


Political Memoirs 3 - Leader Azhari

Implications and Implications: What does Al-Burhan's visit to Egypt achieve?



On August 29, 2023, the President of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council, "Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan," went to Egypt, on a visit that was the first of its kind for Al-Burhan outside his country since the outbreak of the Sudanese crisis last April 15 between the army under his leadership and the Rapid Support Forces led by "Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo." During their meeting in the city of New Alamein, located on the northern coast of Egypt, President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and Al-Burhan discussed developments in the situation in Sudan, ways to cease fire and end the crisis, allow the implementation of humanitarian relief operations, and discuss ways to strengthen relations between...

The two countries and to support and develop it in a way that serves the peoples of Egypt and Sudan, in addition to issues of common interest.

Al-Burhan's choice of Egypt for his first foreign visit is due to the strong relations between the two countries and the confidence of the Sudanese leadership in Egypt's permanent support for Sudan in its crises.

In light of the above, this analysis attempts to address the implications and repercussions of Al-Burhan's visit to Egypt in light of the conditions witnessed by Sudan.

Important implications:

There are many statements about the visit of the Sudanese army commander, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, to Egypt, which lasted one day, during his meeting with President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. This visit indicates a number of...

Among the important implications **are the following:**

(*)Egyptian mediation : Al-Burhan's visit is an attempt to mediate Egypt to coordinate and communicate with regional and international parties, to discuss ways to end the war and start a political dialogue between the two sides of the conflict in Sudan, which may help to find solutions to end the war, and this means other external visits by Al-Burhan to some countries. The region and neighboring countries.

The summit of Sudan's neighboring countries last July, which confirms the permanent **Egypt** It is worth noting that hosting nature of mediation to resolve the crisis by all available means, and for his part, Al-Burhan confirmed in **Egypt's efforts**

In his speech after the meeting, he said that the Sudanese army does not seek to continue ruling, but rather to hold free and fair elections, with the Sudanese people choosing who will rule them.

(*) Protecting and assisting the Sudanese people : The meeting included consultation on efforts aimed at resolving the crisis within the limits of Sudan's unity and cohesion and protecting the interests of its people, as well as discussing ways to Cooperation and coordination to support the Sudanese people, by providing humanitarian and relief aid.

(*) Egypt's permanent support for the security and stability of Sudan : President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi affirmed Egypt's steadfast support in standing by Sudan, by supporting its security, stability, unity and territorial integrity, and supporting and strengthening the common bilateral relations between the two countries. For his part, Al-Burhan praised the sincere and clear Egyptian support. To maintain the safety and stability of Sudan in light of the crisis it has been going through over the course of about five months, A summit of countries **Egypt** through hosting the neighborhood or its discussions with international and regional parties to find a settlement to the crisis.

(*) Discussion of a number of important issues : Important discussions took place between President "Abdel Fattah El-Sisi" and General "Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan" on some issues that focus on achieving the interests of the Sudanese people in light of Statements of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the current crisis, and according to

Due The Sudanese "Ali Al-Sadiq" discussions dealt with the issue of Sudanese schools in Egypt, the approaching new academic year, in addition to discussing the crisis of overcrowding at the land crossings between the two countries, and the damage it causes to the movement of citizens and goods, the movement of exports and imports between Cairo and Khartoum, and the operation of flights between Cairo and Port Sudan.

Actually in **Accordingly**, Al-Burhan's visit confirmed the interconnection between Egypt and Sudan, where Cairo is a party

The process of ending the Sudanese crisis and preventing it from sliding into civil war, and this was clear in

Egypt's movements, specifically after the summit of Sudan's neighboring countries that Egypt called for, in addition to Egyptian-American coordination to discuss developments in the Sudan file, confirms Egypt's major role in communicating between the Sudanese leadership and international parties in order to find solutions to end the war.


It is likely that Egypt will have a role in trying to bring the two sides of the crisis together, through the strong ties between Egypt and Sudan, and perhaps the coming days will witness Egyptian movement towards international and regional powers to discuss possible ways to bring peace to Sudan.

Al-Burhan's visit also confirms the return of Sudan's openness to the world to enhance its regional position

And the international community, after the war that destroyed the capital, killed thousands of people, displaced millions, and caused widespread destruction and violations.

It is worth noting that efforts have increased towards the Sudanese file since the "Conference of Neighboring Countries" was held in Egypt, and the formation of a ministerial committee to discuss developments in the Sudanese crisis with international and regional powers, in addition to the recent American-Egyptian coordination in the Sudan file, and also the role of Saudi Arabia, in cooperation with Washington, held several meetings and discussions in the Saudi city of Jeddah with the aim of ending the conflict, and Al-Burhan's visits came to emphasize the importance of reaching the first steps to end the ongoing war.

Positive repercussions:



After monitoring and following up on the most important implications of the visit conducted by the President of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, that visit resulted in many

positive repercussions, **as follows:**

(-) Operating flights between Cairo and Port Sudan : After Al-Burhan's visit to Egypt, the national company "EgyptAir" announced last August 30 the start of its direct flights from the city of Cairo to the city of Port Sudan, located in the northeast of the State of Sudan, starting from the first of September 2023 and One flight per day. It is worth noting that the national company EgyptAir suspended its flights to the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, last April, since the outbreak of the crisis. This decision comes in response to Sudanese demands to address the damage caused by overcrowding at the crossings between the two countries.

(-) Agreement to increase the capacity of the crossings and provide for the urgent needs of Sudan : The visit between the Chairman of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council, Al-Burhan, and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, during their talks in El Alamein, witnessed an agreement on the necessity of accelerating work on the land crossings between the two capacity, given the overcrowding. The crossings between the two countries are witnessing a rapid increase in their By large numbers of Sudanese, the agreement was revealed by the Charge d'Affaires of the Sudanese Embassy in Cairo, "Mohamed Abdallah Al-Toum." This decision comes in order to support and develop cooperation between the two countries in many fields, including facilitating the movement of businessmen between Egypt and Sudan for the purpose of supporting and activating the movement of businessmen. commerce; To develop ways of economic and trade cooperation between the two countries, in addition To provide many goods and urgent needs to Sudan in light of the crisis it is going through.

(*) Beginning to form a "Sudanese caretaker government ": After Al-Burhan's visit to Egypt, it is expected that the next stage will witness the formation of a caretaker government in "Port Sudan" that will work effectively, especially since the safe states need civil institutions that work to improve the economic situation in the country.

Accordingly, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, led by Yasser Arman, believes that Al-Burhan's determination to form a government in Port Sudan could deepen national divisions, in addition to deepening the dependency of state institutions and the armed forces on the symbols of the former regime during the era of "Omar Al-Bashir."

Therefore, the movement proposes to... The proof is that he conducts broad consultations with all national and democratic forces, and works to reach solutions with international and regional parties to resolve the crisis.

From the above, it can be said that the visit of the President of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council to El Alamein demonstrates the importance of Egypt to Sudan, and his keenness to clarify the position of the Sudanese army to the parties supporting the unity and survival of the Sudanese state, specifically the Egyptian leadership before any regional or international parties, especially since Egypt is considered one of the countries with the most influence. Watch what is happening in Sudan, as Egypt promises

A country with regional and international weight that enables it to mediate and open doors closed to Sudan, in addition to its ability to convince both sides of the crisis and the concerned forces of the necessity of finding a political settlement.

Due to the current crisis, and resuming a transitional path that ensures the transfer of power to an elected government through holding free and fair elections and that the Sudanese people choose who will rule them.

It is expected that a "new phase" will begin in Sudan, witnessing upcoming regional and international visits, with the aim of ending this conflict. The coming days may witness a second foreign visit by the Sudanese army commander, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, to Juba, the capital of South Sudan, in addition to news of his visit.

Potential visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, to consult on developments in the Sudanese situation, and to obtain support during the next stage to confront the challenges facing Sudan, its security, and the integrity of its lands, which indicates Al-Burhan's desire to confirm the (deferred) victory of the army in the battle for Sudan's survival and the continuation of its national institutions, and to reject any initiative or A solution that does not include these determinants or return them to a non-consensual transitional formula that does not include specific provisions for integrating militants into the Sudanese army.

"UNITAMS"... "the UN envoy" between the determinants of the role and the position of the Sudanese parties

Shaima Al-Baksh

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Volker Peretz, Special Representative of Sudan and Chief of the United Nations Integrated Mission in Support of The
transitional phase in Sudan "UNITAMS" was appointed on January 7, 2021. During the period from 2015 to 2018, he previously
held the position of Senior Advisor to the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, and he also continued to hold the position
of Director of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin during the period from 2005 Until 2020, he also
of International Relations at the University worked as an assistant professor

Humboldt in Berlin from 2007 to 2019

Backgrounds to the formation of the UN mission "UNITAMS"

The formation of the UN mission came after the demands of the transitional Prime Minister, Abdullah Hamdok, to form a mission
to support the democratic transition. The arrival of the mission witnessed a state of controversy in opinions between those who saw
a its presence as necessary to support the requirements of democratic transformation and those who absolutely rejected its presence.
It About the continuation of international hegemony, and a third group saw its existence conditionally as an expression
serves the interest of supporting democratic transformation and enhancing Sudan's involvement in the international community.

The formation of this mission came after the end of the mandate of the previous UN mission, "UNAMID," which continued its work
Chapter Seven, and its workplace was in in Sudan from 2007 until 2020, according to
Darfur. The mission began to gradually reduce its structure beginning in 2017 until a phase began

The political transition, with which the issue of international engagement in Sudan was reconsidered and the shift from peacekeeping to peacebuilding and support.

In February 2020, the Sudanese government asked the United Nations to form the new mission, in accordance with Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter, to support peacebuilding and democratic transition. According
“UNATEMS” instead of the one based on Chapter VII to maintain peace in Darfur. And it was determined
The mission’s priorities are to support the ongoing peace negotiations and development, mobilize international support for the Sudanese economy, contribute to the transition from the stage of humanitarian aid to supporting sustainable development programmes, the return of refugees, and the democratic transition in the country, and move the mission’s tasks from peacekeeping to peace support, and help strengthen what Verify gains in Darfur in recent years, providing support for census operations and preparations for elections. The security mission in Darfur continued until the end of 2020, alongside the new mission of a political nature, which was scheduled for January 1, 2021, as the start of its work.

Legal jurisdiction and role determinants

On June 3, 2020, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution No. 2524, according to which the United Nations Mission to Support the Transitional Phase in Sudan (UNITAMS) was established, which is a political mission specialized in month initially. A By providing support to Sudan during its political transition to democratic rule, and for a period of 12 and on June 3, 2021, the Security Council adopted Resolution No. 2579 in 2021, which was added 3, 2022. On the third, it required extending the mandate of UNITAMS for a period of 12 months to

From June 2022, the UN Security Council once again renewed the mission’s mandate for another year, up to the third

A legal authorization According to Resolution No. 2636 of 2022 From June 2023 according

The mission must provide support to Sudan through development and political initiatives aimed at building peace, implementing a national plan to protect civilians, and helping to achieve the objectives of the constitutional document signed in August 2019. The strategic objectives of the mission, in line with achieving the principles of the

constitutional document, were as follows:

Supporting political stability.

Support in drafting the constitution, elections and population census.

Supporting institutional reforms and promoting and protecting human rights.

Supporting a comprehensive peace process.

Supporting the implementation of the peace agreement.

Support in strengthening the protective environment, especially in conflict areas and those that have previously witnessed conflicts

Support in achieving peaceful coexistence and reconciliation between communities.

Support in providing international aid and national economic and social reforms.

· Establishing a national structure for development planning and aid effectiveness to support

· In achieving a comprehensive peace process the support

The mission was also assigned a number of procedural tasks, including:

Assisting in political transition, progress towards democratic governance, promotion and protection of human rights, and sustainability of peace.

Support peace paths and implement future peace agreements.

Providing assistance to build peace, protect civilians and the rule of law, in particular in Darfur and in the two regions (South Kordofan and Blue Nile).

Supporting the provision of economic and development assistance, and coordinating humanitarian assistance by ensuring An integrative approach for UN agencies and funding programmes; And through cooperation with international financial institutions, in a manner that responds to all sustainable development goals.

The positions of the Sudanese parties towards the UN mission

The positions of the parties varied on whether or not to approve the formation and reception of the UN mission, and opinions varied between acceptance, rejection, and conditional positions as follows:

The pro-mission trend

Opinions in this direction stemmed from the necessity of having a UN mission providing technical support in light of the state of weakness that all Sudanese institutions suffer from. The tribal clashes in Darfur and other regions of Sudan provided a strong argument for the supporters of this trend, as they used it as evidence of the inevitability of the presence of this mission, given Sudan's need for security units capable of extending control in the regions.

Conflicts and tension. Experts supporting this view suggested the continued presence of police units composed of peacekeeping and rapid support forces in hotspot areas in Darfur, even within the framework of a broader mission to support the political transition.

The direction that rejects the mission

Many Sudanese opinions were expressed, categorically rejecting the recruitment or renewal of a UN mission.

On the assumption that the presence of international forces transfers decision-making powers to them; Whether political or security, it is considered an end, as it has become a brother to Sudanese sovereignty. Supporters of this view argue that it is necessary

The armed forces' rejection of the presence of the UN mission, and the need for the transitional government to bear its responsibility itself and

The principles of the revolution. He criticizes this trend as a concession, meet the aspirations of the Sudanese in accordance with

A for separation Sudan voluntarily gave up part of its sovereignty; They believe that despite the issuance of the new decision in accordance with...

The sixth, not the seventh, but it included many decisions that restricted Sudan to sensitive internal issues, such as the constitution, the peace process, and elections.

Conditionally approved direction

There is a third trend that mediates the two opinions. He believes it is necessary to set a ceiling for the prospective political mission, after which it will be subject to monitoring and evaluation, with renewal contingent on its performance. Supporters of this trend also see the need for agreement between the

Sovereignty and the Council of Ministers on the terms and controls of the mission's work, in a way that preserves peace and security, and Sudan's sovereignty at the same time. Supporters of this trend also justify that it is still...

Perceptions are unclear regarding dealing with security issues following the withdrawal of UNAMID, which makes its withdrawal at the present time cause a security vacuum that cannot be filled. And then they see there is

There is an urgent necessity for the continued application of the decisions of Chapter Seven, given the seriousness of the situation in Darfur, as it relates to the protection of citizens, at a time when millions of people are still in refugee and displacement camps unable to return to their areas of origin due to insecurity and repeated attacks.

The positions of the United Nations mission regarding the political transition in Sudan

Given the mandate establishing the mission, it had to perform a number of roles, including providing support to the operation According

political transformation through its office to support the political transition, in addition to the roles related to supporting peace,

supporting the protection of civilians and development coordination, and finally providing advisory support to the police and supporting Electoral process. However, since its arrival, the mission's role has been limited to providing support for the political process, by formulating its positions on the nature of the political settlement and the future of the political system, in which its role was limited and did not crystallize fundamentally until after the dissolution of the partnership between the two components.

Civil and military operations according to the procedures of October 25, 2021; After that, the mission's efforts crystallized to mediate between the two parties to resume dialogue and reformulate a consensual formula for governance between them once again.

In the wake of that crisis, the relationship between the military component and the mission became tense, which led to demonstrations in support of the military component, denouncing the role of the UN envoy, and popular campaigns emerged to demand the expulsion of Peretz under the pretext of his interference in internal affairs, as he allowed the angry crowd to reach the mission buildings without objection from the forces. Security.

Then, the head of the Sovereignty Council, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, began to state publicly that the Secretary-General's envoy does not show neutrality and leans toward one of the parties - in reference to the Forces of Freedom and Change. He also spoke about Peretz's withdrawal from his duties and his preoccupation with the political initiative, while he was supposed to follow up on the implementation of the peace agreement and prepare for the elections. And other tasks.

In April 2022, Al-Burhan said that he would not hesitate to expel the UN envoy from the country, expressing

During his meeting with Volker Peretz, he expressed his dissatisfaction with the report submitted to the Security Council because it did not mention the positive indicators on the ground, according to a statement from the Sovereignty Council at the time.

During that period of tension, the UN envoy avoided engaging in verbal battles with the Sudanese government and was content with silence and committed to the technical aspects while presenting the Sudan situation report to the Security Council without referring to the political differences.

As the political situation in Sudan worsened, the UN mission led mediation efforts with the aim of restoring the political track. The mission alone launched an initiative to mediate between the civilian and military components in January 2022, but its efforts were resisted, which led to the introduction of the African Union and the United Nations.

IGAD is in partnership with it to lead this role through what is known as the tripartite mechanism that was formed in March 2022.

Attempts at the tripartite mechanism to mediate between the various parties failed, including an attempt at the first meeting between civilians and the military in June 2020 under the auspices of the Saudi ambassador to Sudan. The political mechanism remained present in the Sudanese scene, through the meetings conducted by the head of the UN mission, Volker Peretz, with most of the political forces on the scene. In the end, the tripartite mechanism supported the initiative of the Bar Association, which launched a project for the transitional constitution as part of the initiatives

Many attacks were launched by many political forces over the past year in an effort to resolve the crisis And resuming the democratic path. This initiative was established in the end, through the efforts of the tripartite mechanism, to summon the military component to sign the framework agreement with the Forces of Freedom and Change on December 5, 2022, excluding the Democratic Bloc from the agreement.

With the launch of the final political process in January 2023, with the holding of a number of workshops to discuss the outstanding and background issues between the two parties to the framework agreement, and under the auspices of the tripartite and quartet mechanisms, disagreements arose between the armed forces and the Rapid Support, which ultimately led to an armed confrontation between the two parties.

Absence of resolution.. The Sudanese conflict is in its seventh month

Peace be upon Khalil.

Peace be upon Khalil

Published on 10/11/2023

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Although the war between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Militia in Sudan has entered its seventh month, it remains clear that the decisive hours are not yet approaching. Rather, the military battles have extended to five states: Khartoum, Al-Jazira, Kordofan, West Yeti, and South Darfur. Developments in military operations indicate that the Rapid Support Forces have opened several battle fronts with the aim of expanding the scope of the confrontation, exhausting the army, and dispersing its efforts on more than one axis of the confrontation, which blocks the way for concentrating and assembling forces and resolving the conflict in Khartoum, which is considered the main task of the ongoing battles during this stage. . This report attempts to shed light on the current conflict map, the field situation in the battlefields, its repercussions and

the reasons for the lack of resol

This importance appears to be increasing in light of the military confrontations in its three cities, Omdurman, Khartoum, and Khartoum Bahri, which witnessed air strikes, artillery shelling, and fierce battles between the two sides of the conflict. Army drones were able to destroy rapid support bases in the areas of Jabal Awlia and Al-Ailfoun, south of Khartoum, in addition to using Light and heavy weapons and military aircraft. Military operations continue in the capital, Khartoum, where the pace of fighting intensified between the two sides of the conflict in a number of areas after the marches carried out the bombing of militia positions in the east of the Nile, and in the Jabra neighborhood adjacent to the Armored Forces unit in southern Khartoum, and also one of the most populated areas for militia members since. established,

· In addition to the regions of Riyadh, Burri, Al-Mansheya, and Taif in the east of the capital

The Air Force targeted, through its intensive sorties, the rapid support sites in the Sports City and the camp grounds in the city of Soba, east of Khartoum. In addition to targeting aviation with bombs

Rapid support centers in the Arquette and Central Market neighborhoods. Violent clashes take place with heavy weapons, coinciding with similar clashes in separate areas. The army was also targeted

Rapid Support locations and positions in south and west Omdurman, especially the northern areas of Al-Thawra suburb.

On sites north of the city of Khartoum Bahri, The Rapid Support Forces also attacked Moa

Targeting a warehouse of army military equipment near the Wadi Saydna military base.

In addition, a number of shells were fired at the headquarters of the Corps of Engineers, while the army responded by bombing the Murabbat neighborhood south of the city of Omdurman, where the militia used artillery on sites in the area as a site to carry out some attacks on the Corps of Engineers from within residential neighborhoods.

After the escalation of the attack by the Rapid Support failed to change the reality on the ground, let alone suffering from heavy losses in equipment and forces, the Rapid Support Forces resorted to withdrawing to the border A, and the northern regionsstate of Al-Jazira with Khartoum state, in the rural areas to the east.

The western part of the state, where it was stationed in the areas of Al-Masid and Al-Thawra, but soon large military reinforcements were sent from the Sudanese army to those areas, and the Al-Jazeera project was cleared of any positions of the Rapid Support Forces. The army also carried out combing patrols and border surveys between the states of Khartoum and Al-Jazira.

In the west of the country, the state of South Darfur witnessed continued fighting in the city of Nyala, the capital of the state, where the Rapid Support is trying to control the city, with the aim of finding an opportunity to return again to the negotiating table, by obtaining a strong pressure card that will allow it to some extent to obtain some gains in the rounds of negotiations. The coming period, especially after its failure to control Khartoum or achieve strategic gains in the new areas to which the confrontations expanded south and east of the capital.

As for North Kordofan State, the Rapid Support Forces launched separate attacks on the city of El Obeid, with the aim of besieging the city's capital three months ago, but all their attempts failed as the Sudanese army confronted those attempts and the militia suffered many losses. Violent clashes and confrontations also broke out in the city of Dilling in South Kordofan state between the Sudanese army on the one hand, and the SPLM-North Abdel Aziz al-Hilu on the other.

Another, as the Popular Movement is trying to expand its control in light of the current turbulent security situation. This is the second attack by the SPLM-North sector on this city within three months, but the movement's forces suffered heavy losses.

Meanwhile, Central Darfur state entered a cycle of civil violence as a result of renewed clashes between the Beni Halba and Salamat tribes, in the Wastani area of Mukjar locality, which led to the killing of dozens of members of the two tribes, as the efforts of the men of the Native Administration failed to resolve the conflict between the two fighting groups, and the Native Administration seeks to conclude a A reconciliation conference between the two parties will take place at the end of this October.

Repercussions and

results: After seven months of military battles between the army and the Rapid Support Forces, the latter lost control over important strategic locations, but is still seeking to impose its military dominance over major cities, such as the city of El Obeid, due to its strategic location and the link between Khartoum and Khartoum.

The rest of the states are western Sudan. The Rapid Support Forces also continued to use the states of the Darfur regions as one of their important corridors in logistical support to continue the war, as they continued to fight major battles with the army to enter the center of some important cities, but without the ability to resolve the conflict in light of the military and tribal complexities that surround it. Multiple operating theatres.

On the other hand, many parties continue to make efforts to reach an effective settlement, as the political, civil and civil forces put forward an initiative, based on the necessity of forming an umbrella mechanism that includes regional partners such as: (the League of Arab States, the African Union, IGAD, the United Nations) for the purpose of establishing For further efforts to resolve the war, to prevent any external interference,

The current crisis is complicated. It is worth noting that these proposals have received the support of a number of active Sudanese political forces, including: the Democratic Bloc, the National Movement Forces, the National Consensus, the National Declaration, the Coordination of Return to the Founding Platform, the Revolutionary Front, in addition to the Native Administration, civil society, women, and the Revolutionary Youth Forces. .

In conclusion, it can be said that despite the complex repercussions of the military conflict in Sudan, and after about seven months of fighting between the Sudanese army and the support forces,

So far, the military operations between them have not resolved the fighting that has been going on since last April, which raises a legitimate question about the expected duration of the continuation of the war in Sudan, in addition to

Other questions relate to the lack of the ability of both parties to resolve militarily, and the nature of the non-military alternatives proposed to avoid the continuation of the conflict for months to come.

Limits of Influence: The return of relations between Sudan and Iran.

Reconciliation

Khalil

Reconciliation Khalil Published on 10/28/2023

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Sudan and Iran resumed their diplomatic relations after seven years of estrangement, as the two countries agreed to resume their relations after a joint statement by the Sudanese Foreign Minister-designate, Ambassador Ali Al-Sadiq, and his Iranian counterpart, Hussein Amir Abdullahian, in July 2023, before the Sudanese Foreign Ministry announced on October 9 the return of relations. Official diplomacy. It is clear that many contacts have been made between Khartoum and Tehran to restore their relations months ago, especially after the rapprochement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Iran in March 2023, after several months of negotiations between them under Chinese mediation.

The roots of the crisis between the two countries go back to 2016, when Sudan took the decision to sever relations.

With Iran as a result of strong tensions between Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia after Iranian protesters stormed the Saudi embassy in Tehran. The Sudanese government at the time took the decision to close all Iranian schools and cultural centers, and expel diplomatic officials and the ambassador from the country.

The development of Sudanese-Iranian relations

Historically, relations between Khartoum and Tehran have been close for nearly three decades. If he sees the basis for weapons to Extremely. Tehran has been an ally of Khartoum, and has also been a source and source for Khartoum since the 1990s and the first decade of the third millennium of the twenty-first century. Cooperation has taken on a strategic nature, given that Iran believes that Sudan is an important center Iranian movements in the Horn of Africa region, within the framework of its broad regional project

It expanded to the African arena during the term of President Ahmadinejad, as the two countries were facing heavy
and US sanctions. pressure

For example, in April 1997 the two countries signed more than 30 agreements ranging from joint projects, joint training,
and the qualification and training of Sudanese army officers and the Security and Intelligence Service in Tehran. In
March 2008, the two countries signed a joint defense agreement, a joint tool to enhance security and peace in the
Horn region, which includes permanent coordination and advanced defense.
African. Before the severing of relations, Sudan had good ties with Iran, especially in the military field, as Iranian
ships were often docked in the port of Port Sudan on the sea.

Red.

But in 2014, the relationship between the two countries began to deteriorate, especially after Sudan faced a serious
economic crisis and Tehran distanced itself from Khartoum, as it failed to provide significant economic gains to Sudan,
before Sudan became involved the following year in supporting the Saudi military operation in Yemen. At a time
when Iran supported the Houthis, which put both Sudan and Iran in a situation of indirect confrontation in Yemen,
which led to
Deep tensions in bilateral relations quickly revealed themselves in 2016 when Sudan decided to sever all forms of
diplomatic relations with Iran, a situation that continued in an enhanced regional context in which the intensity of
polarization increased and the manifestations of hostile policies in the region grew.

Just as regional variables contributed to creating a state of tension that ended in a rift between the two countries,
regional variables also contributed to the restoration of bilateral relations between them in 2023, after the Saudi-
Iranian rapprochement led to the opening of a space that did not exist before.

For the return of Sudanese-Iranian relations, without this meaning the Sudanese leadership taking a decision to change
The pattern of its regional alignment, which may entail high political and economic costs.

The repercussions of rapprochement on Sudan and Iran

Khartoum's rapprochement with Tehran will have an impact on the positions of regional and international powers regarding
the war currently taking place in Khartoum between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces. Apparently
It is clear that the Sudanese army wants to deliver messages to many countries in the regional environment

And internationally, he proves that he has alternatives in the current crisis with which he can modify to some extent his military operations against the Rapid Support Forces, and achieve gains in them at the level of the military operations taking place in both Khartoum and some Darfur states, by opening him up to a strong regional ally that enjoys With extensive experience in supporting its regional allies militarily with military equipment

And experiences that could constitute a factor in changing the existing balance of power on the battlefields in current time .

In practice, Iran can supply the Sudanese army with effective military equipment that helps the institution The military ability to withstand a longer period of war and exhaust the opponent. Iran could also seek to restore its strong presence in Sudan and the region that extends along the eastern coast of Africa, as the recent rapprochement with Sudan helps Tehran reposition itself in the East African region, in which Iran has a strong presence. Military through the Houthis in Yemen, as well as A number of countries in the region, such as Eritrea, Kenya, and the Comoros, have a close history of strong relations with them, as well as some actors in Somalia. Sudan could even turn into a center for Iranian activity in the center of the continent to its west, and in the Lakes region all the way to the south.

The continent, especially since Iran is striving to revitalize its strategy towards the continent in the context of confrontation The isolation imposed on it by the West.

In conclusion, it can be said that the Saudi-Iranian agreement has opened the door for Iran to reposition regionally in a way that is different from the tense relations that prevailed in past years. And in the shadow Given the complex regional context that exists at the present time, Iran will be keen to exploit all available opportunities in order to regain its influence in Africa, some of which it lost during the recent years. Sudan was one of the most prominent countries through which it seemed that Iran would seek to strengthen its presence and restore its declining influence in East Africa, which could have lasting repercussions on the existing balances in both the Middle East and the African continent.

Readers of the International Organization for Migration's report on the refugee crisis in Sudan

Salma Abdel Moneim

Salma Abdel Moneim

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The International Organization for Migration issued a report on May 16 on the nature of the current conditions in Sudan, and in particular on the conditions of refugees since the outbreak of the conflict in mid-April. The report began by sending a call to all parties involved in the conflict to ensure the safety of humanitarian workers so that they can provide assistance to affected Sudanese citizens. As a result of acts of violence; It is worth noting that since the outbreak of the conflict in Sudan, all workers in international relief and peace organizations have been threatened, and the matter has even led to the killing of a number of them and the injury of others.

Notes on the IOM report:

The report began with a general overview of the situation in Sudan, noting that after the conflict in Sudan continued for a month, there was no ceasefire despite all the ongoing peace talks and the signing of a declaration of commitment to protect civilians in Sudan, as there is still an exchange of fire in Khartoum, North Kordofan, and West Kordofan. Darfur: The death toll reached 701 people and the wounded reached 5,576, according to estimates by the Sudanese Ministry of Health.

The report reviewed the results of the conflict, as looting and theft crimes continued without distinction between embassies and buildings that provide humanitarian support, in addition to the severe shortage of basic commodities, especially food, electricity, water, and fuel, and their high prices, in addition to expectations of a 25% rise in prices, according to United Nations estimates, during the months. The next three to six; In addition to the disruption of banking services, and expectations from the World Food Program that the level of food insecurity will reach a record level in the coming months.

It is worth noting that the United Nations Population Fund warned of the increase in gender-based violence, sexual assault and exploitation against women and girls, in addition to the deteriorating conditions of health facilities, to the point that less than 1/5 of these facilities are functioning in Khartoum, according to the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Affairs.

The report monitored more than one million displacement cases in Sudan. Of these, 843,130 are inside Sudan, and 253,591 were displaced across the border to neighboring countries, so that in Port Sudan there are more than 16,000 displaced people of 22 different nationalities. In light of the worsening conditions inside Sudan, the International Organization for Migration, in addition to a number of other relief organizations, called for the necessity of establishing alternative sites to host the displaced. Although the government acknowledged in its last meeting the necessity of providing health care and considering it a priority, the Civil Aviation Authority announced the extension of the airspace closure until May 31!

Humanitarian needs are increasing in Sudan, to the point that the organization indicated that there will be 1.8 million displaced people during the next six months, and the organization is working to follow a new response plan to meet and expand these needs.

The organization indicated that this report includes an overview of the organization's work in responding to the displaced crisis in Sudan and neighboring countries.

First: Sudan:

Various organizations The organization's main office in Port Sudan works to coordinate operations with agencies to issue assessments on the situation in Sudan, as it includes 6 warehouses across 5 countries neighboring Sudan and 7 thousand aid groups; The report explained this through a map with the distribution of conflict areas and the organization's branch offices that serve migrants.

The report indicated that the organization's work plan for eastern Sudan was completed, which included the opening of a new warehouse in Port Sudan, and the work teams traveled on May 16 to Kassala and Gedaref to begin operations, in addition to distributing food supplies, which will include 232 thousand people, in addition to...

Number of Water, hygiene items, etc.; The organization shares its work in Sudan with international agencies and organizations, including the Office of Humanitarian Affairs and the High Commissioner for Refugees. The organization launched its response plan on May 17 and will brief donors and member states on May

22.

Second: South Sudan:

The report indicated that the crisis in Sudan affects the humanitarian situation in South Sudan until more than 57 thousand arrivals passed, including 53 thousand South Sudanese who fled on May 14. The organization recorded the conflict in advance to Sudan!

The organization works to provide 120 liters of water per day to serve the displaced people in South Sudan, and more than 10,000 returnees to the South have been examined, while supporting 376 third-world citizens by providing medical aid, water, food, and other humanitarian needs. With the Government of South Sudan and partners, as well as the organization's office in Renk, the organization is working with others to establish another support point in Malakal.

Third: Central African Republic:

The organization registered more than 9,000 Sudanese within the borders of Central Africa, including more than 6,000 asylum seekers and more than 3,000 who fled to Sudan in light of the 2019 and 2020 crises, and women and children constitute the majority of arrivals, 80%.

Fourth: Ethiopia:

Since the beginning of the conflict, the organization has recorded the arrival of more than 20,000 displaced people through the town of Metema, located on the Sudanese-Ethiopian border, including 48% Ethiopians, 17% Sudanese, 11% Eritreans, and 8% Turks. More than 600 arrivals pass daily, and the organization works to provide support with health care tools, food and water, in addition to examining the displaced and other services that the organization provides in order to protect the rights of refugees.

Fifth: The Arab Republic of Egypt:

The report recorded that, according to the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there are more than 88 thousand displaced people to Egypt across the Egyptian-Sudanese border, including 6 thousand Egyptians and the others are Sudanese citizens. The organization, in turn, provided first aid in cooperation with the Egyptian Red Crescent, food supplies, hygiene tools, etc., and the organization is preparing to increase food boxes and provide... More water to accommodate these numbers

Sixth: Chad:

According to the report, the number of refugees in Chad was estimated at about 60 thousand refugees, most of whom are women and children. The organization works in cooperation with a number of international relief organizations to provide appropriate support and immediate response, especially in providing food, water, and multi-purpose cash assistance to returning families as part of its assistance for the voluntary return of their communities.

Seventh: Libya:

According to the report, about 913 migrants arrived in Libya, either directly from Sudan or indirectly by passing through Chad and then to the Libyan border. Emergency committees were formed to develop preparedness strategies to raise the response in emergency situations, especially since the conflict is still ongoing.

Notes on the IOM report:

In its work, the International Organization for Migration has relied on coordination between many relief organizations, civil society organizations, and government agencies, and therefore the numbers, statistics, and data are agreed upon by all parties.

The organization is able to coordinate its work easily, but outside the borders of Sudan. Due to the increase in combat zones day after day, the organization stumbles in presenting its work within the Sudanese borders.

Egypt is the highest in receiving displaced Sudanese, which in turn creates additional burdens and requires more support from the international community for the Egyptian government.

The organization needs greater support to provide the necessary services to the displaced and returnees. According to expectations, there is a large and continuous increase daily in the number of displaced people.

A number of those fleeing Sudan discussed the difficulty of transportation. The report included an informational interview with, movement, and obtaining water and food within Sudanese territory.

Calculated Engagement: Washington and the Violent Developments in Sudan

What a science

What a science

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“The violence occurring in Sudan represents a tragedy and a betrayal of the Sudanese people’s clear demand for a civilian government and a transition to democracy,” these words came in the statement growing escalation in issued this May, as US President John Biden commented on the chapter in one of the recurring chapters of violence in its history. Sudan is a new Sudan. The arena is witnessing signs of entering the dark tunnel of civil war, after the decline in the state of accommodation between the Sudanese army under the command of General Abdel Fattah, and the Rapid Support Forces that follow Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo, known as “Hemedti,” which was what resulted in the outbreak of fighting between the two sides. Which prompted President Biden to affirm that the United States “stands with the people of Sudan,” and is also working to support Sudan’s commitment “to a future of peace and response tools to deal with the escalating opportunity.” This raises questions about Washington’s violence in Sudan, as well as the motives driving it

Sudan has entered a new phase of instability against the backdrop of a new mid-April wave of fighting in a country rife with militias and rebel movements. In the past, armed violence broke out between the Sudanese army under the command of General Abdel Fattah, and the Rapid Support Forces affiliated with Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as “Hemedti,” months after they signed an internationally-backed draft agreement in December 2022, with the aim of establishing a road map for civilian leadership. But talks about implementing its details failed. The ongoing violent clashes in Sudan have paralyzed the lives of citizens, resulted in hundreds of deaths, thousands of injuries, and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of citizens. This prompted Washington to respond to the complexity and complexity that have now enveloped the Sudanese scene. Tracks to match

Evacuation of Americans:

With the outbreak of the current wave of violence in Sudan, the issue of evacuating American nationals emerged as a major goal of the American administration, to avoid repeating previous failures in some burning areas.

Because of its impact on the popularity of the democratic administration, and because of its potential impact on the chances of the Democrats winning during the 2024 presidential race. As the armed confrontations entered their second week on April 22, the United States carried out an evacuation of its diplomats from its embassy in Khartoum, after By transferring American forces to the Lemonnier base in Djibouti. In this context, the US government has worked to facilitate the departure of American diplomats with military assistance and the departure of hundreds of other American citizens via land and sea convoys and flights on board partner aircraft. While CNN considered that the widespread evacuation efforts came amid rising anger from Americans in Sudan because they felt that the American government had abandoned them and left them alone in a complex and dangerous situation.

Diplomatic moves:

It can be said in general that the Biden administration has sought to participate in the efforts aimed at Sudan's transition to civilian rule. It appointed John Godfrey as Ambassador in Khartoum in a quarter century. Moreover, Washington, through its membership in the Quartet, which For the first time includes (the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE), worked to encourage the Sudanese parties to accept the framework agreement that was reached in December 2022. Following the outbreak of armed violence, Washington made a number of diplomatic moves to contain The scene, US State Department spokesman Samuel Warburg revealed that Washington is communicating with neighboring countries, the Gulf states, the European Union, the African Union, the League of Arab States, the United Nations and others regarding developments on the Sudanese scene. This was linked to Secretary of State Anthony Blinken making contacts with Both Al-Barahan and Hemedti stressed the urgent need to reach a ceasefire, as well as contacting his Saudi and Emirati counterparts in order to restore security and stability in Sudan. Kevin McCarthy, Speaker of the House of Representatives, also discussed, during his visit to Cairo, with President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi. The situation on the regional scene, including the recent developments in Sudan. This has occurred

Washington, in cooperation with Riyadh, presented an initiative aimed at ending the conflict, and opened the door to holding discussions in Jeddah between Al-Burhan and Hemedti.

Humanitarian aid:

The United States is among the largest providers of humanitarian aid to Sudan, which is a reliable approach to dealing with current developments and preventing the country from sliding into further violence. A week after the ongoing wave of violence broke out, Samantha Power, director of the international agency, said that the agency had deployed a team of disaster experts to... USAID coordinates humanitarian aid to Sudan in light of the continuing fighting there. She also explained that the team will work from Kenya in the first phase, and will cooperate with the international community and partners to do so, he confirmed and provide humanitarian aid safely. President Biden said in a May 4 statement that the United States is already responding "to the unfolding humanitarian crisis," adding that Washington stands ready "to support enhanced humanitarian assistance when it allows."

"The circumstances are so." Blinken also confirmed in a statement on May 9 that Washington is working in the Jeddah talks to extend the ceasefire in Sudan, as well as reaching an agreement on humanitarian aid.

Threatening penalties:

So he lost authorities broadens Sanctions have been Washington's prominent and consistent tool for dealing with various conflicts In a May 4 statement, President Biden noted that he had issued a new executive order directing the United States to respond to the violence that began on April 15 by "imposing sanctions on individuals responsible for threatening peace, security, and stability in Sudan, and undermining the democratic transition in Sudan." "They use violence against civilians or commit gross human rights violations." In line with the expansion of the national emergency declared in the Executive Order 13067 issued on November 3, 1997 (prohibiting Sudanese government property and transactions with Sudan), and expanded in Executive Order No. 13400 issued on April 26 2006 (prohibiting the property of persons associated with the conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan), based on developments in Sudan, including the military's seizure of power in

October 2021, and fighting broke out between rival military factions in April 2023, according to the statement.

Avoid field engagement:

violence Coinciding with Washington's intense political and diplomatic moves to deal with the ongoing

The Sudanese arena: Jake Sullivan, the US National Security Advisor, announced in a press conference held at the White House that there are no plans for the United States to deploy peacekeeping forces in Sudan. As Samuel Warberg explained in exclusive statements to Sky News Arabia, Washington's position on the escalating developments and its efforts to evacuate its citizens from Khartoum. It is unlikely that Washington has any intention to send any forces to Sudan. They pointed out that Washington believes that the solution must come from the Sudanese parties themselves, based on the fact that external intervention will not be in the interest of Sudan and the Sudanese people. Therefore, he stressed that the United States would not send any troops to Sudan. This means that Washington realizes the necessity of avoiding the mistakes of the past (such as: Operation Black Falcon) by ruling out the issue of field military involvement in disputes and conflicts.

Intertwined American interests:

In his statement imposing sanctions on the Sudanese parties, President Biden considered that "the developments in Sudan, including the army's seizure of power in October 2021 and the outbreak of fighting between rival military factions in April 2023, constitute an unusual and abnormal threat to national security and the foreign policy of the United States." "United." Which means that the multi-track response stems from a set of incentives linked to Washington's interests, which can be viewed in light of the relative increase in the current US administration's interest in Africa. Which can be explained as follows:

The strategic importance of Sudan:

A strategic sea Sudan enjoys a strategic location overlooking the Red Sea, and has an outlet

It is the port of Port Sudan, and it is bordered by seven countries: Egypt and Libya to the north, and to the south-east

Eritrea, Ethiopia, the state of South Sudan in the south, and in the west and southwest the states of Chad And Central Africa. Due to geographical proximity and geopolitical influence, Sudan is connected to a number of important arenas, such as the Middle East, the Arabian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean. Sudan is also one of the countries rich in agricultural wealth and mining resources. It has a remarkable abundance of natural resources and wealth, the most prominent of which are uranium, gold, cobalt, oil, and others. Sudan also owns large areas of arable land in the Arab world, and also possesses huge livestock wealth. Therefore, it seems difficult to discount Sudan's strategic importance when analyzing Washington's actions toward the current crisis. This is in light of Washington's desire to achieve the maximum benefit while working to discourage its opponents from doing so.

Avoid further ignition:

Much better than the snowball effect in an environment full of plentyThe violent developments in Sudan reflect concern of crises, problems and conflicts, especially in the Horn of Africa region (Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia). In addition, the countries surrounding Sudan, including South Sudan and Chad Libya and the Central African Republic are already suffering from unrest within their borders, and these challenges may increase after the deterioration of the situation on the Sudanese scene. This is what prompted some analysts, including Alan Boswell from the International Crisis Group, to say that "what happens in Sudan will not stay in Sudan." Therefore, Chad and South Sudan are simultaneously at risk from the potential repercussions of the ongoing fighting. In this context, Ezekiel Lual Gatkuoth, the former Minister of Oil of South Sudan, commented, saying:

"Instability in Sudan means no...

"Stability of the region, and South Sudan, which separated from Sudan after decades of civil war, may be the first to be affected." On the other hand, it is expected that the conflict in Sudan will delay the ongoing tripartite negotiations on the Ethiopian dam. Therefore, the reflection of the ongoing violence in Sudan on its already fragile surrounding circles means entering the African continent into a state of instability, the effects of which will not stop at the continent's borders, but may extend to the global arena. This represents an incentive and incentive for Washington to exert further efforts and achieve greater goals

Get involved to avoid this fate.

Limiting the expansion of opponents:

I am suspicious of Washington's dealings with more than one scene. The issue of reducing the role of opponents represents a goal

Including developments on the Sudanese scene, based on Washington's awareness that any American vacuum will be matched by a similar rise in the role of its opponents (Russia and China). Hence, the multi-track American response can be viewed in light of its desire to frame a clear American role that covers the expected moves of its opponents.

Thus, the United States fears

The possibility of launching a Russian base on the Red Sea, which has been planned to be established since 2019, and does not face any objection from any of the warring parties in Sudan. Not to mention Washington's concern about the expanding volume of cooperation between the Russian company "Vagns" and the Rapid Support Forces, which control the bulk of Sudanese gold mines. On the other hand, Sudan and China have deep economic relations in various fields (including agriculture, energy, and mining), and Beijing is considered among Khartoum's largest trading partners and has significant investments in the country. Sudan is part of China's Belt and Road Initiative. Hence, it seems that Washington's decision to be a party to the political track of the crisis stems from its desire to block the way for its opponents to pave the way for another political track, and also its keenness to focus on manipulating the sanctions and aid tools represents pressure on exploitation or economic rapprochement that the opponents seek.

To enhance it.

Continuing the fight against terrorism:

The security dimension has always dominated Washington's vision towards Africa, as confronting the ever-

This was seen as a basis for Washington in its dealings with the continent. Expanding terrorism in Africa has been a goal.

Brown, in light of its global goal related to the war on terrorism. Some analyzes consider that the continuation of the Sudanese crisis in the current manner may establish incubators for terrorist organizations, providing them with a favorable opportunity to reposition themselves through the connectivity of their networks in Sudan and throughout its geographical neighborhood and regional surroundings. With ISIS's announcement that Africa has become its main haven in Iraq and addition to the increase in Amana's activities after its defeat in strongholds, Syria, in Al-Qaeda in the Horn of Africa, especially in Somalia. It is clear that the fragility of Sudan resulting from the continuing ongoing violence provides an opportunity for these organizations to enhance their strength and influence. Not to mention the possibility of Sudan becoming a hub for violent and extremist groups located in the Sahel, Sahara and Horn of Africa regions. Moreover, Sudan's shared borders with Egypt, Libya, Chad, and Ethiopia could help transfer the threat of terrorism to the Middle East and perhaps into Europe. This means harm to influence and interests

Not only in the African continent, but perhaps also in the Middle East and in the United States

Its European allies.

Securing navigation and trade routes:

Due to Sudan's location overlooking the Red Sea, which is of utmost importance to us

For Washington, as it connects Africa and the Middle East, and makes Sudan a meeting point for the interactions of the regional and international systems, it represents a clear incentive for Washington's intervention in the ongoing conflict.

The US National Security Strategy, issued in October 2022, affirms the US administration's commitment to preventing foreign or regional powers from threatening freedom of movement through Bab al-Mandab, the waterway linking the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. This can also be viewed in light of US Ambassador Godfrey's warning to Sudan against allowing Russia to build a naval base in Port Sudan. On the other hand, the fragility of the situation in Sudan may contribute to negatively affecting navigation in the Red Sea, and even stimulate new waves of piracy that

The Horn of Africa region has seen it for years. Piracy attacks often affect the interests of many states, including cargo owners, transshipment states, and destination states. Therefore, in 2008, the US government endorsed a policy to effectively address piracy threats in the Horn of Africa for the smooth running of the global economy and maritime affairs.

Strengthening the path of Israeli normalization:

In recent years, Washington has adopted an approach towards the Middle East and North Africa region

It is based on integrating Israel into the region by pushing a successive series of normalization episodes between countries The region and Israel. Sudan came within this series after the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that the two countries agreed to continue efforts to normalize relations between them during the visit of Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen, who arrived in Sudan in February 2023. This was preceded by both Al-Burhan and Hemedti. By sending high-level military envoys to Israel before the fall of Abdullah Hamdok's government on October 25, 2021, based on the goals of establishing joint intelligence and security relations with Israel. This resulted in the closure of the Hamas movement's office in Sudan, which is classified by both Israel and the United States

As a terrorist organization. This matter was considered by some analyzes as a means by the Sudanese ruling elite to force Israel to put pressure on the United States to respond to the demands that this elite seeks to achieve. Therefore, it is difficult to look at Washington's position on the ongoing violent developments without considering its desire to continue the path of normalization in the region.

Supporting American values:

Since coming to power, the Biden administration has announced the importance of restoring Washington's moral role, or restoring American policy based on values, especially democracy and human rights. Therefore, I adhere to this principle so as not to damage its image Washington ADA recognizes the need to act accordingly

The international arena, in light of its repeated efforts to confirm its continued global leadership. Consequently, internal and external forces are pressuring the United States, including society And they were confused

Sudanese civil rights organizations and international human rights organizations, to stop support for the current elite, based on the "Al-Hurra" website, Sudanese-Americans launched Their role in harming Sudan's stability. So they agreed A legal and humanitarian initiative in the United States through a petition signed by activists and human rights activists calling on the United Nations and the United States to move quickly to investigate existing violations.

In Sudan in the current conflict. Americans of Sudanese origin and others called on the United Nations to bring the two military parties to the conflict to international trial and hold them responsible for the deteriorating conditions and the failure to secure the peaceful transition of civilian authority. They also called on the United States around the world to bear moral responsibility, as well as the United Nations and international organizations, towards the Sudanese people who suffer from complex humanitarian conditions as a result of the war.

Containing the humanitarian crisis:

In light of the growing violence in Sudan, it is expected that the scope of asylum and displacement in Africa will expand. Before the outbreak of clashes, Sudan was hosting more than 1.1 million refugees, according to data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. In the wake of the outbreak of business The year 2022, according to Due to the violence, UNHCR explained on its website that large numbers of civilians were forced to flee the fighting, "including people who had been internally displaced due to previous conflicts in Sudan, and refugees from other countries who sought safety in Sudan." Pointing to new cases of internal displacement in which more than 100,000 people, Sudanese refugees, fled

and returnees, from Sudan to neighboring countries – particularly Chad, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, Egypt and Ethiopia. Moreover, the World Food Program has warned that the ongoing violence in Sudan could cause a humanitarian crisis in the entire East African region. While the United Nations announced that the Secretary-General had decided to send Humanitarian Affairs Coordinator Martin Griffiths "Fu Arra" to the region against the backdrop of the deteriorating situation in Sudan. As such, Sudan and its regional surroundings appear to be strongly vulnerable to intertwined and complex humanitarian crises that will have clear repercussions on the rates of violence, the paths of illegal migration, and the scope of organized crime. This requires Washington to play a concrete role to avoid, or at least contain, these dangerous consequences. This can be inferred from Blinken's statement, issued on May 9, in which he explained that Washington is working in the Jeddah talks to extend the ceasefire and reach an agreement on humanitarian aid. In sum, given the previously mentioned motives and incentives, it seems difficult. It is certain that the United States is dealing coldly with the violent developments in Sudan, based on its positions towards conflicts and disputes.

other countries in the Middle East and Africa during the last decade. The main determinant of Washington's dealings with developments in the Sudanese arena remains linked to the limits of its impact on its interests. Which means that the limits and scope of American engagement in Sudan remain dependent on the interests drawn by the administration in light of the previously mentioned motives and incentives. This is taking into account that the policy adopted by Washington regarding the conflict in Sudan during the coming months may seem likely to change - to some extent - in light of the change in leadership in the White House as a result of the 2024 presidential race.

Contagion of crises: Chad's accounts and positions regarding the Sudanese crisis

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Chad is considered a troubled neighbor to Sudan to the west, as it has witnessed political instability since the death of former President Idriss Deby Itno in 2021. Deby's army was the most effective fighting force in the region in fighting terrorist groups due to its capabilities.

Intelligence and security, as a pillar of stability in a fragile region and an arc of protracted crises. A timetable for the transitional period of 18 months was agreed upon, and elections would be held in October.

2024. Within this context, the longer the conflict in Sudan lasts, the greater the possibility of it extending across the porous Chadian border, destabilizing it and affecting the entire Sahel region of Africa, in light of the shared history, heritage, and intertwined borders between the two countries.

It is one of the precedents of intractable armed conflicts on the African continent and its expansion

Go!

To neighboring countries. The Sudanese crisis, its repercussions, and the fragments of the conflict highlight a number of...

The negative repercussions on the State of Chad include the exacerbation of humanitarian and security crises, the incitement of the tribal dimension, the disruption of trade, and the deterioration of economic conditions. This will be

detailed as follows:

:- a multiplication of humanitarian crises and escalation of refugee flows^{The influence of M} Firstly

The rapid influx of thousands of new Sudanese refugees threatens to upend this fragile situation in Chad, causing...

It puts the lives of large numbers of displaced people at risk, in light of the challenges of hosting refugees

For expatriates, local governments cannot support them in Malaya, where there are only four percent of immigrants

Residents have access to electricity, basic services such as clean drinking water, and mixed sanitation from the West

Darfur region

Health is rare in the country. And the consequences of mass migration

pattern has taken a cyclical pattern over the past 20 years since the start of the conflict in the region ^{In general} The displacement

Humanitarian emergency.

And its dynamics along with

In this context, eastern Chad hosts more than a million people who have been forced to leave their homes,

Including nearly 400,000 Sudanese refugees, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that between

10 and 20,000 people who fled the conflict crossed Sudan's western border into Chad, and the United Nations

estimates that more than 250,000 people could cross into Chad from Sudan in the coming months as the conflict

continues, fears that the repercussions of the conflict will increase pressure on its limited resources, limited

support for refugees, and the possibility of a significant shortfall in aid funding; The World Food Program warned

that food supplies to refugees in Chad will halve as of the beginning of this month.

Due to the lack of financial support, they may face difficulty coping with the conditions if they cross into Chad.

There will be a deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Chad for refugees if the international community does not

mobilize enough aid on time. The prospects for safe return and reintegration in Sudan remain very bleak.

Instead, the numbers of refugees are increasing.

The influx of refugees comes weeks before the start of the dry season, and it is expected that an estimated number of people will be left behind

About 1.9 million people suffer from severe food insecurity. Rains falling at almost the same time threaten to turn swaths

of desert into rivers, endangering delivery

Main food aid for refugees and other vulnerable groups. The mass exodus to Chad also highlights growing

problems in the troubled Sahel countries from Mali and Burkina Faso to Sudan, including the contagion of military coups,

the growth of Western and UN peacekeeping, as well as terrorist groups, and the ineffectiveness of operations

on to prevent the activity of new powers such as Russia, to Exacerbation of instability.

Secondly - the repercussions of the population overlap between Chad and Sudan:

Chad shares a 1,300 km long border with Sudan; The eastern regions of Chad on the border with Darfur in western

Sudan suffered from the repercussions of fighting and civil war in

That area in 2003. Janjaweed militias also caused the deaths of several hundred people in the provinces of Wadi Fira, Ouadi and Sil. There is also a group of communities that did not stop administrative borders

Its movement, which includes various Arab tribes, the Zaghawa, Tama, and Masalit, was previously mobilized by armed movements, and the Janjaweed mainly mobilized the Arab communities. The rebel armed movements in Darfur, such as the Justice and Equality Movement, were led by "Khalil Ibrahim" from the Zaghawa tribe. The conflicts in Darfur over the past two decades have turned into a worrying current war

· important to Chad Regional. This makes Sudan's predicament

Previously, the leader of the Rapid Support militia, "Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo," known as Hemedti, had roots further In Chad and even family members in the Chadian Transitional Military Council. Hemedti is keen to strengthen his power base not only in Sudan, but he also wants to build a broader sphere of influence across the country

The Sahel region of Africa, where the RSF includes many Chadian Arab fighters and former Chadian rebels opposed to the Chadian government. Bechara Issa Gadallah, a member of the Hemedti family, was Chad's Minister of Defense during the Darfur crisis, and is now an influential member of the

In the Chadian Transitional Military Council.

The escalation of violence in Darfur may result in broader insecurity given the tribal dimension, as Darfur hosts many active and former rebel groups.

And tribal militias, which will be increasingly drawn into the fighting between the two sides of the conflict. "Hemedti" and the RSF come from the Arab Rizeigat tribe, part of the nomadic Baggara Arabs also present in parts of Chad and Libya, and the RSF will strengthen its ethnic ties.

And political policy in Chad to recruit armed militias to strengthen their ranks and create tribal tensions. Therefore, in the first days of the armed clashes, the Arab Tribal Council in Chad issued a statement criticizing

Rapid support for its recruitment of young Chadian fighters from the tribes. The ruling family in Chad also belongs to the Zaghawa group, while many senior members of the Transitional Council belong to Arab groups.

In another context, the Front for Change and Accord in Chad, the rebel group responsible for the killing of former President Idriss Deby Itno in April 2021, announced that it does not support any party in the conflict in Sudan, and denied any connection to rapid support, but the armed opposition forces may seek some form of Alliances with Rapid Support.

Third - Exacerbation of security crises:

The Chadian authorities are concerned that the ongoing clashes in Sudan may exacerbate the security situation within its territory and the threats to its eastern borders. Chadian Defense Minister Daoud Yaya Ibrahim said that he is concerned about the influx of refugees, and "we have "More than 400,000 Sudanese refugees have remained with us since 2003, and Chad will suffer from a security standpoint," as the deteriorating security situation in Sudan creates indirect risks to Chad due to the movement of a large number of refugees, the reduced security presence in the border areas, and the deteriorating conditions across the border that it crosses borders full of security and humanitarian gaps. Fears of the proliferation of weapons and terrorist groups operating in these areas, and the new weapons will deteriorate the security situation in the Sahel region as a whole, as weapons are regularly shipped along existing smuggling routes on the border, and the flow of armed individuals and weapons is likely to continue with epilepsy in Sudan, and people will become Travelers are more dependent on smugglers for safe passage Escalation through and around conflict areas, leading to increased smuggling fees and potentially more exploitative arrangements with smugglers in the context of the growing dynamics of smuggling and human trafficking operations, and the expansion of the illicit arms trade due to the establishment of new smuggling corridors.

In January 2023, the transitional leaders of Sudan and Chad agreed to strengthen joint patrols of the two armies along the border. Following the worsening insecurity and terrorist attacks in the border triangle area with the Central African Republic and the West Darfur region, the Rapid Support militia increased its activities along this border area, marginalizing The joint border force was established by Chad and Sudan in 2010. The governments of the Central African Republic and Chad and the Rapid Support Militia also signed a cooperation agreement to jointly fight various rebel groups in the border areas with the support of the Russian Wagner forces. The large gold mines in the border region are a center for arms and drug smuggling that Run by rebel groups

In part, and one of the main sources of illicit revenue for RSF, it was not the troops

The national armed forces have been present for a long time, except in a small way, in these areas.

In addition, the situation in Chad was complicated by the leak of US intelligence indicating that Russian Wagner forces were working with anti-regime rebels in the Republic of Chad.

Central Africa to overthrow Deby and their relationship with Hemedti. US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken expressed his deep concern about Wagner's presence in Sudan. It was reported that Wagner's forces participated in February 2023 in the context of recruiting Chadian rebels and establishing a training site.

Fourth - Economic losses from the cessation of cross-border trade:

An economic crisis for it as a landlocked country in the Sahel region.

The military junta in N'Djamena is trying to maintain a clear balance by inviting both sides of the conflict to dialogue and opening the possibility of holding talks between the parties in N'Djamena. While the Chadian authorities have not yet taken an official side in the clash between the two parties, the transitional government has not taken. They have yet to take a stand on the ambiguity of the current scene, but for them, the seizure of power by an irregular force such as the Rapid Support Forces, in whose ranks many Arab groups are active on the Chadian-Sudanese border, and some former Chadian rebels, will constitute a significant threat to the elite. ruling in the country, and enhances the ambitions within other clans - especially the Rizeigat tribe, to which “Hemedti” himself belongs - for the large Chadian Arab community at the expense of the Zaghawa clan, who have controlled the reins of power for more than thirty years in Chad.

Hence, a source of great concern to the ruling elite in N'Djamena.

Accordingly, many measures and arrangements were taken to secure the borders and contain the possible repercussions, by sending additional forces to secure the borders with Sudan, which were closed at the beginning. the

No, they were afraid the support would kill them. Jendaya Sudanaya, a dissident from the clashes, announced that about 320 people crossed the border and surrendered to the Chadian authorities on April 17, 2023. The closure of the border with Sudan and the withdrawal of Chadian forces from the joint military mechanism between Sudan and Chad concerned with monitoring the border and addressing security imbalances comes in order to cut off the path to any

Regional social security.

Supplies for rapid support from ho

Within this framework, the Minister of Defense, Major General Daoud Ibrahim, stressed that "the conflict does not concern Chad.

"The matter is between the Sudanese, and we must remain vigilant against all possibilities." The leader of the military junta,

Mohamed Deby, also received Al-Burhan and then Hemedti, one after the other, in N'Djamena in the month of May.

January 2023, with the aim of showing neutrality. Moreover, Chad is coordinating jointly with Egypt regarding the ongoing developments in Sudan, supporting efforts to stop the fighting, and achieving a sustainable and comprehensive ceasefire that allows the delivery of humanitarian aid, and paves the way for a constructive dialogue to resolve differences between the Sudanese parties.

Long-term tribal competition for access to resources. As a result of the above, it is clear that failure to resolve creates future repercussions of crises and the risk of potential repercussions of the Sudanese crisis on neighboring countries, specifically Chad, phenomenon of foreign fighters, and the exacerbation of including arms flows across open borders, the escalation of the the refugee crisis on the border. . Consequently, the security situation and the phenomenon of mass displacement in the Sahel region as a whole, and the Chad Basin, are exacerbated given Sudan's proximity to Chad, providing a potential avenue for further recruitment of vulnerable populations by terrorist groups including Boko Haram and splinter groups of the Islamic State in West Africa. . Therefore, Chad is dealing with immediate danger and a combination of the repercussions of the ongoing conflict in light relations between the two countries. of the overlapping tribes and the complexity of

Asmaa Adel, manifestations of Kenyan interest and involvement in the

Sudanese crisis

Asmaa Adel

Published on 05/31/2023

sharing

The situation in the East African region is characterized by political and security turmoil, as Sudan has witnessed armed clashes between the Sudanese army and the semi-regular military structure "Rapid Support Forces" since April 2023. We find that the consequences of the crisis will not be limited to Sudan, but will include the region. This research paper seeks to review the scene inside Kenya, and the manifestations of Kenya's involvement in the Sudanese crisis. Although there are no common borders between Kenya and Sudan, Kenya sought to get involved in the Sudanese crisis that broke out on the fifteenth of April. . 2023

of tension The context of the outbreak of the Sudanese crisis on April 15, 2023 comes with a state inside Kenya between the ruling regime and the political opposition. In March 2023, demonstrations broke out against the Kenyan president, as a result of the deterioration of living conditions, as the economy in Kenya suffers from a number of challenges, which... The political opposition in Kenya exploited it, and worked to employ it to challenge the popularity of Kenyan President William Ruto. The leader of the opposition and the losing presidential candidate in the 2022 presidential elections, Rail Odinga, undertook the process of mobilizing the masses and calling for demonstrations towards the presidential palace, in order to oppose the economic policies pursued by the Kenyan government. The call made by the opposition leader received a response from citizens in Kenya. Clashes occurred between the security forces and the demonstrators. These demonstrations resulted in the arrest of more than 200 people, including a number of senior opposition politicians, and the injury of more than 400 people, including some. At least 60 security officers. However, we find that the ruling regime in Kenya was able to stop these demonstrations by proposing a dialogue initiative with the political opposition, which led to political calm. However, despite this, the roots of the crisis have not been resolved, as the essence

The crisis in Kenya is the difficult economic conditions, where the value of the local currency is deteriorating; There is a decline in the value of the local currency in addition to the insufficiency of hard currency, especially the US dollar, and thus there is difficulty in importing goods and services from abroad, in addition to what was reflected in the standard of living in Kenya. There is also difficulty in the high prices, which is the import of food commodities and medicines, in addition to the increase in the prices of basic services, which puts pressure on citizens in Kenya.

<<Crisis contagion: Chad's accounts and positions regarding the Sudanese crisis

Manifestations of Kenya's involvement in the Sudan crisis

We find that Kenya has tried to get involved in the Sudan crisis by presenting an initiative for a settlement between the two parties to the conflict in April 2023. Kenyan President William Ruto proposed hosting the two parties to the conflict to carry out a mediation process to stop the fighting, which led to the deterioration of the humanitarian conditions in Sudan. The humanitarian situation in Sudan is deteriorating as a result of the continuing armed clashes between the two sides of the conflict, and we find that Kenya is closely following the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Sudan. We also find that the suffering of Sudanese civilians who have been affected by the ongoing clashes is escalating, as the prices of food and means of transportation are rising, and the health sector is witnessing a deterioration due to the lack of medical supplies and the exposure of hospitals to bombing, which has led to many hospitals stopping service, and there are warnings from the World Health Organization. The World Bank confirmed that there are increasing threats of the spread of cholera and malaria in Sudan due to the lack of safe drinking water supplies.

The statements of the President of Kenya also reveal that it is necessary to restore civilian rule in Sudan. Kenya had hoped that Sudan would witness a political breakthrough in early April 2023, by forming a civilian-led transitional government, announcing a new prime minister, forming transitional governing institutions, and signing a transitional constitution, but we find The process of democratic transformation has declined, and a crisis occurred in the course of the political process in Sudan with the outbreak of armed clashes between

The Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces, so that the underlying differences between the President of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council, Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, and the Commander of the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo "Hemedti", became clear in public, regarding the problem of integrating the Rapid Support Forces into the Sudanese military establishment, which prevented the signing of The two parties agreed to the

final framework agreement that was initially announced on December 5, 2022.

Despite the diplomatic calls made by Kenya, its call for mediation was not accepted. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia hosted negotiations between the two sides of the conflict in Sudan in early May 2023. Negotiations took place between representatives of the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces in the city of Jeddah, to stop the escalation. military, and ensuring the arrival of humanitarian aid.

<< Exacerbating crises: The repercussions of the conflict in Sudan on the Middle East

But we find that Kenya's diplomatic engagement with the Sudanese crisis is strengthened in the long term. On average, it occurs through collective action; Kenya is working to coordinate with the countries of the region and regional and international organizations. Kenya has tried to take action on the Sudan crisis within the framework of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Kenya has appealed to both parties to the conflict to ensure full compliance with the decision of the IGAD Heads of State Summit held on April 16, 2023, including This includes stopping the fighting and allowing humanitarian aid to arrive. The Kenyan President also expressed that if he mediates between the two sides of the conflict, he will be in coordination with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the African Union and the United Nations. Kenya worked to coordinate with the countries neighboring Sudan, as the Kenyan President communicated with the Egyptian President during the month of April 2023 regarding the Sudan crisis, and we find that there are common visions between the two countries regarding a ceasefire, supporting peaceful dialogue efforts and resuming the transitional phase. In conclusion, it can be said that Perhaps Kenya aspires to play a positive role in ending the conflict in Sudan through peaceful negotiations, taking into account that the outstanding problems can be resolved politically rather than militarily. If the conflict between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces prolongs, it will be...

To exhaust the Sudanese security institutions, which will pave the way for the fragmentation of the Sudanese state entity, which will have negative repercussions on the region, and the loser from this will be The zero-sum equation is the Sudanese citizen, which requires both parties to the conflict in Sudan to raise the interests of the Sudanese people above narrow interests.

The Egyptian Center for Strategic Thought and Studies organizes a panel discussion with United Nations experts on Sudan

Center team

Center team

Published on 06/06/2023

sharing

The Egyptian Center for Thought and Strategic Studies held a panel discussion with a delegation representing the United Nations Sanctions Committee on Sudan, on Monday, June 5, 2023, with the participation of Mr. "Bifwoli W. Thomas" Bifwoli, UN Security Council Sanctions Monitor, and Mr. "Andrei Kolmakov," who works within a team of experts responsible for the activity of armed groups in Somalia.

The meeting was moderated by Major General Muhammad Ibrahim Al-Duwairi, Deputy Director of the Centre, Dr. Ahmed Amal, Head of the African Studies Unit, and Professor Ahmed Aliba, Head of the Armaments Unit, with the participation of Asma Adel and Shaima Al-Baksh, researchers in the African Studies Unit.

The meeting focused on exchanging visions about the situation in Sudan, regional positions, mediations and their role in calming the conflict, as well as the Egyptian vision of what is happening in Sudan as a A pivotal country in the Sudanese neighborhood.

What is happening in Sudan and related regional and international positions, and the two parties exchanged visions about what, and in this context, and in response to the question of Mr. Kolmakov Andrei, regarding the Egyptian vision While in Sudan, Major General Muhammad Ibrahim clarified a number of points related to the Egyptian ^{when} position as follows:

He explained that Sudan is a national security issue for Egypt, and that there are many efforts made by all parties throughout the transitional phase. And the Egyptian vision of the situation stems from... Egypt with

From its vision of a regional settlement mechanism for any conflict, Egypt starts from constants related to the national state, and the national state stems from the stability of institutions, which in turn leads to the importance of the survival and stability of the Sudanese military institution.

He pointed out Egypt's position on the refugee issue, given that Egypt did not deal with them as refugees, but rather as part of the Egyptian national fabric, and despite the economic challenges Egypt is witnessing, it did not maneuver with the refugee card. Regarding this matter, he referred to the Egyptian-Qatari communication to establish a relief conference related to the humanitarian repercussions resulting from the humanitarian crisis.

He stressed the importance of the stability of geographically neighboring countries for Egypt, which is one of the determinants Egyptian National Security, stressing the Egyptian interest in Sudan's stability and not prolonging the multiplicity of actors. Regarding the settlement, he pointed out the importance of not excluding the conflict that is worsening with Egypt from any settlement regarding Sudan, which is something that the Egyptian presence has proven in many regional files, as happened in Libya and Syria.

In response to the questions raised by Mr. Thomas Pivoli regarding the positions of neighboring African countries, and whether there is a possibility of future African mediation, Dr. Ahmed Amal explained a number of aspects of the African position, which were as follows:

He pointed out the escalation of violence again in Darfur, far from what is happening in Khartoum, which increases the complexity of the crisis, especially since the situation in Darfur is linked to the complexities of the scene and the escalation of violence in the eastern Sahel region after violence was growing in the western Sahel previously. The transformations in the conflict map also portend the complexity of the crisis.

With the roots of the crisis in Darfur not resolved, in addition to the unprepared withdrawal from the mission, The hybrid between the United Nations and the African Union, as well as regional linkages and the escalation of

Given the division between Arab and African tribes, along the Sahel countries, the situation in Darfur is likely to worsen.

Regarding the geographically neighboring countries, he pointed out the importance of the neighboring countries' involvement in any settlement, while ruling out the effectiveness of any future role that the African Union may play despite the importance of its presence, but due to the accumulation of historical experience, the neighboring countries have played historical roles that may qualify it to play the same role again.

On the other hand, Kenya, for example, played a role in reaching the 2005 Naivasha Agreement. As such, IGAD, along with neighboring non-member countries of the organization, may play a role in this agreement.

The command.

A number of experiencesProfessor Ahmed Aliba commented on the complexities of the field and military situation, and they set off

Previously, in regional conflicts, the army has control to some extent, but the way the Rapid Support Forces deal is guerrilla warfare, which is likely to lead to a blockage of the horizon of the crisis in Sudan, and there is a fear that the Rapid Support Forces will obtain drones. Also, the Sudanese army's call-up of reserve forces is a difficult indicator that the army has entered a cycle of exhaustion.

He pointed out the possibility that this is the first round of conflict, in a country that is considered one of the seven worst countries suffering from fragility, and if the conflict is fueled by regional countries, it will go from bad to worse. In summary, we find that the form...

The situation is likely to increase, as war, the nature of weapons, internal disintegration, and regional and international intervention will lead to the situation remaining as it is.

My brother Ara, Ambassador Mohamed Al-Naqli commented on the importance of the international community's reaction being more sensitive. This is especially true since UN envoys are keen to meet the standards and issue statements regardless of the facts on the ground. He pointed out the complexity of the humanitarian situation in Sudan, which confronts Egypt, Chad, and neighboring Sudanese countries with a great humanitarian challenge and responsibility.

Linking the multiplicity of actors on the ground to the complexity of the conflict, with the lack of political will for a solution, in light of the divergence and conflict of interests of the countries involved in the conflict, which is a matter that requires decisiveness and a real will from everyone.

Cairo summit of Sudan's neighboring countries and the search for a new mechanism to settle the conflict

Peace be upon Khalil.

Peace be upon Khalil

Published on 07/13/2023

sharing

In order to discuss the crisis in Sudan and find paths to settle the conflict, on July 13, 2023, Cairo will host a mini-summit that includes Sudan's neighboring countries: Libya, Chad, South Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Central Africa. Egypt wants the Cairo summit to open effective paths to end the current conflict between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Militia. Participants in the conference also discuss the negative repercussions and repercussions of the crisis on Sudan's neighboring countries, most notably the influx of displaced persons, the geostrategic and geographical dimensions of the crisis, its impact on neighboring countries, and its danger. On the expansion of the conflict to these countries, in addition to coordination and consultation with other regional and international tracks related to resolving the crisis in Sudan.

The importance of the meeting comes at a time when the situation is worsening in Sudan, as the conflict rages between the two sides of the crisis, leaving disastrous effects on the internal situation, in addition to its external effects.

It also comes at a time when settlement paths and initiatives, including regional and international mediations, have failed, as neither party to the conflict committed to the truce that was hoped to be a prelude to calming the situation and finding ways out of the crisis. The talks held in Jeddah resulted in:

In the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a series of ceasefire truces were constantly violated by both sides, which prompted Washington and Riyadh last month to suspend the talks and search for a more effective formula for negotiations. For his part, the military spokesman announced that the Sudanese army has restricted its participation in the talks, which is a worrying matter as the crisis is worsening, and there is no mechanism to contain it.

perhaps

Sudan's neighboring countries fear that the crisis is no longer internal as much as it has become linked to agendas. Regional and international efforts aiming to bring about geopolitical changes that may affect all of Sudan's neighboring countries, as the conflict opened the opportunity for Sudan to turn to competing agendas between regional and foreign powers.

Her interest came in finding paths to settlement. From this standpoint, she called Competing international, and hence

Atta Cairo seeks to build a unified position on the part of Sudan's neighboring countries, as they are the most confused

crisis, those most affected by it, and even the most affected by it. This unified position could pave the way for

The path towards finding a formula through which the crisis can be addressed.

The importance of the Cairo meeting appears to be that it embodies Egypt's active role in the Sudanese crisis, a role based on geographical and historical factors and close relations with Sudan and with all countries of the region, in addition to being a role completely devoid of trying to achieve political gains, which is a role

It is considered effective It paves the way for Egypt to play a prominent role in efforts to resolve the crisis. There is no doubt that Egypt, because it primarily aims to preserve the state important and influential roles and that their role can make a difference

Sudanese and support regional stability and security, away from the logic of employment and attempts to exploit the crisis in the interests of Sudan and its people and in the interest of the countries of the region, their peoples and their national security.

<<The final statement of the summit of Sudan's neighboring countries

Objectives of the Cairo Summit for Sudan's neighboring countries

One of the top priorities of the leaders in Cairo at the Sudan Neighborhood Summit is to find ways to end the war between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces, as well as examining the effects of the conflict on the neighbors.

Sudan, especially since the crisis directly casts a shadow over the security and stability of these countries.

via Nearly 700,000 took refuge in countries neighboring Sudan, and more than 250,000 crossed the border to Egypt, which was already inhabited before the crisis by a Sudanese community estimated at about 4 million, and most of the rest arrived in Chad, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic. It was previously reported on Sunday that Sudan On the verge of a day, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres warned of a large-scale civil war that could destabilize the entire region, which gives this...

The summit is especially important.

It will also seek to develop effective mechanisms to settle the issue peacefully in coordination with regional tracks

And other international ones. The path that will emerge from the Cairo Summit does not compete with other paths, whether those related to the Jeddah negotiations, or the efforts of the IGAD Organization, but it is complementary to all of them. Except that

It constitutes a more comprehensive and broad framework. It is not possible to imagine a crisis in Sudan like this

level without the participation of Egypt, which considers Sudan's security as part of its national security.

In addition, the two countries are also linked by social, cultural and economic ties dating back to centuries. For centuries, Egypt has also played a major historical role in all of Sudan's crises, and has contributed to...

Addressing many crises, and it has a large balance of soft power at the Sudanese level, whether among official or popular bodies.

It is likely that other issues will appear on the conference agenda, such as discussing the strategy of calm between the two sides of the conflict, as well as paving the way for a road map that will ultimately lead to a settlement.

A peaceful response to the crisis, discussing the potential repercussions of the state of instability in the region as a result of the ongoing war in Sudan, working to address the escalating tensions and then restoring stability in Sudan, discussing the disturbing escalation in social and ethnic violence, working to put an end to the seriousness of the deteriorating humanitarian conditions, and assisting Sudan. To overcome the internal challenges as a result of the currently ongoing fighting, and pave the way for a final end to the crisis, as well as focusing specifically on

My president called for an end to the fighting, the restoration of stability to the region, and an immediate cessation of hostilities, so as not to aggravate and prolong the conflict.

There is no doubt that Sudan's neighboring countries possess influential pressure cards on both sides of the conflict in Sudan, not only across the common borders, but also through the relations that bind those countries.

It is caught up in the crisis and receives various repercussions that threaten its security. With the parties to the conflict, it is also more confused. And its stability, and therefore its efforts can contribute to addressing the current crisis, setting a framework for action to avoid exacerbating the conflict, or engaging in it in a negative way, and crystallizing a single point of view towards the crisis in a way that helps in the settlement.

Therefore, there are challenges ahead of the summit, as the agendas of the countries participating in the summit conflict. There are deep disagreements between a number of participating countries, and their interests in the crisis differ, with both sides of the crisis at home. Therefore, it will be the responsibility of Cairo, which has different relationships, to go beyond its diplomacy. Effective efforts to address all these problems and challenges, and create a new, effective path Effective in dealing with the crisis.

A unified regional response: Sudan Neighborhood Summit

Nisreen Al-Sabahi

Nisreen Al-Sabahi

- Researcher at the African Studies Unit

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sharing

On July 13, 2023, the Egyptian capital, Cairo, hosted a summit of Sudan's neighboring countries, with the participation of the presidents of Libya, Chad, Central Africa, South Sudan, Eritrea, and the Ethiopian Prime Minister.

The summit of Sudan's neighboring countries comes as the Sudanese conflict approaches its fourth month since mid-April 2023, to discuss ways to end the crisis and contain the negative repercussions of the conflict on neighboring countries, stabilize the region as a whole, and settle the crisis by peaceful means with the participation of these countries concerned with resolving the crisis because they are directly affected by the fragments of the conflict, in order to Reaching the formulation of a joint vision to ensure the preservation of the capabilities and sovereignty of the

Sudanese state, in addition to coordination with other international and regional paths to resolve the crisis through a clear summit agenda with the qualitative presence of the seven neighboring countries, and

representation from the Arab League and th

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From this standpoint, Egypt's movements and efforts came to calm the situation in Sudan, establish a ceasefire, and preserve the capabilities of the Sudanese people, which have become evident since the outbreak of the crisis.

The Egyptian vision was a comprehensive and sustainable ceasefire, non-interference in Sudan, preserving the unity of Sudan's institutions and people, a political solution to the crisis, coordinating and unifying previous initiatives, and calling on relief agencies and donors to provide the necessary support to neighboring countries. Egypt was also keen to resolve the Sudanese crisis in several ways

Considerations, foremost among which are national security, the common historical ties between the two countries, and the importance of reuniting other Arab countries. The Egyptian role in resolving the crisis is similar to Egypt's interest in...

Urgent pressure to hold the summit

It is not in light of the lack of military resolution and the worsening situation that the Sudanese crisis entered a humanitarian turn, the deterioration of economic conditions, the fluidity of the security scene, the tribal dimension mixed with the armed conflict and its expansion, and the escalation of the intensity of tribal violence in the Darfur region, which constituted repercussions. dangerous for immediate neighboring countries, including the multiplier effect of humanitarian crises, and the escalation

Refugee flows, and the aggravation of security crises, with an increase in regional anxiety, a state of security alert, and cautious anticipation of the consequences of the conflict, in light of the breach of successive truces by both sides of the complex paths of the crisis. Therefore, the summit is being held to find an urgent peace settlement and put an end to the conflict and put an end to the negative effects of the crisis, for a number of considerations:

- Exacerbation of security crises: There were fears about the spread of the phenomenon of tribal conflicts in Darfur, fears of the spread of cross-border weapons, the movements of armed groups, and irregular migration to neighboring countries, in light of the decrease in the security presence in the border areas, as terrorist groups operate in these incubator environments, and will lead to New weapons lead to a deterioration in the security situation in the region as a whole, an increase in smuggling fees, an expansion of the illicit arms trade, and security liquidity risks to the stability of regional security.

Cross-border refugee flows: Since the beginning of the Sudanese crisis, the number of refugees has increased, and the three neighboring countries were the most prominent in containing refugees (Egypt, Chad, and South Sudan), respectively, then Ethiopia and Central Africa, in light of these countries suffering from crises.

Exacerbating political, economic and social conditions and difficult humanitarian conditions, the Sudanese conflict increases the burden of these crises, as Sudan is considered a focal point in its turbulent geographical location, the arc of crises extending into the countries of South Sudan, Central Africa, and Chad, specifically with Ethiopia.

- Cross-border economic repercussions: South Sudan is considered the most affected by the repercussions

The negative impact of the conflict is that its economy is linked to the oil refineries in the port of Port Sudan, and the obstruction of logistical and transportation links between the oil fields and the port of Port Sudan, and the negative impact on oil revenues that

It constitutes almost the only resource for Juba. In addition, the economies of other landlocked countries, such as Ethiopia, Chad, and Central Africa, which depend primarily on Sudan's ports overlooking the Red Sea, are affected, which has resulted in an unprecedented rise in the prices of food commodities and materials.

primary, obstructing cross-border trade, and exacerbating hunger and food crises in these countries.

<<The final statement of the summit of Sudan's neighboring countries

Determinants of the influence of neighboring countries in settling the Sudanese crisis

Many countries and regional and international organizations have presented initiatives to communicate with both sides of the Sudanese conflict, as

the African Union put forward its initiative, as well as the IGAD organization, as well as

Initiatives from African countries, bilaterally, such as Egypt, South Sudan, and Chad, to achieve a ceasefire and address the humanitarian situation with a comprehensive vision, and offer to play a bilateral mediation role. In addition to the Saudi-American initiative, the Jeddah Agreement on the Protection of Civilians, and the Quartet Initiative led by the IGAD organization. However, these initiatives did not achieve silencing the guns, or achieving a sustainable ceasefire.

The multiplicity of competing initiatives has caused confusion about how to persuade the warring parties to negotiate, as neighboring countries' positions on the crisis differed in terms of anticipation and cautious responses. The summit of neighboring countries comes as a serious attempt to reduce the area of difference in visions between Sudan's neighboring countries, reach consensual solutions, and coordinate and unify all previous initiatives and efforts in order to formulate a comprehensive common vision for resolving the crisis. The summit also succeeded, by involving all of Sudan's neighboring countries without exception, in increasing pressure on both sides of the conflict, which may help them return to the negotiating table again, and working to reduce the severity of the deterioration of the security and humanitarian conditions in Sudan, and providing support and conducting humanitarian efforts to contain the flows of refugees and those affected by the scourges of the conflict. Conflict, and agreeing on effective settlement mechanisms with the participation of all parties.

The Cairo summit of Sudan's neighboring countries revealed that the neighboring countries possess the ability and desire to resolve the Sudanese crisis, given the intertwining interests and common challenges, specifically the repercussions of refugees, in light of the mutual negative effects of the conflict on these countries as a result of the intertwining of interests and common challenges.

Extended tribal, economic and social relations, and the inability to bear the cost of the Sudanese conflict.

Accordingly, the determinants of neighboring countries are to block the expansion of internal conflict and attempt Reaching solutions to end the crisis through three paths: the military path with a permanent ceasefire and a return to normal life, the political path that works to greatly calm the situation and stability, and the humanitarian and relief path in light of the worsening severity of the humanitarian crisis in the capital, Khartoum, and the states of the Darfur region. In particular.

As a result of the above, it can be said that the intertwining and complexity of regional interests imposed on the neighboring countries the necessity of unifying their common vision, as reflected in the Cairo summit, which also emphasized the relations of all neighboring countries, and the extension of their role in preserving the security and stability of the neighboring countries that all Egypt is close to and the region in general by proposing a vision A comprehensive regional solution to resolve the crisis in cooperation with regional and international parties and partners.

Exacerbation of the conflict: Prospects for settling the Sudanese crisis after entering its fourth month

Peace be upon Khalil.

Peace be upon Khalil

Published on 07/18/2023

sharing

In light of the continuing military conflict between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Militia, and the resulting significant deterioration in the humanitarian situation and internal and external displacement, in the event that the parties do not reach a rapid settlement of the conflict; Its cost will increase and may eventually lead to international intervention. This situation poses legitimate questions, the first of which is: What is the impact of the conflict on the future of Sudan? Second: What is the extent of the possibilities of external intervention in Sudan?

The war between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces has entered the fourth month with no end in sight in Sudan, and the fighting is largely concentrated around the capital, Khartoum, with some areas in the states of North, West, and South Darfur, at a time when all truces have failed to be implemented since the beginning of the crisis, and in light of the deteriorating situation Humanitarian aid, especially in Khartoum and some states of Darfur. The daily escalating military conflicts in Sudan have exacerbated the situation

This is already deteriorating, and may lead to the expansion of conflicts of an ethnic and tribal nature in light of a state suffering from a state of non-integration and the national state project since the 1950s.

Indicators of the armed conflict of the crisis in Sudan confirm the possibility of it spreading to neighboring countries, in the event that there are no signs of a decline in the fighting and an end to the ongoing battles between the warring parties, especially in light of the parties resorting to violence and forceful change to resolve the conflict, which leads to complex situations that may devastate... With the unity of the Sudanese state.

The circle of parties participating in the conflict also expanded, after forces affiliated with the armed movements that signed the Juba Peace Agreement clashed with the Rapid Support militia west of the city of El Obeid.

The capital of North Kordofan State at the beginning of July. The joint force included:

The Justice and Equality Movement, the Sudan Liberation Army, the Sudan Liberation Forces Rally, and the

^{Fah}Sudanese Alliance, which sought to secure North Darfur state in the wake of the security vacuum that created
Withdrawal of the army to Khartoum, in addition to ensuring the transfer of humanitarian aid to all states of Darfur.

Earlier, the Rapid Support Militia had been seeking, since the beginning of the war, to control the strategic city of El-Obeid, which connects all five states of Darfur and the other states of Kordofan. Fierce battles took place with the army to control El-Obeid Airport, but the militia's attempts failed. This attempt coincided with an attack launched by the SPLM-N, led by Abdel Aziz Al-Hilu, on military sites of the Sudanese army, in Blue Nile State, which raises international fears of the expansion of military conflicts into South Sudan and Ethiopia.

<<The relief and humanitarian dimension at the summit of Sudan's neighboring countries

Future effects of the continuation of the conflict

The war in Sudan imposed a new reality and changed many political and military equations.

Economically, socially, and any solutions will require new solutions and a consensual vision to confront with The requirements for reconstruction, and achieving the stability required to get the state out of its crisis, especially the fact that the war is concentrated in the capital and not in the peripheries, as was the case in Sudan's previous conflicts.

Attempting to jump on the new reality created by the war will lead Sudan into another cycle of instability and wars, and make it vulnerable to the plans of those who covet its lands and natural resources, as well as projects to divide it or open the way for foreign military intervention in the country.

Sudanese territory, which not only means the continuation of conflict and instability, but may also open the door to the possibility of terrorism expanding into Sudan, and there are many examples from Libya, Nigeria, Mozambique, Somalia, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq.

Thus, the repercussions of the continuation of the conflict on the future of the Sudanese state are extremely dangerous, as a result of the presence of a fragile security environment, in addition to cross-border ethnicities, and the escalation of the situation in the capital. Khartoum and the main cities of the Darfur region, such as: El Geneina, Zalingei, and Nyala, in addition to important areas, most notably the "Um Dafouk" land port linking Sudan and the Central African Republic, Rahid Al-Bardi and Manwashi in South Darfur State, and Kutum, Tawila, and El Fasher in North Darfur State.

The horizon of regional attempts to contain the conflict

The outcomes of the Cairo summit of Sudan's neighboring countries, which was held on July 13, confirmed their keenness to address the roots of the crisis, reach a comprehensive political solution, and stop hostilities between the two sides of the conflict in Sudan. It also proposed the formation of a joint mechanism and a regional action plan aimed at...

To redouble efforts to resolve the ongoing conflict in Sudan, by forming a ministerial mechanism composed of foreign ministers of neighboring Sudanese countries to coordinate joint efforts to resolve the conflict. All neighboring countries participated, led by the host country Egypt, the Central African Republic, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya, South Sudan, the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, Ahmed Aboul Gheit, and the Chairman of the African Union Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat.

The participating countries also agreed on the principles of full respect for Sudan's sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, considering the current conflict as an internal Sudanese matter, and the necessity of non-external interference in the conflict. Crisis. The document recognized the urgent need for a political solution to stop the ongoing conflict, and to launch a comprehensive national dialogue between the Sudanese parties.

With the expansion of the scope of the conflict in Sudan, and its high material and humanitarian costs, there is still an opportunity to stop these losses, for the external powers concerned with Sudan to put aside their own agendas in order to adopt an agenda that pushes towards regional stability, through integrating efforts and working to build a consensual response that addresses the Sudanese crisis. From its roots.

Breaking isolation: The Sudanese scene after "Al-Burhan" tours and the "Hemedti" initiative

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For the first time since the outbreak of the conflict between the armed forces and the Rapid Support Forces on April 15, the head of the Sovereign Council, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, left the capital, Khartoum, to conduct a field tour, which had a political and diplomatic nature, and some considered it a deal that may

It paves the way for stopping the war, especially in light of the diplomatic movement of civil forces that preceded it. Regional and international, seeking mediation between the two sides of the war; Especially since he will continue his tour

He is in Sudan on a regional tour, his first outside the country since the outbreak of the conflict.

This move coincided with the Rapid Support Commander "Hemedti" coming out with a publishing initiative, the text of which was posted on social media, expressing his position on the conditions and the form of the political settlement that could lead to him stopping continuing the fighting, at a time when battles are continuing between the two parties in the three cities of the capital. , especially in southern Khartoum and Omdurman, which intensified early on August, with clashes continuing on other open fronts in Kordofan and Darfur; Which in turn raises the question about the possibility of these movements creating any breakthrough in the field scene, or opening the way for both sides of the conflict to sit at the dialogue table?

Breaking isolation

After being stationed at the General Command headquarters in Khartoum over the past months, Al-Burhan appeared for the first time outside the capital, where he inspected the military bases and installations, in Omdurman, amid the fighting that had been taking place there for weeks. He left on Thursday, August 24, for the city of Atbara in the Nile River State to the north, where he met with military leaders and inspected the war-wounded inside a hospital

Military, and visited the artillery. During his speech among the soldiers, Al-Burhan denied any talk of an agreement, or a deal according to which he left Khartoum, stressing that the fighting would continue until the end to confront the remnants and defeat the rebellion, especially since they did not start the war, which gives them the right to defend the country.

Till the end. He indicated that his departure was with the participation of air, land, and naval forces.

It was not a foreign deal, as his departure from the General Command headquarters witnessed fierce fighting that led to it

Due to the death of two martyrs from the naval forces.

He headed to eastern Sudan, where he addressed the forces of the Red Sea region at the Flamingo base

Navy, on Monday, August 28, followed the efforts made by the region's forces to secure Sudan's maritime borders and all regions of the Red Sea, and stressed once again that no action would be taken.

An agreement with the Rapid Support, and that the armed forces will not put their hands in the hands of the rebels, and that they They will focus their efforts on decisiveness and ending the rebellion. This speech came in response to the initiative presented by

Hemedti the day before his presence in Port Sudan. And coinciding with his presence in From the President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir, he confirmed his defect via telephone Port Sudan Al-Burhan received a call for commitment to initiatives aimed at ending the ongoing conflict in the country.

Some view the current scene as a starting point for reviving efforts aimed at holding direct talks between the two sides of the conflict,

About solutions and that it is an indication of Al-Burhan's move, in search of...

Diplomacy, and that it is an expression of political openness, may pave the way for the two parties to accept sitting at the dialogue table, especially since Al-Burhan's internal movements were followed by his only foreign visit since the start of the war, where he visited Egypt on August 29 for one day, after which he returned to Sudan. This August comes, based on

The movements after the meetings of the foreign ministers of neighboring countries in Chad in 7 outcomes of the first summit hosted by Cairo last July 13, which may indicate that Egypt and South Sudan will continue further efforts, in communicating with both sides of the conflict.

Imposing conditions

Sunday, August 27, these movements coincided with the exit of Hemedti, with an initiative on the day of the Rapid Support's position on the comprehensive solution in Sudan, and its vision of building a Sudanese state on new foundations, as he made clear that the asymmetric federal system, in which the nature and type of

The powers enjoyed by the constituent units of the federal union is the most appropriate form of government for Sudan. He called for building a Sudan based on social justice, tolerance, and peace, and for the state to stop practicing violence against its people, especially on the margins, as he considered that the ongoing war

In the country, it is a manifestation of the state crisis that must stop, in order to establish a democratic, civil system of government based on fair and free elections, with the involvement of a larger and broader base.

Possible political and social efforts from political parties, civil society organizations, women and youth, and the necessity of establishing and building a new, professional and national Sudanese army from the current multiple armies.

These issues that Hemedti set out to negotiate with the parties to the war can be summarized in: the issue of establishing a national professional army, the transitional period and transitional civil rule, comprehensive, just and sustainable peace, transitional justice, the federal system, its structures, levels, and powers to divide resources, with the importance of participating in The negotiations included the forces marginalized by the Bashir regime in the center, as well as the resistance committees, youth, and women.

On the other hand, there was a similar initiative issued on August 15, issued by Malik Aqar, Vice President of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council, outlining the scene, and a road map that begins with the time of opening fire, and identifying rapid support assembly sites, in preparation for implementing security arrangements, as well as calling on the United Nations to change... The UN envoy, and that elections are the only way, Which reduces the scope for conflict in visions between the two parties, with regard to the terms of the settlement and the ceasefire, as the Rapid Support imposes its political vision for the future of the country, as a previous step, and a condition for the ceasefire, and it also presents it assuming its right to shape the features of the future, even if all the visions are The issue at hand was previously addressed by the Juba Peace Agreement, which failed to establish peace, justice, and development in the country, at a time when the military establishment views the Rapid Support Forces as rebels, and that the final decision, and their inclusion under the banner of the General Command of the Armed Forces according to its terms, is the logic. Ruler of its movements.

A ruling

context: These movements by the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces come against the backdrop of complex situations taking place in Sudan, the most prominent indicators of which are the continuation of battles between the two parties throughout the month of August in the three cities of Khartoum and Omdurman, where fighting renewed in the vicinity of the armored forces camp in South of Khartoum, where the Rapid Support launched attacks over the course of a week on the vicinity of the Armored Corps, and violent clashes took place between the two forces in the neighborhoods of Jabra, Al-Ashra, Al-Lamb, and Gaza, which are areas surrounding the Armored Corps.

The city of Omdurman and the old neighborhoods of Omdurman, as well as Umm Baddah, west of Omdurman, also witnessed, where army artillery continued to bomb the Rapid Support sites in Omdurman to cut off the supplies that reach the Rapid Support via the Shambat Bridge.

Army warplanes also targeted sites of the Rapid Support Forces in the vicinity of Khartoum International Airport, and the General Command of the Armed Forces east of the capital. Air strikes also targeted sites in the neighborhoods of Riyadh, Burri, Garden City, and the areas north of Khartoum Bahri, and the Rapid Support air strikes continued in southern Khartoum. And in the vicinity of the sports city, the camp grounds, and the Kalakla area, south of Khartoum. In parallel with the ongoing battles in the Sudanese capital, the army repelled an attack by the Rapid Support Forces on the Zarqa Um field.

Oil iron, West Kordofan State.

These battles continue despite international calls for a ceasefire, due to the deteriorating situation Humanitarian conflict, as continuous battles over five months resulted in the deaths of 5,000 people, and more than 4.6 million people fled their homes. In light of this suffering, August criticized both sides of the conflict, saying to the American ambassador to Sudan, John Godfrey, on Friday the 25th, that they were not worthy of ruling, which angered the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

There are warnings and reports from relief organizations and agencies about the deteriorating humanitarian conditions in the country, as UNICEF announced on August 4 that 24 million people are in need of food, but only 2.5 million of them have received aid due to fighting, lack of funding, and difficulty entering and avoiding threats related to the spread of epidemics. This is in addition to those working in the humanitarian field. And famines, which imposes the inevitability of humanitarian aid and a ceasefire.

In conclusion, the recent movements provide initial indications of the possibility of paving the way for a possible settlement To the conflict in Sudan, if there is consensus on it, between the internal and regional parties, but this poses difficulties. The situation does not mean the end of the sharp difference in positions between the two sides regarding regional mechanisms and mediation efforts to stop the conflict and build a stable peace in Sudan.

A possible ending.. How did the conflict between "Burhan" and "Hemedti" begin?

The British historian Peter Woodward could not find a better title for his book on the history of Sudan

"The turbulent state," to describe Sudan's tumultuous history after independence from British colonialism in the mid-twentieth century, as that history witnessed successive rounds of political conflicts, revolutions, and coups, equal to, if not greater than, what happened to its neighbors combined.

Due to the nature of the political history of Sudan, where The title "Troubled State" did not come out of nowhere, in theory

Since national independence, Sudanese society has witnessed sharp politicization all the time. Its trade unions and federations

Its schools, religious institutions, and even the military institution were no exception to this. It was transferred

Since independence, Sudan has changed between several different forms of government and authority, divided into three periods

of civil rule, and three periods of coups and military rule. However, military coups in Sudan differ from coups in other countries,

as the coup officers seek to achieve what their civilian counterparts failed to achieve. Or vice versa, when politicians fail to

manage civilian rule, their opponents resort to their military allies to achieve their political goals.

The December 2018 uprising, which removed President Al-Bashir and the Salvation Front from power, who ruled the country for about three decades, was an episode in Sudan's political history, and began a transitional phase in which the military and

civilians shared power, as a result of the August 2019 agreement, until elections were held. This arrangement was disrupted

after The events of October 25, 2021 and the military's monopolization of power, which caused a series of mass protests

demanding democracy in Sudan. The Sudanese army received internal support from rebel factions that benefited from

the peace agreement in 2020. Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), the leader of the Rapid Support Militia, supported

the transition plan, as Al-Burhan appeared on television to announce the removal of civilians from power, and Hemedti

supported those measures. Al-Burhan rewarded him by appointing him as deputy.

He was in the Sovereignty Council, but the military could not

The conflict appears between the two men, maintaining their cohesion after monopolizing power, and something that reached

Hemedti's description of the military's monopolization of power, which he supported on October 25, 2021, until then.

led to the clashes that began on April 15 and are still ongoing , That it was a mistake

In the capital Khartoum, between the Sudanese army forces led by Al-Burhan and the Rapid Support Forces led by Hemedti.

This paper attempts to answer the following question: What are the causes of the conflict in Sudan, and how does it end?

Reasons for succession:

Al-Burhan and Hemedti...the roots of the dispute between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces

Disagreements have existed since the era of Al-Bashir between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces, which were formed in 2013 to eliminate the rebellion in Darfur. After the overthrow of Al-Bashir in 2019, the military and civilians fought over power until the military took control of it after the events of October 25, 2021. Then the conflict began between the two men, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, who was the commander of the ground forces during the era of Al-Bashir and became a commander for the regular army, and Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), who He founded the Rapid Support Forces, relying on the Janjaweed militias that fought a bloody war in Darfur supports the Sudanese army. The reasons for the disagreement between the two generals can be summarized as follows:

Political aspirations:

Many experts in Sudanese affairs believe that the differences between "Burhan" and "Hemedti" are essentially the result of their political aspirations, and the agreement that was signed last December, which included civilian parties, came as a first step in a political process aimed at ending the crisis caused by and sought to procrastinate, while Hemedti sought to improve his ability Lieutenant General Al-Burhan approached the agreement as a coup tactic, Competitiveness and went so far as to describe himself as an ally of freedom and change, and denied the existence of any disagreements with those in power (those who cling to it), and against anyone with the army. He said that our caliphate, in and the army leadership denounced those statements and accusations directed at it of not Al-Burhan wants to become a dictator, wanting to complete the democratic transition process and said that they were public attempts to gain political sympathy and obstruct the democratic transition process, and before that

To nominate Hemedti has worked for a long time to improve his image on the international stage, in preparation

He chose himself for the presidency of Sudan, in light of intense competition with General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, as he resided in El Geneina, the capital of the West Darfur region, and received the imam of the Drancy suburb in Paris, Hassan Shaljoumi, a French citizen of Tunisian origin, and a violent critic of religious extremism, and also

A strong defender of the Abraham Accords, which resulted in the normalization of Israeli relations with the Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan under the auspices of US President Donald Trump, and Chaljoumi enjoys the support of French President Emmanuel Macron, and thus Hemedti sends hidden messages to Paris and other European capitals that he does not support the return of Islamists and the Islamism that prevailed. During the era of President Al-Bashir during the period from 1989 until 2019

Hemedti used the services of the French public relations agency "Instores" in parallel to try to facilitate interviews with the French media to improve his image internationally, and for a short period.

In 2019, Hemedti sought help from the Canadian company Dickens & Madison and its Canadian-Israeli director, Ari Ben Menash, to make his voice heard in Washington, D.C. In Khartoum, engineer Idris Mudallal from the Rapid Support Forces managed Hemedti's media relations.

Since 2019, Hemedti has sought to show himself as a man of the periphery, confronting the generals of the center and north who dominate the Sudanese leadership, led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and he reinforced that message with his long stay, which lasted fifty days, in El Geneina, the capital.

The West Darfur region, and his mediation during that period between Bedouin communities during the rainy season, during which bloody clashes increase. He actually returned to Khartoum after reaching four reconciliation agreements between the various opposition groups. Indeed, his marriage to a woman from a Sudanese tribe and in Sinai was part of Al-Ababda. Living on both sides of the from Egyptian border, this is his strategy to demonstrate his local legitimacy, unlike the Khartoum generals.

To get closer to Sudanese youth and the local community, he was always visible

Hemedti followed this approach

Wearing a white turban on the Tik Tok platform, which is most popular among young people, and Shin Hemedti

A media campaign was launched against rivals in the Sudanese army, and he chose the British BBC network in August 2022 to publicly criticize Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. He even went so far as to declare that the October 25 coup was a failure, and that without his support, al-Burhan would not have been able to remove civilians from the country.

Power is so easy.

Integrating the Rapid Support Militia into the army:

Sudanese Army: The field commander of the Rapid Support was injured - Al-Osboa

In the framework agreement signed on December 5th, the negotiators of the civil political group set provisions Related to the integration of the Rapid Support Militia into the armed forces, but it is not It includes details or plans regarding the establishment of a unified army. The meeting of the Army Command Board held last January ended with the necessity of integrating the Rapid Support Forces into the armed forces, which was met with hesitation from the Rapid Support Command, despite Hemedti signing the agreement, and even becoming one of the strongest Supporters of developing this agreement to become final, to form a civilian government, and the military's withdrawal from power, but the army's demand to support the Rapid Support Militia in the army was disrupted by the end of the transitional period, while Hemedti believes that the merger should take place in ten years, which only turned the negotiations into tensions between Both parties.

External files:

Sudan and Russia agree on several matters, including regarding the "Renaissance Dam" | Step News Agency

The triangulation of the foreign relations file, especially relations between Sudan, Israel and Russia, in addition to relations with neighboring countries, is one of the most important points of disagreement between the two generals, as the army accuses Hemedti of working to establish diplomatic relations parallel to the state through his visits to the countries that Al-Burhan visits, which gives the impression of the existence of two leaders. For the country, many sources reported that With Tel Aviv, where Hemedti seeks to open channels Regarding the relationship, there was There is a rivalry contact between the two men with the Mossad, which prompted Al-Burhan and Hamdok to protest to the Israeli side, with Israel to retired Major General Mubarak Abdullah Babiker in April 2022, and Al-Burhan decided to hand over the relations file it was between the in April 2022 to unify communication channels between the two countries. As for relations with Russia, two men on the grounds that it affects Khartoum's relationship with Washington, where he traveled. A succession broke out

Hemedti came to Russia on the eve of the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war in February 2022 and met

President Putin, and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, which angered the American side in Khartoum, where the Charge d'Affaires of the American Embassy, Lucy Tamlin, held a meeting with Al-Burhan and a number of members of the military component, and inquired about the reason for Hemedti's visit to Moscow, and Al-Burhan replied that Hemedti visited Moscow in his capacity as the support For president commander. Fast and not as a representative council of state.

The framework agreement and relations with neighboring countries:

The agreement, which was signed on December 5 of last year, is seen as the main reason for the explosion of the situation between the two generals, as despite their agreement to the text of the agreement that includes the withdrawal of the military institution from power, their statements after the signing revealed some of the crisis.

Hemedti announced his full support for the agreement as a way out of the divergence of visions between them, as it was caused by the failed coup, as he described it, and that the agreement was one package that must be implemented as a whole without division in a clear courtship of the forces of freedom and change, while Al-Burhan saw the need to include others, and this quickly changed. parties to the disagreement is based on the terms and conditions. The agreement between the

with neighboring countries, as Hemedti It is also one of the sources of disagreement between the two men, represented by relations manages economic and investment partnerships with a number of neighboring countries, especially Ethiopia and Central Africa. Sources indicate that Hemedti refused to have his forces participate in the military operations launched by the Sudanese army against a number of Ethiopian armed groups in mid-2021.

Al-Burhan and Hemedti have different views regarding the countries neighboring western Sudan, especially Chad and Central Africa, given that they are located in the sphere of international influence between Russia and the West. Previously, Hemedti indicated the presence of Sudanese forces trying to change the regime in Central Africa. Al-Burhan quickly denied this, stressing that Khartoum does not send militias to destabilize security and stability in neighboring countries. Hemedti also refused to deploy the Rapid Support militia on the border with Central Africa, which he praised. The President of the Transitional Council in Chad.

Future of conflict:

Because the Sudanese army has greater capabilities and experience than the Rapid Support Forces, it is expected that... Look
For a number of reasons, the Sudanese army resolves this conflict in a short period of time, including:

The combat and weapons capabilities possessed by the Sudanese army, which exceed the capabilities of the Rapid Support
Forces.

What occupies this is the international and regional community's unwillingness to erupt in a long conflict in Sudan, with its strategic
location, in light of its preoccupation with the Russian-Ukrainian war.

The Wagner forces, the main supporter of the Rapid Support Militia, are busy in the Russian-Ukrainian war, as well as Syria.

The position of the Gulf states, the main supporters of the parties to the conflict, rejecting the outbreak of a conflict that
threatens stability in Sudan in light of their huge economic investments in Sudan.

Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan issued a decision to dissolve the Rapid Support Militia, making it lose the legitimacy it
coveted.

In conclusion, the crisis in Sudan has completed its cycles so that it will not be resolved, after the conflict between...
Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, Chairman of the Sovereignty Council and Commander of the Army, and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo,
known as Hemedti, commander of the Rapid Support Militia, after days of war of statements between them, and the war began
with words, as Sudan witnessed on Saturday, the fifteenth of April, widespread armed clashes, especially in Khartoum,
While the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces exchanged accusations of attacking the headquarters of the other
party, amid local, regional and international calls to stop the fighting. In a conflict that analysts agree is a conflict between the
political ambitions of the two generals after the end of the transitional phase.

Tension under control in Sudan: Are there differences between Al-Burhan and Hemedti? Muhammad Abdel

Karim Muhammad Abdel

Karim

Sudan has achieved important steps in the current transitional phase, even if it did not live up to previous expectations months ago.

Despite the signs of popular unrest that Sudan is currently witnessing in mid-June

Against the backdrop of the painful economic solutions that the government of Abdullah Hamdok is resorting to, and recently hinted at retreating from some of them, the overall picture suggests a deepening of Sudan's steps towards the end of the current transitional phase and the ability, with remarkable smoothness, to overcome many obstacles except - with a high probability - to

the "deferred" settlement. issues at this stage. And so

Despite what appears to be two paths of hidden competition regarding the perceptions of the Chairman of the Sovereignty Council, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and his deputy, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo "Hemedti," of the outcomes of this settlement, at the heart of which is the institutional development of the Sudanese Armed Forces, the position of the "Rapid Support Forces" led by Dagalo, and their future roles in the post-stage period. Transitional Council, especially since Article 34 of Chapter 11 of the Constitutional Document (August 2019) stipulates that "the Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces are a national military institution that protects the unity and sovereignty of the nation, reporting to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and subject to sovereign authority."

In a text that faces, from its inception, many challenges and a veiled refusal by Dagalo to "hand over" his forces to the military establishment, and what this means in terms of dismantling the personalization of the idea of support forces and integrating them into the process of institutional transformation that the Sudanese Armed Forces are witnessing.

What are the most important roles of Al-Burhan and Hemedti in the current transitional phase in Sudan?

Sudan faces the complexities of the current transitional phase on more than one level. Under the leadership of Al-Burhan and Hemedti, Khartoum succeeded in overcoming some serious crises, such as the deterioration of the political and social conditions in the Darfur region, by accepting the nomination of the Darfuri armed groups to appoint the leader Minni Minnawi (leader of the Sudan Liberation Army) as governor of the region according to a decree.

Issued last April 29 (in accordance with the outcomes of the Juba Peace Agreement in Sudan), which represented a work program of the transitional government scheduled for February 28, 2021, deepening of the

Based on five priorities:

Social and economic issues (particularly women's empowerment and the provision of basic services; And peace; security, and strengthening Sudan's international relations; And the democratic transition. However, the path of democratic transition

The formation of the Sudanese Legislative Council (which faces the crisis of missing the previously set date (ARA was scheduled to no later than February 25, 2021), and the transitional government postponed officially implementing the "federal system of government" in Sudan until the conference on its implementation was held at the appropriate time, and in anticipation of the outcomes of a new round of negotiations between the government and the People's Liberation Movement. Sudan, led by Abdel Aziz Al-Hilu, was scheduled for the end of May and extended into this June without the desired results

yet.

The roles of Al-Burhan and Hemedti in Sudan's foreign policy were surprisingly prominent, and perhaps beyond the assumption of joint coordination between them, as Sudan, in light of a noticeable rapprochement with Cairo since the beginning of this year, has maintained a foreign policy consistent with its historical role as a country with Ethiopia, and the border crisis in Arab countries is important. And adopting decisive positions regarding the files related to the Sudanese Fashaga region and the Renaissance Dam.

Sudan also strengthened its military, political, and economic ties with Egypt, which in turn was keen to strengthen its ties with Al-Burhan and treat him as president of the republic. While Sudan, through Hemedti, played an important role in the process of stabilizing matters in neighboring Chad following the killing of President

Yep, and Hemedti made diplomatic efforts to explore the restoration of former Chadian warmth to Sudanese-Turkish relations (this June), in what some Sudanese analyzes considered indicators of Hemedti's leadership a new "game of axes," even if in reality these analyzes ignored the subsequent change in regional relations since the weeks prior to Hemedti's visit to Ankara makes the idea of an interlocutor in its traditional sense completely diminish.

In general, Sudan, led by the Sovereignty Council and its leaders, Al-Burhan and his deputy, Hemedti, and with the support of the government of Prime Minister Abdullah Hamdok, whose performance appears to be closer to a caretaker government, is moving with clear determination towards ending the transitional phase with the least possible losses, and with great reliance on the roles of Al-Burhan and Hemedti.

How do Al-Burhan and Hemedti support the political track?

The political path of the transitional phase represents the general framework that aims to crystallize the shape of the Sudanese state after the end of this phase, as the Sovereignty Council has taken several important steps. In mid-last March - during the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement - the Sovereign Council formed what was known as the "Supreme National Committee to follow up and monitor the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement," headed by "Hemedti," in addition to four subcommittees to follow up on four of the five tracks of the peace agreement and postpone the formation of the track of the relevant committee. The eastern track until the outstanding political issues are settled, especially those related to representation and reconciliation.

In accordance with these agreements, and after the Sudan Liberation Movement faction led by Mustafa Nasr al-Din Tambur signed the Juba Agreement on March 25, the transitional government began to define gathering areas for armed groups in anticipation of the installation of ceasefire monitoring mechanisms in the region.

Darfur, and the launch of the path to "unify the Sudanese army." The renewed violence since the end of March - early April 2021 in El Geneina, in the west of the region, was accompanied by the "Sudanese Defense and Security Council" announcing the acceleration of plans to form the "Joint Protection Forces for Darfur," with a strength of up to 20,000 individuals.

Accusations against members escalate The Sovereignty Council itself witnessed a striking accusation in mid-May of involvement in the killing of demonstrators during the protests against deposed President Omar al-Bashir. These accusations were renewed after the killing of two demonstrators in commemoration of the "2019 uprising." Musa, a member of the Sovereignty Council, on May 12; Daglo took the initiative, and Aisha resigned on May 17, by announcing that the Council had accepted the resignation of Attorney General Taj Al-Sir Al-Habre, and the dismissal of the Speaker.

The judiciary is Nemat Abdullah Khair, as Dagalo took the step while Al-Burhan was at the Paris conference to support Sudan, which at the time indicated the truth of the "hidden" dispute between the two leaders.

While the transitional government and the concerned parties continue to achieve peace in the country, an important report issued by Volker Perthes Volker, Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and Head of the United Nations Integrated Mission to Support the Transitional Phase in Sudan (UNITAMS), on the United Nations Security Council (last May 20), noted that the delay in the formation of the main parliamentary bodies and the continuation of tribal conflicts and "violence against women and girls" threaten the stability of the country and the civilian population during the transitional phase, anticipating positive changes in the transitional phase.

transitional period in the second half of this year.

The economic and political steps show that important breakthroughs have been achieved in the transitional phase, although it is expected that the government will accelerate decisive steps towards establishing councils.

Parliament, which in turn will contribute to settling many outstanding problems such as the form of the state and its relationship to religion (since Dagalo is managing this file within the negotiations of the Juba peace agreement with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement North led by Abdel Aziz al-Hilu, and he and Burhan adopt a position of postponing This issue is pending the establishment of legislative institutions, the status of the army, and the activation of the federal system Resolution and other issues are still subject to popular approval through parliamentary institutions.

Al-Burhan, Hemedti, and the "unification" file of the Sudanese Armed Forces

The most prominent issue due to differences in viewpoints between Al-Burhan and Hemedti is the "unification" of the military institution, which is an intertwined and extremely complex file at the internal, regional and international levels. It is strongly linked to the path of the peace agreement in Juba, the components of the former military opposition and the mechanisms for integrating them into the armed forces. It is also linked on another level to the position of the "Rapid Support Forces" led by Dagalo, as well as to a regional presence represented by Egypt playing a prominent role in supporting Sudan economically, politically and militarily. Egypt stresses the necessity of providing a regional environment Suitable for the stability of Sudan because its security and stability are an integral part of the security and stability of Egypt

And the entire region.

With the arrival of relatively large Egyptian forces at the beginning of last May 21, to participate in joint Egyptian-Sudanese military exercises in Khartoum and its surroundings entitled "Protectors of the Nile," aiming to "exchange military experiences, enhance cooperation, and unify working methods to confront the expected threats to the two countries." Which leads to the conclusion that the process of rebuilding the capabilities of the Sudanese army will take place almost entirely through Egyptian military experience, which has good mutual knowledge with the Sudanese Armed Forces, as well as raising expectations of Egypt's support for Sudan in any confrontations with the Abiy Ahmed regime in Ethiopia.

Read also: Arming, training, construction... How did the Egyptian Navy prepare to defend its interests?

Egypt?

As for the core of the relations between Al-Burhan and Hemedti, the issue of merging the Rapid Support Forces represents the most prominent issue of disagreement between them, as Hemedti confirmed before mid-June of this year his rejection of the idea of merging, considering it a large force and difficult to integrate because that "could disintegrate the country." And he went on A frank conflict over power before the end Hamidati takes deeper steps, and perhaps it will come later The transitional phase and resolving its outstanding files.

As head of the Supreme National Committee to follow up on the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement (June 17), he issued a number of decisions to "resolve security chaos" in the capital and the states and impose the prestige of the state, most notably the formation of a joint force consisting of "the armed forces, the rapid support forces, and the police forces." And the General Intelligence Service," in addition to a representative of the Attorney General and representatives of the parties to the peace process, which imposed a de facto classification of the Rapid Support Forces as a party.

Independent (as Dagalo maintains that it is subject to explicit laws) the armed forces share the tasks of maintaining security in the capital and the regions.

What are the most important features of the regional dimensions of the roles of Al-

Burhan and Hemedti? Here it is possible to see the difference between Al-Burhan and Hemedti - theoretically - on the one hand that Al-Burhan acts as a successful statesman in consolidating his country's ties with Egypt in an unprecedented manner, and adopting a balanced "international" discourse even on a sensitive issue such as the file of normalization with Israel, and the issue of the Ethiopian relations with Ethiopia, where he presented The proof is the image of the Sudanese statesman who deals completely with Prime Minister.

On the other hand, Hemedti played a role based on the nature of his historical leadership of the Rapid Support Forces Whether in internal files in western Sudan (the issue of security in Darfur and his ability to avoid escalation in recent weeks), or in external files such as addressing the crisis in Chad, and rapprochement with Turkey (which he visited accompanied by a government delegation and at an official invitation from the Turkish government to meet the Turkish Vice President at the end of Last May), this role was dominated by exploring the prospects for new relations for Sudan with various parties.

Conclusions

Although there are speculations about the existence of deep disagreements between the two men, it is inconceivable that these disagreements (primarily in visions) will reach the point where one of them "turns against the other," given several factors, the most prominent of which are:

They have been partners since the first moments of Omar al-Bashir's isolation in "stabilizing" Sudan.

Any "exclusion" of either of them is not realistically possible given the support network that each has

Of these, it represents a popular base that cannot be underestimated.

The extent of the "division of labor" between them in internal, regional, and to some extent international files indicates a necessary bond to overcome the current transitional phase and maintain the important, and in fact critical, balance in light of the economic and political turmoil inherent inside Sudan, between the roles of the military, security, and sovereign institutions on the one hand. , and the roles of "civilian components",

And the possibilities of the re-emergence of the power of Islamic movements on the Sudanese scene once the dates for the constitutional dues establishing post-transitional institutions are announced.

In conclusion, the relationship between Al-Burhan and Hemedti may witness a degree of tension due to differing perceptions or steps on certain issues, as previously indicated, but the nature of the transitional phase with some Arab parties, and Sudan's regional and international path and commitments (in relations with the United States in particular) do not allow any space. We are facing an open disagreement between the normalization of relations between Al-Burhan and Hemedti, and even making the disagreement limited to "restructuring" some loyalties, whether within the Sudanese Armed Forces, or the semi-regular military components, or in the currently existing or latent political forces that are waiting for Sudanese entitlements to either be exploited by the forces." "current military and security forces" or to impose new operating rules with civilian components.

Implications and Implications: What does Al-Burhan's visit to Egypt achieve?

On August 29, 2023, the President of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council, "Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan," went to Egypt, in a visit that was the first of its kind for Al-Burhan outside his country since the outbreak of the Sudanese crisis last April 15 between the army under his leadership and the Rapid Support Forces led by "Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo." During their meeting in the city of New Alamein, located on the northern coast of Egypt, President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and Al-Burhan discussed developments in the situation in Sudan, ways to cease fire and end the crisis, allow the implementation of humanitarian relief operations, and discuss ways to strengthen relations between...

between Egypt and Sudan, in addition to issues related to the two countries and supported and developed in a way that serves common interests.

Al-Burhan's choice of Egypt for his first foreign visit is due to the strong relations between the two countries and the confidence of the Sudanese leadership in Egypt's constant support for Sudan in its crises.

In light of the above, this analysis attempts to address the implications and repercussions of Al-Burhan's visit to Egypt in light of the conditions witnessed by Sudan.

Important implications:

There are many statements about the visit of the Sudanese army commander, Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, to Egypt, which took one day, during his meeting with President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi. This visit indicates a number of...

Among the important implications are the following:

(*)Egyptian mediation: Al-Burhan's visit is an attempt to mediate Egypt to coordinate and communicate with regional and international parties, to discuss ways to end the war and start a political dialogue between the two parties to the conflict in Sudan, which may help to find solutions to end the war, and this means other external visits by Al-Burhan to some countries.

The region and neighboring countries.

The summit of Sudan's neighboring countries last July, which confirms the permanent nature of mediation to resolve the crisis by all available means, and for his part, Al-Burhan confirmed Egypt's efforts

In his speech after the meeting, he said that the Sudanese army does not seek to continue ruling, but rather to hold free and fair elections, with the Sudanese people choosing who will rule them.

(*)Protecting and assisting the Sudanese people: The meeting included consultation on efforts aimed at resolving the crisis within the limits of Sudan's unity and cohesion and protecting the interests of its people, as well as discussing ways to Cooperation and coordination to support the Sudanese people, by providing humanitarian and relief aid.

(*)Egypt's permanent support for the security and stability of Sudan: President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi affirmed Egypt's steadfast support in standing by Sudan, by supporting its security, stability, territorial integrity and integrity, and supporting and strengthening the common bilateral relations between the two countries. For his part, Al-Burhan praised the sincere and clear Egyptian support. To maintain the safety and stability of Sudan in light of the crisis it has been going through for A bite Egypt about five months, by hosting neighboring countries or holding discussions with international and regional parties to find a settlement to the crisis.

(*) Discussion of a number of important issues: Important discussions took place between President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan on some issues that focus on achieving the interests of the Sudanese people in light of Statements of the Sudanese Foreign Minister the current crisis, and in accordance with He watched as he approached "Ali Al-Sadiq," the discussions dealt with the issue of Sudanese schools in Egypt, the new academic year, in addition to discussing the crisis of overcrowding at the land crossings between the two countries, and the damage it causes to the movement of citizens and goods, the movement of exports and imports between Cairo and Khartoum, and the operation of air flights between Cairo and Port Sudan. .

ActuallyAccordingly, Al-Burhan's visit confirmed the interconnectedness between Egypt and Sudan, where Cairo is a party
In the process of ending the Sudanese crisis and preventing it from sliding into civil war, this was clear

In Egypt's movements, specifically after the summit of Sudan's neighboring countries that Egypt called for, in addition to
the Egyptian-American coordination to discuss developments in the Sudan file, this confirms Egypt's major role in
communicating between the Sudanese leadership and international parties in order to find solutions to end the war.

It is likely that Egypt will have a role in trying to bring the two sides of the crisis together, through the strong ties
between Egypt and Sudan, and perhaps the coming days will witness Egyptian movement towards international and regional
powers to discuss possible ways to bring peace to Sudan.

Al-Burhan's visit also confirms the return of Sudan's openness to the world to strengthen its position
Regional and international, after the war that destroyed the capital, killed thousands of people, displaced millions, and
caused widespread destruction and violations.

It is worth noting that efforts have increased towards the Sudanese file since the "Conference of Neighboring Countries"
was held in Egypt, and the formation of a ministerial committee to discuss developments in the Sudanese crisis with
international and regional powers, in addition to the recent American-Egyptian coordination in the Sudan file, and also the role of
Saudi Arabia, in cooperation with Washington, held several meetings and discussions in the Saudi city of Jeddah with the
aim of ending the conflict, and Al-Burhan's visits came to emphasize the importance of reaching the first steps to end the
ongoing war.

Positive repercussions:

After monitoring and following up on the most important implications of the visit conducted by the President of the Sudanese
Sovereignty Council with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, that visit resulted in many positive repercussions,
as follows:

(-) Operating flights between Cairo and Port Sudan: After Al-Burhan's visit to Egypt, the national company "EgyptAir" announced on August 30 the start of its direct flight from the city of Cairo to the city of Port Sudan, located in the northeast of the State of Sudan, starting from the first of September 2023 and One flight per day, and it is worth noting that the national company EgyptAir suspended its flight to the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, last April, since the outbreak of the crisis. This decision comes in response to Sudanese demands to address the damage caused by overcrowding at the crossings between the two countries.

(-) Agreement to increase the capacity of the crossings and provide the urgent needs of Sudan: The visit between the Chairman of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council, Al-Burhan, and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, during their talks in El Alamein, witnessed an agreement on the necessity of accelerating work on the land crossings between the two countries, overcrowding witnessed at the crossings between Both countries are increasing their use. In addition to an increase in demand by large numbers of Sudanese, the agreement was revealed by the Chargé d'Affaires of the Sudanese Embassy in Cairo, "Mohamed Abdallah Al-Toum." This decision comes in order to support and develop cooperation between the two countries in many fields, including facilitating the movement of businessmen between Egypt and Sudan for the purpose of Support and stimulate trade movement; To develop ways of economic and trade cooperation between the two countries, in addition To provide many goods and urgent needs to Sudan in light of the crisis it is going through.

(*) Beginning to form a "Sudanese caretaker government": After Al-Burhan's visit to Egypt, it is expected that the next stage will witness the formation of a caretaker government in "Port Sudan" that will work effectively, especially since the safe states need civil institutions that work to improve the economic situation in the country.

Accordingly, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, led by Yasser Arman, believes that Al-Burhan's determination to form a government in Port Sudan could deepen national divisions, in addition to deepening the dependency of state institutions and the armed forces on the symbols of the former regime during the era of "Omar Al-Bashir." Therefore, the movement proposes to... The proof is that he conducts broad consultations with all national and democratic forces, and works to reach solutions with international and regional parties to resolve the crisis.

From the above, it can be said that the visit of the President of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council to El Alamein demonstrates the importance of Egypt to Sudan, and his keenness to clarify the position of the Sudanese army to the parties supporting the unity and survival of the Sudanese state, specifically the Egyptian leadership before any regional or international parties, especially since Egypt is considered one of the most affected by what is happening in Sudan, as Egypt promises a country with regional and international weight that enables it to mediate to open doors closed to Sudan, in addition to its ability to convince both sides of the crisis and the concerned forces of the necessity of finding a political settlement for the current crisis, and resuming a transitional path that guarantees the transfer of power to an elected government by holding free and fair elections and for the Sudanese people to choose who will rule them. .

It is expected that a "new phase" will begin in Sudan, which will witness upcoming regional and international visits, with the aim of ending this conflict. The coming days may witness a second foreign visit by the Sudanese army commander, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, to Juba, the capital of South Sudan, in addition to news of his visit.

Potential visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, to consult on developments in the Sudanese situation, and to obtain support during the next stage to confront the challenges facing Sudan, its security, and the integrity of its lands, which indicates Al-Burhan's desire to confirm the (deferred) victory of the army in the battle for Sudan's survival and the continuation of its national institutions, and to reject any initiative or a solution that does not include these determinants or return them to a non-consensual transitional formula that does not include specific provisions for integrating militants into the Sudanese army.

of military resolution and settlement. The Sudanese crisis between the possibilities

On June 22, 2023, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies held a workshop on developments in the Sudanese conflict that erupted since April 2023, to analyze the field and operational military scene in the Sudanese arena, its implications for Egyptian national security, and to explore the future of the Sudanese state in light of the various scenarios of the crisis. A number of experts and researchers at the Center and from outside it participated in this workshop.

First: The motives and strategies of the parties to the conflict

The Sudanese crisis raised a set of questions about the Sudanese balance of power. Military and civil, and the future of the state under it, and to what extent Sudan represents a reflective mirror of the state of the national state in Africa and the Arab region, especially since the crisis essentially sparked the dilemma of state building, which many African and Arab countries have faced over the past decades, in addition to what the crisis has presented. There are question marks about whether it was driven by conflict over resources? Or does it contain efforts to re-engineer the region? To what extent is the consensus or competition between regional powers reflected in this war?

In this context, the participants addressed the crises of building the national state in the Arab world, which are mainly represented in the nature of civil-civilian, civil-military, and religious-secular relations, as well as tribal, tribal, and ethnic societal divisions. The condition is considered A, which can explain the severity

It is full of all these contradictions, which makes it more difficult for the Sudanese government to deal with the current crisis and its development. The current crisis in Sudan also raises the question about the extent of the opportunity to overcome the crisis and resolve it in the future, or has the project of building the national state in Sudan failed completely?

The participants addressed the causes of Sudan's protracted crisis since its independence, in light of the instability of civil-military relations since the 1950s, and the turbulent interactions between Sudanese forces that sometimes amounted to what resembled a state of revenge, in a country that includes more than 400 tribes.

Amidst linguistic diversity and ethnic division; It makes the interactions between them highly complex, in light of the mobilization and mobilization of supporters.

On the other hand, Sudan's crises crystallized after the overthrow of the IRGC regime in April 2019 in the absence of competence and experience among the elite of the transitional period, which suddenly took the lead on the scene, paving the way for the former president's bulldozing of political life in his country over the course of three decades, which sparked an unbridled ambition to reach power. among newcomers; The civilian component and its solid core of the Professionals Association split as a result of disputes between them, which deprived them of establishing a strong political alliance. The division of the military forces into about 9 "armies" of varying strength and influence contributed to the disruption of the security scene and to the weakening of them all.

The impact of political considerations is still not completely clear, in light of the failure of the ruling elite to manage the political scene after the events of 2019 and the outbreak of armed conflict between the army and the Rapid Support Forces. Which is less The chances of success of the truces that were proposed since mid-March. Oh without the opportunity April 2023, with each party insisting on resolving the battle, Askar

For a settlement, which made the conflict a zero-sum match, this was helped by the position of both sides of the conflict towards some regional mediators, especially after the army's rejection of Kenyan mediation due to accusations from the leaders of the Rapid Support, with the absence of a vision for the post-ceasefire phase for Nairobi of rapprochement with fire. All of this has made it difficult to predict a solution that will lead to a settlement in the foreseeable future.

! Regarding developments in the operational theatre, the participants made it clear that the battle was decided by military forces

In favor of one of the parties, it seems difficult at the current stage, in light of the complexity of the military scene.

The country is witnessing security challenges, complex internal polarization, and shifts in the course of the conflict in light of the rapid pace of the war, and the emergence of a hybrid type of war, which witnesses the heavy involvement of regular and irregular forces. Amidst this, fears are increasing about the war expanding and moving from the center of the country to its outskirts, especially as societal factors stimulate the escalation of the war in some regions such as western Sudan.

The discussion touched on the difficulties of implementing the military integration project for the Rapid Support Forces into the army, even in light of the settlement, which may be an impetus for the continuation of the conflict until the elimination of

the other once and for all. This is encouraged by the multiplicity of overlapping regional parties and the increasing possibility of a revival of proxy wars.

O: International and Arab accounts in the crisis second

Sudan represents one of the most important points of international competition on the African continent, in light of the vital importance it enjoys thanks to its geostrategic position, as part of two important regions of the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, which gives it important weight in regional and international accounts, which strengthens it.

The presence of the Bab al-Mandab Strait at the southern entrance to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal in the north. In addition, Sudan connects a number of strategic regions, such as East Africa - including the Horn of Africa - and the Sahel and Sahara region, in addition to the Middle East and the Gulf, which is suitable for Africa.

Mediation, which makes Sudan an entry point to the Arabian Ocean, the Indian Ocean, and the Mediterranean Sea south of the Sahara, and makes it a link between the north and south of the continent, in addition to being a central gateway to East, Central and West Africa, especially since it is adjacent to pivotal countries: Egypt, Libya, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Chad and Central Africa.

The current scene of international collapse on Sudan is not at all new, as Sudan has approached the United States during the era of former US President Donald Trump, coinciding with steps to remove Sudan from the terrorist list progress in Sudanese-Israeli normalization, and the year 2020. Moscow also tried to strengthen its presence in the Sudanese arena, in light of its efforts to

No**Wow** And northern Chad, to expand from Libya through Sudan - especially Darfur Garaba - Central Africa, in addition to Mali and Burkina Faso in the Sahel. Russia has strengthened its presence in Sudan through the activity of the Wagner Security Group, in addition to Russian attempts to establish a military base in the port of Port Sudan since 2017. China has economic interests in Sudan, which enjoys an abundance of wealth and natural resources, most notably oil. European concerns about illegal immigration have increased, and European interest in Sudan is increasing from Africa, through Sudan, and from there to the Mediterranean, a file that poses extremely serious security threats to the European continent.

At the level of the Arab position, the participants pointed out that the Sudan crisis came at a difficult stage among the crises of Arab countries in general, in light of the varying experiences of Arab military intervention following the revolutions since 2011, and the varying levels of Arab engagement in Sudanese affairs.

In light of the calculations of the national interests of each country, which is reflected in Arab positions on the conflict. Here two basic Arab positions emerge, as follows:

1 - Direct Arab neighboring countries: mainly Egypt and Libya. In general, the Libyan view (east and west) suggests that Libya will suffer from the negative repercussions of the Sudanese crisis, whether it continues or is settled. The former Libyan Minister of Defense, Muhammad Mahmoud Al-Barghathi, warned "that what happens in Sudan - regardless of its final results - will be reflected in the situation." In the presence of a common border that is fragile in terms of security," he stressed, "that the members of the losing team are in this ^a Libya, in theory

« They were safe and headed from there towards Libyan territory They may find refuge in Libya

2 - Indirect Arab neighboring countries: represented by: Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, and Qatar. There are growing interests of the three Gulf states in Sudan, the most prominent of which are promoting agricultural investments and achieving food security. The three countries have concluded various agreements to cultivate millions of acres worth billions of dollars. In addition to the goal of presence in the Red Sea region through developing and managing ports on the African coast, including Sudanese ports. In December, with Sudan to develop the Sudanese port of Abu Amama ^a 2022 DP World signed an agreement

Red Sea coast. In March 2018, Qatar and Sudan signed an agreement worth \$4 billion to develop the port of Suakin. Gulf concerns are growing regarding the possibility of some international and regional powers establishing military bases in the port of Port Sudan, thus enhancing regional and international influence in this vital region for Gulf security. In addition, there is interest in competing for resources and wealth, especially gold, and Sudan is considered an important Gulf station to reach deep into Africa.

A: The effects of the Sudanese crisis on Egypt Third

Participants emphasized that the Sudanese conflict places many strategic burdens on interests

Egypt, which has been facing serious challenges in recent years, requires the formulation of a flexible Egyptian policy regarding the Sudanese crisis. Some considered that the crisis represented an opportunity to change mental perception among sectors of the Egyptian and Sudanese people, especially since Egypt has been receiving large numbers of Sudanese refugees since the outbreak of the crisis in April 2023.

The workshop included two main sessions. The first discussed "Armed Conflict... Motives and Strategies," where Dr. Amani Al-Taweel, the Center's academic advisor, gave an intervention entitled "Parties to the Conflict and Internal Equations in the Sudanese Crisis," and Mr. Ahmed Alibah, an expert at the Center, presented an intervention entitled "Strategies of the Actors... Why has military resolution failed so far?" Dr. Amira Muhammad Abdel Halim, an expert at the Centre, gave an intervention entitled "Opportunities for a settlement and the reasons for the failure of truces and initiatives", followed by two main comments from Dr. Muhammad Ezz Al-Arab, expert at the center, Dr. Rania Hussein Khafaja, political science teacher at the Higher College of African Studies, and the session was chaired by Dr. Wahid Abdel Majeed, academic advisor at the center. The second session discussed regional and international accounts, where Dr. Ahmed Amal, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Higher College of African Studies, gave a presentation entitled "International Conflicts over Gold, Oil, Land, and Ports," and Dr. Moataz Salamah, an expert at Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, gave an intervention entitled "Calculations of Interests... Why Do Arabs Disagree over Sudan?" Dr. presented. Ayman Al-Sayed Abdel-Wahab, Deputy Director of the Center, presented a presentation entitled "The Repercussions of the Sudanese Crisis on Egypt." This was followed by two key comments from Dr. Mr. Fleifel, Professor of History and former Dean of the Graduate School of African Studies, and Dr. Rawya Tawfiq, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the College of Economics and Political Science. The session was chaired by Dr. Amr Al-Sh

Al-Burhan during his meeting with Sisi: We seek to complete the transitional path, and the army does not want power

In this photo provided by Egypt's presidency media office, Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi, right, greets

Sudan's army chief General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan at the Presidential palace in el-Alamein city, Egypt, Tuesday, Aug. 29, 2023. (Egyptian Presidency Media Office via AP)

Al-Sisi (right) receives Al-Burhan at the presidential palace in El Alamein (Associated Press) 8/29/2023|Last

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The President of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council, Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, announced - today, Tuesday - during his meeting with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, in the city of El Alamein, in the first foreign visit since the outbreak of confrontations in Sudan, his commitment to continuing the path of democratic transition, while El-Sisi affirmed his country's position in support of the security and stability of Sudan.

Al-Burhan said, during the meeting that took place at the presidential palace in El Alamein, that the Sudanese leadership seeks to complete the path of democratic transition until the Sudanese people choose who will rule them.

He added that the armed forces have no tendency to seize power or rule in Sudan.

For its part, the Egyptian presidency said - in a statement - that Sisi's meeting with Al-Burhan witnessed a review of developments in the situation in Sudan, and consultation on efforts aimed at resolving the crisis.

The Egyptian presidency added that Al-Sisi affirmed Egypt's position to stand by Sudan and support its security, stability, unity and territorial integrity, noting that Al-Burhan praised Egyptian support for maintaining the safety and stability of Sudan.

The Sudanese Sovereignty Council said - in a statement - that the President of the Council will hold discussions during the visit with the Egyptian President regarding developments in the situation in Sudan, relations between the two countries, and ways to enhance and develop their support.

During his visit to Egypt, the Chairman of the Sovereign Council, Army Commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, is accompanied by the Foreign Minister-designate, Ambassador Ali al-Sadiq, the Director of the General Intelligence Service, Lieutenant General Ahmed Ibrahim Mufaddal, and the Director General of the Defense Industries System, Lieutenant General Mirghani Idris Suleiman.

Earlier, the Transitional Sovereignty Council reported that its president met - yesterday, Monday - in the city of the agency's performance, members of the government-designate, and discussed with them Port Sudan (eastern Sudan) with the country's executive during the last stage, and the general features of the government's plans and programmes.

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Sudanese Minister of Culture and Information, Graham Abdel Qader, quoted Al-Burhan as saying that the country will rely on its own resources to confront the dangers, and he thanked the Sudanese people for rallying around the army to defeat what he described as a brutal rebellion.

This is the first meeting of the President of the Sovereignty Council with the government directly, since the outbreak of confrontations between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces in mid-April.

The representative of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council also said that the President of the Council met in Port Sudan with the Shabaya Fada from West Darfur state, Ramo includes community and civil administrations, and youth leaders headed by Saad Abd al-Rahman Bahr al-Din, Sultan of "Dar Masalit."

According to the source, the meeting discussed the conditions of Sudanese refugees in Chad and the ongoing efforts to deliver humanitarian aid to them. Sultan Saad Bahr al-Din said that he conveyed to the Chairman of the Sovereignty Council the urgent need of these refugees for the necessities of food and shelter.

Al-Burhan and Hemedti

The Chairman of the Sovereignty Council, Commander of the Sudanese Army, Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, had said earlier that there was no room for dialogue with those he called rebels and traitors, and denied the existence of any deal for his exit from Khartoum.

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For his part, Malik Agar, Al-Burhan's deputy, said that the heads of state and government expressed their understanding and support for legitimacy in Sudan, in his meetings with them during his foreign tour.

Malik added that heads of state and government confirmed that they would not deal with Sudan's affairs except through the Sudanese government.

The Sudanese official recently visited several countries, including: Russia, Ethiopia, and Egypt.

On the other hand, the Commander of the Rapid Support Forces, Mohamed Hamdan Hemedti, said - in the context of talking about his vision for any upcoming settlement - that the most appropriate system of government for Sudan must be federal.

Daily Life in Sudan

Damage to a building in Darfur as a result of previous clashes between the army and the Rapid Support (Anadolu Agency)

Dead in Darfur

Maidanaya, Agence France-Presse quoted eyewitnesses and a medical source - today, Tuesday - that at least 39 people were killed as a result of bombing on civilian homes in the Al-Sikka Al-Hadid neighborhood in The city of Nyala, the capital of South Darfur (western Sudan), during clashes between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces.

· Hill of all its members The sources said that most of the dead were women and children, including the Q family

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For his part, Al-Jazeera correspondent Al-Taher Al-Mardi reported that the army's warplanes attacked heavily - Tuesday morning - in the sky of Khartoum, and that the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces responded by firing ground anti-aircraft guns.

R

The correspondent pointed out that the battles have not yet been resolved over a number of strategic military sites, including the Armored Corps and the Engineers Corps.

It is noteworthy that the ongoing confrontations between the army and the Rapid Support have so far resulted in the death of about 5 thousand people, according to the non-governmental organization "ACLID".

The fighting also forced more than 4.6 million people to flee, according to the latest statistics published by the United Nations.

Source: Al Jazeera + agencies

A hot spot in the arc of protracted crises

Sudan has entered a cycle of armed conflict that some countries in the region have not completely left. Such as Yemen, Syria and Libya. Sudan came in the second wave of the "Arab Spring," and it seems that it will usher in the second wave of armed conflicts in the region. Over the course of two weeks of battles, the truce that was reached for humanitarian considerations did not hold, and as countries evacuated their nationals in the wake of an unprecedented wave of displacement in Khartoum and the tense Sudanese states, the space of this theater is - it seems - being evacuated in anticipation of an open war that puts the future of Sudan at stake. Crossroads.

It is conceivable that the repercussions of the continued state of chaos in Sudan may be worse in its repercussions, and more costly in political and security terms, when compared to the case of Libya, which did not It is recovering, especially after the Tripoli war in the spring of 2019 until the summer of 2020, when it is still in the maze of faltering political transition. The Egyptian national security priority in the case of Libya was the process of controlling the borders to prevent the spread of chaos, and to work to avoid the danger of dividing the country. But Egyptian national security priorities in Sudan go beyond the issue of border control, to what is related to the water security file. The fragility of the central state that could be torn apart in Sudan and become a new Somalia has become a possibility, especially in light of the contagion of disintegration, whether in the Horn of Africa region or in Sudan itself, which witnessed the independence of the South in July 2011, which did not lead to stability in either of them. There are more than 30 armed factions in Sudan, which reinforces the scenario of a recovery in chaos in the country.

Egypt has been in the spotlight since the first spark of military escalation between the two sides, which broke out from the "Meroi" air base in the north, where an Egyptian military force was present - within the framework of a joint protocol between the Egyptian and Sudanese sides - and this crisis was ably prepared to conduct an exercise. Joint air next May. Egypt eventually managed to restore Egyptian military power from Sudan, in the first and most important breakthrough that occurred since the outbreak of the crisis.

Egypt is making efforts to form a crisis management team from the relevant ministries (Ministry of Defense, I have spoken
The General Intelligence Service, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and the Interior) to evacuate their nationals
from Sudan, also as an interim priority, and joint coordination with some countries to help evacuate their nationals, then
Receiving thousands of refugees through the Arqin border crossing, and providing the humanitarian requirements
to deal with this situation. In parallel, Egypt moved diplomatically and quickly on a bilateral level with the state
of South Sudan to launch a ceasefire initiative, and through regional mechanisms such as the Arab
League and the African Union, as well as the United Nations and international powers, to coordinate efforts in
the same direction.

It is envisaged that the definition of mediation at the current stage focuses first on efforts to reach a coherent
truce, even if it is indirect mediation between the two parties, then developing and extending it for the longest
possible period to pave the way for humanitarian organizations and bodies, in addition to ensuring that it does
not turn into a break in war. Rather, it is an attempt to gain confidence, even partially, to rearrange the situation
with the aim of preparing the atmosphere to move to the advanced mediation stage to bring the parties to the
negotiating table.

Accounts of the forces involved in the conflict

The calculations of the forces involved in the conflict are the calculations of the war after the political calculations
faltered following the collapse of the consensus on the security and military reform project in its final stage.

What it will result in Hence, each side expects the war to reshape the political balance accordingly

A war in which each party seeks to defeat the other, and thus achieve military defeat first

Then political defeat, although all similar experiences confirm that urban wars

These are wars of destruction for countries that pay their costs from their human and material capabilities and resources, and then...

It is difficult to achieve the criteria of victory and defeat in the traditional sense.

The biggest miscalculation revealed by the ongoing war in Sudan is the expectation that the two sides of the
conflict could have merged into one entity, in the absence of appropriate conditions for that. The seeds of
integration that were planted during the era of the previous regime grew within the framework of an alliance of interests
Alliances are back on Roll at the moment the regime fell, and...Shared. The disintegration of
this alliance was based on the same foundations, which are common interests in the political transition phase, in
addition to technical considerations that indicate the difficulty of integration in light of the state of dissimilarity between the
structures of the regular army and the Rapid Support Forces militia. Regular armies also have national accounts regarding...

With armaments, foreign policy, and financing from the state budget, on the contrary, there are other sources of funding for rapid support, the most prominent of which is what is known as the "Princes of Gold" coalition, and revenues Deals to share its forces outside the country, which also reflects that it has a different foreign policy agenda.

It is also conceivable that one of the wrong and common questions at the same time will be decided Conflict from both sides? Because this question is an entry point for shifting from mediation to alignments, and consequently falling into the trap of proxy war, it is one of the lessons learned from many regional conflicts. It is important in this regard to point out the statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs with US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and Kenyan Foreign Minister Alfred Mutua during his meeting (April 24) that many international and moment requires those regional powers have relations with both sides of the conflict, and therefore the current parties to Not taking sides with a particular party.

While it is conceivable that the ongoing battles in Sudan deserve to be described as "confrontations against logic," not only based on the regional and international situation, but also based on the Sudanese internal reality. The outbreak of confrontations came days after the announcement of the draft of the final political agreement in Sudan in March 2023, which established the detailed points regarding reform of the military institution, determined the foundations and steps for integrating the Rapid Support Forces into the army, and the agreement stipulated the formation of a Security and Defense Council with the membership of the Commander-in-Chief. of the Armed Forces, followed by the Commander of the Rapid Support Forces. All of this indicates that the tensions that Sudan was exposed to in the post-revolution phase, between the military and civilian components, were rooted in the conflict now taking place between the two military components.

Regardless of the fact that the emergence of the Rapid Support Forces in 2003, as another military component alongside the army, was not a natural or normal matter at all, and necessarily implied confrontations with the army at a later moment, the confirmation of the saying that it is a "war against logic" is based on the fact that the two men (Burhan and Hemedti) have long experience, and in such confrontations there is no victor or loser, and the main loser is Sudan. In most cases, such confrontations begin and their parties believe that they will achieve their goals and eliminate their opponents within days, but then they find themselves facing a confrontation that may extend for years. Years from now, the two parties will have no choice but to sit together, after they have incurred all the losses, depleted Sudan's wealth and dispersed their people, and after Sudan becomes a prisoner of the conflicts of external powers, and a theater for managing the conflict on behalf of the outside.

Regional accounts

The war in Sudan is also a “war against logic” because it comes in the context of a regional mood with reconciliations and settlements, after long experiences with internal and regional wars. The Sudanese confrontations erupted after the situation in Yemen became relatively promising, following the Saudi-Iranian agreement, direct talks between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, after relative stability with the Syrian regime, after a series of reconciliations in Libya, and with the start of Arab steps for intra-Arab reconciliation (the Arab Quartet countries and Qatar). And the Qatari reconciliation with Bahrain), and also as a result of reconciliations between Arab countries and Turkey. The major conclusion from the previous decade was the necessity of ending civil wars and internal conflicts, and reducing external interference in the Arab reality, until the battles in Sudan completely changed the mood.

At the level of regional accounts in Africa, it can be said that Sudan is linked to a regional neighborhood to the north in a way that places it at the heart of the interactions of the Middle East, and also brings it together^A complex that brings it together. Which places it in the circle of interactions of the Horn of Africa region in Egypt, Ethiopia and Eritrea to the east. In addition to its western neighborhood with Libya, Chad, and the Central African Republic, which strengthens its position as an important player in the African Sahel region, in addition to its southern neighborhood represented by the Republic of South Sudan, which links Sudan to the Great Lakes and East Africa regions.

Among the striking ironies in the current Sudanese scene is that although the current crisis is the most complex and severe since the fall of Al-Bashir in April 2019, it has witnessed the lowest levels of intervention by regional powers from Sudan's neighboring countries compared to various previous successive crises in the last four years. .

This unexpected trend in the behavior of neighboring countries does not reflect a reluctance on the part of the regional players or any of them's appreciation of the limitations of

His interests are affected by what is happening in Sudan, but it came as a direct result of the high level of danger of the current crisis, which carries real opportunities to plunge Sudan into a state of comprehensive internal strife, as well as to turn into a multi-party regional conflict.

Accordingly, the Sudanese neighboring countries in the recent crisis tended to adopt responsible statements and positions that are a reflection of the sensitivity of the field situation on the ground. But situations appear

Ethiopian in particular, to embody the mechanism by which Sudan's neighboring countries make their calculations regarding the current crisis and its impact on the outcome of future situations at the level of Sudan and the region as a whole. Ethiopia has gone through a series of major changes at the political and military levels, along with the turbulent conditions in Sudan, which had direct repercussions on the position of the Ethiopian government regarding the confrontations between the armed forces and the Rapid Support Forces. Abiy Ahmed came to power about a year before the fall of Omar al-Bashir in Sudan in April 2019. A number of main trends can be identified that revealed Ethiopian biases towards the interactions in Sudan, which are as follows:

- Siding with the Forces of Freedom and Change at the expense of the armed forces, and trying to exploit the turbulent situation in Sudan with the aim of strengthening Ethiopia's regional role, as was evident in the interactions caused by the faltering political consensus between the civilian and military components after the fall of Al-Bashir in the period between the dispersal of the sit-in of the General Command of the Armed Forces On June 3, 2019, until the signing of the Constitutional Document on August 17 of the same year; During that period, Abiy Ahmed took advantage of the mandate of the IGAD Organization, as its rotating president at the time, to communicate with the Sudanese parties to bring points of view closer together.
- The clash escalated with the Sudanese Armed Forces, which took an early decision to confront the Ethiopian occupation of the Greater and Lesser Fashqa regions, which has been in place since the 1990s. This resulted in a series of armed confrontations in which the Sudanese Armed Forces were able to recover about 90% of Sudanese territory. These confrontations sparked hostility between the two sides, especially in light of the Ethiopian government's formulation of a media speech that promoted that the Sudanese military movements were an exploitation of the war in the Tigray region, and that they exceeded the scope of Sudanese territory. They also came - according to the Ethiopian narrative - within the framework of a Sudanese review of its regional position with distancing steps. Between it and Addis Ababa, it brings it closer to Cairo.

Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, who visited Addis Ababa for the first time in the steady Ethiopian rapprochement with June 2020 and then in January 2022, visits that came in conflict with the official positions of the Sudanese governments and without the minimum coordination with any of the military and civilian government partners in Sudan.

- Exerting direct pressure on Sudan, medially and diplomatically, by opposing the balanced Sudanese positions on the Renaissance Dam, especially during the period of Abdullah Hamdok's second government, and then repeated accusations against Sudan of supporting the Tigray Liberation Front in the first months following the outbreak of the conflict in the region located north of Ethiopia in November 2020.

These four trends in the behavior of the Ethiopian government towards Sudan since the fall of Al-Bashir were clearly reflected in the position on the current Sudanese crisis, despite the fact that the Ethiopian government has a clear interest in the victory of the Rapid Support Forces, or at least their remaining a major player.

In the Sudanese scene, militarily and politically, Ethiopia was unable to provide any tangible support to the forces Rapid support, which can be attributed to a number of reasons, most notably:

- The clear field superiority from the first day of the Sudanese Armed Forces, especially in the regions of eastern Sudan that share borders with Ethiopia, which was the first to announce the armed forces' control over the Rapid Support headquarters, which is still treated as a "foreign" entity to the eastern states.

The recent clashes occurred close to the existing truce in relations between Abiy Ahmed and Abdel Fattah al-Burhan since the former's visit to Khartoum at the end of January 2023, during which it was agreed to contain the background issues between the two sides.

The Ethiopian desire to avoid provoking more hostile popular trends among many Sudanese sectors, which may reflect negatively on the future of relations in the post-military confrontation phase, as was embodied in the Ethiopian government's quick denial of the news that indicated a new Ethiopian military expansion in Al-Fashqa Al- to the turbulent situation in Sudan. Sughra, exploiting

- Ethiopian fear of provoking a negative American reaction, especially after US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken's visit to Addis Ababa in mid-March 2023, a visit that witnessed increased American pressure on Abiy Ahmed's government to make progress on the fragile peace path with the Tigray Liberation Front. What increased the tendency of the Ethiopian government to adopt a conservative position on the situation in Sudan was the For all countries and parties American warnings that were announced early.

concerned with ceasing any form of interference in armed confrontations between the armed forces and the Rapid Support Forces.

From all of the above, it seems that the Ethiopian position in particular regarding the Sudanese crisis has been dominated by reservation and movement according to limited, calculated steps, which cannot be read as an indication of a decline in Ethiopian interest in Sudan, as much as it indicates a postponement of the return of Ethiopian activity on the Sudanese scene for the next stage.

International calculations: a modest American role in the crisis despite President Joe Biden's announcement since his first day in the White House on January 20, 2021, and many US administration officials that the issue of democracy and human rights is a priority on the US agenda, and the holding of two democracy summits in December From 2021 to March 2023, the United States has not taken many steps to advance the democratic transition in Sudan since the overthrow of the "Omar al-Bashar" regime.

The American position - to this day - of fueling the conflict between the two most powerful military leaders in Sudan, who are supported by complex networks of international and regional alliances with conflicting interests that may endanger the country's future, has shown the limits of the American role in Sudan, as the United States is no longer the central actor in Sudan after it was the influential international actor in ending the war between northern and southern Sudan for decades, and supporting the independence referendum for South Sudan.

The democratic transition crisis in Sudan was not a priority for the administration of President Joe Biden, as US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken did not visit Sudan during his visits to Africa, unlike previous prime ministers of foreign affairs in successive Democratic and Republican US administrations (Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, Mike Pompeo (and John Kerry), as well as its leniency towards Sudanese military leaders in the wake of the faltering transfer of power to civilian forces, as it did not deal with and impose sanctions on them despite the demands of Democratic and Republican legislators to do so. The decline of the American role in Sudan allowed the rise of regional and international powers, especially Russia, to enhance its influence And its interests in Sudan, which often coincides with the Sudanese military leadership's continued control over the joints of the Sudanese state, which contradicts the interests and vision

American. These powers have become more influential than the United States in determining the future Sudan.

In light of the decline of American influence in Sudan, the options before the administration of President Joe Biden to deal with the current crisis are limited to two main options:

The first is to adopt the approach of the administration of former President Donald Trump by seeking the help of regional and international forces allied with the United States active in Sudan to coordinate a response to the crisis, and to pressure "Burhan" and "Hemedti" to sit at the negotiating table to end the military fighting, and agree on a formula that achieves Sudanese stability and security. Its effects will not be limited to the interior, but will have regional repercussions in the Horn of Africa region, which is a priority for Washington, and for American influence in the African continent, which has turned into an arena of strategic competition between the United States, China, and Russia. US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken said on April 24 that the US administration "will coordinate with its regional and international partners and Sudanese civil forces to help establish a committee to oversee the negotiation, conclusion, and implementation of a permanent cessation of hostilities and humanitarian arrangements."

In an attempt to play a role in the Sudanese crisis, the United States, with the support of its regional and international partners, reached a ceasefire, which the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces agreed to for 72 hours, after two days of intense negotiations. It is not expected that

This truce contributes to calming the fighting between the Sudanese factions, and will continue as it did during the past week, as the US National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan, indicated that there is a form of long conflict for the current Sudanese crisis, even if it is interspersed with moments. Possibly

Of the ceasefire truces.

Second, to comply with the demands of many Democratic and Republican legislators, who are playing a more active role in American foreign policy towards Sudan and fill the void.

The American diplomat, to impose sanctions on the Sudanese military leaders and their networks with the aim of disrupting the army's sources of revenue and its grip on power; Which provides an opportunity for the rise of the civil component in the country. These calls to impose sanctions on Sudanese military officials are not the result of fueling the current military clash between Al-Burhan and Hemedti. The American administration can

By starting to impose these sanctions through an executive order issued by the US President, or by relying on the Magnitsky Act. But these sanctions will not be enough to stop the fighting between "Burhan" and "Hemedti." In addition, it may push them to cooperate with forces competing with the United States for influence in Sudan, especially Russia, which has developed relations and contacts with the Wagner Group with Hemedti's forces, and which is looking to establish a naval base in Sudan to give it a route to the Indian Ocean.

The treatment of the American administrations (Republican and Democratic) since the overthrow of President Omar al-Bashir in 2019 has demonstrated the failure of the United States to provide full support and assistance to achieve the democratic transition in Sudan, causing its role to decline in favor of regional and international powers that have interests that conflict with American interests. The decline of American influence in Sudan has undermined Khartoum and the gap between rhetoric and policies are among the Biden administration's options for dealing with the current crisis.

A possible ending.. How did the conflict between "Burhan" and "Hemedti" begin?

The British historian Peter Woodward could not find a better title for his book on the history of Sudan

"The turbulent state," to describe Sudan's tumultuous history after independence from British colonialism in the mid-twentieth century, as that history witnessed successive rounds of political conflicts, revolutions, and coups, equal to, if not greater than, what happened to its neighbors combined.

Due to the nature of the political history of Sudan, where The title "Troubled State" did not come out of nowhere, in theory

Since national independence, Sudanese society has witnessed sharp politicization all the time. Its trade unions and federations

Its schools, religious institutions, and even the military institution were no exception to this. It was transferred

Since independence, Sudan has changed between several different forms of government and authority, divided into three periods

of civil rule, and three periods of coups and military rule. However, military coups in Sudan differ from coups in other countries,

as the coup officers seek to achieve what their civilian counterparts failed to achieve. Or vice versa, when politicians fail to

manage civilian rule, their opponents resort to their military allies to achieve their political goals.

The December 2018 uprising, which removed President Al-Bashir and the Salvation Front from power, who ruled the country for about three decades, was an episode in Sudan's political history, and began a transitional phase in which the military and

civilians shared power, as a result of the August 2019 agreement, until elections were held. This arrangement was disrupted

after The events of October 25, 2021 and the military's monopolization of power, which caused a series of mass protests

demanding democracy in Sudan. The Sudanese army received internal support from rebel factions that benefited from

the peace agreement in 2020. Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), the leader of the Rapid Support Militia, supported

the transition plan, as Al-Burhan appeared on television to announce the removal of civilians from power, and Hemedti

supported those measures. Al-Burhan rewarded him by appointing him as deputy.

He was in the Sovereignty Council, but the military could not

The conflict appears between the two men, maintaining their cohesion after monopolizing power, and something that reached

Hemedti's description of the military's monopolization of power, which he supported on October 25, 2021, until then.

led to the clashes that began on April 15 and are still ongoing , That it was a mistake

In the capital Khartoum, between the Sudanese army forces led by Al-Burhan and the Rapid Support Forces led by Hemedti.

This paper attempts to answer the following question: What are the causes of the conflict in Sudan, and how does it end?

Reasons for succession:

Al-Burhan and Hemedti...the roots of the dispute between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces

Disagreements have existed since the era of Al-Bashir between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces, which were formed in 2013 to eliminate the rebellion in Darfur. After the overthrow of Al-Bashir in 2019, the military and civilians fought over power until the military took control of it after the events of October 25, 2021. Then the conflict began between the two men, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, who was the commander of the ground forces during the era of Al-Bashir and became a commander for the regular army, and Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), who He founded the Rapid Support Forces, relying on the Janjaweed militias that fought a bloody war in Darfur supports the Sudanese army. The reasons for the disagreement between the two generals can be summarized as follows:

Political aspirations:

Many experts in Sudanese affairs believe that the differences between "Burhan" and "Hemedti" are essentially the result of their political aspirations, and the agreement that was signed last December, which included civilian parties, came as a first step in a political process aimed at ending the crisis caused by and sought to procrastinate, while Hemedti sought to improve his ability Lieutenant General Al-Burhan approached the agreement as a coup tactic, Competitiveness and went so far as to describe himself as an ally of freedom and change, and denied the existence of any disagreements with those in power (those who cling to it), and against anyone with the army. He said that our caliphate, in and the army leadership denounced those statements and accusations directed at it of not Al-Burhan wants to become a dictator, wanting to complete the democratic transition process and said that they were public attempts to gain political sympathy and obstruct the democratic transition process, and before that

To nominate Hemedti has worked for a long time to improve his image on the international stage, in preparation

He chose himself for the presidency of Sudan, in light of intense competition with General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, as he resided in El

Geneina, the capital of the West Darfur region, and received the imam of the Drancy suburb in Paris, Hassan Shaljoumi, a

French citizen of Tunisian origin, and a violent critic of religious extremism, and also

A strong defender of the Abraham Accords, which resulted in the normalization of Israeli relations with the Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco

and Sudan under the auspices of US President Donald Trump, and Chaljoumi enjoys the support of French President Emmanuel

Macron, and thus Hemedti sends hidden messages to Paris and other European capitals that he does not support the return of

Islamists and the Islamism that prevailed. During the era of President Al-Bashir during the period from 1989 until 2019

Hemedti used the services of the French public relations agency "Instores" in parallel to try to facilitate interviews with the French media to improve his image internationally, and for a short period.

In 2019, Hemedti sought help from the Canadian company Dickens & Madison and its Canadian-Israeli director, Ari Ben Menash, to make his voice heard in Washington, D.C. In Khartoum, engineer Idris Mudallal from the Rapid Support Forces managed Hemedti's media relations.

Since 2019, Hemedti has sought to show himself as a man of the periphery, confronting the generals of the center and north who dominate the Sudanese leadership, led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and he reinforced that message with his long stay, which lasted fifty days, in El Geneina, the capital.

The West Darfur region, and his mediation during that period between Bedouin communities during the rainy season, during which bloody clashes increase. He actually returned to Khartoum after reaching four reconciliation agreements between the various opposition groups. Indeed, his marriage to a woman from a Sudanese tribe and in Sinai was part of Al-Ababda. Living on both sides of the from Egyptian border, this is his strategy to demonstrate his local legitimacy, unlike the Khartoum generals.

To get closer to Sudanese youth and the local community, he was always visible

Hemedti followed this approach

Wearing a white turban on the Tik Tok platform, which is most popular among young people, and Shin Hemedti

A media campaign was launched against rivals in the Sudanese army, and he chose the British BBC network in August 2022 to publicly criticize Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. He even went so far as to declare that the October 25 coup was a failure, and that without his support, al-Burhan would not have been able to remove civilians from the country.

Power is so easy.

Integrating the Rapid Support Militia into the army:

Sudanese Army: The field commander of the Rapid Support was injured - Al-Osboa

In the framework agreement signed on December 5th, the negotiators of the civil political group set provisions Related to the integration of the Rapid Support Militia into the armed forces, but it is not It includes details or plans regarding the establishment of a unified army. The meeting of the Army Command Board held last January ended with the necessity of integrating the Rapid Support Forces into the armed forces, which was met with hesitation from the Rapid Support Command, despite Hemedti signing the agreement, and even becoming one of the strongest Supporters of developing this agreement to become final, to form a civilian government, and the military's withdrawal from power, but the army's demand to support the Rapid Support Militia in the army was disrupted by the end of the transitional period, while Hemedti believes that the merger should take place in ten years, which only turned the negotiations into tensions between Both parties.

External files:

Sudan and Russia agree on several matters, including regarding the "Renaissance Dam" | Step News Agency

The triangulation of the foreign relations file, especially relations between Sudan, Israel and Russia, in addition to relations with neighboring countries, is one of the most important points of disagreement between the two generals, as the army accuses Hemedti of working to establish diplomatic relations parallel to the state through his visits to the countries that Al-Burhan visits, which gives the impression of the existence of two leaders. For the country, many sources reported that With Tel Aviv, where Hemedti seeks to open channels Regarding the relationship, there was There is a rivalry contact between the two men with the Mossad, which prompted Al-Burhan and Hamdok to protest to the Israeli side, with Israel to retired Major General Mubarak Abdullah Babiker in April 2022, and Al-Burhan decided to hand over the relations file it was between the in April 2022 to unify communication channels between the two countries. As for relations with Russia, two men on the grounds that it affects Khartoum's relationship with Washington, where he traveled. A succession broke out

Hemedti came to Russia on the eve of the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war in February 2022 and met

President Putin, and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, which angered the American side in Khartoum, where the Charge d'Affaires of the American Embassy, Lucy Tamlin, held a meeting with Al-Burhan and a number of members of the military component, and inquired about the reason for Hemedti's visit to Moscow, and Al-Burhan replied that Hemedti visited Moscow in his capacity as the support For president commander. Fast and not as a representative council of state.

The framework agreement and relations with neighboring countries:

The agreement, which was signed on December 5 of last year, is seen as the main reason for the explosion of the situation between the two generals, as despite their agreement to the text of the agreement that includes the withdrawal of the military institution from power, their statements after the signing revealed some of the crisis.

Hemedti announced his full support for the agreement as a way out of the divergence of visions between them, as it was caused by the failed coup, as he described it, and that the agreement was one package that must be implemented as a whole without division in a clear courtship of the forces of freedom and change, while Al-Burhan saw the need to include others, and this quickly changed. ^a parties to the disagreement is based on the terms and conditions. The agreement between the

with neighboring countries, as Hemedti It is also one of the sources of disagreement between the two men, represented by relations manages economic and investment partnerships with a number of neighboring countries, especially Ethiopia and Central Africa. Sources indicate that Hemedti refused to have his forces participate in the military operations launched by the Sudanese army against a number of Ethiopian armed groups in mid-2021.

Al-Burhan and Hemedti have different views regarding the countries neighboring western Sudan, especially Chad and Central Africa, given that they are located in the sphere of international influence between Russia and the West. Previously, Hemedti indicated the presence of Sudanese forces trying to change the regime in Central Africa. Al-Burhan quickly denied this, stressing that Khartoum does not send militias to destabilize security and stability in neighboring countries. Hemedti also refused to deploy the Rapid Support militia on the border with Central Africa, which he praised. The President of the Transitional Council in Chad.

Future of conflict:

Because the Sudanese army has greater capabilities and experience than the Rapid Support Forces, it is expected that... Look

For a number of reasons, the Sudanese army resolves this conflict in a short period of time, including:

The combat and weapons capabilities possessed by the Sudanese army, which exceed the capabilities of the Rapid Support Forces.

What occupies this is the international and regional community's unwillingness to erupt in a long conflict in Sudan, with its strategic location, in light of its preoccupation with the Russian-Ukrainian war.

The Wagner forces, the main supporter of the Rapid Support Militia, are busy in the Russian-Ukrainian war, as well as Syria.

The position of the Gulf states, the main supporters of the parties to the conflict, rejecting the outbreak of a conflict that threatens stability in Sudan in light of their huge economic investments in Sudan.

Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan issued a decision to dissolve the Rapid Support Militia, making it lose the legitimacy it coveted.

In conclusion, the crisis in Sudan has completed its cycles so that it will not be resolved, after the conflict between...

Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, Chairman of the Sovereignty Council and Commander of the Army, and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, commander of the Rapid Support Militia, after days of war of statements between them, and the war began with words, as Sudan witnessed on Saturday, the fifteenth of April, widespread armed clashes, especially in Khartoum, While the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces exchanged accusations of attacking the headquarters of the other party, amid local, regional and international calls to stop the fighting. In a conflict that analysts agree is a conflict between the political ambitions of the two generals after the end of the transitional phase.

In the first foreign visit since the start of the war... Al-Sisi meets Al-Burhan in El Alamein Discussions

between Al-Sisi and Al-Burhan... Efforts to resolve the crisis and protect the sovereignty and unity of Sudan

Egypt

Sudan

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The Sudanese army commander, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, arrived on Tuesday at the airport in the coastal city of El Alamein in northern Egypt, where he was received by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, on his first visit outside the country since the start of the war between his forces and the Rapid Support Forces more than four months ago.

The official spokesman for the Egyptian Presidency revealed that the President stressed during the meeting Egypt's great pride in the historical ties and deep bilateral relations that link it to Sudan at the official and popular levels, stressing Egypt's firm and firm position to stand by Sudan and support its security.

And its stability, unity and territorial integrity, especially during the current delicate circumstances it is going through, Taking into account the eternal ties and common strategic interest that unites the two countries

The two brothers.

From the meeting between Sisi and Al-Burhan in El

Alamein From the meeting between Al-Sisi and Al-

Burhan in El Alamein, on his part; Lieutenant General Al-Burhan expressed his deep appreciation for the strong fraternal relations

With sincere Egyptian support to maintain the peace and stability of Sudan between the two brotherly countries, praising

In light of the historical turning point it is going through, especially through the good reception of citizens

The Sudanese met with Egypt, expressing in this context his country's appreciation for Egypt's active role in the region

And the African continent.

The official spokesman added that the meeting witnessed a review of developments in the situation in Sudan, and consultations on efforts aimed at resolving the crisis, in order to preserve the safety and security of brotherly Sudan.

In a way that preserves the sovereignty, unity and cohesion of the Sudanese state, and preserves the interests of the brotherly Sudanese people and their aspirations for the future. The meeting also discussed developments in the path of Sudan's neighboring countries, as the President of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council welcomed this path, the first summit of which was held recently in Egypt. The discussions also touched on ways of cooperation and coordination to support The brotherly Sudanese people, especially through humanitarian aid and relief, so that Sudan can overcome the current crisis peacefully.

Statement of the Transitional Sovereignty Council

Earlier, a statement by the Transitional Sovereignty Council in Sudan stated that the Army Commander, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, headed to Egypt today to meet with the Egyptian President. This is the first time that Al-Burhan has left Sudan since the conflict with the Rapid Support Forces began on April 15.

The statement said that during the visit, Al-Burhan will hold discussions with President Sisi regarding developments in the situation in Sudan, bilateral relations between the two countries and "ways to enhance and develop their support in a way that serves the peoples of the two countries and issues of common interest."

The statement added that the Foreign Minister-designate, Ambassador Ali Al-Sadiq, the Director of the General Intelligence Service, Lieutenant General Ahmed Ibrahim Mufaddal, and Lieutenant General Mirghani Idris Suleiman, Director General of the Defense Industries System, are accompanying Al-Burhan during his visit to Egypt.

Al-Burhan before his departure for Egypt. Al-Burhan before his departure for Egypt

Sources from Al-Arabiya and Al-Hadath reported yesterday that the head of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council will travel today to the Egyptian city of El Alamein, in his first foreign visit since the start of the crisis in Sudan in mid-April. Our sources said that Al-Burhan will meet with President Sisi, and they will discuss developments in the crisis, the overall political and humanitarian situation, and the conditions of displaced Sudanese in Egypt. The sources stated that Al-Burhan is likely to travel in the coming period to a number of Arab and African countries, "including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, South Sudan, and Chad."

The President of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council confirmed in a recorded speech from Port Sudan that was broadcast yesterday, Rapid Support. Monday, that there is no agreement or deal with the He also stressed that the armed forces "will not put their hands into the hands of the rebels." He promised to continue fighting, stressing that the army would continue until victory. He continued, saying: "We are fighting alone We are proud of that," he added, adding that the armed forces did not start the war, but rather the rapid support, and therefore they will be covered by its fire and will be severely defeated.

Al-Burhan's statements came in response to the initiative of the Commander of the Rapid Support Forces, Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo "Hemedti," in which he indicated his openness to a long-term ceasefire with the army, presenting his vision of "establishing a new state" in the country, to be based on "true federalism." He also stressed that "the government system must be a civil democracy based on fair and free elections at all levels of government."

Hemedti and Al-Burhan - an emoji Hemedti

and Al-Burhan - an emoji in support of the

Sudanese army. Major General

Othman Abdel-Jabbar Othman, head of the intelligence body of the Sudan Liberation Army Movement, announced the Transitional Council, which is led by a member of the Sovereignty Council, Dr. Al-Hadi Idris. He announced in a statement the movement's support for the Sudanese army in its battle against the Sudanese Army forces. Fast support.

With the rebels, Al-Burhan: There is no agreement and no deal

Sudan

With the rebels Sudan Al-Burhan: There is no agreement and no deal

The movement said in its statement that its support for the People's Armed Forces comes as it is one of the official state institutions and performs its national and professional duty.

The movement added that it will continue to support the armed forces until security arrangements are completed in accordance with the Juba Peace Agreement. It will not ask for permission to protect defenseless Sudanese citizens

On their behalf against anyone who violates their dignity, lands, and historical rights.

The fighting between the Rapid Support and the army enters its twentieth week without any party declaring victory. Millions were forced to leave their homes in the capital and other cities, while the United Nations warned While A proportions" with increasing hunger, the collapse of health care, and the destruction Of a "humanitarian catastrophe of enormous of infrastructure, it also warned of violations and accusations of ethnic cleansing in West Darfur state.

Scenarios before Al-Burhan after his exit and breaking the siege wall, ranging from

With them stopping the war, expelling the Islamists, or continuing the alliance. Published: -19:52 August 26, 2023

AD - 08 Safar 1445 AH

The Sudanese are circulating speculations and analyzes that seem contradictory and conflicting, related to the first step that the army commander, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, will take after his departure from the headquarters of his opponent, the commander of the "General Support Forces," and whether he will move to stop the war and sign an agreement with Al-Sari', Lieutenant General Muhammad Hamdan. Dagalo (Hemedti), or exploited the moral victory resulting from the exit to strengthen the position of his forces in order to continue the war until the "rebel militia" was eliminated, a line supported by supporters of the Islamist regime led by former President Omar al-Bashir.

Speculation ranges between optimistic analysts who expect a confrontation between the army leadership and the main advocates of continuing the war represented by the "Muslim Brotherhood" and supporters of the former regime, or entering into a confrontation with them, while other analysts believe that Al-Burhan will take advantage of strengthening his forces' combat from position and continue the war, taking advantage of the opportunity, and will step forward. Towards the "psychological" and moral support provided by his exit from the General Command headquarters, where he was surrounded by "Rapid Support" forces.

What trends and scenarios will the man adopt after more than 4 months spent inside the General Command tunnels in central Khartoum?

Army control

The advisor to the Higher Academy for Strategic and Security Studies, retired Major General Moatasem Abdel Qader Al-Hassan, told Asharq Al-Awsat that Al-Burhan, in addition to his leadership of the armed forces, is the "head of state," which requires him to exercise his duties as president over all Sudanese soil.

An essential duty of a leader. The forces outside the command and direction are inspected, which is a part

Al-Burhan with citizens of Neighborhood 100 in Omdurman (from the Sudanese Army's Facebook site). Major General Al-Hassan

explains that the

man's exit, regardless of how he appears, confirms the control of the armed forces over the land, and that they move in any part of it according to the requirements of the situation, contrary to what The Rapid Support claims that it controls the capital almost completely.

The military expert describes the analyzes that call for paying attention to the Sudanese files before completely eliminating the rebellion and its effects and returning life to normal as "early," and says: "This is what was expressed by

Al-Burhan in his speech on Army Day, mid-August.

The path to civil rule.

However, the distinguished political analyst Al-Jamil Al-Fadil has another angle of view, as he said in his testimony to Asharq Al-Awsat that "Al-Burhan's path after his release from captivity is a one-way road, which is the direction of the bridge of transition to flawless democratic civil rule. The return to civil rule intervened." "The military point, with partnership or under guardianship," and he continues: "This is of course one of the benefits of war despite the heavy costs."

Al-Fadil believes that the "Muslim Brotherhood," which he describes as the party that ignited the fire of war, "must pay the bill for the war, by losing some of their leaders and many of their jihadi cadres."

The trainer who issued a fatwa to the former Vice President, Ali Othman Mohamed Taha, on the need to save their strength for

another unpleasant day."

He continues: "It is likely that the two parties implicated by the Islamists, namely the army and the ADF, will sign and officially end the state of war between them." Al-Sari'i), in a war in which they have no camel and no camel, agreed

He continues: "But I think that the war will not only stop according to this agreement, but rather it will continue for some time outside the cover and umbrella of the regular official military establishment.

It will be led by the Liwa al-Baraa bin Malik jihadist brigades, and those known as the Mustafareen, to fight for various motives, plunging the entire country into an endless civil war."

Al-Fadil warned against the rise of the Islamic organization, which is waging an existential war in every sense of the word.

In the future, by opening a war with international horizons, it will attract global terrorist groups possessed by the lust to change the world. He adds: "I believe that Al-Burhan, who suffered the hardship of underground house arrest imposed on him by the Brotherhood for more than 4 months, during which, as is rumored, they liquidated his bodyguards, and he personally survived two assassination attempts, perhaps he no longer has a reserve of trust."

Enough to build a new rapprochement with them."

An imminent end to the war

In turn, the Arab Socialist Baath Party was concerned with Al-Burhan's departure from the general leadership, and its significant implications for the issues of war and peace. He said in a speech published by his mouthpiece Al-Hadaf newspaper: "The comments centered - mainly - on how or when the man's exit occurred, and whether he represented part of the scenario within which the arrangements were made."

what."

The Baath Party believed that the facts on the ground cannot ignore the outcome of the military operations in which the armed forces were able to extend their victory in large areas of the city of Omdurman, according to

The positive defense strategy, and its steadfastness in the face of repeated attacks from the "Rapid Support" forces on its positions at the headquarters of the Armored Command in Khartoum, the headquarters of the Armed Forces of Engineers and Wadi Sidna in Omdurman, and the decline in the deployment of the "Rapid Support" forces. He continued: "Whatever angles

Look, they meet at the indicator of the imminent end of the war, which is deduced from the statements of Al-Burhan himself. «

Read also

Smoke rises during previous clashes between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces (AP) Britain: The Sudanese army and the Rapid

Support Forces will be held accountable

The party, which left the "Forces of Freedom and Change Declaration" coalition shortly before the signing of the framework agreement, explained that stopping the war has become an urgent popular demand, and that failure to achieve it

It is a failure to assume national responsibility, and a betrayal of the German people and their legitimate aspirations.

He added: "The slowness of the ongoing negotiation process in Jeddah, which appears to be intentional by some

The parties, and perhaps their faltering... is not only due to the lack of desire and seriousness of the two parties to
of the civil and political forces to the war to end hostilities and stop the war, but also due to the inability

Social and professional, by building its anti-war front... and besieging the forces of war and pressuring its parties to
stop them without conditions."

Mass flight from Khartoum as the fighting continues (AFP) The Left Party called

on the political, civil and professional forces to restore what it called "confidence in their capabilities and in the capabilities
of their masses", to fulfill their responsibility and duties towards the homeland threatened by war, and to block attempts
to prolong its reign by weakening and dividing the forces. political, and creating the atmosphere to impose
commandments on them with solutions that do not express the will and aspirations of the people."

Towards a government with the size of the challenges

As for the political analyst close to the army, Al-Taher Satti, he says that the process of Burhan's exit is more than related
to the Islamists, but rather to what he did before he left, by initiating a new phase of state administration and ending the
rebellion. He continued: "The recent armored battles, it seems to me, were intended for a long time, and led to a complete
change in the theater of operations, and imposed a reality."

For national security or military institutions, as in New «. He added: "The militia is no longer a threat
Over the past months, they have turned into mere pockets."

Sati promised that what happened created a new reality that forces Al-Burhan to form a government that meets the
challenges of the stage, and he added: "In my estimation, this is the main reason for Al-Burhan's move from a theater
and I do not call it a departure - to the positions of state administration, whether in Atbara or Port Sudan operations -
Or other safe states of Sudan." He continued: "He is no longer just the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, but
rather he is the President of the Sovereign Council, after over the past months he was only the Commander-in-Chief."

Satti says: "Now, Al-Burhan has become the head of the Sovereignty Council, and I expect that the new capacity that he emerged with or wants to activate will appear in the coming days, in the administration of the state and government, in addition to continuing work in the field."

The first public appearance of "Al-Burhan" a month after the war

The battles continue... and the "Rapid Support" rejects new appointments in the police. Al-Burhan among his soldiers in the General Command of the Army (the Armed Forces page on Facebook) Al-Burhan among his soldiers in the General Command of the Army (the Armed Forces page on Facebook) Khartoum:

Mohamed Al-Amin Yassin Published:

-18:08 May 17, 2023 AD - Shawwal 25, 1444 AH

A short video spread on social media showing the head of the Sovereignty Council of Sudan, Army Commander Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, walking among his soldiers at the main headquarters of the Army Command in the center of Khartoum, carrying a rifle on his shoulder. the capital, Khartoum, wearing military uniform and

Meanwhile, fierce battles continue between the army forces and the Rapid Support Forces in various areas of the Sudanese capital.

In the video, directly behind Al-Burhan, clear features of the "Land Forces" command building appeared, a large portion of which occurred in the first days of the outbreak of war. Which was bombed and burned in parts Mid-April last year.

Al-Burhan among his soldiers at the Army General Command (Armed Forces Facebook page) Specifying the time of filming the video that was broadcast (Wednesday), but it represents the first public appearance of the commander of the Sudanese army since the outbreak of war more than a month ago.

^a
·Of his forces The video, which is less than a minute long, shows Al-Burhan shaking hands with individuals

The commander of the Rapid Support Forces, Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo, known as "Hemedti," was speaking in his meetings and statements until recently about Al-Burhan and other army leaders hiding inside the "basement" of the General ^a
· Arrest them and bring them to trial Command, threatening

Earlier, the Sudanese army announced its full control again over the General Command headquarters To the army and Khartoum International Airport, after the expulsion of the "Support Forces", which had controlled parts of Al-Maqrin during the first weeks of the war.

Al-Burhan among his soldiers in the General Command of the Army (Armed Forces Facebook page) Before that, Al-Burhan appeared on the first day of the war through a short video, inside a building that is likely a "basement" inside the command, and next to him was the military commander Shams al-Din Kabashi and other leaders, watching On a large screen, the progress of military operations in Khartoum is shown.

As for the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, he appeared in public for the first time two weeks ago, in front of the presidential palace in Khartoum.

Al-Burhan among his soldiers in the General Command of the Army (Armed Forces Facebook page). In parallel, clashes continued between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces in a number of neighborhoods north of the city of Bahri, for the second day in a row, and in other separate areas in Khartoum.

According to eyewitnesses in testimonies to Asharq Al-Awsat, military aircraft participated in bombing a number of...

And they agreed

Locations near the "Halfaya" Bridge, linking "Bahri" and the city of Omdurman.

The Rapid Support Forces announced their control of an army camp in the Al-Kadro area, and captured about 700 of its soldiers. They also seized control of the Chief of Staff and the Air Defense Command in the center of the capital, Khartoum.

On Wednesday, citizens reported renewed clashes with heavy weapons in the areas of "Al-Kadro" and "Al-Droshab," north of "Bahri."

It is likely that the Rapid Support Forces are intensifying their attack on these areas, and mobilizing more of their forces deployed in Khartoum, to attack the "Wadi Sayyidna" base north of the city of Omdurman, the largest military area of the army, which includes the military airport.

Yesterday, the army announced that it had monitored the movements of the "Rapid Support" forces inside and outside the capital, indicating that its forces are ready to deal decisively with any operational changes. Khartoum, pointing out

On the other hand, the Rapid Support Forces announced their objection to the decision of the Chairman of the Sovereignty Council, Army Commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, to make changes in the leadership of the police forces to throw them into the ongoing war.

She said in a statement, on Wednesday, that the police forces have remained nationalistic and neutral throughout their history, and they must not follow what they described as "the plans of the army leaders and the remnants of the former regime" and enter into a war to which it is not a party. In which

The Rapid Support Forces warned that its forces would not hesitate to confront any movements and actions by the police or any party that exploits its name and uniforms against its forces.

^{With exemption} The Sudanese army commander, Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, issued a decision last Monday Lieutenant General, the Interior Minister-designate and Director General of the Police Forces, Anan Hamed, resigned from his position, and a replacement was He has Lieutenant General Khaled Hassan Mohieddin, to carry out the duties of the police department. After the outbreak of war ^{appointed} Immediately, police forces numbering in the thousands withdrew from stations, departments, and streets throughout Khartoum.

Earlier, army commanders deployed large police forces from the "Central Reserve" unit to secure residential neighborhoods and streets during confrontations with the "Rapid Support" forces.

Last Thursday, representatives of the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces signed a declaration of principles

At the initiative of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and America, it stipulates that... agreement in the city of Jeddah, according to
Harm to civilians in areas of clashes.

Mediation seeks, with international and regional support, to get the two parties to reach a permanent ceasefire agreement,
which opens the way for political talks to resolve the crisis in the country.

The Sudanese crisis between introductions and scenarios

The current crisis in Sudan was not surprising at all. It was read by Everyone: Sudanese political forces, the international community, most experts and observers, and even its flight to the capital, Khartoum, three days ago. And look Airlines that fly

The preliminaries of this crisis have crystallized in three stages: The first is related to the determinants of the relationship between the parties, which is the constitutional document that was signed in August 2019. The second is related to managing the interactions between the political parties themselves after the failed coup attempt that took place on September 21 last. The third focuses on the crises in eastern Sudan and the repercussions of the failed coup attempt that took place at the end of last September.

During these three stages, there are direct reasons for the confusion in the Sudanese political scene over a period of more than two years after the success of the Sudanese revolution in ending the rule of Omar al-Bashir, and they can be detailed in the following.

The Constitutional Document

Crisis In the wake of the Sudanese Armed Forces' bias towards the Sudanese revolution and the removal of former President Omar al-Bashir from power on April 11, 2019, an initial political agreement was finalized between the Military Council headed by Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the Forces of Freedom and Change, which consisted of Sudanese parties and professional unions that The same applies to the Professionals Association, following the removal of Al-Bashir, where it was agreed to form a joint sovereign council that would possess the powers of the President of the Republic and lead a three-year transitional period after which general elections would be held. However, this council took place during the months of April and May 2019, as a battle insisted on who would lead the body. The military decided to take the helm of command, but the civilians refused to do so and announced the end of negotiations in this regard, May 19, 2019. The Forces of Freedom and Change relied on their support of the masses on their day, and resorted to the streets to resolve the conflict. Indeed, revolutionary processions rushed towards the headquarters of the Army General Command to put pressure on it, in an open sit-in. It was

dispersed on June 3, 2019, causing casualties and cases of rap

The relationship between the parties to the Sudanese political equation: This crisis extended for several months until it was resolved within the framework of a constitutional document signed in August 2019, which gave civilians the right to preside over the sovereign council, but two years after the military component assumed this leadership. It may have been characterized by relationship between the parties. fragility and was not a decisive determinant for regulating the document and the first reason for this fragility is that it was hacked, influenced by two factors:

The first is the pressure of marginal forces and armed movements so that political agreements with them to achieve peace prevail over the constitutional document, as the Juba Peace Agreement signed in October 2020 between the Sudanese government and the armed movements resulted in exceeding the three-year period of the transitional period to extend to four years, and the Sovereign Council was expanded, and the formation of New councils as partners with the center. The result of the transitional period to accommodate the political elites from the reconciliatory fringes directly extending the transitional period for one year is the occurrence of a crisis regarding the item of the date of handing over the presidency according to the first arrangement or June. Presidential Council for the Civil Component: Is it November 2021-2022 due to the extension of the transitional period?

Second, failure to fulfill the requirements of the document, especially with regard to completing the structures of the transitional period From a legislative council, a constitutional court, etc., and therefore the constitutional document is no longer a solid determinant It is resorted to by the parties, as accusations were exchanged between the civilian and military components regarding each party's responsibility for obstructing the crystallization and inauguration of the structures of the transitional period.

An imbalance of power between the parties to the equation
a
A number of political actors 2020 with For the meetings I had in Khartoum in December
According to Al-Sudania, it can be said that the beginnings of the revolution against Al-Bashir in 2018 were crystallized by the direct influence of the revolutions in the Arab region at that time, as professional organizations began arranging their papers to lead an opposition against Al-Bashir whose ultimate goal was to weaken the regime and revolt against it.

In this context, the Sudanese Professionals Association took shape and attempted to remove Al-Bashir in September 2013, when anger broke out against the Sudanese regime with massive demonstrations, but it was able to cordon off these demonstrations with brutal security intervention, with more than 200 people falling victim. And it has

The Professionals Association continued its political struggle, but on the basis of demands related to wages, and these foundations developed in 2019 with the intervention of the National Consensus Forces (one of the opposition alliances against Al-Bashir).

The Professionals Association led the Sudanese revolution within a broad framework that took place on January 1, 2020 and was named the Freedom and Change Alliance. It is the alliance that led the revolution and included all political parties, social movements, and civil society organizations, and its solid nucleus was the Professionals Association. Over the course of two years of the transitional period, the Freedom and Change Alliance and the Professionals Association were exposed to factors of erosion and division, for a number of reasons, including:

The role of the military component in making the Juba Peace Agreement in 2020, and what resulted from that with the armed movements, in a way that prompted both of them to increase their weight, especially in the context of their relations with the Governor of Darfur, Minni Arko Minawi, and the Minister of Finance, Khalil Ibrahim, to side with him in leading the withdrawn from the coalition. Freedom and Change was named a ~~host~~ as they had The transitional phase and the declaration of national consensus, a division that crystallized demonstrations last October 16, and whose supporters staged a sit-in in front of the Republican Palace.

The Communist Party broke away from the Freedom and Change Alliance, against the backdrop of the joint sovereign council formula between the civilian and military components, considering this a strategic mistake based on what he called a blood partnership. This withdrawal contributed to the division of the Professionals Association against the backdrop of internal elections that produced only members of the Communist Party, which was rejected by the rest of the components.

- The tendency of some components of Freedom and Change, including parties with a nationalist character, to support the military component in political interactions, and to contribute to raising its weight vis-à-vis other political parties, which resulted in a stagnation in Freedom and Change, the political incubator of the executive government led by Abdullah Hamdok, in a way that made the latter adopt an initiative seeking For the unity of freedom and change to preserve His political weight in the equation.

The Professionals Association was divided between supporters of the Communist Party and other freedom and change parties, with the first group exerting political pressure on the rest of the components under the umbrella of the state-

The partnership that was approved in the constitutional document between the civilian component and the military component in To disable the administration of the transitional period, which is the partnership that was called the "blood partnership" due to Committees investigating the events of the sit-in at the General Command of the Armed Forces, which was forcibly dispersed on June 3, 2019, resulting in deaths.

The end result of these extended interactions was an imbalance of power in favor of the component Concerning weakening Military, despite many pressures that have been developed internationally 2020 agrees to it his abilities; At the American level, Congress issued a law in December The Democratic and Republican parties commit the US State Department to detailing its policy and procedures in the areas of supporting human rights and transparency, especially at the level The US President is also required to submit a quarterly report on the progress of his administration in this process, as well as the overall support policies and procedures for the transitional period and democratic transformation.

Eastern Sudan crisis

The problem of eastern Sudan has emerged as a direct cause of the extent of distress and pressure caused by the Empowerment Removal Committee to elements of the Bashir regime at the political and economic levels, as well as the desire to weaken the civil component, as Muhammad Al-Amin Turk, head of the Supreme Council of Beja Councils in Eastern Sudan, called for an end to the work of the Empowerment Removal Committee, The formation of a new military council to represent the six regions of Sudan, as well as the change of Hamdok's government, all of this under The umbrella of the demand to cancel the East Route in the Juba Peace Agreement signed between the government and the armed factions in October 2020.

The three demands for the Eastern Sudanese region resulted in confusion in the political scene and the exchange of accusations regarding the parties responsible for its expansion, despite its threat to Sudanese national security, as the Eastern Region controls Sudan's communication with the world from the Red Sea platform, and its closure affects the vital supplies of the state that meets 70% of its needs from abroad, especially from Fuel, food, and medicine, which are supplies that have become scarce in the markets during the past period. The closure of the Eastern Sudan region also affects the economies of the state of South Sudan through the export of almost all oil, the resources of which constitute the bulk of the budget and are exported from the port of Bashayer, which was closed along with all ports in eastern Sudan. In this context, consider the aspect of

The Sudanese political street said that the events in the East were made with the aim of not handing over the presidency of

the transitional authority to the civilian component.

The crisis of the failed coup attempt In the

wake of the failed coup attempt that was announced last September 21, both sides of the Sudanese political equation sought to exploit the event to their advantage, as the civilian component was held responsible for the failed coup as a result of the failure of the government and its political incubator to confront the worsening crises on the economic level. affecting people's daily lives, and preoccupation with sharing positions, while the civil component considered these accusations as a prelude to a realistic coup against them.

The American support for the civilian component in this battle contributed to the crystallization of the Professionals Association's demand to end the partnership with the military component and hand over all authority to the civilian component, a step to which the military

Secretary of State for the security of the Sudanese people. guardian component responded by saying, "The armed forces and the withdrawal of the Joint Security Forces guards from the Empowerment Removal Committee and about 22 sites."

Economically, it was under its jurisdiction. He also stopped meetings with the civil component, and accused some

Its members had "dual loyalties," and the First Deputy Chairman of the Sovereignty Council, Lieutenant General Lt. Gen., said:

"We have a street," including Mohamed Hamdan Daglo, in the Sudanese street, a response that warns of the possibility of confrontations breaking out between the revolutionary forces and affiliates of the Bashir regime, and the National Islamic Front, under the umbrella of Accumulation of weapons in the Sudanese capital and other areas.

In this context, both Jibril Ibrahim, Minister of Finance, and Minni Arko Minawi, Governor of the Darfur region, announced their

demands to change the government and expand the base of political participation, as they staged a sit-in on October 16 from some tribal formations in front of the Republican Palace in With their supporters, especially

in the past, at a time when Prime Minister Dr. Abdullah Hamdok attempts to end the political crisis, by forming a seven-party committee, as the Central Council of the Freedom and Change Alliance responded by rejecting proposed axes for political dialogue, especially with regard to the scope of expanding political participation, which was stipulated that it should not be from the old regime. Yasser Arman said that the expansion may be from the resistance committees. And the Communist Party, in the last press conference for Freedom and Change, where the Central Council relied on its popular bases that had already come out to support the principle of October 21, which carries great symbolism in history. Democratic transformation in large crowds on the day of the Sudanese politician, despite the well-known mistakes of the Sudanese government and its incubator. Political freedom and change.

The end point of the crisis political interactions between the civilian and military components was set by Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, President of the Sovereign Council, in a statement he issued hours ago announcing the dissolution of both the government and the Transitional Council and the imposition of a state of emergency while suspending some articles of the constitutional document, after a massive arrest campaign of members of the Council. The Sovereign Council, the government, and some political party leaders.

In this statement, reassurances were provided at the internal and external levels. On the internal level, he announced the formation of a competent government after a period of what he called "political disagreement," and a commitment to the Juba Peace Document, as well as resolving the crisis in the East and inaugurating the transitional structures of a legislative council. As for the external level, he committed to handing over power in accordance with a constitutional court and others.

For the constitutional document, but in 2023

Overall, it can be said that the extent of the ability to create political stability in Sudan will be tested

In the next stage, in light of two factors: first, the position of the international community in particular

The United States was aware of this development that took place while US President Jeffrey Feltman's envoy was in Khartoum, which will result in the state of regional interaction in terms of whether or not to support the dissolution of the government and the sovereign council.

The second is the internal position, at the public level, on this development and the state of interaction with it, especially in light of the raging economic crisis that the general public is suffering from, and they are looking forward to Ending it, the presence of youth committees in Sudanese neighborhoods, the outbreak of some demonstrations, and the disappearance of the second row of Sudanese party leaders, which may result in expected confrontations that may take on a violent nature.

Al-Burhan: The Sudanese army is fighting mercenaries from all directions

The head of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council directed an end to the accumulation of trucks on the border with Egypt

Within a week

October 2, Arqin crossing in a
Head of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council, Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, inspected in
2023 (Sudan News Agency)

October 2, Arqin crossing in a
Head of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council, Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, inspected in
2023 (Sudan News Agency) Khartoum:

“Asharq Al-Awsat”

Published: -12:41 2 October 2023 AD - 16 Rabi' al-Awwal 1445 AH

The head of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council, Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, said on Monday that the army is fighting the

“Rapid Support Forces.” A statement issued by the Transitional Sovereignty Council stated

that Al-Burhan, who is the Commander-in-Chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces, said during an inspection visit to
the Nineteenth Infantry Division in the northern state that those mercenaries “violated the sanctity of citizens and took lives

Do not rely on for reasons

Logic,” according to what was reported by the Arab World News Agency.

Al-Burhan criticized some politicians in the country, saying, “Some politicians seek power even if it is at the expense of the
country and its people.” He added that people like these “practice lying and deception in support of the rebel militia, but
the army is fighting in the name of Sudan with the strong support of all the people, and there are no organizations, but
loyalty is to the homeland alone.”

Arqin crossing with Egypt in the city of Wadi Halfa, as part of his visit to the state a We were losing the proof, today,
7 days. The statement stated that Al- Empty the backlog of trucks North, and issued a directive
Burhan “studied the problems facing citizens at the crossing, and the efforts made by the competent authorities to
overcome them.”

A crossing, and creating a work environment there to facilitate AI-Burhan called for speedy treatment of the problems

Incoming and outgoing movement, the flow of commercial traffic, and overcoming obstacles, in coordination with all relevant authorities.

Al-Burhan dismisses 4 ministers and governors of 6 states.

The Sudanese military leader, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, stands on the podium during the signing ceremony of the framework agreement between the military rulers and the civilian forces in Khartoum, Sudan, on December 5, 2022 (Reuters)

Sudanese military commander Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan stands on the podium during the signing ceremony of the framework agreement between the military rulers and the civilian forces in Khartoum, Sudan, on December 5, 2022 (Reuters)

Wad Madani Sudan: Ahmed Younis and Muhammad Amin Yassin

Last update: 19:43-22 November 2023 AD - 08 Jumada al-Awwal 1445 AH

Published: -19:32 November 22, 2023 AD - 08 Jumada al-Awwal 1445 AH

The President of the Transitional Sovereignty Council, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, dismissed (Wednesday) 4
6 of the state governors, and also ended his mandate. Ministers, including the Minister of the Interior, appointed new ministers who were
4 to two states controlled by the Rapid Support Forces. dismissed and retained just instead of the But he appointed
Without rulers.

The city of El Daein in East Darfur state witnessed fierce clashes between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces during the past few days. After days of tension between the two sides, the Support Forces announced (Tuesday) control of the
20th Infantry Division of El Daein, affiliated with the army. And

According to a statement by the Sovereignty Council, Al-Burhan dismissed the Minister of Interior, Police Lieutenant General Hassan Mohieldin, and appointed in his place Police Major General M. Khalil Pasha, Sairin Amarqil, and Minister of Justice, Muhammad Saeed Al-Helou, and appointed as his replacement Muawiyah Othman Muhammad Khair, and Minister of Industry Batoul Abbas Awad,
He appointed Mahasin Ali Yaqoub, Minister of Religious Affairs, Abdul Ati Ahmed Abbas, and appointed Osama Hassan Muhammad Ahmed as his replacement.

In the decree regarding the governors of the states, Al-Burhan decided to dismiss the governor of the Jazira state, Ismail Awadallah Al-Aqib, the governor of Kassala state Khojali Hamad Abdullah, the governor of the northern state Al-Baqir Ahmed Ali, the governor of West Kordofan state Mutasim Abdel Salam Awad Abdel Salam, the governor of Central Darfur state Saad Adam Babakir, and the governor of South Darfur state Hamid Muhammad Al-Tijani.

Al-Burhan appointed 4 new governors for the four governorates, namely: Al-Taher Ibrahim Al-Khair Al-Hassan for the governorate of Al-Jazira, Lazy, and Abdeen Awadallah Muhammad for the governorship and Muhammad Musa Abdel-Rahman Yunus for the governorship of Al-Jazeera. To West Kordofan. Al-Burhan did not appoint a governor North, and Essam El-Din Haroun Ahmed Mohamed Walia For two states, South Darfur and Central Darfur, which are controlled by the Rapid Support Forces.

Earlier this month, Al-Burhan dismissed the ministers of energy, oil, trade and supply, transportation, labor, and livestock.

Horrible losses

Meanwhile, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Martin Griffiths, said (Wednesday) that "there is no end in sight to the conflict that has been ongoing in Sudan for more than 7 months."

Griffiths described the losses among civilians in the Darfur region as "horrible," and pointed out that Khartoum still lacks the possibility of humanitarian aid reaching it. He added: "The fighting must end. All parties must respect the commitments they made in

Jeddah Talks.

Recently, a meeting between a delegation from the Forces of Freedom and Change in Sudan and the President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir Mayardit, approved the formation of "a joint committee between the Forces of Freedom and Change and the South Sudan Mediation Committee, for communication, follow-up and coordination."

Egyptian mission

On the other hand, the Rapid Support Forces gave assurances regarding the work of the Egyptian mission charged with water monitoring on the White Nile River, stressing its keen interest in the security and safety of the dam reservoir.

guarantees and facilities for the return of the working technical and engineering teams Jabal Awliya, and providing all and the Egyptian mission to begin their work in water monitoring operations on the White Nile River.

At the beginning of this week, the "Support Forces" took control of the military air base belonging to the Sudanese army, Khartoum). one kilometer away from the Jabal Awliya area (44 km from the capital, Violent confrontations with the Sudanese army continued for several days, and thus it imposed its control over the reservoir.

The two parties to the fighting in Sudan (the army and the "Rapid Support") exchanged accusations of destroying part of the dam for any serious damage. The dam for the passage of river salt, without any body being exposed

She said in a statement that ensuring the safety of the Jabal Awlia Reservoir and allowing the entry of technical engineers with are among her priorities and commitments to all regional and international agreements signed. in Egypt.

from water, and to ensure the safety of She added: "We firmly believe in the necessity of coordination with Egypt to benefit reservoirs in locations under our control for the benefit of our people's water resources." She affirmed her respect for "the fraternal and historical relations and common interests that bind Sudan to the peoples of the region, especially neighboring countries and Egypt, in supporting the Sudanese people in these difficult circumstances they are facing."