations with each country individually only, without collective confrontation with the Nile Basin countries, even if in cooperation with Sudan as a downstream country like it, which contributed to deepening the allegations that Egypt is the only beneficiary that He was able to take the lion's share and then achieve development at the expense of the rest of the poor Nile Basin countries

The involvement of the World Bank in this relationship between Egypt and the Nile Basin countries served to inflame it, especially with the Bank's bias toward those countries as the poorest and most threatened by famine, not to mention the indirect reason for the Bank's desire to deliver water to Israel.

On the Sudanese side, its alliances changed in favor of Ethiopia for several considerations: [97]

_The Ethiopian indulgence in influencing internal Sudanese affairs, especially the problem of South Sudan, as it became a mediator in its disputes with the South.

the International Criminal Court _Omar al-Bashir's crisis with

_The opposition of the Egyptian regime to the Sudanese regime after June 30, not to mention the economic sanctions imposed by the Gulf states on Sudan as a result of the Iranian rapprochement. Consequently, only Ethiopia was found to be a regional and strategic ally in the region.

- It is possible to take into account the course of Egyptian-Sudanese relations, which have ranged between push and pull since the coup carried out by the Salvation Front and its launch of hostile campaigns against Egypt.

Indeed, these developments had implications for the rapprochement between the two countries, represented in many indicators, including: [98]

_Establishing an electricity transmission line between Sudan and Ethiopia in the Sudanese state of Gedaref and announcing Omar to benefit from it Al-Bashir's support for the Renaissance Dam and Egypt's invitation

_Concluding a memorandum of understanding between the two countries to build a strategic partnership and combat terrorism and cross-border crime

_ Adding 1,000 to the number of Ethiopian forces participating in peacekeeping in the Abyei region as a kind of mandate for Ethiopia to solve the security problems of that region

- Doubling the volume of trade exchange between Ethiopia and Sudan. The Sudanese-Ethiopian Economic Forum was also held with the aim of establishing 723 projects with Sudanese capital.

_Opening a consular office within the state of Gedaref Kamal and facilitating procedures for Sudanese wishing to travel to Ethiopia

Consequently, in view of the above, Ethiopia was able to impose a fait accompli policy, especially during the era of the Muslim Brotherhood, where their dealings were characterized by an attempt to severely downplay the crisis, and even after the river was diverted, there was only the consultative meeting that was broadcast live without taking place.

Notifying the attendees, which Ethiopia exploited to serve its plan to gain time and portray Egypt as threatening aggression and as an obstacle to its development, which had negative effects on the three rounds of negotiations in Khartoum[99].

Ethiopia continued this approach, relying on maneuvering, keenness to prolong the talks, and rejecting Egyptian proposals despite the great flexibility shown by the Egyptian negotiator and the recommendations of the international tripartite committee, including: [100]

_Ethiopia rejected the Sudanese-Egyptian proposal regarding the presence of international experts to evaluate the Renaissance Dam, as Ethiopia insisted on local experts despite Egypt's demand for the necessity of starting technical cooperation, developing an agreed-upon program, and studying the environmental, social, climatic and other impacts.

_Ethiopia's rejection of the Egyptian proposal aimed at building confidence among the countries of the Eastern Nile Basin (Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia)

- Ethiopia's rejection of the consensus formula that was proposed to balance the development requirements of the Ethiopian people and not threatening Egyptian water security.

Therefore, it can be said that Ethiopia's success in transforming the Renaissance Dam into a reality is based on three basic pillars: the first is the refusal to stop work on the dam until half of it has been completed, and the rejection of any proposals related to its specifications and increased storage capacity, and the third is adherence to the results of the Entebbe Agreement despite the disagreement with prior notification, historical quotas, and pattern Voting on Egypt on three project issues. On the other hand, the Egyptian negotiator failed to confront Ethiopian intransigence and the Sudanese position supporting it due to the shortcomings of the Egyptian negotiating approach and its tools for about 15 years. Weak influence and effectiveness in the African context, the multiplicity of parties seeking to change the rules of water law at the expense of Egypt's historical rights, not to mention Ethiopia's ambition to lead the continent and its exploitation of the January 25 Revolution and the resulting wave of instability [101]

With the assumption of President Sisi, there became many challenges to implementing the road map, especially with the suspension of Egypt's membership in the African Union. Hence, the diplomatic move was to confirm Egypt's African identity and the importance of the Egyptian role in Africa, until Egypt's success in reactivating membership and reaching the Agreement of Principles that was signed in March 23, 2015, which was based on mutual understanding and understanding of the water needs of the upstream and downstream countries, the implementation of the recommendations of the international committee of experts, and the emphasis on the equitable use of the river's resources and respect for the final outcomes of the final report of the international committee of experts. However, opinions varied regarding it as follows: [102]

The first trend: It is seen as an important step for the return of confidence between Egypt and Ethiopia, and it also gives an opportunity to reconsider the Entebbe Agreement.

The second trend: He believes that it does not represent an end to tensions because it does not specify the storage capacity of the dam, which is the basis for forming and concluding the agreement, not to mention that it does not address Egypt's historical rights, not to mention that it gives explicit recognition of the dam, which facilitates increasing the flow of financing for the dam.

The third trend: It believes that the agreement is in the Ethiopian interest alone, and that the signing represents an acknowledgment of the dam's storage capacity and the reference to state sovereignty in the declaration may enable Ethiopia to build other dams in the same manner.

The fourth trend: It is based on a legal vision of the Declaration of Principles, which considered it a framework for cooperation and development among the signatory countries, with cooperation being a basis for common understanding, common benefit, good intentions, gains for all, and understanding of the water needs of both upstream and downstream countries.

In this context, the possibility of transformations in the interpretation of the Sudanese position emerges through three stages, the first of which was balanced in that it pointed out the negatives and positives and presented the role of mediation. As for the second stage, it was characterized by the absolute support and support of Ethiopia in the Renaissance Dam file, as talk began about the benefits of this dam for Egypt and Sudan in addition to To talk about the previous agreements concluded, they are unjust agreements and raise the issue of Halib and Shalateen, and the third stage begins after Morsi, which is the stage of remaining cautious, as it was officially declared that it is an internal matter, the fall of Mohamed.

Although there were campaigns in front of the Egyptian embassy to stop the coup, Al-Bashir dealt with the situation pragmatically and sent an official delegation to congratulate President Sisi[103]

Despite the eight rounds that were held, without going into details, they led to the non-implementation of the Egyptian demand to stop construction until the technical studies were completed, and then real negotiations must be reached instead of those that rely on evasion, based on the following features: [104]

_ Refraining from implementing any projects on the Ethiopian side except after consultation and consensus between the three countries, while the Egyptian and Sudanese projects are considered merely internal actions and do not affect other Nile Basin countries.

_ Ethiopia's acknowledgment of the shares of Egypt and Sudan as a precondition for approving the Renaissance Dam, with Ethiopia's pledge not to prejudice their shares in the Ethiopian tributaries.

_ Both Egypt and Sudan should look at the Ethiopian projects from a realistic perspective, acknowledging their right to generate electricity, but within the framework of preserving the historical rights of the two countries.

_ Agreement on the size of the reservoir, such that its capacity is kept within safe engineering limits, and that this capacity is within acceptable limits that does not affect the two countries' shares of the Nile water.

_ Egyptian cooperation with Ethiopia in its water and electrical projects so as not to leave room for hostile countries to play this role and work to exploit solar energy and use it to generate electrical energy, thus reducing the need to build dams that are built for this purpose.

Therefore, it is necessary to develop alternatives and options available to the Egyptian side to confront the threat to its water security, including the following: [105]

According to some studies, the solution is represented in two parts, one of which is legal and the other is political. As for the legal aspect, it is the possibility of Egypt to withdraw from the Entebbe Agreement, citing the fall of Hosni Mubarak for Egypt, and the secession of South Sudan for Sudan, or for it to remain with their reservations. As for the political aspect, it is represented by working to change the balance of power. Which benefits (Ethiopia_Kenya_Uganda_South Sudan) and improving Egyptian-Sudanese-Barritrean relations and making a diplomatic effort with Congo, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania to confront the other quadripartite axis.

Another study presents three alternatives, the first of which is continuity and the maintenance of the status quo, the second is the resumption of negotiations to reach a solution that reflects the balance of interests and does not harm others, and the third alternative is diplomatic confrontation within the framework of the United Nations as a last option in the event that all Egyptian diplomatic and political means are exhausted, but it must be included in advance. Regional and international support

The third solution: is to focus on interests rather than positions, and thus the integrative perspective adopted by Ethiopia is integrated with the functional perspective of Egypt through one project after another.

Linked to this proposal are a number of proposed and direct scenarios, as monitored by Dr. Fleifel: [106]

_Entering as a partner in the Renaissance Dam project, especially in light of the circumstances of the financing crisis for the dam

_Working out a water plan with South Sudan and disbursing it, while at the same time continuing to support it

With Sudan until Egyptian projects such as the Congolese alternative and the Jonglei Canal are obstructed

Relationships

With Ethiopia, especially in light of the change in leadership - consolidating relations

also on the Ethiopian soil, so Emphasizing the risks resulting from building the dam, not only on Egypt's share of the water, but pressure is put on the Ethiopian negotiator, and at the same time the Egyptian citizen responds to rationalization.

In order to achieve these alternatives and options, work must be done on the internal and external fronts and using all Egyptian foreign policy tools[107]

On the internal level, the current structure must be restored in terms of decision-making and civil society involvement, the volume of information exchanged must be deepened, the file must be under the direct supervision of the head of state, a national water council must be established, and it must avoid arbitrary politics.

At the external level: The issue of Nile water and water cooperation should not be reduced to the issue of the Renaissance Dam and interest in the future of water cooperation between the Nile Basin countries as a whole.

Emphasizing the idea of cooperation and linking water, food and humanitarian security issues, especially since this message is a motivating idea for donor countries.

_The beginning of diplomatic action towards the donors and financiers of the dam, in parallel with the role of the media and civil society organizations

_Supporting the establishment of private Egyptian companies in the Basin countries and enhancing military cooperation

- Striving to complete the idea of a complete deal, where it would be on two levels, the level with the Nile Basin countries and the other level with the United States to enhance the idea of stability in the region through these forces.

Egyptian strategic dialogue with

In conclusion, it should be said that all of these strategies are within the reach of the Egyptian negotiator and Egyptian foreign policy, in addition to the possibility of resorting to more stringent measures. However, the idea

The deal that was talked about is considered the ideal solution, in addition to the fact that the most escalating measures that lead to military intervention are scenarios that have their own calculations and determinants, such as the size of available resources, the availability of political will, and the nature of the challenges imposed by the current moment.

Therefore, these forces, both soft and hard, must be highlighted within the framework. Cooperation to preserve and not infringe on Egypt's historical rights[108]

The Sudanese position on regime change in Egypt

The Sudanese position on regime change after the January 25 revolution:

The revolution of January 25, 2011, in terms of the principles and goals it calls for in the field of foreign policy, heralded the restoration of Egypt's pioneering role in the region and its departure from the sway of the American-Zionist policy, which contributed to weakening this role and harmed Egyptian-Arab and African relations in general and Egyptian-Sudanese relations in particular, which affected security. Egyptian and Sudanese nationalism, and Sudan was greatly harmed by this policy in previous years. Therefore, it is expected that Egyptian-Sudanese relations will return to a situation that serves the interests of both countries in all fields.

Sudan supported the January 25 Revolution in hopes of bringing about a shift in the level of Egyptian-Sudanese relations, as the two countries exchanged a number of mutual official visits, and officials released a number of statements and

statements expressing a political desire, which may seem certain, to support relations until they reach the stage of partnership, including... Serves interests full strategic Egyptian Sudan, my country and my people, the Nile Valley, especially the visit of President Omar al-Bashir to Cairo with President Morsi to consider common issues between the two countries and regional situations and discuss ways to develop joint cooperation to serve the interests of both parties, not to mention the visit of Issam Sharaf, the interim Prime Minister, to Sudan and receiving him with a warm welcome that confirms the extent of the Sudanese people's support for the revolution. To confront common dangers and challenges[109]

Perhaps the intellectual ideological reasons related to Islam and each regime's perception of it and its vision of the world were a reason for this support or cooperation and can be summarized in several features[110]

_Both systems agree on the comprehensive view of peace as a religion, worldly life, economy, and politics, and then as a logical result, each of them works to build a new society in which the application of Sharia is based and increases that With the idea of loyalty that elevates belonging to the group over the nation, despite this

This similarity in the common vision of governance prevents the existence of conflicts as a result of the regional and international atmosphere

restructuring the The idea of empowerment and control over state institutions, which was evident in Mohamed Morsi Supreme Press Council and appointing members of the National Council for Human Rights and others. On the other hand, the Sudanese regime excluded many citizens to serve that idea. The idea even extended to include the security services and the army for their opposition to the government's Islamic tendencies, in addition to For many personal reasons

- Its failure to achieve a balance between the conservative and reformist movements, in addition to its inability to accommodate all segments of society, not to mention the group's isolation into itself, which led to its failure to achieve advanced demands and developments.

_ Failure to present an integrated political project. Despite Sudan's desire to export its model on the basis that it is the civilizational model for Islam and the Renaissance project in Egypt, they did not go beyond their theoretical framework, which was evident in the antagonism of most of the powerful forces and political parties, but also to their allies, which is what happened between the Brotherhood and the Salafists in Egypt.

_Also their failure to provide a model for economic development and their members making profits outside state institutions and building economic empires. Hence, there was no interest in the poor or middle classes, which led to their reluctance and a decline in their support.

However, they differed in the way they came to power. While the Sudanese elite arrived through a coup, the Muslim Brotherhood arrived in Egypt through elections, in addition to international pressures that prevented the implementation of those promises, especially the international sanctions imposed on Sudan. Despite this, the Sudanese regime was able to remain in power. Power despite his policies

The mechanisms of his rule were what led to power, despite the presence of divisions, but the Egyptian regime was unable to continue and its legitimacy ended with the June 30 Revolution [111]

After reviewing the reasons for support and the similarities and differences between the two systems, the achievements and forms of cooperation that were achieved in that period since the January 25 Revolution will be highlighted: [112]

_Several agreements were signed, including the preparation of joint projects in the field of food security, the realization of investments in all fields, and the return of the delegation of Cairo University, Khartoum branch.

_ Negotiating with the Nile Basin countries and the Sudanese side to complete the Egyptian-Sudanese partnership project for agricultural integration in the Blue Nile. This connection is linked to the escalation of the water crisis, which necessitated a great deal of cooperation as a matter of national security for Egypt, especially the Renaissance Dam.

_Conducting studies related to the feasibility of implementing the Arqin project on the border area between the two countries

_Focusing on the field of animal production and studying the establishment of a cow breeding project in the Jazira region

_Raising the level of the joint supreme committee at the level of the two presidents and developing an action plan to implement what was agreed upon.

However, all these attempts, despite their consistency with the intellectual lines of both regimes, did not work to build a real strategic partnership, and even more so, they did not go beyond that previous traditional relationship.

The Sudanese position on the Egyptian regime after the June 30 Revolution:

Despite informal reservations from the Sudanese side due to the group's dominance in Egypt over the rest of its branches and activities, the removal of the Brotherhood from power aroused the ire of the Islamists in Sudan, especially in light of expectations of besieging the Islamists who came to power in the interest of achieving and continuing the interests of the traditional elites in the Arab countries, and therefore Sudan considered it A military coup against the legitimate authority with attempts to tighten the stranglehold on the July 3 road map. Despite this, Omar al-Bashir sent an official delegation to congratulate him when the president won.

[113]

However, a new phase of détente began in relations between the two countries, since President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi's visit to Khartoum during his return from Malabo. Since that time, the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement that what happened in Egypt is an internal matter and has moved away from sympathy for the Brotherhood. What is arising in this regard is the search for... The reasons for this shift towards the Egyptian regime after June 30 can be summarized in the economic pressures that Sudan is exposed to, which necessitates regional openness and the international sanctions imposed on it. For this reason, the following methods were followed[114]:

Morsi, which was previously mentioned - trying to implement the agreements agreed upon with Egypt during the period of President Mohamed

_ Cooperation with the Gulf states to confront the economic crisis, especially the secession of its oil-rich south, the increase in inflation, and the deterioration of the Sudanese pound, while alluding to the Kingdom's role in standing by Sudan in its economic plight and the futility of the partnership with Iran, against the backdrop of Riyadh stopping its banking transactions with Sudan and reducing the import of livestock due to military relations. Sudanese Iranian

_ Proving good intentions with regard to Libya, against the backdrop of the accusations attributed to Libya of especially with the supporting armed groups, especially Libya Dawn, which is hostile to the government, allegations that Sudanese aircraft had penetrated the Libyan area to assist those groups, as it was made clear that they were carrying logistical and military assistance to the joint forces between the two countries, and then Sudan's emphasis on the necessity of working I must secure the borders, gradually disarm, and stop war and military confrontations

_ Strengthening regional cooperation with the countries of the region, based on the belief that the countries of the region are working to incite conflicts in Sudan and support the opposition in order to pressure it. To do this, he took measures to build confidence again, even with the armed opposition, and pledged to abolish laws restricting rights, release political detainees, and form a transitional government for two years. To draw up a permanent constitution, not to mention his haste to visit Cairo

Al-Bashir's visit to Sisi focused on a number of axes, the most important of which was the Libyan crisis and the necessity of coordination and cooperation in order to restore stability in Libya, work to restore state institutions, most notably the national army, and provide dialogue between all Libyan factions. The idea of establishing a joint Sudanese-Egyptian force to monitor the borders was discussed, and courses were held. Joint training, in addition to cooperation in the fields of armament

The new regime, and the necessity of overcoming the Haleeb and Shalateen crisis, whether at the official level or the media, in addition to implementing the committee's position that it should be at the level of presidents and not heads of government, with the emphasis that the Nile River is a means to achieve common development for all the peoples of the Nile Basin countries without harming the interests of any party and developing bilateral relations between The two countries[115]

In light of this transformation, the ruling party in Sudan did not invite the Muslim Brotherhood to attend October 25 on the basis that its general conference, which was held in Khartoum during the period of 23 October, had changed by removing it from power and imprisoning a large number of its leadership.

Hence, indicators of cooperation at that stage after that transformation can be highlighted in the following dimensions[116]:

Strategic crossings:

_The opening of the Ashkit-Qastal border crossing between Egypt and Sudan, despite the postponement of its opening for 3 years, which reflects the political will for rapprochement and coordination to confront their security challenges.

The National Airport has contributed to increasing trade exchange and facilitating the natural, non-stop movement of goods and passengers since its opening

_Working to open more crossings to stimulate the economy and increase trade movement in the Suez Canal, and working to establish a free trade zone, which enhances Egypt's regional role in Africa.

Economic relations:

-Doubling the capital of the Egyptian Sudanese Agricultural Integration Company, owned by the two states, with a contribution

The private sector and work to increase the targeted area for growing cotton and corn in order to meet the Egyptian market's need for oil crop projects such as sunflowers.

_Conducting 9 joint agreements and many memorandums of understanding and executive programs such as the executive program

Signed between the Egyptian Investment Authority and the Sudanese Ministry of Investment, and a memorandum of understanding for media cooperation and another for maritime safety.

Security agreement:

The main purpose of which was to refute the allegations of both countries regarding one of them supporting the opposition in the other country. As for Sudan, it wants to remove Egyptian support, both soft and armed, and provide shelter for Sudanese opposition groups. In return, Cairo wants not to support the Brotherhood.

Political cooperation:

It is represented by the Sudanese reactions, which worked to correct its course from the June 30 Revolution with countries that sought a new ^{Alliance} direction open to the new regional order, which was represented by the Gulf and the move towards Egypt to build a strategic partnership between the two countries that goes beyond the limits of security and military relations.

In conclusion, it can be said that the shift in the Sudanese position towards Egypt after the June 30 revolution is represented by a strategy of tightening four parties to put pressure on Sudan: [117]

Strengthening the parties from the East, which is represented by Saudi Arabia and the Emirates suspending investments and transfers to Sudan and portraying Sudan as a refuge for terrorist groups, which ultimately led to the closure of a number of Iranian cultural centers in Sudan.

Strengthening the parties from the West: This is in Egypt providing political, financial and military support to Haftar's regime against the Islamic groups that are supposed to be linked to Sudan, not to mention providing support and improving relations with Chad is a country with a hostile record with Sudan

Strengthening the parties from the north: through Egypt, using the border dispute card (Halib and Shalateen), and using the Egyptian and Gulf media tools to portray Sudan as a protective haven for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

Pulling the parties with the South: Egyptian cooperation with the government of the South and blaming Sudan for the failure of the Renaissance Dam negotiations

The position of Egypt and Sudan on regional issues: (Libya)

There is no doubt that the Libyan crisis since the outbreak of the revolution and its subsequent repercussions has greatly affected the especially with the increasing growth of jihadist groups in Libya and the existence of political entanglements that threaten national security,

Geography has deepened this threat since the January 25 Revolution and the rise of political Islam, especially after the June 30 Revolution. These threats may be represented in many manifestations, including the mutual contact of jihadist groups in Libya and their counterparts in Sinai, the use of the Libyan-Egyptian border to smuggle weapons and drugs, targeting Egyptian labor and investments, as well as embracing eastern Libya. For the Islamic opposition to the Egyptian regime after June 30 [118]

Therefore, in view of this threat, the Egyptian position is based on three basic elements: the first is viewing Libya as no longer threatening only Egyptian national security alone, but also regional and international security, especially with the disintegration of the state and scenarios that make it a hotbed and breeding ground for expectations of terrorism in the region, and the second is supporting the legitimate institutions in Libya. To confront jihadist groups, and third, to emphasize the necessity of arming the national army, while also emphasizing support for a political solution to the Libyan crisis[119].

The conflict between Egypt and Sudan in this file lies in Egypt accusing Sudan of providing support and weapons to extremist Islamic militias in Libya, while Sudan denies those allegations, in addition to supporting Sudan with the idea of a political solution without interference, just like Tunisia and Algeria.

[120]

First: The Egyptian position on the Libyan crisis:

The Libyan file has two tracks, one of which is political, and the other is military, in a way that guarantees the regime the continuation of its influence and the realization of its interests in Libya: [121]

On the political track, coordination between the Egyptian regime and the current Libyan government is still ongoing, while communication continues on the other hand with Fayez al-Sarraj, head of the Government of National Accord.

emanating from the Skhirat Agreement, and the recent effort to reach a consensus between the Government of National Accord on the one hand and the Tobruk Parliament and "Khalifa Haftar" on the other hand, to ensure the speedy completion of the formation of

A government of national reconciliation that includes ministerial portfolios that are approved by the Tobruk Parliament as commander of the so- and the current government and guarantees, on the other hand, that Haftar's position called Libyan National Army will not be compromised. At the military level, military cooperation and arming of the forces affiliated with the institutions supported by the Egyptian regime will continue, so that they will be able to confront the Islamic State and other groups. Other armed forces will ensure the security of Egypt's western borders and ensure the continuation of Egyptian influence on the Libyan scene

In reference to the military dimension, the direct Egyptian role appears when it launched air strikes on February 16, 2015, as a qualitative development in the pattern of Egyptian confrontation with the escalating threats from the Libyan neighbourhood. With this response, Cairo moved to the stage of direct military confrontation with the Libyan threats^[122]

The military dimension is related to the absolute support for the Haftar regime, its intelligence and information support, and its support in the air strikes it directs against terrorist groups, as Egypt differs in the necessity of there being military intervention from neighboring countries, while the others differ in the necessity of a political solution only, which Egypt sees as a reason for its delay and faltering. Including the events in Libya, in addition to NATO's intervention, and therefore the possibilities of military intervention in Libya are a preferred option for the Egyptian regime. ^[123]

However, the options for that intervention became the result of many restrictions, the most important of which is Security Council Resolution 2174 prohibiting military intervention, which necessitates amending Egyptian foreign policy towards Libya. However, it continued to make many attempts to prefer the military option and put forward a joint initiative to stop the advance of the Libya Fajr group. These attempts can be summarized. In a number of indicators: ^[124]

_ Launching Egyptian media campaigns for the idea of carrying out pre-emptive operations outside the borders to confront the dangers coming from Libya, Sudan, and Gaza, and allegations of the formation of the Free Egyptian Army similar to Syria.

_The visit of Egyptian Prime Minister Ibrahim Mehleb to Chad to discuss the Libyan file and hopes to play an important role in maintaining African peace and security in the Central African region so that Egypt will be a power

An important regional region, especially after the events that took place in Libya and the accusations of the Chadian president that Libya is a stronghold for armed groups.

_The Egyptian-Gulf alliance, which overthrew the Brotherhood, and the agreement on Gulf financial support, especially the Emirati, to confront the Islamists' control over the majority of the National Conference and the growing influence of jihadist groups, especially Ansar al-Sharia and the Army of Islam in eastern Libya.

Abdel Fattah El-Sisi raised more than once the seriousness of the situation in Libya and the inevitability of some intervention to reduce the influence of the groups he described as terrorists that smuggle weapons on the Egyptian border.

-The Egyptian positions are clearly biased towards the options supporting the "Dignity" operation, as it considered it a military mechanism to confront terrorist movements. Egyptian solidarity with Khalifa Haftar has increased, after establishing a legal framework as Egypt launched Announcing the formation of the House of Representatives in Tobruk, as it represents A media and political campaign against the "Libyan Revolutionaries Chamber" and the revolutionary movements in eastern Libya.

-Egypt tried to employ cooperation with France and the UAE to form an international framework that strengthens the path of military intervention in Libya. The culmination of this trend was in calling on the French Minister of Defense to confront the threat of terrorism in the south of Libya and prevent it from spreading to the north of the country.

With Libya, through military agreements - Egyptian policy sought to establish a constitutional framework for the relationship that would allow it to intervene to protect Libyan institutions. In this context, controversy arose about signing a military agreement for mutual defense, but it was not clear how it would enter into force in light of the conflicts.

Constitutional and political issues in Libya

The Egyptian position continues to crystallize on two levels: the first: providing indirect assistance to the Operation Dignity team, facilitating its meetings in Cairo, and providing political support to the House of Representatives (Tobruk), and the second: assisting the government of (Abdullah al-Thani) in international forums, and there

There are many paths of political support internationally, the most prominent of which was the crystallization of the regional initiative

It was presented as a document before the Security Council (August 27, 2014)

The Sudanese position on the Libyan crisis:

With the arrival of Islamic rule with the project to bring the Muslim Brotherhood to power in the region at the beginning of 2011, which means that Sudan could be one of the main players in it due to the tendency of its authority and its connection to the Muslim Brotherhood, as Sudan is considered a great safe haven for them regionally and internationally. 2011 was the beginning of

Their dream, and with the huge hidden local surge, enables Sudan to be present with particular force in the Libyan issue, starting with what was known as the Friends of Libya group on the basis that Omar al-Bashir was the first president to visit Libya after the revolution, and therefore Sudan was the first to provide weapons to the Libyans and pledged to put Sudan's capabilities under Libya's control. 125]

The Sudanese position - the official public position - is based on the necessity of working to secure these countries, with the approval of the Libyan representatives in these meetings, and agreeing to gradually disarm the borders and a commitment to calling on external parties, to refrain from funding and arming the parties, and to strengthen all spectrums of monitoring of the sea, land and air ports, to achieve this. The goal and dialogue with Libya to achieve consensus, stop the war, and stop the military confrontation[126]

In this context, President Omar Al-Bashir expressed his country's readiness to mediate and provide everything necessary to achieve reconciliation in Libya. The Sudanese government adopted a pivotal regional plan "from Libya's neighboring countries" to resolve the crisis there, which was agreed upon by the governments in Khartoum and Tripoli. Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir and Prime Minister Abdullah Al-Thani chaired bilateral discussions at the guest house in Khartoum between two delegations from their governments, which discussed common interests in support of the relations of the two countries. The two sides agreed to enhance cooperation in a way that achieves the interests of the two peoples, in addition to committing to implement the military agreements signed between the two countries. Al-Bashir affirmed Sudan's readiness to provide everything that would achieve national reconciliation and advance the development process in Libya. He stressed the importance of bringing together the Libyan parties and unifying their word towards a comprehensive political solution agreed upon. All parties, and leads to achieving peace and stability[127]

In this regard, Sudanese Defense Minister Abdel-Rahim Mohamed Hussein affirmed Sudan's support for the option that the Libyans are most capable of resolving the issue. A unified Libyan army that includes all components of the Libyan people, pointing out their issues, stressing Sudan's rejection of any military intervention that would complicate the situation in Libya and Sudan's keenness to continue cooperation with the Libyan armed forces and its support for the peace process in Libya[128].

The conflict between the Egyptian and Sudanese positions:

The dispute between Egypt and Sudan appears in the fact that Cairo accuses Sudan of supporting the Libyan revolutionaries since the outbreak of the revolution against Gaddafi due to inherited differences between him and Gaddafi regarding the issue of South Sudan, and Sudan's support for the Islamic factions fighting in Libya continued after the fall of Gaddafi through undeclared support for that "Libya Dawn" operation. Forces affiliated with the Libyan General National Congress, the majority of which are of Islamic backgrounds, including the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood, which Sisi is hostile to as a regional extension of the parent group in Egypt. He also rejects the military solution and supports the political solution, not to mention Egypt's refusal to have Sudan participate with forces in the event of sending a force. Joint Arab League to achieve the goals of the Arab League [129]

This support continued, especially what was reported about Sudan's involvement in supporting Islamic groups, which led to Khartoum being accused of supporting armed groups and militias, despite Sudan denying these accusations and allegations. However, a statement came from the Libyan government that a Sudanese military transport plane entered the airspace. Without permission or an official request from the Libyan Civil Aviation Authority, it was heading to "Mitiga Airport" near the Libyan capital, Tripoli, which is controlled by extremist Islamic militias, affiliated with the "Libya Dawn" forces. Consequently, the result was that the Sudanese military attaché was considered persona non grata. I requested that he leave the country, but Sudan responded that this plane was carrying military and logistical supplies for the joint force of the national army[130].

Despite the Sudanese regime's movement on more than one front to ward off suspicions of supporting armed groups in Libya and the Sudanese army's announcement that Sudanese territory is free of foreign armed groups and its control over the Darfur region, which is intended to be a crossing point for extremists and weapons to pass to Libya, some international reports confirm that Sudan, since the Libyan army commander's announcement of its With a process

Al Karama continues to send weapons to Libya, not to mention support for the Libya Fajr group via Mitiga Airport near Tripoli, in which it declared the Tripoli Province, which is the most prominent faction of the Muslim Brotherhood and which aims to carry out terrorist operations against Egypt, especially in Sinai, not to mention the statement of the Chief of Staff of the Libyan Army, Major General Al-Razzaq Al-Nadhuri reported that Sudanese officers trained a group of Misrata militants [131]

In conclusion, after highlighting both the Egyptian and Sudanese positions in the Libyan crisis, there remains a regional atmosphere that does not embrace the idea of military intervention proposed by Egypt, like Algeria and Tunisia, and the emphasis on a political solution, and also the similarity of that position to the international position, which is more than that in not supporting arming the forces affiliated with Al-Thinni's government or lifting the arms embargo. As a result, some options, alternatives, and scenarios for dealing with the Libyan crisis emerge and can be summarized as follows: [132]

Various Libyan parties to support efforts for a political solution to the crisis - opening channels of communication with

_Working to arm and train the forces led by Major General Khalifa Haftar, especially after he

Parliament in Tobruk appointed him Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan Forces and promoted him to the rank of Lieutenant General; As it became

Cairo can rely on this decision to support the capabilities of these forces, as they are considered the legitimate army, to carry out further military operations against members of the organizations She can do something for Libya,

including jihadism, which achieves the goals that Egypt seeks to achieve and at the same time avoids its involvement

In direct military intervention, these forces undertake the task of confronting the threat of ISIS on the one hand and changing the internal political equation in Libya on the other hand.

_Increasing security and development interactions with the western border regions to secure the first line of defense

_Continuing to support the Tobruk government and parliament, and trying to exploit the emerging cracks, will allow, in the event of the success of the national dialogue, its outcomes to lean within the "Libya Dawn" camp, which may favor the team supported by Egypt.

_Working to form a mini-Arab front that includes Egypt and a number of Arab countries supporting its position on the Libyan issue, and perhaps with undeclared support from countries such as Italy, France, and Russia, including a cover for
What are the expected Egyptian military operations? Oh meh Oh Arabsother countries. Granted to Egypt

Linked to the last point is the visit of French President François Hollande to Egypt and his handling of the issue of terrorism, especially due to the presence of many French interests in North Africa and the escalation of terrorist attacks in France. In this context, the Libyan file appears at the top of the priorities for combating terrorism, given the close borders between Libya and Europe, in addition to its oil wealth, and thus the position is based In this regard, the French government should support the government of Fayez al-Sarraj, which was formed in cooperation with the United Nations as a central government that can cooperate with it in eliminating armed groups in Libya, in addition to the possibility of calling for international intervention, which would facilitate French intervention in Libya[133].

_Egypt seeks to reduce the gap between it and the regional powers neighboring Libya, especially Algeria, which western and constitutes a major regional figure in the Libyan crisis, with its pervasive relations with the tribes in southern Libya[134]

Conclusion: The future of Egyptian-Sudanese relations

Egyptian-Sudanese relations are not emotional relations or relations born of a moment, but rather relations that are rooted in their history from ancient times and have continued throughout the ages and have been supported by religious and tribal ties, ties of blood, language, religion, the Nile, and other considerations. They are relations of a special nature, despite the push and pull stations that have always afflicted that relationship, and hence There are several scenarios related to the course of these relations. The first is for both parties to overcome the conflicts and causes of disagreement and seek to restore and revive the integration agreements between the two countries, and even reach stronger ties of cooperation. The second is for the relations to turn into hostile relations in light of the hot issues between the two countries as a problem. Haleb Shaltin and resorting to international arbitration, not to mention Sudan's support for Ethiopia in the Renaissance Dam at the expense of Egypt and its national security, and the problem of persecuting the Sudanese in Egypt and imprisoning and killing some of them. The third is to keep the situation as it is between ups and downs, meaning the rise of the crisis and the two parties' efforts to remedy it, but without solving it or settling it permanently. This is the most likely to happen

The first scenario (developing and improving relations and reintegrating again)

It remains linked to the political will of both countries. Although the recent situation imposes that scenario, on the Egyptian side, the two Egyptian revolutions appeared and what they represented as a harbinger of Egypt's restoration of its regional role, in addition to what has already happened in terms of the revitalization of Egyptian diplomacy on the

African scene, represented by the presence of President Sisi. A hand from the summits, in addition to the official delegations from the Egyptian Foreign Ministry and also the Egyptian popular delegations to Sudan, and also for Sudan, the desire to impose political stability throughout the countries within the framework of improving its relations with neighboring countries, some of which are accused of supporting their opposition, especially Egypt, not to mention the conditions that the Sudanese regime is witnessing. From international and regional isolation with Egypt, also not to mention the regional and international changes that may push him to improve the relationship, which requires a strategic partnership between the two countries, but the reality has not gone beyond agreements concluded in the commercial, economic, and cultural field by super-institutions represented mainly by two main individuals, the Egyptian and the Sudanese. In light of the stagnation and neglect of any significant role for the civil society in both countries and some projects such as the Arqin Road scheduled to be opened at the end of this year, in addition to the food security agreements and others, which have not yet been implemented, not to mention the Four Freedoms Agreements, which have not been implemented yet, especially from the Egyptian side, in addition to the recent talk. Regarding solving controversial problems such as Haleeb, Shalatin, and the Renaissance Dam, and respecting Sudanese citizens in Egypt and treating them decently, however, most of these

issues are still unresolved, even if there is no escalation regarding t

Sudan's position on the Renaissance Dam may change, especially if it causes harm to Sudan, such as sinking part of its territory or losing part of its share of water. Thus, Sudan stands on Egypt's side against Ethiopia and the rest of its projects and dams to be built, which casts a shadow over improving relations between them.

Relations may improve further if the political regime in Sudan is changed, whether through a democratic method with Egypt and coordinating with it in or a military coup, with another regime committed to improving the relationship many fields, and then reviving the integration agreements and entering into a real strategic relationship.

In any case, if that scenario is achieved, that relationship must be built on new foundations based on independence, equality, and common interest, and stop exploiting those ties for the political interests of the two ruling regimes, as happens in the case of the Haleeb and Shaltin triangle, with a review of previous integration attempts, evaluating them, and avoiding their defects in the event of concluding a platform. Or another agreement for integration between the two countries, while trying to eliminate the causes of the dispute between the two countries once and for all, until they become active again due to internal political factors in one of the two countries or due to regional or international factors.

[135]

The second scenario (tension in relations between the two countries and escalation of problems)

The issue of Halib and Shalatin may contribute to the tension in relations between the two countries. The Sudanese side has escalated this problem and presented it to the Security Council as an attempt to worsen Egypt's international situation and position in the 1990s. This problem may arise, especially after the border demarcation agreement between Egypt and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, especially in light of Egypt's adherence to Al-Bashir praised its Sudanese-ness, but in most cases it will not reach the stage of the 1992 and 1995 crises, especially since at that time there were many disputes, whether political, namely Egypt's accusation of Sudan of harboring the Egyptian Islamic and armed opposition, not to mention the disagreement regarding the issue of the crisis of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, not to mention the Sudanese-Iranian alliance. Despite the similarity of this situation to the current situation, where the difference between the Egyptian and Sudanese positions on some regional issues, such as the Libyan file and the Yemen file, in which Sudan participates with its forces in addition to the participation of Egypt, or despite the fact that Sudan sought to break its alliance with Iran by closing a number of cultural centers in Khartoum, the relevant aspect remains Due to Egyptian security concerns related to harboring Islamic groups, where they still exist, not to mention Khartoum's accusation that Cairo supports the opposition and armed groups in Darfur, and therefore skirmishes may occur between the two countries on this issue, especially since it does not come to the surface except as a result of a crisis or political discrepancy between the two regimes.

Regarding the Renaissance Dam, Egypt considers it a national threat, a threat to its water share, and an infringement on its acquired with historical rights in the Nile River Basin, not to mention the Sudanese alliance, especially the official statement of President Omar al-Bashir, where the Renaissance Dam may cause large parts of Egypt to sink and Egypt to lose a large part of its share, not to mention Ethiopian intransigence in continuing its continuation

Another issue may arise that could also play a role in tense relations, which is the file of Sudanese nationals in Egypt, especially after Khartoum accused Cairo of mistreating the Sudanese, and the Sudanese embassy submitted a memorandum to the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to inquire about the killing of Sudanese nationals who attempted to infiltrate Israel at the hands of Egyptian security, as well as campaigns to Searches and detentions target Sudanese people carrying hard currencies. This problem is compounded by Egypt's acknowledgment of this and its efforts to solve this problem, which confirms Sudan's claims, even partially.

Also, the difference in the orientations of the existing political systems in the two countries - despite the fact that each is supposed to be independent and not interfering in the affairs of the other - and the difference between the ideology or reference of the Egyptian regime could in turn contribute to the tension in relations, which was clearly evident in Sudan's opposition to the Sisi regime as a coup against legitimacy despite this being different from The official position was closely linked to its predecessor due to the compatibility of ideological and intellectual references

The third scenario: The situation remains as it is, between push and pull (rise and fall):

This is the clearest scenario and the most practiced by the two countries through their organizations, as both regimes were keen not to escalate the causes of the problems on the Sudanese side, while President Omar al-Bashir officially stated that he would not resort to force regarding the problem of Haleeb and Shalatin, lost or war in trying to recover Halayeb and Shalatin as lands.

Sudanese and his emphasis on the brotherly relations between the two peoples and his effort to maintain that relationship, and on the Egyptian side Morsi, whose foundations are close, successive regimes also worked on that, and even in the regime of Muhammad and the regime of Al-Bashir, this issue was not resolved despite promises to resolve it when the authority visited his regime, Morsi refused to give it up on it. Not to mention Morsi to Khartoum, and in light of allegations of an agreement between Muhammad, both countries never resorted to submitting the issue to international arbitration, and negotiations continued as ^{Mohammed} a basis for a peaceful settlement, but without a solution.

Another issue appears that played a role in the outbreak of problems between the two countries, which is the difference in ideological orientation of the ruling regimes, which happened during the takeover of the National Congress government in the wake of independence for Sudan and the positions of the Umma Party towards Egypt, not to mention that Egypt also views with suspicion and suspicion the regimes with an Islamic orientation, considering that it is a protector of the movements.

Jihadism, and in this regard, President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi took office after the June 30 revolution, which is what appears in this regard

Sudan considered it - at the official level - an Egyptian affair that reviewed the will of the Egyptian people and their choices, as Al-Bashir treated it pragmatically and worked to send an official delegation to congratulate President Sisi.

The issue of the Renaissance Dam also appears. Despite the explicit Sudanese position on supporting Ethiopia, Sudan received the Egyptian-Sudanese-Ethiopian negotiations in Khartoum, in addition to its presence in the Declaration of the Principles of the Renaissance Dam, and despite the fact that the Sudanese alliance went through three stages: the first of which was balanced in that it pointed out the negatives and positives and presented The role of mediation. As for the second stage, it was characterized by the absolute support and support of Ethiopia in the Renaissance Dam issue, as talk began about the benefits of this dam for Egypt and Sudan, in addition to talking about the previous agreements concluded as being unjust agreements and raising the issue of stage begins after the fall of Mohamed Morsi, and it is a stage Remain Haleeb and Shalateen. The third cautious, as it was officially stated that it was an internal matter. Despite the presence of campaigns in front of the Egyptian embassy in Khartoum to stop the coup, Al-Bashir dealt with the situation pragmatically and sent an official delegation to congratulate President Sisi. What concerns us here is the first and third stages, where the crisis is contained and taken ca

Although Egypt will not forget Sudan's support for Ethiopia in the Renaissance Dam issue, and in return, Khartoum maintains that Halib was Sudanese from 1902 until the Egyptian forces took control of it in 1955, both regimes may show flexibility at the official level, but will continue with their undeclared policy. Against the other party, and at that time, Saudi-Emirati mediation may emerge to bring their points of view closer together, even though the differences and discrepancies between the Gulf parties themselves may make this discrepancy between the two parts of the Nile Valley exist, but within its permitted minimum limits[136].

Hence, it is important to formulate a future vision for Egyptian-Sudanese relations based on the following foundations[137]

_ Deepening the common understanding of the interests that bind the two countries, identifying the risks and threats facing their national security, while opening channels of communication at both the formal and informal levels, represented by scientific missions, grants, and tourism exchange, and removing all obstacles in the way of stabilizing relations between them.

Egypt for its regional role in the region and the interest in the region whose absence - working to restore it - caused many problems and portraying Egypt as only working for its own interest in that region and then the rise of hostile feelings and the building of dams and reservoirs at the expense of Egypt's share and historical rights and work on mediation between the parties The Sudan conflict is for the sake of its stability and also for the sake of preserving Egypt's national security, given that Sudan is the strategic depth of Egypt and its gateway to Africa.

The two countries are moving towards comprehensive economic integration that goes beyond rhetorical and worn-out slogans and work according to well-thought-out plans in preparation for real integration and not just a political slogan.

_Working to open the pages of the Egyptian and Sudanese press, especially the national press, so that those concerned with the affairs of the two countries can exchange their different points of view and different ideas, which include knowledge of the problems and ambitions of both countries and the threats facing each of them.

In this context, it is highlighted the necessity of not using the media as a tool to launch hostile campaigns and inflame relations between the two countries, especially in times of crises, instead of calming them.

_Also, we must work to overcome and go beyond the security framework that governs relations between the two countries and work at a full strategic level.

_Establishing and establishing a form of institutionalism as opposed to individualism that ends with the outbreak of political crises or the departure of their initiators from power, which provides foundations for continuity in cooperation and paving the way for true integration.

_Work to read regional and international developments in an integrated manner and refer to history that proves the involvement of regional and international parties in booby-trapping the relationship between the two countries and which sought only to achieve their interests.

The Sudan file in particular and Africa in particular - emphasizing that security and intelligence dealings with the general public means a decline in the Egyptian role in Africa, which is the only best gateway to Egyptian foreign policy in light of the dominance of Israel, Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, as well as Turkey and Iran over the Arab region and the Middle East[138].

Hence, Egyptian-Sudanese relations need visions other than the old visions that called for integration between the two countries and the two peoples, and which were nothing more than political slogans that were limited only to the institutions of the two states, especially at a time of intellectual rapprochement between the ruling regimes in each of the two states, and nothing more, which was not spared. Of the negatives, I have never known a way to implement it. Therefore, in order to overcome these negatives and open new pages between the two countries based on mutual trust and joint cooperation, there must be a broad strategic vision to express the common and mutual interests between the two countries and provide the political will capable of implementation, with the need for there to be a decisive role. For the civil society of both countries, so that relations do not end with the fall of the regime in either country[139].

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Egyptian-Sudanese relations

Ali Hassan Al-Saadani

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Axis: Politics and International Relations

Considerations of geography, the paths of history, and the movement of people have woven a special relationship between Egypt and Sudan, in a way that may not have been possible for two other peoples in the region.

There is a strong relationship between the two brotherly peoples, as there is a connection of lineage, marriage, and blood between them. It is noted that the majority of the people of Aswan trace their roots back to Sudan, and the Egyptian-Sudanese border extends about 1,273 km. Sudan represents the southern strategic depth of Egypt, so

Sudan's security and stability are part of it. From Egyptian national security, and from here the importance of politics emerges

Its cohesion, on the one hand, and in strengthening Egypt towards Sudan to maintain its unity, stability, and complementary relations between the two sides, on the other hand. The two countries are keen to strengthen and support relations between them in various fields. Sudan is the only country that has a consulate in Aswan Governorate, which indicates the growth in the volume of trade exchange. The role of this consulate does not stop at strengthening trade and economic relations between the two countries, but rather this role extends to include relations in various fields. In confirmation of supporting relations between the two brotherly countries in various fields, an Egyptian-Sudanese committee was formed, headed by both the Sudanese Vice President and the Prime

Minister of the Egyptian government. This committee issued the most important provisions of the agreement

related to economic, cultural and political issues

Bilateral relations:

Egypt is keen to establish relations characterized by privacy and deep understanding with brotherly Sudan, given the unity of goals and destiny that binds the two countries. In addition to strengthening the bonds of cooperation in various fields.

Regarding the major political transformations that Sudan has witnessed in recent years, the Egyptian position regarding the most thorny issues there was as follows:

-Egypt and Sudan signed at the headquarters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Khartoum on April 17, 2014 the final minutes of the border crossings agreement between the two countries. The minutes of the agreement were signed by the Egyptian side, Ambassador Mohamed Al-Sayyid Abbas, supervisor of the Arab-African cooperation sector at the Ministry of International Cooperation and head of the Egyptian side in the meetings of the joint Egyptian-Sudanese committee. For the border crossings, while the Sudanese side was signed by Ambassador Abdel Mahmoud Abdel Halim, Director General of the Department of Bilateral and Regional Relations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the head of the Sudanese side at the meetings, in the presence of members of the two delegations representing the various agencies and departments concerned with operating the border crossings and ports between the two countries.

He explained that a timetable and a clear road map had been agreed upon to implement the operation of the border crossings, which he described as not only for the movement of trade and individuals, but that they will become new communities that will be established on both sides of the roads leading to those crossings, which will contribute to creating a new life in those border areas between the two countries. He stressed that the Egyptian side It will be ready in "Qastal-Ashkit", so that the crossing will be ready in less than a month regarding the arrangements related to the crossing for operation in less than three months from now at the latest, indicating that if the Sudanese side finishes completing its procedures and arrangements before the specified date, it will be done immediately The trend toward operating the crossing, and all Egyptian departments and offices will move to their locations at the crossing west of the Nile River, will begin after three months. The Egyptian ambassador confirmed that work at the "Arqin" port will begin weeks from now, indicating that the technical committee will follow the same procedures and steps that were taken at the Ashkit port, with the same understanding between the two sides. .

First, Egypt's position towards the southern crisis:

Sudan entered a new phase in its history by signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on South Sudan in Nairobi on January 9, 2005, which was known as the "Naivasha" Agreement. The peace agreement specified a transitional period of 6 years, ending with a referendum to decide the fate of South Sudan in 2011, in which the people of the South chose between Remaining in a unified Sudan or secession and establishing a state

And despite the Egyptian reservation on the right to self-determination, and its earnest effort to achieve the unity of Sudan, this did not prevent it from accepting and working towards the full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement regarding the South, and trying to solve the problems that obstruct its implementation, considering it is the agreement that stopped the civil war. . Egypt sought to achieve what the Sudanese agreed upon, which is to provide an opportunity for voluntary unity or peaceful secession, provided that work takes place during the transitional period that precedes the self-determination agreement in 2011 for the sake of unity, which is what Egypt has striven to work to achieve, and Egypt has made efforts It

made significant efforts during the period following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on South Sudan in order to overcome the obstacles that prevent the implementation of the agreement on the ground, through its distinguished relationship with the government of the south and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement. The visit of the President of Egypt to Juba, the capital of the south, in November 2008 represented for the first time a prominent greatest support provided by Egypt to South Sudan. During the visit, a discussion event. It represented the session was held between former President Mubarak and Salva Kiir, First Vice President of Bashir and the Prime Minister of South Sudan, which discussed ways to achieve comprehensive peace in South Sudan and Egyptian projects Egypt in the region, as well as joint projects between the two sides. On October 26, In 2009, it affirmed its commitment in the end to what was decided by the majority of the Sudanese people in the south, and the importance of the southern government committing to holding the presidential and parliamentary elections on time, and that the north commits to holding a referendum on the right of self-determination for the south on the scheduled date, and that the two sides, during the remaining period, carefully study the results that could be achieved. It entails the establishment of an independent state in the south that does not have the infrastructure and institutions necessary for the establishment of a viable independent state, and the risks of tribal fighting over the fate of the nascent state. The two sides must agree from now on how to confront the problems that could result from secession if the option of independence. Egypt continues its efforts to develop the south and help it illuminate its cities and educate its children. It also emphasized improving health care in the ten southern states, and encouraging Arab and Egyptian investors to invest in development projects in the south, because the south will remain, from Egypt's point of view, part of Sudan even after the establishment of the independent state. .

Egypt has participated in a practical way in advancing development, service projects, and infrastructure projects. It established an Egyptian medical clinic in Juba, laid the foundation stone for Alexandria University in the south, established electricity stations in several cities in the south, and granted the people of the south 300 scholarships annually to study in Egyptian universities, in addition to working on Cleansing the Nile for navigation, joint projects in the field of water, education and training, exchange of experiences and joint cooperation in all fields.

! Egypt's position towards the Darfur issue secondly

Before the Southern Peace Agreement was reached, another crisis had broken out in Darfur in western Sudan in 2003. It quickly escalated in the following years, and many international resolutions were issued regarding it, the most recent of which was Resolution 1593, which transferred the Darfur case to the International Criminal Court, which issued a decision to arrest Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir. .

Egypt believes that Darfur is part of Sudan, and views all the people of the region, whether those with Arab roots or African roots, as Sudanese citizens, and not according to the classifications that divided the region's Arab population into Arabs and Africans, and portrayed the conflict as saying from day one that the issue in Darfur has complex causes. It is an African country, and Egypt's position was on political, economic, developmental, social, and humanitarian solutions to address the situation.

The Egyptian move towards the Darfur issue was characterized by its awareness of the complexities of the internal situation in Darfur and its external connections, and its belief in the necessity of this desired solution to be a comprehensive and just solution in order for it to be permanent and continuous. It was also well aware that it is not possible for any party, whatever it is, to create this solution alone, and this This is what was expressed well by the Egyptian leaders, who said that they were open to coordination and cooperation with all parties and regional and international efforts in order to contribute to solving the Darfur problem and preserving the unity of Sudan, and their emphasis on the necessity of coordination with the Libyan side and building on the efforts made in Tripoli to unify the factions.

The Egyptian policy to contribute to resolving the Darfur crisis took more than one path, with the aim of helping to reach internal solutions, preventing the escalation of military action, the internationalization of the issue and foreign interventions, and keeping the crisis within its regional framework.

Egypt supported the efforts of the Arab League and the African Union to resolve the issue on the one hand, and She supported cooperated with the Sudanese government to resolve it on the other hand.

Egypt opened its doors to the leaders of the armed movements in Darfur, whom it invited to more than As it opened one meeting, the last of which was the Cairo Forum on July 14, 2009 to unite 7 Darfur factions as an urgent necessity to enter into negotiations with the Sudanese government to resolve the crisis in Darfur, in which Egypt presented a three-dimensional road map, which focuses on working in... There are three directions to resolve the crisis. The first is unifying the armed movements in the region through two formulas. Either the unity is through one organization as a maximum, or through joint negotiating visions and one negotiating delegation as a minimum. The second is working to achieve Sudanese-Chadian reconciliation, and the third is working to improve the humanitarian conditions. and security in the region.

The Egyptian position was not limited to political and diplomatic action, but rather extended to the field of humanitarian and medical aid, as official and popular medical and humanitarian convoys have not ceased from the Darfur region since the beginning of the crisis until now. These contributions have increased in the period that followed Sudan's expulsion of Western relief organizations following the issuance of The International Court's decision to arrest Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in March 2008, and there is a permanent Egyptian medical presence in Darfur from the Egyptian Armed Forces, as well as civil society organizations, in addition to the Egyptian presence in the joint peacekeeping forces between the United Nations and the Military Union, where the African Union contributed to the region, and one of its members was martyred. there.

Egypt's position on the decision to arrest Al-Bashir¹ Third

When the International Criminal Court issued a decision to arrest Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in... Egypt March 2008 on charges of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur. It confirmed its support for all efforts that would freeze the court's procedures, and made efforts with the Arab and African countries in the Security Council to implement Article 16 of the Basic Law of the International Criminal Court to stop any action against Sudan and President Al-Bashir. It also confirmed its support for efforts to achieve security and safety in Sudan, affirm its national sovereignty, and achieve peace in Darfur.

Economic relations

Egypt has been keen to continue its policies aimed at strengthening integration relations with Sudan in all fields, especially the economic field, the importance of which has increased recently in light of the global financial crisis and the world food crisis. This keenness is represented in the signing of a number of economic integration pacts between the two countries, the most important of which are:

A - In 1974, the Egyptian and Sudanese presidents signed a protocol for political and economic integration to codify the special relations between the two countries and help renew the joint efforts and human and material energies between them.

In this context, the executive authorities in the two countries were obligated to approve the foundations of purposeful projects that achieve economic coordination and integration and to establish the devices and systems that ensure the provision of technical capabilities. And the administrative resources necessary to create projects that find their way into implementation.

With his signature, integration aimed at consolidation. B - On October 12, 1982, the two heads of state signed a charter Relations in all their forms, especially the economic and financial fields, with the aim of establishing a complete economic A timetable to ensure coordination unit based on a strategy that will be implemented gradually according to Economic, trade, financial, and monetary policies between the two countries in preparation for their unification, while developing practical arrangements aimed at eliminating all restrictions, including customs duties, that hinder the free movement of people, capital, and profits, and the freedom to exchange national goods and products.

Freedom of residence, work, ownership, use, and economic activity practices, and freedom of transportation and transit. The

charter specified three main bodies based on integration affairs, which are:

- The Supreme Council for Integration

- Nile Valley Parliament

- Integration Fund

The Supreme Council for Integration is at the head of all authorities in exercising the powers stipulated in the provisions of the Charter, and it must issue the necessary decisions, regulations and directives to implement the objectives of the Council. according to

The Charter, and the Supreme Council for Integration issued Resolution 21 of 1983 regarding regulating trade and payment arrangements between Egypt and Sudan, aiming to work towards achieving the goals of economic and financial integration between the two countries, including several facilitations in the field of customs and administrative restrictions.

In the field of camel trade, in the field of border trade and in the field of payment arrangements.

The most important trade agreements between the two countries:

1 - The COMESA Agreement, within the framework of which commercial transactions are currently carried out between the two countries -

2 - The agreement to facilitate and develop trade exchange and its executive program to establish a major Arab free trade area

3 - A protocol for trade exchange between the two countries (March 1993), the most important of which includes that commercial transactions be carried out in freely payable currencies and with a system of equal transactions. 4 - During the month of November 2003, an agreement was signed between the two sides, according to which the Egyptian side would import Sudanese chilled meat from Sudan.

5 - An agreement to manage the Sudanese camel trade between the two sides in a continuous and flowing manner

6-Agreement to establish a free zone in the city of Juba.

Trade exchange and investments between the two countries:

Sudanese-Egyptian relations have witnessed progress over the past few years in various aspects Economic and investment opportunities and the increased flow of businessmen between the two countries, which resulted in an increase in trade exchange and doubled the number of Egyptian companies in Sudan and vice versa.

Statistics indicate that the volume of trade exchange between the two countries is centered around 500 million Egyptian dollars. With regard to Egyptian exports to Sudan, there is a dollar that tends to favor a number of Egyptian exports that have witnessed an increase in their value, most notably rebar.

Metal furniture, food commodities, plastic products, petroleum products, medicines, and copper products.

Regarding the movement of Egyptian imports from Sudan, it was concentrated in raw cotton, sesame, and oil seeds.

As for the value of Egyptian investments in Sudan, it amounted to about 2.5 billion dollars, after it had not exceeded 82 million dollars at the end of December 2002, which means a 30-fold increase.

Egypt occupies third place among the most important Arab countries investing in Sudan, while Sudan occupies 13th place among the most important Arab countries investing in Egypt, with a value of \$197.2 million.

Egyptian investments in Sudan were represented in the fields of industry (70.5%) and services (28.4%), and the Sudanese agricultural sector ranked third with 1.1%.

-Joint projects between the two countries in the fields of transportation and roads, the most important of which are:

-;- Construction of the coastal road between Egypt and Sudan, with a length of 280 kilometers inside

-;- The Qastal-Wadi Halfa Road Project, with a length of 34 km within Egyptian territory, and 27 km within Sudanese territory

-;- Aswan / Wadi Halfa / Dongola Road. ?

-;- Developing and restructuring railway lines to facilitate the movement of goods and people ?

-;- Extending the electrical network to northern Sudan ?

-;- Developing the irrigation and drainage network in Sudan ?

Water relations between the two countries:

Sudan is of special importance to Egypt regarding this part, as the water relationship between the two countries has received special attention due to considerations of geography, history, religion, language and intermarriage, as well as the political position of Sudan in relation to Egypt, in addition to the fact that they are two downstream countries.

The two countries have committed to all terms of cooperation in accordance with what was approved by the 1929 and 1959 agreements regulating the exploitation of the Nile River waters in a way that achieves the interests of both Egypt and Sudan within the limits of the shares assigned to each country.

The Egyptian and Sudanese sides agreed during the visit of President Dr. Morsi to Sudan on 4/5/2013 to continue their joint coordination and cooperation regarding the Nile waters, stressing the unity of their common position in cooperation with the Nile Basin countries.

Before that, both Egypt and Sudan were keen on water coordination between them, and this was reflected in the interconnectedness of the two countries during the crisis that arose during the year 2009 around the framework agreement for legal and institutional cooperation of the Nile Basin Agreement to redivide the waters, and the establishment of a commission for the Nile Basin countries, which was prepared by the upstream countries and which the upstream countries rejected. Egypt signed it, based on the demand to preserve the historical rights and legal privileges related to Egypt's share and prior notification.

Coordination between the two countries regarding the waters of the Nile was not limited to simply taking common positions regarding everything that affects this important water resource, but rather it went beyond carrying out joint projects to preserve and develop this resource. The most important of these projects is the "Jongli" Canal Project, 80% of which has been dug, and of which its water revenues are shared by Egypt and Sudan.

The most important fruit of the meeting that took place between former President Mubarak, the Prime Minister of the South, and Sudanese Vice President Salva Kiir in Cairo on 10/26/2009 was the formation of joint committees that would identify all the side problems that could result from the use of the Jonglei Channel and discuss their possible solutions within the framework of some partial amendments. Which could affect the canal's path before work begins again to resume digging the remaining twenty percent of the canal.

Cultural relations between the two countries:

Universities in the two countries play an effective role in supporting bilateral relations between the two countries through the exchange of visits between professors of Egyptian and Sudanese universities with the aim of exchanging experiences, exchanging literature and research between universities in the two countries, and allowing outstanding university students to visit the universities of other countries and offering scholarships to complete postgraduate studies.

Advisor to the Arab-African Council

Researcher in political and strategic sciences

Egyptian-Sudanese relations

Egyptian-Sudanese relations

Map indicating locations of Egypt and Sudan

Egypt

Sudan

Egyptian-Sudanese relations refer to bilateral relations between Sudan and Egypt.

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Ancient History

Ahmose, part of southern Egypt, was released MDuring the eras of the Middle Kingdom in Egypt and the New Kingdom, it was later conquered by Kush. The ancient Egyptian language became the official language. Especially after Ahmose, the founder of the Eighteenth Dynasty of the Hyksos, was expelled from Egypt.

Tuthmosis III reached the Fourth Cataract. The kings of the New Kingdom appointed deputies to administer southern Egypt.

Twentieth century

Egyptian-Sudanese diplomatic relations go back to the first half of the nineteenth century, since Muhammad Ali, the ruler of Egypt, began building the modern state. In 1820, the armies of the Egyptian state advanced for the first time to bring together the parties to the regions south of it, represented by one administrative and political sultanate, which was

And the kingdoms and tribes of Sudan, to make an entity out of all of this

To call it Sudan.

Egypt was immersed during the reign of Muhammad. The conquest of Sudan in 1820 was the third of the wars that Ali fought to form its political unity. If Turkey had not urged him to take the initiative to dispose of the armies on the Arabian Peninsula, the conquest of Sudan would have been the first of his wars after he repelled the English invasion, because

Muhammad Ali did not He would not have overlooked Sudan's vital importance to Egypt.

This stage of unification and formation continued for nearly half a century, until modern Sudan was completed in the year 1874 after the Sultanate of Darfur was annexed to Sudan by Al-Zubayr Pasha Wad Rahma Al-Juma'i, who was a Sudanese leader under the command of Khedive Ismail, and this was preceded by the exploration and annexation of the territory of South Sudan. Which was known at that time as the "Equatorial Directorate", through three major exploratory campaigns that burdened the Egyptian treasury, which later contributed, along with Khedive Ismail's extravagance at the opening ceremony of the Suez Canal, to Egypt falling under the burden of foreign debts, which paved the way for after This was due to foreign interventions that ended with its occupation by Britain in 1882

It existed and was only interrupted for a limited period during the era of the Mahdist state The interconnection between Sudan and

Egypt remained Egypt again for Sudan through dual rule (from 1885 to 1898), where it returned (Egyptian-British) until Sudan gained its independence on January 1, 1956.

After Sudan's independence in 1956

Since Sudan's independence at the beginning of 1956, Egyptian-Sudanese relations have gone cyclical With ebbs and flows, or with cycles of ups and downs. The prevailing analysis among the Sudanese military regime sector was based on the saying that Egypt prefers to deal with Sudan, and that this is among the reasons for these regimes to remain in power for longer periods. It has led

The spread of this impression - in addition to other reasons that will be mentioned later - led to the deterioration of Egyptian-Sudanese relations, especially in the "third democracy" phase, which expressed itself through the cancellation of the joint defense agreement, the cancellation of the Egyptian-Sudanese integration agreements, and replacing them with an empty piece of paper that Mr. Al-Sadiq called Al-Mahdi (Prime Minister-elect at the time) The Fraternity Charter.

In the nineties of the twentieth century, Egyptian-Sudanese relations deteriorated in an unprecedented way, reaching the level of a true cold war, which did not stop at the point of discord between the regimes, but rather extended inside Sudan to a greater extent through continuous media attacks and mobilization against what was portrayed as... An external opponent, which created a generation in Sudan that looks at Egypt with suspicion and apprehension.

This stage, despite its bleakness, was useful, at least, in terms of drawing lessons to avoid slipping into this pit again, and also in order to realize a simple truth... which is that Egypt and Sudan are indispensable to each other, no matter how different the ruling regimes are here or there, take it into consideration. The consideration before undertaking any action or reaction... is that there are necessities that Egypt and Sudan must remain in this place since the dawn of creation... and they will remain so, regardless of the events or developments in the north or south of the valley, and that there is a mutual influence and influence that will result Their impact in all cases, and therefore cooperation for the common good is the most effective and beneficial, and it is the natural logic of things, and that no matter how far apart the paths are, there is no escape from returning to cooperation, understanding and coordination again[1].

Mubarak era

Former Egyptian President Mubarak and Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, during his visit to Cairo in April 2010

The eighties

The period of Sadiq al-Mahdi: The government of "Sadiq al-Mahdi" requested the cancellation of the Egyptian-Sudanese integration pact, and replaced it with what was called the "Pact of Brotherhood," which is much less cooperation than . Integration Charter According to him, Which was planned

The nineties

Since the outbreak of the Salvation Revolution in 1989 until the preparation of this study? What are the consequences of that? What are the future prospects for these relations in light of the current circumstances? Then the research plan is determined as follows: First: The Sudanese regime's method of managing relations vision for this (; Second: The resulting results; Third: A future Egyptian Sudanese) 97-89 relations.

First: How did the Sudanese regime manage Egyptian-Sudanese relations (89-97)

Reviewing the file of Egyptian-Sudanese relations during the period under study makes it clear that, with the exception of a limited cooperative period in 1989-90, the conflictual nature is the dominant character in the Sudanese regime's management of these relations, and we can therefore determine the method of the Sudanese regime's management of these relations as follows: A - The Sudanese regime attempted to employ these relationships to achieve some of its goals, especially in the beginning, and then moved towards a cooperative method in managing these relationships.

B - An attempt to follow the method of crisis management for these relations, whether to cover up its internal failure, or to achieve some limited regional gains, or to seek to play a regional and international role based on the ideology adopted by the regime, and then it turned to a conflictual nature.

C - Returning to the call for a limited cooperative method when the regime's crisis increased internally, regionally and internationally, raising the slogan of common vital interests. Below we shed light on each of these points: the Sudanese regime and the cooperative method of managing Egyptian-Sudanese relations in the beginning: Egyptian support was clear for the Salvation Revolution in the beginning. The Egyptian leadership considered it a national regime that came to achieve stability in Sudan, and solve the crisis in the south and the economic crisis that began to show its features in the last period of the rule of the government of Sadiq al-Mahdi (2) - especially since this government had requested the cancellation of the Egyptian-Sudanese integration pact that was signed during the era of President Numeiri, and it was replaced by another, less powerful formula, which is known as the Pact of Fraternity

The Sudanese regime tried to take advantage of the previous state of stagnation between Egypt and the government of Al-Sadiq, seeking to consolidate Egyptian-Sudanese relations, the Mahdi, so that it presents itself as a regime and achieve political and economic stability in Sudan, which represents one of the basic goals of Egyptian foreign policy. In fact, the Sudanese regime was seeking To other goals, such as consolidating its foundations and gaining regional and Arab legitimacy through the Egyptian portal, in addition to seeking to reduce the intensity of the American pressures that had begun to appear, especially after the measures it took at the internal level, including dissolving parties and unions, arresting political leaders, union leaders, and thousands of workers and citizens, and expanding its expansion. In using violent methods and issuing death sentences on some Sudanese political figures, in addition to confiscating newspapers, which affected human rights groups and the American administration at the time. The Sudanese regime also tried to exploit Egyptian-Sudanese relations within the scope of the problem of the south. Al-Bashir asked President Mubarak for help in reaching a solution. To reach a peaceful solution to the problem of the south, Cairo hosted a delegation from the Sudan People's Liberation Movement within the framework of negotiations to reach a peaceful solution to this problem, in addition to a delegation from the coalition of Sudanese opposition parties.

However, Brigadier General Muhammad Al-Amin Khalifa, a member of the Sudanese Military Council, criticized in press statements these meetings and described them as poisoning. Egyptian-Sudanese relations (3) It seems that the Sudanese government wanted Egyptian military assistance to solve the problem of the south, which Cairo rejected, preferring the negotiation method to solve this problem, especially since Mr. Muhammad al-Mirghani, the former head of the Council of the Head of State, had reached an agreement with John Grange to solve this problem, but the government of Sadiq al-Mahdi procrastinated in implementing this agreement, as it was an agreement reached by the leadership of the Unionist Party, the traditional competitor to the Umma Party. The Egypt government responded to France's celebrations of the two hundredth anniversary of the French Revolution, which was attended by the media, and President Mubarak coincided with this and appealed to the leaders of the Western world. Supporting the nascent Sudanese regime. Dr. Mansour Khaled believes that he believes that US President George Bush has responded to President Mubarak, as he used his right to disrupt the implementation of US Law 512, which obliges the US administration not to assist any regime that overthrows democracy for a period of six months of monitoring (4). In fact, the side Although Al-Masry welcomed the new Sudanese regime and provided diplomatic assistance in order to obtain regional and Arab legitimacy and reduce the intensity of American pressure, he expressed his fear of the escalation of the regime's methods of violence towards the Sudanese political opposition forces. He also expressed his reservations about the trend towards imposing a party regime. The one and Sudanese policy towards the south. It is noteworthy that this Egyptian reservation came at the popular and official levels. The Wafd Party This government represents the will of the people saw that this was a military regime that seized power by a coup against an elected democratic government, whatever the Sudanese differences - (5) while the Tagammu Party and During h

A regime that expresses an Islamic fundamentalist trend that would raise many problems and crises in the region

(6). The Egyptian political group also paid attention to this Sudanese event, so many articles and studies appeared about the cycles of the Sudanese ruling system between democracy and military rule, and most of them saw that it would be better not to have The new system is a repetition of previous military systems, and one of these studies clarified at an early stage the matters that the new system must be aware of, including: - 1 - The armed forces' assumption of responsibility for governance is temporary and that the basis is the existence of a stable civil institutional system for governance, and therefore The solution to the problem of political parties is not to abolish them completely, but rather to develop and establish them on national foundations and not on religious, sectarian or regional foundations. It is unreasonable for Sudan to once again begin to discover the virtues of multipartyism compared to the defects of the one-party system - 2 - if it were here A positive role for the military coups that raise the slogans of the revolution. This role is linked to their ability to resolve and complete the outstanding issues and eliminate the shortcomings and corruption, without being bound by partisan considerations. The issue of laws applying Islamic Sharia and resolving distress. In this context, the necessity of resolving the problem of the South and solving the economic problem appears - 3 It is important that an organized effort be made to avoid the shortcomings of the Sudanese political system as a parliamentary system characterized by the presence of a large number of parties, none of which has the strength to enable it to rule alone, which leads to political instability. Therefore, there must be a political system that brings together Between party pluralism and the presence of a strong national central authority, and that is the task of the new ruling elite, and the entire Sudanese elite - (7) - and at the official level, President Al-Bashir's visit to Cairo in February 1990 was one of the occasions in which the Egyptian political leadership expressed its fear and reservations about some of the procedures that it was following. The Sudanese regime is dealing with the same issues - Order (8) - which some members of the ruling military council in Sudan objected to as interference in the internal affairs of Sudan. Then came the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and Sudanese support for Iraq, which represented a major difference with the Egyptian approach, in addition to the embarrassment it caused. To the Egyptian leadership, which made a previous diplomatic effort to persuade the Arab Gulf states to recognize the new Sudanese regime, putting an end to the cooperative phase in the scope of Egyptian-Sudanese relations, especially after reports circulated about Iraq deploying its missiles in Sudan directed against Egypt, which made President Mubarak threaten to strike it if the regime proved that. Sudanese and the management of Egyptian-Sudanese relations in crises: The method of managing relations between countries in crises is one of the well-known methods in the field of international relations, and is based on one of the international parties creating a crisis within the scope of its relations with another international party (9). There are multiple motives that cause or push this party. The international community has to follow this method, including trying to address its internal crises by creating an external crisis, which gives it the opportunity for internal mobilization and regaining the initiative at the internal level. It may also resort to this method in order to achieve specific reg

A specific ideology that he believes in and tries to spread or export to other international parties. In the Sudanese case, most of these factors that actually pushed Egypt were present during the period under study. We can provide several examples for the Sudanese regime to follow this method in managing its relations. Examples With Egypt. of these manufactured crises on the part of the Sudanese regime in The scope of his relationships

A - The crisis of members of Egyptian Islamic groups fleeing to Sudan

In May 1990, Egypt informed the Sudanese government of its deep concern over the increasing number of members of Egyptian Islamic groups escaping sentences issued against them and taking refuge in Sudan, and receiving military training in the camps of the National Islamic Front led by Dr. Hassan al-Turabi (10). Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman was the leader of the Egyptian Jihad group. He had gone to Sudan, at that time, and Ibrahim Adam, a member of the ruling military council at the time, announced that hosting Omar Abdel Rahman in Sudan was like Cairo hosting the Sudanese opposition (11). Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman appeared on Sudanese television at that time, speaking about the project. The religious state in Egypt and Sudan. The Sudanese authorities also allowed him to give a number of public lectures and other television talks and later helped him obtain an entry visa to the United States. The Sudanese opposition in Cairo warned of a Sudanese plan aimed at transferring political violence to the Egyptian arena, and that preparations had been made. Within the Islamic Front (12) this issue has remained one of the controversial topics between Egypt and Sudan until now, especially after the Egyptian security services monitored training centers for terrorist elements in Sudan, and made clear accusations against the Sudanese regime in this regard. This crisis escalated as a result of The assassination attempt that President Mubarak was subjected to following his arrival in Addis Ababa to attend the African Summit in 1995, in which some elements associated with the Sudanese Islamic Front were proven to be involved in this attempt. The Ethiopian government called on the Sudanese regime to hand over the accused who fled to Sudan, but the Sudanese reaction was not At the required level, as Sudanese statements varied on this issue, which proved in its developmental outcome that there was Sudanese involvement in this attempt in one way or another, which led to Ethiopia submitting a complaint to the Security Council, which resulted in the imposition of sanctions on Sudan, in addition to the inclusion of The United States includes Sudan on the list of countries encouraging international terrorism

B - The Haleeb Crisis and the Sudanese

Escalation In June 1993, Sudan submitted four memorandums to the Security Council regarding the border dispute over the Haleeb Triangle, and at the same time the Sudanese government took sharp escalatory measures.

It represented the annexation of the Egyptian educational mission schools to the Sudanese Ministry of Education towards Egypt. The branch of Cairo University in Khartoum was also closed and turned into a Sudanese university under the name of Al-Nilein University. The Sudanese authorities also returned a group of Al-Azhar preachers to Cairo, and the rest houses of the Egyptian Ministry of Irrigation in Sudan were seized. The Sudanese government subsequently announced a state of general mobilization against the Authority for the Defense of Faith and the Homeland. The Sudanese authorities also announced the discovery of a plot to invade Sudan from abroad, run by the Sudanese opposition and in which Egypt participates with support and training. Others, through the Egyptian embassy in Khartoum, also organized a number of marches in Sudanese cities denouncing the so-called Egyptian aggression. The Sudanese government also accused Egypt of thwarting the Abuja negotiations between the Sudanese government delegation and John Garang in April 1993 (13). In fact, this escalation of... The Sudanese side, which led to creating a crisis in Egyptian-Sudanese relations, had its motives resulting from the internal situation in Sudan, and the failure of the Salvation Government to fulfill its promises to the Sudanese people, as the economic and living conditions worsened, and the intensity of acts of political violence by the Sudanese regime towards opponents and citizens increased. Both, which represented a clear violation of human rights, and the failure to reach a settlement of the southern issue despite the occurrence of some regional transformations in favor of the Salvation Government and at the expense of Garang, all of these internal factors interacted to represent a framework that transcends the legitimacy of the Salvation Government regime, which prompted it to fabricate this Crisis (14) On the other hand, such as the Iranian factor that entered the Sudanese equation as one of the motives driving the Sudanese regime to create this crisis, as Sudan, consolidate its relations with Iran, in the wake of the end of the second Gulf crisis, moved to which continued to seek to limit Egyptian influence in the Gulf by... While encouraging the creation of crises on the southern border of Egypt, this Sudanese escalation, which we see as being encouraged by Iran, coincided with the success of President Mubarak's initiative to settle the conflict between Qatar and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which arose at that time and in which the Iranian side had a clear role alongside Qatar, which... This means that Iran seeks to send a specific message to the Egyptian leadership. The ideological factor represented by the clarity of the Sudanese regime's fundamentalist identity comes through the National Islamic Front's control over the regime and the Front's endeavor to impose its intellectual and ideological model on the regional and global levels, which contradicts the Egyptian approach, adding a new motivation. To create this series of crises in Egyptian-Sudanese relations (15) - Return to the call for limited cooperation with the worsening crisis of the Sudanese regime: The economic and living conditions have reached a critical situation, conditions have worsened in Sudan, and the political especially after the announcement of the formation of the Sudanese opposition coalition and its announcement Using the military option as a tool to overthrow the Sudanese regime. Fighting has already begun in southern and eastern Sudan, and the opposition forces have taken control of some Sudanese areas, which

The emergence of the military militias of political parties and the growth of the military power of the National Islamic Front militia (16). Sudanese relations with neighboring geographical countries also became conflict relations, in

addition to the increasing intensity of the Arab isolation of the Sudanese regime as a result of the disputes that arose between it and the Arab Gulf states regarding its position on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and its policies.

Concerning the encouragement and training of some opposition terrorist elements in a number of other Arab countries, and if we add to that the international isolation of the Sudanese regime, especially after the imposition of

political sanctions by the Security Council and the inclusion of Sudan on the list of countries encouraging terrorism, all of these factors indicate the extent of the worsening crisis of the Sudanese regime. Whether at the

internal, regional or international level, the Sudanese regime therefore tended to call for calming the tension in

Egyptian-Sudanese relations, which was done for a limited period following President Mubarak's meeting with President al-Bashir on the sidelines of the Arab Summit in June 1996 (17). Then the Sudanese regime moved with

The increase in his crisis led him to call for limited cooperation with Egypt in order to stop what he called external attacks, suggesting that these attacks only affect the vital Egyptian and Sudanese interests, and that they are primarily directed against Egypt, through its threat to the sources of the Nile, and the visit of the Sudanese Vice President to

Egypt was in This framework was established at the beginning of 1993, but this visit did not achieve the desired

results for the side during this visit. The Sudanese position was based, especially after Dr. Hassan Al-Turabi, Egypt,

and the Egyptian in this regard on the following grounds based on the statements of President Mubarak and Mr.

Amr Moussa, the Minister of Foreign Affairs:

A - What is happening in Sudan is an internal matter between the Sudanese opposition and the Sudanese government, and that the Sudanese regime must reach a solution to this problem through negotiation.

B - Egypt is keen not to interfere in the internal political affairs of Sudan, and it is also keen not to interfere with any other external parties in Sudanese affairs.

Egypt is committed to preserving the unity of Sudan D - The need for the Sudanese regime to take some C -

Adhering to the necessary measures to rebuild confidence between the two countries so that cooperative relations

can be established - (18) - Second: The consequences of the Sudanese regime's way of managing Egyptian-

Sudanese relations: It can be said that The method followed by the Sudanese regime in managing Egyptian-

Sudanese relations has resulted in a set of dangerous consequences, the most important of which can be identified as follows:

- A state of distrust towards the Sudanese regime's tendencies in general prevailed among the Egyptian political leadership, in addition to the sharpening of the discrepancy in viewpoints between the two countries on many issues, such as the method of managing regional relations with neighboring African geographical countries, the issue of terrorism, and the new methods of international dealing imposed by it. The nature of the changes that the world is witnessing - Sudanese policy towards African geographical neighbors has highlighted the negative aspects in Arab-African relations, especially since the Sudanese regime tried to highlight the nature of the conflict between Arabism, Islam and African identity, which created new problems in the region that represent... Critical to Egyptian policy in Africa, which it was always keen to avoid - Sudanese policy has led a point to the introduction of a new international element from outside the region, which is Iran, which is trying to play a role in this region by finding a topic presented to it in the Red Sea region, which increases the effectiveness of The impact of its pressure on the Arab countries and gives it the opportunity to expand its influence at the expense of Egyptian influence in an area that is extremely sensitive to Egyptian national security.

Sudanese policy has opened the doors to international intervention in the Sudanese issue, which creates new situations and extremely complex political equations for Egypt and Sudan alike, especially since the Egyptian approach in this regard is to reduce the intensity of international intervention in the Sudanese issue as much as possible, out of awareness by the Egyptian leadership of the dangerous repercussions. This interferes with the future of the Sudanese state, and the possibility of the south separating from the north, which leads to the creation of new political conditions that are not guaranteed or safe with regard to Egyptian and Sudanese national security.

Sudanese policy towards Egypt created a critical situation for Egyptian diplomacy. The activity of this diplomacy sought to avoid imposing any international forums, especially since the focus of sanctions on Sudan was to mitigate the severity of these sanctions as much as possible, despite the ongoing Sudanese escalation towards Egypt, which... It weakens the possibility of Egyptian pressure to achieve its pivotal goal, the race to define it in the advanced concept (19) - Third - Towards a future vision for Egyptian-Sudanese relations: In light of the current data on the Sudanese scene and at the regional and international levels, it can be said that Egyptian-Sudanese relations will take one of the following paths or combine Some elements of these paths:

1 - In the event of an increase in violence that threatens to erupt into a Sudanese civil war and an attempt to eliminate the Sudanese regime by force, the Egyptian role will have great weight, especially since the Egyptian political leadership is aware of the dangers of this civil war erupting, as it opens the doors to more

Foreign interventions have unsafe consequences. They also represent in themselves a threat to security and stability in the southern Egyptian border region, and lead to an increase in the number of Sudanese immigrants to Egypt to escape the civil war, which represents a burden on the Egyptian government, especially in light of the intertwining of Egyptian-Sudanese human relations and the presence of More than three million Sudanese in Egypt live and work without any distinction between themselves and the Egyptians. Therefore, the harbingers of such a civil war appearing now may lead to the Sudanese regime responding to some Egyptian demands, which encourages the Egyptian government to intervene positively to prevent the outbreak of civil war in Sudan. Or at least calm down and reduce the intensity of the conflict, which may lead to some degree of improvement in Egyptian-Sudanese relations, but the matter depends on the extent of the Sudanese regime's ability to reduce the burdens of the National Islamic Front, especially since there are some objections stemming from within the Front's policy. .

2 - In the event of a new military coup in Sudan that leads to the elimination of the regime with Egypt, and it is supposed to strive like the next, the new regime will tend to improve relations. This new regime will aim to get rid of the heavy legacy of the current regime by seeking to rebuild Sudanese relations with other countries. The African neighbourhood, and the Arab countries, in addition to improving Sudan's image at the external level. In such a situation, Egyptian policy will have to provide assistance to the new regime, even if there are some reservations that will be taken into consideration, including the necessity of the new regime's commitment to handing over power to civilians, establishing a democratic government, and achieving reconciliation. Sudanese, in addition to reaching a peaceful solution to the problem of the south and east, and the matter in this case depends on the extent of the possibility of a military coup in Sudan and the result of the dismissal of the officers that will lead to this coup, especially since there is dissatisfaction in the professional Sudanese army with military competence and the subjection of the army to the control of the Islamic Front.

3 - In the event that the current Sudanese regime persists and the state of internal discontent and guerrilla warfare against the regime continues, Egyptian diplomacy must play a positive role in reducing the intensity of regional and international interference in Sudanese affairs. It must also continue despite the embarrassment of its position and considerations related to vital interests. Egypt, by seeking to spare Sudan from further international sanctions, or at least mitigate the severity of these sanctions. In the three cases, Sudan remains one of the dilemmas facing Egyptian foreign policy, as the actions of the current Sudanese regime have created new, unprecedented situations and problems in the region, and introduced elements of external power. It cannot be underestimated, and therefore the Egyptian move towards the Sudanese dilemma will be governed by extremely complex and precise calculations (20)

2011-2000

At the beginning of the new millennium, Egyptian-Sudanese relations began to improve, after the split that occurred within the ranks of the Ingaz regime and the departure of Hassan al-Turabi from power, and after overcoming the crisis sparked by the signing of the Machakos Agreement in 2002, Egyptian-Sudanese relations gained a strong boost through the lightning visit made by the former president. Mubarak to Khartoum on May 1, 2003, after a long period of interruption that lasted more than 13 years. The visit in itself represented a major event, and was the culmination of the slow path of improvement in relations between the two countries, and gave an indication that many of the concerns and outstanding files between the two countries, especially the file The security issues have been overlooked or bypassed, especially the effects resulting from the attempted with assassination of President Mubarak in Addis Ababa in 1995, and that Egypt decided to give priority to its strategic interests by opening a completely new page to the rescue authority and putting aside

During this visit, Presidents Mubarak and Al-Bashir decided to activate the integration institutions between the two countries again, which was developed shortly thereafter during President Omar Al-Bashir's visit to Cairo on January 18, 2004, where the two countries agreed to issue a law that recognizes four freedoms: ownership, movement, and Residence and work between Egypt and Sudan. President Mubarak also directed the Egyptian government during this summit in Cairo to immediately begin opening health units and service projects in the south in order to contribute to creating stability and consolidating peace.

However, the Four Freedoms Agreement did not have the expected effects, because its implementation remained deficient on the Egyptian side, as entry visas for Sudanese were not completely cancelled. On the other hand, Sudan remained preoccupied with pursuing successive crises in the south and west in continuous attempts to achieve stability, to no avail.

Secession of South Sudan

The process of political settlement of the civil war in South Sudan, embodied in the signing of Naivasha 4 in January 2005, unleashed a massive wave of interactions within Sudan, as well as in the surrounding

Egypt, and it became clear to everyone that from that moment on, Sudan was no longer regional and international, especially the Sudan that we had known over the past fifty years. Rather, there would be a different Sudan, whose final features and divisions had not yet been settled, as the south was about to secede, and then Sudan would be divided into Two countries, northern and southern.

In this context, it seemed that Egypt, which had always been preoccupied with its northeastern borders and the issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict, was surprised that there were structural changes that had begun to reveal themselves in the south of the valley, and that would structurally affect its national security in the broad sense of the word. Sudan's importance to Egypt cannot be reduced to an issue. Water is a part of the heart and body, and if Sudan turns into a region of unrest and instability, this will undoubtedly mean Egypt's isolation and siege within its geographical borders, the shrinkage of its regional role, and its loss, perhaps, of the basic opportunity that is still available to it to reformulate its view of itself and its role in this region. By communicating its ancient affiliation in the Nile Basin, of which Sudan is located at the heart.

Secession in South Sudan will not stop at the borders of the South, but may extend beyond it to the disintegration of the North itself into warring states and cantons that are poor in resources and locked in their own internal crises.

This scenario represents a real danger, and the Darfur crisis may represent a clear example of that.

It sought to contribute to resolving the Sudanese crisis through the joint initiative that it presented Egypt It was in conjunction with Libya. This initiative was more comprehensive of controversial issues and included all Sudanese political parties. It called for resolving the Sudanese crisis through implementing the principle of citizenship and full equality without discrimination based on religion or religion. race or color, but it did not include the principle of the right to self-determination that the "IGAD Initiative" included, and it was precisely this reason that stood in the way of the progress of the joint initiative, as the Sudan People's Liberation Movement accepted it in form and continued to obstruct it in substance through evasions Procedural.

After the initial emotions that accompanied the Egyptian reservations about the right to self-determination subsided, resulting mainly from the feeling of exclusion and surprise, a kind of quiet shift in Egyptian policy gradually began to appear, which tended to deal with the status quo, considering that the right to self-determination for the south had become a reality. Through a binding legal agreement, especially since all Sudanese political forces had announced their support for the agreement, which in fact is a support that falls under the heading

Achievement of the outcome, as these forces had agreed to the right to self-determination before, since the signing of the “Asmara Decisions” at the Fateful Issues Conference in 1995, and these forces confirmed that they support voluntary unity based on persuasion and common understanding.

After the Egyptian revolution of 2011

2011 Egyptian Revolution: Detailed article Crystal Clear app kdicit.png

Ali Othman Taha, the second vice president of President Al-Bashir, resigned from Egyptian Prime Minister Essam Sharaf, March 27, 2011.

On March 29, 2011, during the visit of Egyptian Prime Minister Essam Sharaf to Sudan, Egypt signed several agreements in the meetings of the Egyptian-Sudanese Supreme Committee, which included the preparation of joint projects in the field of food security and the encouragement of investments between the two countries in various fields. The agreements included the return of a delegation from Cairo University, Khartoum branch, in addition to discussing the Nile water problem and seeking to resolve differences through dialogue and understanding between the basin countries[2].

The Minister of Agriculture, Dr. Ayman Abu Hadid, revealed that there are negotiations with the Sudanese side to complete the Egyptian-Sudanese Fork Project for agricultural integration in the Blue Nile, to cultivate 160,000 acres. It is scheduled to grow cotton, sunflower, sorghum, and sesame crops, with production divided between the two countries.

He added that the Agricultural Research Center is currently conducting studies related to the feasibility of implementing the Arqin project on the border area between the two countries, with the aim of reclaiming and cultivating two million acres.

He stressed that livestock production will have a large share of joint cooperation and that five Egyptian investors are studying establishing a cow breeding project in the Al-Jazeera region in Sudan. This makes the price of a kilogram for consumers no more than 28 pounds (\$4.7).

On December 27, 2018, Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry and Head of Egyptian General Intelligence, Major General Abbas Kamel, went to Khartoum on an official visit. They are expected to participate

During their visit, in the second quadripartite meeting at the level of the foreign ministers and the heads of the intelligence services in Egypt and Sudan[3].

The official spokesman for the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ahmed Hafez, said that the visit is also And he declared expected to witness a bilateral meeting between the foreign ministers of the two countries, indicating that these meetings come within the framework of permanent communication between the two sides at all levels, and in light of the directives of the leadership of the two countries towards supporting bilateral relations. And develop it in all fields.

He also noted that the meetings will address all aspects of joint cooperation between the two countries, and follow up on the implementation of the decisions of the joint Egyptian-Sudanese presidential committee in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, headed by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in October 2018, in order to strengthen bilateral relations between the two countries and push them towards greater horizons. I welcome what lives up to the aspirations of the peoples of the two brotherly countries.

Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi and Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, Cairo, October 27, 2020

Sudanese sources reported that Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi will visit the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, on Saturday, March 6, 2021, which will last for hours, during which he will hold discussions with the Chairman of the Sovereign Council, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan. The sources indicated that Al-Burhan and Al-Sisi will discuss the Renaissance Dam file, the border crisis between Sudan and Ethiopia, in addition to bilateral issues.

Sudanese Foreign Minister Maryam Sadiq Al-Mahdi and her Egyptian counterpart Sameh Shoukry, Cairo, March 2, 2021.

On March 2, 2021, Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry received his Sudanese counterpart, Dr. Maryam Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi, to hold discussions at Tahrir Palace in Cairo, and a press conference is scheduled to be held after the meeting. This is the first visit of the Sudanese Foreign Minister to

Since taking office in early February 2021[4].

Egypt

The previous evening, Maryam Al-Mahdi arrived at Cairo International Airport, and was received by the Sudanese Ambassador to Cairo, Mohamed Elias, Ambassador Osama Shaltut, Assistant Foreign Minister for Sudanese and South Sudan Affairs, as well as Ambassador Nabil Habashi, Assistant Foreign Minister for Sudanese Affairs in Sudanese News Agency. Cairo, according to the official The Sudanese Minister of Foreign Affairs is scheduled to participate in the work of the regular session (155) of the Council of the League of Arab States at the ministerial level at the headquarters of the General Secretariat of the Arab League. She will present Sudan's statement on the issues raised on the agenda, and will also hold a number of bilateral meetings with her counterparts. Arabs[5].

Following the meeting, a joint Egyptian-Sudanese statement was issued, in which the two countries stressed the importance of reaching a binding legal agreement on filling and operating the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam that achieves the interests of the three countries. It preserves the water rights of Egypt and Sudan and limits the harm this project will cause to my country Downstream. The two countries also stressed that they have political will and a serious desire to achieve this goal as soon as possible, and they also called on Ethiopia to show good faith and engage in a negotiating process. effective in reaching this agreement.

The two countries expressed their appreciation for the effort made by the Republic of South Africa during its presidency of the African Union in managing the course of the Renaissance Dam negotiations. They also welcomed the Democratic Republic of the Congo's assumption of leadership of these negotiations after President Felix Tshisekedi of the Democratic Republic of the Congo assumed the presidency of the African Union. They affirmed their full support for the efforts The role of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in this regard

The two ministers also expressed concern about the faltering negotiations sponsored by the African Union, and stressed that Ethiopia's implementation of the second phase of filling the Renaissance Dam unilaterally would constitute a direct threat. For the water security of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Republic of Sudan, in particular

Regarding the operation of Sudanese dams and threatening the lives of 20 million Sudanese citizens, they also stressed that this measure would be considered a material violation of the Declaration of Principles agreement concluded between the three countries in

Khartoum on March 23, 2015

They also stressed the countries' adherence to the proposal submitted by Sudan and supported by Egypt regarding developing the negotiation mechanism sponsored by the African Union through the formation of an international quartet led and managed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in its capacity as the current president of the African Union, and including the United Nations, the European Union, and the United States to mediate the negotiations, as they called for These four countries call upon these four parties to adopt this proposal, announce their acceptance of it, and launch these negotiations as soon as possible.

The two ministers stressed the necessity of continuing coordination and ongoing consultation between the two countries on this vital file. They also agreed to inform the sisterly Arab countries of developments in these negotiations on an ongoing basis, through consultation with the Arab committee formed to follow up on developments in the Renaissance Dam file and coordination with the United Nations Security Council on all matters related to it. Developments in the issue, which includes Jordan - Saudi Arabia - Morocco - Iraq and the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States.

Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi and Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan in Khartoum, March 6, 2021

On March 6, 2021, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi stated that he rejects Ethiopia's announcement of its intention to implement the second phase of filling the Renaissance Dam even if it does not reach an agreement with Egypt and

Sudan. Al-Sisi added, today, Saturday, during a speech at the press conference in Khartoum, following discussions with the President of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council, that "the inevitability of returning to serious and effective

negotiations with the aim of reaching, as soon as possible and before the next flood season, a fair, legally binding agreement on... Filling and operating the Renaissance Dam, in a way that achieves the interests of the three countries and enhances the bonds of cooperation and integration between our countries and peoples." [6] He stressed the

identical vision of Egypt and Sudan regarding "rejecting any approach based on seeking to impose a fait accompli and extending control over the Blue Nile, through unilateral measures." It does not take into account the interests and rights

of the two downstream countries, which was embodied in Ethiopia's announcement of its intention to implement the second phase of filling the Renaissance Dam, even if we do not reach an agreement regulating the filling and operation

of this dam, a measure that may threaten to cause serious damage to the interests of Egypt and Sudan." The Egyptian

President continued in his speech: "We discussed ways to relaunch the negotiations process by forming an international quartet that includes the African Union, the United States, and the European Union, along with the United Nations, to mediate the negotiating process." He pointed out that this mechanism, which was proposed by Sudan and supported by

Egypt, aims to support the efforts of President Felix Tshisekedi of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and to maximize the chances of su

Course of negotiations. Emphasizing his full confidence in Tshisekedi's ability to manage these negotiations,

And achieve a breakthrough in order to reach the desired agreement.

Saleh Gosh.

On September 12, 2021, informed sources in the Sudanese Public Prosecution said that the Attorney General-designate, Mubarak Mahmoud Othman, received positive signals from his Egyptian counterpart to cooperate in handing over the former Sudanese Director of Security and Intelligence, Saleh Gosh, and other members of the isolated regime, who fled to Egypt after... The overthrow of President Omar al-Bashir's regime in April 2019[7].

To the former Sudanese Attorney General, Taj Al-Sir Al-Habr, The Egyptian authorities rejected the request By extraditing Gosh, Khartoum then began procedures to recover him through the International Interpol in criminal complaints related to terrorism, financial corruption, suspected illicit wealth, and the torture of detainees during the outbreak of protests in the country in 2018. The reliable sources added that serious discussions took place between the Sudanese Attorney General and his Egyptian counterpart regarding the Sudanese defendants. Most wanted persons currently in Egypt. She indicated that a major breakthrough had occurred in this regard.

The Egyptian side expressed its full readiness to discuss cooperation in handing over wanted persons to the Sudanese authorities, and the two sides also agreed to continue contacts between them about the manner and methods by which this matter will be done.

The Sudanese Public Prosecutor returned to the country after a five-day visit to Egypt, at the invitation of his Egyptian counterpart, Hamada Al-Sawy, during which they signed several memorandums of understanding to train prosecutors at criminal investigation institutes in Cairo. The sources suggested that the step would open the way for the extradition of former Sudanese intelligence director Saleh Gosh, as he is one of the most wanted persons in Sudan. Cooperation also includes the extradition of a limited number of symbols of the isolated regime who fled to Egypt, and some violators of the country's criminal laws.

The same sources reported that the Sudanese Public Prosecutor seemed optimistic about cooperation with the prosecution Regarding the extradition of wanted persons through the communications that... The Egyptian public will make great progress

It will continue between the two countries. Middle East follow-ups indicate that there are other officials who held senior positions in Al-Bashir's government, who now live in Cairo.

Early in September 2021, press reports reported that the National Office of Interpol in Sudan asked the International Criminal Police to activate the Red Notice to track down the director of the Security and Intelligence Service, arrest him, and hand him over to the Sudanese authorities.

In January 2020, the Illicit Wealth Prosecution in Sudan asked Interpol to arrest Gosh to investigate him regarding complaints filed against him. It also seized his property and bank accounts, and banned him from traveling. The former Public Prosecutor had begun international measures to arrest Gosh, who faces 4 criminal complaints.

Gosh is being pursued on another charge related to his direct involvement in providing financial and logistical support to a terrorist cell that aimed to undermine the constitutional order in the country. It was arrested before the operation was carried out in May 2019. The Sudanese authorities accuse him of being behind the rebellion of the Operations Authority, which is the armed wing of the isolated regime's security apparatus, which terrorized Citizens in Khartoum in January 2020, forcing the army and rapid support forces to confront these elements with heavy and light weapons inside the city to control the rebellion.

After the fall of President Omar al-Bashir's regime, the Director of Security and Intelligence, as one of the most dangerous figures in the government, was placed under house arrest in his home in Khartoum, but he managed to escape before press reports revealed his presence in Egypt. In February last year, Interpol approved the Sudanese authorities' request to retrieve the fugitive accused Gosh after he was informed by the Public Prosecution that his movements were being monitored in one of the neighboring countries where he resides almost permanently.

Photo of Egyptian battalion soldiers who the Rapid Support Forces claim surrendered themselves in Marawi,

April 15, 2023.

The Rapid Support Forces published a video clip of members of an Egyptian army battalion, claiming that they surrendered themselves at a military base in the city of Marawi. In the video clip published by the Rapid Support Forces, the Egyptian officer addressed the official in the Rapid Support Forces, saying: "I am an officer and I... The official... I am an Egyptian captain and I am responsible for these people... I am a captain in the Egyptian Armed Forces." Reuters published the news and said that it was not able to immediately verify the footage and that the Egyptian authorities did not make any comment on this matter[8].

Egyptian military spokesman Gharib Abdel Hafez confirmed that, within the framework of the presence of joint Egyptian forces to conduct training with their counterparts in Sudan, coordination is being made with the relevant authorities in Sudan to ensure the security of the Egyptian forces. It also called on the Egyptian Armed Forces to maintain the security and safety of the Egyptian forces.

On the evening of April 19, 2023, Egyptian media reported the arrival of the first batch of Egyptian soldiers detained in Sudan to Cairo. According to the sources, an Egyptian military plane landed in Sudan at the start of the truce and received the Egyptian soldiers, adding that the plane took off from Khartoum and the clashes stopped while they were being transported. While a second batch of Egyptian military personnel will arrive in Cairo within hours[9].

Earlier today, the Rapid Support Forces announced in a statement the transfer of Egyptian soldiers from Merowe to the capital, Khartoum. She confirmed in a statement on Twitter that all Egyptian soldiers are fine, and will be extradited whenever the opportunity arises. She said, "We reassure the families and government of Egypt that the soldiers who were present at the Merowe military base are all fine and receiving the necessary care, and that they "

Due to the situation the country is going through will be handed over whenever the appropriate opportunity arises, according to

Political relations

the border

The Egyptian-Sudanese border extends about 1,273 km, and Sudan represents the southern strategic depth of Egypt, so Sudan's security and stability represent part of national security.

Al-Masry[10].

On January 27, 2022, the people of Northern Sudan State continue to close the Northern Arterial Road linking Sudan and Egypt, which has led to an almost complete paralysis in the movement of trade through the land crossings linking the two countries, to put pressure on the central government in Khartoum to meet their demands, most notably canceling the increase in electricity prices. The state's shares of its natural resources and the organization of commercial movement[11].

Along the road, which is one of the largest continental roads, protesters detained hundreds of Egyptian and Sudanese trucks transporting goods between the two countries. The closure of the artery road began in January, in decision of Finance Minister Jibril Ibrahim to increase prices protest against the North 23 years ago, electricity allocated to the agricultural sector has been affected by thousands of farmers in the northern state. Although he retracted the decision earlier, he came back and officially implemented the increases.

Sharif Al-Hamdabi, one of the sons of the state active in the case, explained that a meeting included all... Representatives of the district and village committees in the northern state agreed to close the road and not open it Until their demands were met, and this was done in agreement with the farmers' association. at all The activist said that closing the road led to the detention of hundreds of Egyptian trucks transporting a lot of goods, with the exception of citizens' cars between the two countries.

The activist stressed that the various groups that signed the statement regarding closing the road will not back down negotiations with the authorities unless all the conditions from their position and will not enter into any that were agreed upon are met. A statement issued by representatives of some regions in the northern state stated that they dealt with the Minister of Finance to cancel the increase in electricity, and opened the way last week with good intentions for the movement of trade, but they were surprised by the procrastination in implementing the decision and the continued application of the new prices to all agricultural, industrial and residential sectors.

The statement indicated that, out of concern for the interests of the state, they agreed to re-close the road "The artery of the north" until their demands find a response from the government. Among the most prominent demands made by the protesters in a number of regions in the state: canceling the increase in new electricity prices, exempting compensate for the losses of the current season, and giving the northern state electricity from electricity to Agricultural projects are irrigated and from mining revenues. Its share of the dam's electricity

The statement stressed the application of safety standards for cargo trucks by establishing weighing points on the national road, and establishing a single agreed-upon binding transaction for trucks to enter the borders of Sudan and Egypt, as the latter prevents Sudanese trucks from entering its territory while its trucks transport goods from all regions of Sudan.

The protesters called for issuing a decision prohibiting the export of any Sudanese crude unless it is introduced into manufacturing industries, establishing a free trade zone, and beginning maintenance of the "Northern Artery" road, which was damaged due to the large movement of large transport trucks transporting goods between the two countries.

Protesters close the international northern artery road in a number of areas from the far north to the borders of the Nile River State at the city of Atbara. The resistance committees, which are active in blocking the road, demand that the people of the north unite behind their demands, including the return of civil rule in the country, the main guarantor of resolving all the issues that the state and the country are suffering from.

Members of the resistance committees in the "Al-Hafeer" area explained that they closed the (Arqin-Dongal-Khartoum) road to the movement of trucks, while the "Al-Burqia" resistance committees closed the northern artery road that connects Halfa-Dongal-Khartoum. Activists posted on social media dozens of photos. Egyptian trucks were parked for days along the road in many areas of the northern state.

Milk problem

Egypt and Sudan claim sovereignty over the Halib region, which is located on the Red Sea and has an area of 20,000 square kilometers.

In March 1899, the Egyptian Interior Minister, Mustafa Fahmi Pasha, decided to amend the border line between Sudan and Egypt to start at the Halfa area of the Egyptian Nubia Directorate. With this amendment, Halfa and other areas around it became part of Sudan.

In July 1902, the Egyptian Minister of the Interior issued a decision to annex the Haleeb triangle to Sudan. He reached this decision after forming a technical committee headed by the director of Aswan, an "Egyptian," and three inspectors, one of them from the Egyptian Interior, one representing the government of Sudan, and a third representing the Egyptian Coast Guard. Their mission was to determine the land The Bisharin tribes submitted a report confirming that the Halib and Shaltin triangle is a land inhabited by Sudanese tribes. In light of this report, the

Egyptian Interior Minister issued his decision[12]

The conflict re-emerged in 1991 following the deterioration of relations between Khartoum and Cairo, after Egypt accused the Sudanese government of supporting armed Egyptian extremists.

In August 2008, President Al-Bashir declared that Haleeb and Shalateen are Sudanese lands. Dr. Ibrahim Nasr al-Din, professor of African studies in Cairo, said in an interview with the Qatari Al-Jazeera channel, commenting on the Sudanese president's statements: "Raising the Haleeb issue at this particular time indicates the existence of... American pressure on the Sudanese government due to its position of support for the Palestinian cause and opposition to an American strike on Iraq." Egypt

He added that these pressures are an American attempt to silence the Egyptian voice regarding any settlement In South Sudan, it prevents its division and secession, and completely distances it from the Palestinian issue, in addition To silence her voice that rejects an American strike on Iraq.

In January 2013, Sudan informed the UN Security Council of its objection to the Egyptian presence in the [13]. Not to neglect the triangle as it is truly original Haleeb region.

In February 2013, Ambassador Essam Awad, Director of the Egyptian Affairs Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, confirmed Egypt's acceptance of Sudan's objection to the international borders mentioned in the cooperation protocol.

What is common between the two countries in Article (5), which the Egyptian side added, and told reporters at the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, "If we had accepted it, it would have been our recognition of Egypt's right to the Halib and Shaltin regions."

We lose many issues." He reiterated that Sudan would not give up Egypt's right to Halib, pointing out

He pointed out that the time is not appropriate to raise border issues at the present time, and he broke off the agreement of

Egypt and Sudan not to interfere in the borders of the two countries, and revealed a proposal to establish ports for free crossing across the borders of the two countries. He criticized the Egyptian side's failure to implement the Four Freedoms

Agreement, and said that there are 23 joint committees between the two countries in all axes that have begun their meetings,

except for the Four Freedoms Committee. He attributed the failure to settle the file of Sudanese prisoners in Egyptian prisons

It is difficult to settle the file, and he said there are large numbers of... to Egypt's failure to sign the prisoner exchange agreement, stating that

Sudanese in its prisons.

Four Freedoms Agreement

In February 2013, harbingers of a crisis began looming on the horizon between Sudan and Egypt following Khartoum's

dissatisfaction with Cairo's failure to implement the Four Freedoms Agreement, which stipulates Egypt's freedom of movement in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, work, and residency and ownership between the two countries. An official

in charge of the Sudanese file revealed the Egyptian government's procrastination in returning at least 100 cars

and gold prospecting equipment that Egyptian security confiscated from Sudanese who were arrested in

2012 for entering Egyptian territory by mistake. The Egyptian government later released the Sudanese after the

Sudanese government intervened and appealed to Cairo several times to release them. The director of the

administration confirmed that Egypt in the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Essam Awad, said that Egypt file

it delayed signing the Four Freedoms Agreement because it objected to the freedom of ownership and movement for

49 of the mentioned cases before it and that the ownership, noting that Egypt prohibits the right to

ownership be free, while land ownership in Sudan is carried out according to the monopoly law. Awad stressed

that the difference in the freedom of ownership clause requires political guidance and was referred to Vice

President Ali Osman Muhammad Taha. He said that Egypt has shown its unwillingness to sign an

agreement between Khartoum and Cairo to exchange criminals from the two countries, noting that Cairo is not keen

on the step because Sudan is holding an Egyptian in its prisons.

One. Awad revealed that Khartoum agreed to the Egyptian request to postpone the opening of the Qastal and Wadi

Halfa crossings, which were expected to be inaugurated in early March 2013, attributing the postponement to the

incomplete construction of administrative buildings for some of the border crossings on the eastern side. The

official expected the opening of the crossing within three months and confirmed in another context that the Egyptian

government agreed to Sudan's request to cancel the word "international borders" in the crossings agreement, noting that the two countries

, Without They agreed to limit themselves to the 22nd parallel as a border between the two countries for the port of Qastal and Wadi Halfa, without mentioning any other ports, in reference to the disputed Halib Triangle between the two countries.

Joint agreements

Shared The Egyptian and Sudanese sides signed during the Egyptian-Sudanese committee In Khartoum on March 27, 2011, 9 agreements, memorandums of understanding and executive programs for cooperation between the two countries were concluded.

These agreements included:

A cooperation agreement between the Social Fund in Egypt and the Zakat and Development Office in Sudan

Agreement to achieve food security between the peoples of the two countries.

An agreement to establish another biofuel project.

A framework agreement between Cairo University and the Ministry of Higher Education in Sudan regarding the return of the mission of Cairo University, Khartoum Branch, to work in Sudan.

A memorandum of understanding in the field of administrative reform between the Central Organization for Organization and Administration and the Ministry of Labour, Civil Service and Human Resources Development in Sudan.

A memorandum of understanding between the Central Bank of Egypt and the Bank of Sudan to exchange information and data in the banking field.

Signing an executive program in the field of investment between the Egyptian Investment Authority and the Sudanese Ministry of Investment.

An executive program for environmental protection for 2011/2012, a memorandum of understanding regarding the mechanism for implementing the work of the joint supreme committee between the ministries of transport in the two countries, a memorandum of understanding for media cooperation, and another for maritime safety.

Establishment of a sovereign fund

On March 11, 2021, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi received Dr. Abdallah Hamdok, Prime Minister of Sudan, at the Federal Palace, in the presence of Dr. Mostafa Madbouly.

Prime Minister, Dr. Mohamed Maaait, Minister of Finance, and Minister Abbas Kamel, Head of General Intelligence.

Ambassador Bassam Rady, the official spokesman for the Presidency of the Republic, stated that the meeting dealt with "following up on issues of bilateral relations between the two sides, in light of the president's recent visit to Khartoum, as well as developments in regional issues of mutual interest."

The two sides reviewed the latest developments and joint efforts between Egypt and Sudan, with regard to the issue of the Renaissance Dam, and it was agreed to intensify close coordination between the two sides in light of the current delicate stage that the Renaissance Dam file is going through, and to strengthen communications with regional and international parties, to activate the Sudanese proposal to form an international quartet to mediate. In that case, to help reach a comprehensive and binding legal agreement on the rules for filling and operating the Renaissance Dam, before the next rainy season[14].

Military relations

Egyptian Chief of Staff Mohamed Farid Hegazy and his Sudanese counterpart Mohamed Othman Al-Hussein, Khartoum, March 1, 2021.

On March 1, 2021, the Sudanese Chief of Staff, Mohamed Othman Al-Hussein, received his counterpart, the Chief of General Staff of the Egyptian Army, Mohamed Farid Hegazy in Khartoum. According to Sudanese military media sources, the step comes at the beginning of the visit of the Chief of General Staff of the Army

Al-Masry to Khartoum, during which he witnesses the conclusion of the ongoing talks between the two armies, [15]." conclusion, a joint cooperation agreement will be signed." which will last three days. He added: "At its

On March 2, 2021, Egypt and Sudan signed a military cooperation agreement between the two countries, on the sidelines of a visit by the Egyptian Army Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Mohamed Farid, to Khartoum. The Chief of Staff of the Sudanese Army, Lieutenant General Mohamed Othman Al-Hussein, said following the signing that the goal of the agreement is "to achieve national security for the two countries by building armed forces full of experience and knowledge," directing "thanks to Egypt for standing by Sudan in difficult situations." For his part, Lieutenant General Mohamed Farid, Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces, confirmed that Cairo

It seeks "to consolidate ties and relations with Sudan in all fields, especially military and security, and solidarity as a strategic approach imposed by the regional and international environment." The Egyptian Chief of Staff added that "Sudan and Egypt face common challenges and that there are multiple threats facing the national security of the two countries," expressing his country's readiness to meet all of Sudan's requests in all military fields, describing the level of military cooperation with Sudan as "unprecedented." [16] On March 19, 2021, the Sudanese authorities received military equipment and machinery from the Egyptian army through the port of Port Sudan, within the framework of joint cooperation protocols.

The official Sudanese News Agency, SUNA, reported that, in accordance with the protocols of joint cooperation and twinning between the leadership of the Sudanese Corps of Engineers and the Egyptian Corps of Engineers, the Egyptian Armed Forces supplied its Sudanese counterpart with equipment and machinery, which recently arrived at the port of Port Sudan.

The agency noted that "this equipment is used in building and constructing roads and other civil works, and is considered a real addition to the Sudanese Corps of Engineers."

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi paid a visit to the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, in early March, and met with the head of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council, Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, his deputy, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo "Hemedti," and the head of the transitional government, Abdallah Hamdok.

Al-Sisi's visit came as a culmination of meetings and mutual visits between Egyptian and Sudanese officials. It also came days after a visit by the Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Forces, Lieutenant General Mohamed Farid, to Khartoum and his signing with his Sudanese counterpart, Lieutenant General Mohamed Othman Al Hussein, of a military cooperation agreement covering the areas of training and securing the borders between the two countries [17].

Hamat the Nile 2021 maneuvers

Hamat the Nile 2021 maneuvers

On May 21, 2021, the Sudanese army announced the arrival of a group of Egyptian soldiers to its territory, as part of preparations for the launch of the "Protectors of the Nile" maneuvers, which will continue from May 26 to May 31, with elements from all specialties and ranks of the two armies participating in the project.

The statement noted: "The Egyptian forces participating in the project arrived at the Khartoum Air Base, alongside convoys of ground forces and vehicles that arrived by sea."

The army continued: "The (Protectors of the Nile) maneuver comes as an extension of the joint training cooperation between the two countries. It was preceded by Nile Eagles 1 and 2, and all of them aim to exchange military experiences, enhance cooperation, and unify work methods to confront the expected threats to the two countries [18]."

Economic relations

Egypt was keen to continue its policies aimed at strengthening integration relations with Sudan in all fields, especially the economic field, the importance of which has increased in light of the global financial crisis and the world food crisis. This keenness is represented in the signing of a number of economic integration pacts between the two countries, the most important of which are:

1 - In 1974, the Egyptian and Sudanese presidents signed a platform for political and economic integration between Egypt and Sudan to codify the special relations between the two countries and help renew the joint efforts and human and material energies between them. In this context, the executive authorities in the two countries were obligated to approve the foundations of purposeful projects that achieve economic coordination and integration and to establish the agencies and systems to ensure To provide the technical and administrative capabilities necessary to create projects that find their way into implementation.

With his signature, he aimed to consolidate relations

2 - In October 1982, the two heads of state signed a charter

In all its forms, especially the economic and financial fields, with the aim of establishing a complete economic unit based on a

A timetable to ensure policy coordination

strategy that will be implemented gradually according to

Economic, commercial, financial and monetary relations between the two countries in preparation for their unification while

developing practical arrangements aimed at eliminating all restrictions, including customs duties, that hinder the freedom of movement

People, capital and profits, freedom to exchange goods and national products, freedom of residence, work, ownership, use and practices of economic activity, freedom of transport and transit. The charter identified three main bodies based on integration affairs, which are:

•The Supreme Council for Integration • The Nile Valley Parliament • The Integration Fund

The Supreme Council for Integration is at the head of all authorities in exercising the powers established in accordance with

The provisions of the Charter, and it must issue the decisions, regulations and directives necessary to implement the objectives

The Charter, and the Supreme Council for Integration issued Resolution 21 of 1983 regarding regulating trade and payment arrangements between Egypt and Sudan, aiming to work towards achieving the goals of economic and financial integration between the two countries, including several facilitations in the field of customs and administrative restrictions,

In the field of camel trade, in the field of border trade and in the field of payment arrangements.

The most important trade agreements

1 - The COMESA Agreement, within the framework of which commercial transactions are currently carried out between the two countries.

2 - The agreement to facilitate and develop trade exchange and its executive program to establish a major Arab free trade area.

3- A protocol for trade exchange between the two countries (March 1993). Its most important provisions include that commercial transactions be carried out in freely payable currencies and in a system of equal transactions.

4 - During November 2003, an agreement was signed between the two sides under which the Egyptian side would import Sudanese chilled meat from Sudan.

5 - An agreement to manage the Sudanese camel trade between the two sides in a continuous and flowing manner.

6-Agreement to establish a free zone in the city of Juba.

Trade exchange and investments

Sudanese-Egyptian relations have witnessed progress over the past few years in various aspects
Economic and investment opportunities and the increased flow of businessmen between the two countries, which resulted
in a doubling of the number of Egyptian companies in Sudan and vice versa. Increase trade exchange and

The volume of trade exchange during 2008 between the two countries amounted to about \$500 million and is still tending to
Egypt, compared to previous years, there have been great leaps, especially in the last three years. an interest

With regard to Egyptian exports to Sudan, there are a number of Egyptian exports that witnessed, and are still witnessing,
an increase in their value during the year 2008 AD, most notably reinforcing steel, metal furniture, food commodities, plastics,
petroleum products, medicines, and copper products.

Regarding the movement of Egyptian imports from Sudan, it recorded a value of \$31.6 million during the year 2008 AD,
compared to \$40.3 million during the year 2007 AD, a decrease of \$8.7 million, and Egypt's imports from Sudan are
concentrated in raw cotton, sesame, and oil seeds.

As for the value of Egyptian investments in Sudan, at the end of 2008 it reached \$2.5 billion, after it had not exceeded \$82
million at the end of December 2002, which means a 30-fold increase in just 6 years. Egypt holds third place among the
most important Arab countries investing in Sudan. Sudan, while Sudan occupies 13th place among the most important
Arab countries investing in Egypt, with a value of \$197.2 million as of June 30, 2008.

Egyptian investments in Sudan were represented in the fields of industry (70.5%) and services (28.4%), and the Sudanese agricultural sector ranked third with 1.1%. - Joint projects between the two countries in the fields of transport, roads and irrigation:

and the most important:

Construction of the coastal road between Egypt and Sudan, with a length of 280 km inside
The Qastal-Wadi Halfa Road Project, with a length of 34 km within Egyptian territory, and 27 km within Sudanese territory

Aswan - Wadi Halfa - Dongola Road.

Developing and restructuring railway lines to facilitate the movement of goods and people

Extending the electrical network to northern Sudan

Continued cooperation in the field of water resources and irrigation, including reviving the Jonglei Canal project to clear the
southern part of the Nile

Developing the irrigation and drainage network in Sudan

Transport

Fire after the truck exploded at the Arqin crossing, August 17, 2021

On November 9, 2020, Egyptian Minister of Transport Kamel Al-Wazir announced a project to extend railway lines linking Egypt to Sudan and Libya. The announcement falls within the framework of the Egyptian government's efforts to modernize the transportation sector in the country, especially the railway network, which is often the extension of Construction of the Aswan railway line It also witnesses accidents.] 19] The project includes Toshka, Marsa Matrouh-Siwa, and the extension of the Matrouh line to the city of Wadi Halfa in Sudan. It also includes the construction of the Salloum line to the city of Benghazi, Libya."

On August 18, 2021, the director of the Arqin border crossing between Egypt and Sudan, Brigadier General Mubarak Daoud, revealed details of the explosion of an Egyptian truck loaded with chemicals inside a barn.

The crossing the previous day. Al-Sudani newspaper quoted Daoud as saying that the truck exploded at twelve o'clock in the afternoon, and that it belonged to the Al-Amrabi textile factories in Khartoum State, adding

The chemicals on board the truck were dyes, bleaches and nylon threads

Its payload is 9 tons [20].

Daoud attributed the cause of the explosion to spontaneous combustion resulting from high temperatures and the contact of chemicals with each other in the truck, according to a statement from the Specifications and Metrology Department at the crossing.

We saw fire extinguishing means at the crossing, which led to their assistance David criticized the non-tov damaged by the fire With the Egyptian firefighting team to save the situation. The Sudanese official denied that 4 trucks were

One truck loaded with ceramics caught fire nearby To Tesla at the crossing, pushing out

from the explosion and the fire was brought under control in a timely manner before it was damaged, ensuring the safety of lives in

The truck commanders and employees crossed the crossing, but the truck was charred with its entire load[21].

While social media users circulated a video clip showing Sudanese intercepting an Egyptian fire truck within the borders of Sudan at the Arqin land crossing, which was on its way to control a fire. The Egyptian administration's response to the crossing workers' request was delayed after a fire broke out in their homes to control it. The difficulty of procedures for the fire engine to enter the fire scene was a reason.

In her late entry. The delayed arrival of the fire truck led to the fire being uncontrollable, which sparked an angry reaction and the workers refused to enter the fire truck when it arrived, as shown in the video clip [22].

Water relations

png.kdict app Clear CrystalDetailed article: Nile Basin Initiative

Sudan is of special importance to Egypt with regard to this point, as it is the meeting place of the tributaries of the Nile River coming from Ethiopia via the White and Blue Nile to cross it in the direction of Egypt. The water relationship between the two countries has received special attention for considerations of geography, history, religion, language and intermarriage, as well as the political position of Sudan in relation to For Egypt, in addition to that, they are both downstream countries. The two countries have committed to all terms of cooperation in accordance with what was approved by the 1929 and 1959 agreements regulating the exploitation of the Nile River waters in a way that achieves the interests of both Egypt and Sudan within the limits of the shares assigned to each country.

Both Egypt and Sudan were also keen on water coordination between them, and this was reflected in the interconnectedness of the two countries during the crisis that arose during the year 2009 around the framework agreement for legal and institutional cooperation of the Nile Basin Agreement to redivide the waters, and the establishment of a commission for the Nile Basin countries, which was prepared by the upstream countries and Egypt refused to sign. Accordingly, based on the demand to preserve the historical rights and legal privileges of Egypt's share and prior notification.

Coordination between the two countries regarding the waters of the Nile was not limited to merely taking common positions regarding everything that affects this important water resource, but rather extended to undertaking joint projects to preserve and develop this resource. The most important of these projects is the "Jongli" Canal Project, 80% of which has been dug, and of which its water revenues are shared by Egypt and Sudan.

The most important fruit of the meeting that took place between former President Mubarak, the Prime Minister of the South, and Sudanese Vice President Salva Kiir in Cairo on 10/26/2009 was the formation of joint committees that would identify all the side problems that could result from the use of the Jonglei Channel and discuss their possible solutions within the framework of some partial amendments. Which could affect the canal's path before work begins again to resume digging the remaining twenty percent of the canal.

Cultural relations

Universities in the two countries play an effective role in supporting bilateral relations between the two countries through the exchange of visits between professors of Egyptian and Sudanese universities with the aim of exchanging experiences, exchanging literature and research between universities in the two countries, and allowing outstanding university students to visit other country's universities and offering scholarships to complete postgraduate studies.

Exchange of official visits

President Omar al-Bashir and Mr. El-Badawi Shehata, head of the official Egyptian delegation, on his visit to Khartoum, May 7, 2011

Morsi receives Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir during his visit to Cairo, Egyptian President Mohamed, September 2012

Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir receives his Egyptian counterpart Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, October 25 .2018

October 24, 2018: President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi visited the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, during which he met with Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir, where the Egyptian-Sudanese summit discussed many files related to joint cooperation and ways to strengthen bilateral relations in a way that contributes to achieving the interests of the two brotherly countries and the peoples of the Nile Valley[23] .

The work of the second session of the Joint Egyptian-Sudanese Presidential Committee also witnessed the signing of a package of executive programs and memorandums of understanding between the two sides in the fields of exchanging experiences, health care, agriculture, land reclamation, education, media, youth, sports, and other areas of joint cooperation.

July 19, 2018: President Sisi visited Sudan, and was received by Omar Al-Bashir, President of Sudan. The two sides discussed ways to strengthen relations between the two countries at all political, economic, security and cultural levels, and discussed all issues of common interest, most notably combating the Nile water issue in light of the recent developments in negotiations with the Ethiopian side, terrorism, and strengthening tripartite cooperation and the rest of the Nile Basin countries in particular, and the countries of the African continent. in general. They also discussed the latest developments in the countries of the region and ways to end the conflict and shed blood in Libya, Yemen, Syria and Iraq, and developments in the peace process in the Middle East in light of the Arab constants of the Palestinian issue of adhering to the two-state solution and establishing an independent Palestinian state on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital.

July 2, 2015: President Sisi visited Sudan to participate in the inauguration ceremony of President-elect Omar al-Bashir as president Sudan has a new mandate, and after the end of the inauguration ceremony, a contract was held Bashir as president Egypt meeting to provide all forms With President Al-Bashir, he congratulated him, stressing A full readiness to support Sudan in order to achieve more progress and stability. The two sides also reviewed developments in the situation on the Arab and African arenas.

October 10, 2016: President Sisi visited Sudan, to participate in the closing session of the Sudanese National Dialogue. He was received by the Sudanese President and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Information and Cooperation.

International in Sudan. President Sisi held a short session with the presidents of Sudan, Mauritania, Chad and Uganda, on the sidelines of the final conference of the national dialogue in Sudan.

March 23, 2015: President Sisi visited Sudan to participate in the tripartite Egyptian-Sudanese-Ethiopian summit called for by Al-Bashir and in which Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn participated. He was received by Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir. Presidents Al-Sisi and Omar Al-Bashir discussed ways to develop bilateral relations between the two countries, developments in the situation in the Middle East, and issues of common interest.

July 27, 2014: President Sisi visited the Sudanese capital, Khartoum. The visit was to check on the health of President Omar Al-Bashir, congratulate him on the success of the surgery he recently underwent, and discuss issues of common interest at the regional and international levels. Especially the situations in Libya, Syria, Iraq, and South Sudan, and the exchange of views between the two sides on those issues[24].

On December 3, 2012, Morsi Abdel-Rahman Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi, assistant, received President Mohammed, President of Sudan.

Prime Minister Hisham Qandil's visit to Khartoum on September 18, 2012, and his meeting with President Omar Al-Bashir, and he discussed with officials in Sudan joint cooperation in all fields.

Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir's visit to Cairo on September 16, 2012, and his meeting with President Mohamed Morsi. The two presidents discussed issues of joint cooperation and expanding the partnership, especially with regard to food security.

Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Kirti visited Egypt on August 25, 2012, where he met with Morsi. The meeting dealt with strengthening bilateral relations, following up on the implementation of programs under President Mohammed and cooperation agreements concluded between the two countries in various fields, increasing trade and investment exchange, and the participation of Egyptian companies in the development process in Sudan.

The visit of former Egyptian Prime Minister Essam Sharaf to Sudan in March 2011, at the head of a delegation that included the Minister of Electricity and Energy, the Minister of Planning and International Cooperation, the Minister of Transport, the Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation, the Minister of Agriculture and Land Reclamation, the Minister of Higher Education, Scientific Research and Technology, and the Minister of Industry and Foreign Trade, And the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

On March 29, 2011, during the visit of Egyptian Prime Minister Essam Sharaf to Sudan, Egypt signed several agreements in the meetings of the Egyptian-Sudanese Supreme Committee, which included the preparation of joint projects in the field of food security and the encouragement of investments between the two countries in various fields.

Domains. The agreements included the return of the Cairo University delegation to the Khartoum branch, in addition to discussing the Nile water problem and seeking to resolve differences through dialogue and understanding between the basin countries. [25] The Minister of Agriculture, Dr. Ayman Abu Hadid, revealed that there are negotiations with the Sudanese side to complete the Egyptian-Sudanese Fork project for agricultural integration in the Blue Nile, To cultivate 160 thousand acres. It is scheduled to grow cotton, sunflower, sorghum, and sesame crops, with production divided between the two countries.

Visit of former Foreign Minister Nabil Elaraby on the sidelines of the Egyptian delegation's visit to Sudan on March 27, 2011. Elaraby met with his Sudanese counterpart, Ali Karti, and the discussions dealt with coordinating positions on the latest internal, regional and international developments that the Arab region is going through and ways to strengthen bilateral relations between the two countries.

The Egyptian Minister of Irrigation made ten visits to Sudan during the years 2009 and 2010, to discuss with the Sudanese Minister of Irrigation the Nile Basin Initiative, unify the negotiating position of Egypt and Sudan as downstream countries facing upstream countries, and develop the joint Egyptian-Sudanese technical body for the Nile waters.

The visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and former head of the General Intelligence Service, Omar Suleiman, to Khartoum on November 25, 2009, to hold discussions with Sudanese officials, led by President Omar Al-Bashir. The visit covered all aspects of Egyptian-Sudanese relations, and some of the matters that resulted from the events of the decisive match that brought together the national teams of Egypt and Algeria. In Khartoum.

The visit of Lieutenant General Salva Kiir Merdit, Prime Minister of the South and Vice President of the Republic, to Egypt on number of Egyptian October 25, 2009, which lasted for three days, during which he held several interviews with a officials, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the head of the General Intelligence Service.

President Omar al-Bashir's visit to Egypt on July 12, 2009, during which he met with the President of the Republic and they discussed the situation in Darfur and the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, before President al-Bashir participated in the activities of the Non-Aligned Summit held in Sharm El-Sheikh on July 15, 2009.

President Omar Hassan Al-Bashir visited Egypt, accompanied by Foreign Minister Deng Alor, on March 25, 2009, and held discussions with former President Hosni Mubarak following the issuance of the International Criminal Court's decision to arrest President Al-Bashir.

Former President Mubarak visited Khartoum in Juba on November 10, 2008, where he held talks in Khartoum with President Al-Bashir that dealt with the peace agreement between the north and the south in Sudan and discussed the situation in the Darfur region and the repercussions of the International Criminal Court's decision.

Prime And bilateral relations of common interest. He also held discussions in Juba with Salva Kiir Mayardit, Minister of the South and Vice President of the Republic, about the process of implementing the Naivasha Agreement and the efforts of the Government of the South to find a solution to the crisis in the Darfur region.

Saleh Gosh, head of Sudanese intelligence, receives his counterpart Abbas Kamel in Khartoum, March 10, 2018

On January 22, 2022, a government source reported to the Emirati Al-Sharq TV that Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi was visiting Khartoum on an unannounced one-day visit. The source added that the Director of General Intelligence, Abbas Kamel, and a number of ministers will accompany Sisi on his visit, during which he will meet with the President of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and members of the Sovereign Council. It is noteworthy that President Sisi's last visit to Sudan was hours before the October 2021 coup, and Abbas Kamel's director continued to visit Sudan repeatedly before the coup, to meet Al-Burhan. [26]